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ABSTRACT 
The thesis is motivated by some important recent developments 
in macroeconomic theory and the theory of macroeconomic policy. A 
common theme emphasized throughout is the integration of rational 
expectations into macroeconomic policy evaluation and the sophism 
of conducting evaluations predicated on alternative expectations 
hypotheses. 
The application of rational expectations to optimal control 
theory inspires a game-theoretic paragigm for the derivation of 
optimal economic policies. This transform fundamentally the way 
in which economists should address the control problem. The recent 
proliferation of research in the area is subject to the first 
systematic investigation. The necessity for assimilating model 
uncertainty into the problem of policy evaluation is emphasized. 
This is made operational with respect to a particulaxly topical 
issue concerning the optimal choice of monetary instrument. 
A substantial part of the thesis is devoted to a rigorous 
exploration of the information structure conditioning expectations. 
Particular emphasis is on partial ignorance. An intelligent system 
can exploit statistical filtering techniques to extract the informa- 
tion content of certain economic variables. The thesis illustrates 
vividly the potentially critical dependence of the laws of motion of 
the system on the information structure. it calls for a detailed 
explication of that structure a3 a pre-requisite for any analysis and 
highlights properties of certain earlier treatments which are 
symptomatic of their neglect of this. 
Analytical work is combined with computer simulations of a 
larger econometric model. Higher order dynamics are the realised 
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consequences of asset accumulati6n and the government budget 
constraint. The issue of bond-financed deficit instability is 
subject to extensive testing and the implications of divergent 
e: cpectations mechanisms elicited. 
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INTRODUCTION ý 
The thesis is motivated by some, interesting and important recent- 
developments in macroeconomic theory and the theory of macroeconomic 
policy. For the most part, these developments'have emerged as a 
realised consequence of the assimilation of the rational expectations 
hypothesis in macroeconomic policy evaluation. The thesis does notý 
dispute the hypothesis, though some-cautionary-remarks will be, 
elicited. Rational expectations is applied rigorously throughout on 
the grounds that it is a sophism to consider any alternative which 
eschews the implications of an intelligent economic system. -, As yet, 
rational expectations is the only hypothesis which embraces, this in 
any formally definitive way. For a clear, critical and comprehensive 
appraisal of rational'expectations, the reader is'urged to consult 
the excellent studies by Begg (1982a), -Kinford, and Peel (1983b) and 
Sheffrin (1983) (for further useful discussion and some doctrinal- 
historic perspectives see, for example, -Kantor (1979); Buiter 
(1980b); Laidler (1981b); Meade (1981); Tobin (1981); Hahn, (1982); - 
Haddock and Carter (1982); Hoover (1984)). -1 
For much of the thesis, 'small stylised models are constructed ý 
which permit analytical tractability. ", This is, of course, to incur 
criticism from those who regard suchidevices with-scepticism: they 
have little or no relevance either in the understanding of the laws 
of motion of the system nor in practical policy making. These 
criticisms are vacuous here. Though thesimple models which decorate 
the following pages are clearly, unsuitable for practical policy 
making, it is stressed at the outset that it is not the intention 
that they should be considered as anything otherwise. The use of 
small analytical models serves efficiently the purpose of demon- 
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strating succinctly issues which are entirely general, which may be 
obscured in much larger models and which are unlikely to be qualified 
in the latter. In this way, small models may yield insights into the 
operation of more complicated structures. 
The thesis emphasizes the need and makes operational a particular 
methodology in macroeconomic policy evaluation. A policy is only 
optimal given the preferences of the controller and the system under 
control. it is unlikely to remain optimal in an alternative struc- 
ture with different laws of motion and a different performance 
criteria. The testing of optimal policies across divergent systems 
is taken as a condttto stne qua non of sensible policy evaluation. 
A payoff matrix can be constructed which conveys important infor- 
mation about control rules that perform reasonably well irrespective 
of the particular dynamic system. Such policies may be termed modet- 
robust rules and they derive their attractiveness from the eclectic 
methodology. 
A significant and important ingredient in the thesis is the 
potentially crucial role of the information structure in determining 
the behaviour of the system. A desirable feature of the rational 
expectations hypothesis is that it-draws attention to the information 
content of economic variables. The implications-of this are far- 
reaching. Control rules now have scope to influence the system in 
two ways: the standard mechanism whereby control alters the dynamic 
response of the system; and an additional route by which control 
alters the information content of variables. Moreover, the actual 
implementation of controls is endowed with an additional complicated 
dimension since the controller might wish to avoid feedback on 
unobservable variables. 
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A sunmaxy of the thesis is outlined below. It is essentially 
comprised of two main parts. Part I contains chapters 1-4. 
Part 11 is primarily concerned with the informational assumptions 
in rational expectations models and comprises chapters 5-6. ' 
Chapter 1 considers some recent developments in the application 
of optimal control theory to the derivation of optimal economic 
policies under rational expectations. Recent years have witnessed 
a proliferation of research in this area. The conclusions seem to be 
of fundamental importance and alter-drastically the problem of policy 
evaluation. Yet some of these have been obscured by the pace at 
which the research has developed. The chapter attempts a compre- 
hensive and detailed appraisal of the issues involved with the view, ' 
to making these accessible to a wider audience than has hitherto been 
the case. The chapter forms a recent discussion paper by-theauthor. 
Chapter 2 is byway of'a prelude to chapter 3. Both are 
concerne Id with making operational the aforementioned methodology 
regarding, the search for model-robust control rules. The particular 
context is the issue of the optimal monetary instrument. In chapter 
2, a brief critical review of the existing literature'is given. ' It 
concludes that the resulting payoff matrix has negligible information 
value. An analytical framework which corrects for this is discussed 
informally. The main'innovation in the chapter is a proposed resolu- 
tion of'the'pioblem of indeterminacy under interest rate control. 
This is borrowed frOM son-- recent work in collaboration with the 
author's supervisor and can be found in a discussion paper. 
Chapter 3 formalizes the taxonomy discussed in chapter 2. A 
systematic investigation into the instrument-control problem is 
performed. This yields a payoff matrix which conveys useful informa- 
tion about the possibility of model-robust policies. The chapter is 
a much extended version of a recent discussion paper by the author. 
is 
Chapter 4 adopts computational techniques for examining a larger 
econometric model. Asset accumulation and the government budget 
constraint are important components. The issue of bond-financed 
deficit instability is addressed and simulations of various exogenous 
shocks are performed. A comparison of divergent expectations mechan- 
isms is the basic motivation. The chapter is based on a research 
paper forthcoming in the Economic Journal and written in collaboration 
with others whose identities are given in the acknowledgements. 
Chapter 5 discusses the signal-extraction problem. A critical 
review of some recent literature is given. The novel, element in the 
chapter is the formal clarification of the information contents of 
asset prices. This follows closely a recent discussion paper by the 
author, to be pulblishecl in the 14anclhester School. 
Chapter 6 contains a re evaluation of the monetary instrument 
problem in the context of an information variable framework. The 
relative superiority of alternative control rules is shown to be 
non-invariant with respect to the information structure. This may 
qualify the favourability of certain policies derived from orthodox 
analysis. As before, the analysis can be found in a recent discus- 
sion paper. 
Chapter 7 summa izes the preceding chapters. it suggests areas 
where we believe important research to lie in the future and records 
our final thoughts. 
The thesis has a fairly high technical content, exploiting some 
relatively new techniques which might be unfamiliar to the reader. 
in view of this, the main text of the thesis is supple nted by a 
series of mathematical appendices. rn each, the general technique 
is described and is followed by its application to the particular 
problems in the main text. 
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AppendiX A summarizes the solution of the dynamic optimal control 
problem using the maximum principle and Hamiltonian dynamics. 
Appendix B reviews the saddlepoint solution for rational 
expectations models. 
Appendix C contains the undetermined coefficients technique 
for solving rational expectations models. 
Appendix D gives a procedure for examining dynamic stability by 
computation of the test functions of the characteristic equation 
of the system. 
Appendix E demonstrates the derivation oýf'the asymptotic 
variance-covariance matrix of the staýeývector in a'system of 
linear stochastic differential equations. 
A bibliography is given at the end of the thesis. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
MACROECONOMIC POLICY EVALUATION AND OPTIMAL CONTROL THEORY 
A C3ZITICAL REV'IEW OF S014E RECENT DEVELOPMENTS * 
1.1 Introduction 
Recent years have witnessed an exciting and rapidly growing- 
research programme on macroeconomic policy evaluation when private 
sector behaviour is forward-looking. The-issues raised appear far- 
reaching and alter fundamentally the nature of, the policy problem, 
focussing on such issues as credibility and reputation as important 
and endemic aspects of economic, policy design. Above'all, 'the, major 
insight is the appreciation of the policy problem as a dynamic game 
between intelligent players - the government and the private sector - 
and the implications thereof. This chapter offers the first critical 
appraisal of this research with the view to putting, matters into 
perspective and making the area accessible to a wider, audience. 
For the most part, the recent literature adopts an optimal-con- 
trol framework for the purpose of deriving optimal economic policies. 
There is no reason-to believe, however, - why, the issues raised should 
not apply generally to the problem of-implementing economic policies. 
If nothing else, -the optimal control framework, is a useful expos- 
itional device and is probably much more than-this, being a valuable 
contribution to'the economist's armoury. Briefly, optimal control 
theory is a branch of applied mathematics designed to compute an 
optimal strategy for, directing a system to a desired-state (useful 
introductions to optimal control theory include Aastroem (1970); 
Chow (1975);, Intrilligator (1971); Meditch (1969); see also appendix 
A for further references).,, The deployment of this technique to 
econoinic problems was a consequence-of--the realisation of the apparent 
similarity between economic and physical systems. Both could be 
21 
summaxized by an appropriate mathematical framework specifying the 
endogenous (state) and exogenous. (forcing) variables, the control 
variables (instru nts), the stochastic properties of the system, and 
the way in which the variables are related via a set of static and 
dynamic simultaneous equations. The derivation of an optimal control 
rule then proceeds by specifying a performance criteria and optimizing 
this subject to the structure of the system as completely described 
above. The attractiveness of this approach for economists was 
confirmed in the late 1970s when the growing interest was reflected in 
the content of the 1976-1977 volumes of the Annals of Economic and 
social measurement; in the symposium in the 1976 edition of the 
American Economic Review; in the establishment of PREM (Programme of 
Research into Econometric Methods) in the UK; and ultimately in the 
official committee report on policy optimization, (see also. Phillips 
(1954,1957); Johansen (1979); Pau (1979); Schupp (1979)). 
About this time, however, the findings of a new breed of 
economists were becoming a popular focus of attention. Drawing from 
the seminal contribution by Muth (1961), a number of authors concen- 
trated their efforts on investigating the implications, of,. the 
rational expectations hypothesis for macroeconomic policy evaluation. 
To begin with, the series of theoretical papers by Lucas (1972, 
1975), Sargent (1973), Sargent and Wallace (1975,1976) and Barro 
(1976) purported to demonstrate the superfluousness of macroeconomic 
policy in models embodying rational expectations - specifically the 
ineffectiveness of systematic stabilization-policy in influencing the 
distribution of re; al variables - which, in terms of output at least 
therefore, meant the fallacy of applying optimal control techniques. 
Needless to say, a vast, and by now well-known, literature emerged 
with the view to prove and counter-prove the opposite and it was soon 
realised the importance of distinguishing between the rational 
22 
expectations assumption and the system in which this is embedded. By 
suitable re-specification of the model structure, the efficacy of 
control is entirely consistent with rational expectations and the 
policy ineffectiveness result merely a special case. A more detailed 
discussion of these issues is contained in chapter 2 (section 
2.3)(-1). 
Though the prevailing orthodoxy survived the ineffectiveness, 
proposition, rational expectations theorists were preparing to launch 
a much more funda ntal and general attack which struck at the roots 
of conventional policy evaluation. Thus, Lucas (1976) delivered a 
devastating criticism of existing approaches which ignored the- , 
effects of different policy regimes on the estimated coefficients of 
an econometric model arising thorugh private sector expectations. 
The critique is well-known and provides one of the most compelling 
reasons for adopting the rational expectations assumption-in policy 
formulation( 2 ). 
Kydland and Prescott (1977) purported to strike a final blow to 
the established convention by highlighting an important dilemma in 
applying methods of the physical-sciences, to social phenomena- 
in particular, the application of standard optimal control techniques 
to the-derivation of optimal economic policies when the-economic 
system is characterised by forward-looking behaviour. Under'such 
circumstances, the controller is playing a game against an intelligent 
private sector which behaviour is conditioned by its perceptions about 
the nature of the control to be applied. There is now a dilemma in 
implementing an optimal policy: an announcement by the controller 
stating his planned optimal strategy may lack credibility because he 
has an incentive to renege on the announcement subsequently. The 
optimal ex ante policy loses its optimality property, because it is 
not believed and the controller is forced to pursue an inferior- 
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policy. The ex post suboptimality of the ex ants optimal policy is 
known as the ttme tnconststency of this policy. it is this: and its 
resolution which has inspired the recent surge of literature on 
ma ro-economic policy evaluation and optimal control theory which the 
current chapter is concerned to assess. Essentially,, the policy 
problem in the absence of a credible optimal policy involves the 
search for control rules which, though sub-optimal with respect to 
the non-credible policy, are optimal within the subset of, credible 
(time consistent) policies. Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Prescott 
(1977) regarded the time inconsistency property as the downfall of 
optimal control theory in economics. We believe this to be overly- 
pessimistic: though the nature of the control problem becomes funda- 
mentally more complicated, this does not preclude its usefulness. 
A virtue of the recent literature is that, for the most part, the 
conclusions reached do not seem to be limited by model specificity 
and, to this-extent, it offers potentially very important contribu- 
tions to, the theory of economic policy. An unfortunate outcome, -'how- 
ever, is that some of'these contributions have been obscured,, partly 
by the pace at which the research has developed,, - partly by the lack 
of a unified terminology and partly by the high degree of technical 
sophistication. As yet, its precise importance, relevance and 
operational significance for practical policy making is unclear and 
there has been no attempt to, put, matters into perspective which is 
probably the-reason why they remain principally the domain of a 
group of academics with little interest shown by others (a reflec- 
tive discussion of some ofýthe issues can be found in Currie (1985a, 
b)). We hope to make the issues accessible to a wider audience by 
offering what is hopefully an exhaustive account of the problems 
involved and, by complementing mathemtical rigour with economic 
intuition. In doing these, it has been our intention to contain the 
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formal solutions and proofs in a separate section and to concentrate 
the remaining sections on more informal discussion. This should allow 
those unfamiliar with the technical apparatus to grasp the main 
issues involved without having to understand the formal derivation of 
results, as well as providing a fairly rigorous mathematical fra - 
work for the more specialist researchers. 
The chapter is structuredas follows. Section 1.2 discusses the 
notions of time consistency and time inconsistency. It contains the 
standard control problem and then introduces a two person dynamic 
game. Time inconsistency is seen to arise in standard ga theory 
(which does not formally model rational expectations) where there is 
a dominant player, though we point out the implicit assumption of 
intelligent forward-looking behaviour and turn to a system which 
models rational expectations at the outset(3). section 1.3 surveys 
the various proposed resolutions of time inconsistency along with 
addressing some other issues which have emerged in the literature. 
Equilibrium concepts are introduced and the notions of threat and 
reputation effects emphasized. This section concludes with an 
examination of some of the more substantive issues which are rarely 
addressed in the literature. For the more specialist and interested 
reader, section 1.4 provides a fairly comprehensive mathematical 
treatment of much of the issues discussed in the previous sections. 
Finally, section 1.5 contains some concluding remarks and suggestions 
about where we believe the import-ant research lies. 
1.2 Optimal Control and Dynamic Games : Time Consistency and 
Time rnconsistency 
- The discussion in section 1.1 indicated the funda ntal dif- 
ference between the control of physical systems and the control of 
social systems. Unlike the former, the latter has the intrinsic 
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feature that the system under control is int6lligent'and will attempt 
to anticipate the control which is to be applied. It'is this inherent 
circularity that distinguishes the rational expectations approach to 
policy evaluation from the orthodox approach - a'distinction between 
causa& and non-causaD systems(4). The correct way of addressing the 
policy problem then requires an appreciation of the strategic beha- 
viour of economic groups. In the presence of forward-looking beha- 
viour, it is not so much the dertuatton of optimal control rules which 
is of most interest to begin with, but-rather their tmpLementatton. 
To be sure, the existence of an optimal, policy is not at question. 
What is at stake is the operational significance of this, policy, 
which may be zero because the policy lacks credibility. Then'tbe 
derivation of'alternative policies which are credible becomes' 
important. 
This section'marks the beginning of'an extensive discussion of 
some recent developments in the theory of optimal control under 
rational expectations. As a starting point, we find it useful to 
make the following remaxks. 
An important distinction in the optimal control literature is 
between open Loop and cLosed Loop control. In the former, the 
current and future values of control instruments are specified at the 
beginning of the planning horizon and are invariant with respect to 
any new information that becomes available during the course of this 
period. These are state tndependent (or non-contingent) rules. By 
contrast, the latter type of control makes the control instruments a 
function of new information previously unavailable at the beginning 
of the planning period. These are state dependent (or contingent) 
rules. In deterministic systems the distinction is innocuoust the 
optimal open loop policy is identical to the optimal closed loop 
policy in terms of yielding an equal value for the performance 
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measure. Closed loop control is generally regarded to be superior in 
stochastic systems because it permits a response to unforeseen 
contingencies(5). 
Now, a possible source of confusion arises when the control prob- 
lem takes on the features of a ga , for the strategic behaviour of 
players can also be defined in terms of open loop and closed loop 
concepts (this, will be clarified later). It is sufficient, to note 
here the potential confusion which arises when the solution of an 
open loop ga can be expressed in terms of a closed loop control- 
rule. To avoid such confusion, we propose at the outset to retain 
open loop and closed loop concepts to characterize part of-the 
strategic structure of the game and to define the eventual control 
rules which result therefrom in tex of either state independent 
(non-contingent) or state dependent (contingent) rules. Then each 
of these rules can be expressed formally as, respectively, 
YM fin(to)] (1.2.1) 
emml 
where w- vector of control variables 
and rl is the information set with t0 being the beginning of the 
planning horizon. 
In what follows, deterministic systems occupy most of the 
discussion, serving as a convenient abstraction in most instances. 
These may, hc-. -ver, eschew potentially very important issues which 
a. rise in a stochastic environment and which may qualify certain of 
the results derived from the deterministic case. Accordingly, we 
also consider the stochastic control problem. in terms of the 
mathematical framework in section 1.4, the issues are formalised 
within a lirwmx quadratic continuous time framework which is the 
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usual approach in the literature. The solution of the control 
problem then exploits the maximum (or minimum) principle developed 
by Pontryagin et al. (1962) and Summarized in appendix A. 
1.2(A) Time Consistency and the Principle of Optimality 
The early view that optimal control constituted a valuable tool 
for economic policy evaluation was justified by the apparent simil- 
arity between physical and economic systems. Standard dynamic 
programming techniques were available from the engineering sciences 
which enabled computation of optimal economic policies. To be more 
precise, the standard optimal control problem is as follows. 
Consider a general linear economic system with laws of motion that 
can be expressed in terms of the differential equation system 
I- Ay + Dw 
where y- rLxl vector of predetermined state variables 
w- mxl vector of control variables. 
All variables are measured as deviations from long-run 
equilibrium and we write X- y(t) and w- ! f(t) for notational 
convenience. Hence, j(t) is the time derivative of y(t). A and 
B are time-invariant matrices with orders nxn and nxm respectively. 
Next, assume that the controller possesses a performance measure, 
J, which is a positive semi-definite quadratic in the state and 
control: 
i> im 42 
t1 
e-pt(y,. 
Týe + WTRW)dt 
1 
to 
where p is a discount factor, Q is a symmetric positive semi-definite 
time-invariant matrix of order nxn and R is a symmetric positive 
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definite time-invariant matrix of order mxm. The planning hor2. zon 
I 
is (to, tl) with initial time, to, given and terminal time being tl. 
Thus, 
_the 
controller wishes to minimise deviations of the state and 
control. variables from their long-run equilibrium levels(6). 
The optimal control problem is to choose a control sequencep 
13f(t ),..., w(t )) - (w(t)) 
I 
which minimizes equation (1.2.4) 01t0 
subject to equation (1.2.3) and the n initial conditions, 
X(t )-x Section 2.4(A) solves this problem formally where it is 
shown that the optimal control rule can be expressed either as. a 
linear time-invariant feedback rule on the state vector, X(t), or as 
a linear time-varying rule on the initial state,. y(t 0)- YO 
(that is, 
a trajectory; equation (1.4.8)). It should also be noted that the 
control parameters derived using the maximum principle are merely 
the solutions to the steady state matrix Ricatti equation obtained 
from more conventional methods (Proposition 2.4.1). The, fundamental 
property of both types of, control rule (contingent and non-contingent) 
is that they satisfy the principle of optimality (Proposition 1.4.2): 
the optimal policy computed at time tis, i>0, is merely the 
continuation of the original optimal plan, computed at timeýto, which 
is to say that the optimal policy is ttme, constatent. Thus, if we 
denote by H(tit the optimal policy computed at time ti then time 
consistency implies w(tIt i) 3f(t 
I to )(i > 0). "This 
result I 
is 
obtained in standard dynamic programming solutions which involve 
recursive backward substitutions, J(t I 
). is minimized with respect 
to ! t(t taking as given all previous decisions and states; hence- 
forth, J(t (0 1) are ittinimi ed taking as given all previous 
decisions and states as before and, in addition, subject to the 
constraint, that J(t i )ý(j <i< 1) are minimized in an analogous way 
(a sketch of this is given in section 1.4(A), equations (1.4.13) - 
(1.4.14)). 
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what is important to note at this stage is that the time consis- 
tency property arises in the single controller problem inevitably and 
in standard dynamic programming solutions by construction. Actions 
at any time are based on the knowledge that subsequent actions are 
optimal and consistent with the initial action. Even though bygones 
are bygones, there is no incentive to change plans because the 
planned behaviour in subsequent periods is already optimal. 'Further 
discussion is contained below. A dilemma arises, however, when the' 
control problem takes on the features of a dynamic ga for under 
such circumstances there may well exist an incentive to depart from 
the initial planned strategy. It is to this which we now turn. 
1.2(B) Tima Inconsistency and Game Theory 
The possibility of there existing an incentive to renege on 
announced plans yields the time inconsistency problem. More 
formally, an optimal policy computed at time t0 is time inconsistent 
if the optimal policy obtained by re-optimizing at time ti* i> or 
is not the continuation of the original plan formulated at t0. Hence, 
time inconsistency implies It(tit i) ;d E(tit 0) 
(i ,# 0). This leads to 
problems of credibility as the controller's commitment to an announced 
policy is undermined. 
The recent surge of interest in this and related issues has 
arisen from the realised consequences of incorporating rational 
expectations into economic models. As mentioned previously, however, 
explicit treatment of a rational expectations framework is by no 
means a necessary nor sufficient condition for time inconsistency to 
prevail. Time'inconsistency is a possibility in any game-theoretic 
framework where' the ga is between intelligent players and rational 
expectations is merely one way of modelling the ga in which case 
the system is non-causal. There are other, more established methods, 
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too and the systems for these are entirely causal (see, for example, ' 
Simaan and Cruz (1973); Cruz (1975); JKydland (1975,1977); Holly 
(1983); Miller and Salmon (1983,1984b); Turner (1983); Cohen and 
Michel (1984)). In spite of this, however, rational expectations is 
not entirely innocuous for the time inconsistency issue. rn fact, 
though time inconsistency can arise in systems which, do not formally 
incorporate rational expectations'into the'structure of the model, 
sophisticated forward-looking behaviour is implicit-. We clarify this 
below. 
consider, then, a two person game over the horizon (t, 0t1 )'and 
let us distinguish each player by the subscripts I and 2(7). Each 
player chooses a trajectory for his own controls (a strategy) 
I (k - 1.2)'and the payoff to each player will generally be a (F-k(t))t 
0 
function of his own controls and the controls of his rival: 
t 
J31- m Jk( (MI(t))tl I (M2(t))ttl) (k 1,2) (1.2.5) 
00 
The strategy of each player determines his control vector at any time. 
A general fammulation of these strategies is 
wMw (Y-M) "k `-k 
which encompasses both open Loop and cLosed Loop strategies for the 
dynamic qa . An open loop ga is defined in terms of, moves which are 
essentially constant strategies, wk (X(t)) (k - 1,2) say. Then 
player I makes forecasts of player 2's current and future actions, 
t1- 
(w 
t 
1, (w2(y-(t)))t 
0, 
and formulates his best response, ;;., (X(t)))t 
0 
and 
utce versa. Clearly, such strategies are independent of the state at 
all times. By contrast, a closed loop game is defined in terms of' 
rulas for each player which, at any time, are functions of the state 
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at that time m., - wk (. Y: (t)) (k - 1,2). Analogously to before, player 
.1 forecasts player 2's actions, 
(w (X(t))) 1, and formulates his best 
t2t0 
response, (w I 
(. Y(t)))t and utce-versa. 
The simplest way of incorporating game theory into optimal con- 
trol problems is to invoke the Nash assumption. By this, each player 
takes the strategy of the other as given. This may be refined 
further according to whether the strategies axe open loop or closed 
loop. An open loop Nash game involves each player taking as given 
the policy paths of his rival whilst in a closed loop Nash game each 
player treats as parametric his rival's control rule. The important 
difference between these types of strategies is that, in the latter, 
each player announces a rule describing how he will respond to any 
new information that may accrue during the course of the game. Thus, 
in computing their response, each player recognizes that this will 
influence the response of his rival because each player's actions 
influence the state and the state determines the control via the. 
closed loop assumption. 
In the types of ga s that interest us - ga s between the private 
sector and the government - the symmetry in the Nash assumption may 
be implausible. Specifically, the private sector can be considered 
as comprising many atomistic agents and, in this respect, the private 
sector may be regarded as passive uts & vts the government. The 
latter, however, assi s the role of a dominant player, recognizing 
the influence of its own actions on private sector behaviour. This 
type of strategic environment is encapsulated in the StackeLberg 
assumption(8). In a Stackelberg ga therefore, not all participants 
take the strategies of others as given but rather some players 
recognize that the strategies of their rivals are non-variant with 
respect to their own behaviour; hence the distinction between leaders 
and followers and the asymmetry which is absent in the Nash ga . in 
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our two person ga suppose that player 1 is the dominant player 
and player 2 is the follower. Then player 1 acts first, announcing 
his strategy in the knowledge that player 2 will condition his behav- 
iour on this announcement. As before, the game can be refinedfurther 
by assuming either open loop behaviour (player 2 takes as given the 
policy path of player I who takes into account the effect of this on 
player 2's actions) or closed loop behaviour (player 2 treats as para- 
metric the decision rule of player I who takes into account the effect 
of this on player 2's decision rule). 
Having introduced some relevant ganke-theoretic concepts, let us 
now examine how they relate to the optimal control problem and the 
issue of time inconsistency. Following Miller and Salmn (1983, 
1984b), we consider a two person non zero-sum differential ga over 
the horizon (t 0 It 1) 
(a useful introduction to some of the issues can 
be found in Turner (1983) for static games). Strategic behaviour can 
be introduced into the system in equations (1.2.3) - (1.2.4) straight- 
forwardly by distinguishing between the instruments under the control 
of each player: 
2 
Ay + F. B3 (2.6) 
kI 
t, 
-pt(X,. TQX +2T e 1: 1ý11")dt (k-1,2 (2.7) 
t0 h-1 
whexe yk - wkxl vector of control Variables (k-1,2) 
and tha ord-sra of Bk and R,,, are nxN and mhxmh respectively 
(k, b - 1,2)(9). Section 1.4(B) solves the control problem for open 
(10) loop Nash and Stackelberg games 
In the Nash game, as for the single controller problem, the 
optimal control rule can be expressed in either state dependent form 
(with time-invariant coefficients) or as a control path 
(11) (equation 
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But the similarity between the Nash and single controller 
solutions does not stop here: more importantly, the optimal policy 
in the Nash ga remains time consistent (Proposition 1.4.3); 
NN 
x (tit 3t'(tjtO) (i > o). rn these respects, therefore, a game 
approach to optimal economic policy formulation does nothing to 
qualify the standard approach. The principle of optimality applies 
to both. 
Matters are funda ntally different for the Stackelberg game, 
however. First, the control rule cannot be expressed as a linear 
time-invariant state dependent rule. Tf one is seeking to implement 
a rule in terms of the state vector, then this must be in the form of 
either a linear ttme varytng contingent rule (equation (1.4.31) or a 
(12) form of tntegraL controL (equation (1.4.32)) . More significant 
is that the optimal policy in the Stackelberg game is no longer time 
consistent (Proposition 2.4.4), 
S 
(tit it 
S (tlto)(i ), 0), and does 
not, therefore, satisfy the principle of optimality. 
Thus, we have seen that a game against nature yields an optimal 
t 
policy, (y(tlto))t # which is dynamically consistent and though this 
continues to be true for a Nash game, (It 
N (tit )) I, it is not true 
St10t0 for a Stackelberg game, (w (tit O)It 
0. 
Let us now be more specific 
about the source of time inconsistency. The reason for the differ- 
ences in the properties of the above solutions is to be found in the 
strategic structure of each type of game. In a dominant player game, 
the leader announces his strategy first, (t! (tjt )) 
I, the follower 10t0 
takes this as given and the leader appreciates his influence on the 
follower - in particular, the leader knows he is able to influence 
the follower currently by announcing what he plans to do in the 
future. He does just that and the announced plan, (E (tIt )) 
2, is 10t0 
optimal. Yet after the influence on the follower has been realised, 
bygones are bygones and the dominant player can profit by departing 
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from the initial plan. This means that there is necessarily a 
St distinction between the ex ants optimal policy (! t I (tito))t , and the 
ex post optimal policy, (It 
S (tItJ)j I (i > 0): ex ante the optimal 1 to 
policy is the announced plan; ax post the optimal policy is to depart 
from this. The net result is a ttme tnconsi-stent optma& poLtcy invol- 
ving the combination of announcement and reneging. We reflect further 
on this below. 
In contrast to the above, a Nash ga precludes time inconsist- 
ency because it destroys the asymmetry inherent in the Stackleberg 
ga ; though players still take account of the future strategy of 
their rival, neither exploits this, both of whom believe they have no 
influence on their rival. As Simaan and Cruz (1973) and Cruz (1975) 
point out, the Nash assumption safeguards each player against 
attempts by others to seek further gains which arise due to the 
ability to dupe others into believing a particular strategy. The 
fact that there exists no profitable opportunities from departing 
from an original plan makes the distinction between ex ants and 
ex post optimal policies redundant and the problem effectively 
reverts back to a game against nature. 
rt is seen, therefore, that time inconsistency is an established 
property in standard ga theory where one player is dominant. As 
we have already mentioned, however, the apparent abstraction of 
rational expectations is misleading. Fischer (1980) has recently 
stressed, and the foregoing discussion (together with the proof in 
section 1.4(B)) should have made clear that time inconsistency 
hinges on intelligent forward-looking behaviour - specifically, the 
ability of future expectations to influence current decisions. Thus, 
rational expectations (or some forward-looking behaviour at a minimum) 
plays the crucial role, making the original causal system bec 
non-causal. 
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it is important at this juncture to clarify further the notion, of 
time inconsistency as this has been subject to different interpreta- 
tions in the literature and may have led to some confusion. A non- 
trivial distinction to be made is between an opttma& poLtclj which ts 
ttme tnconststent and the tfme tnconsistent opttmaL poLtcy. The 
St former refers to the ex ante policy, (t! 1(tito))t which, in the 
Stackleberg game, is time inconsistent. The latter is the actually 
realised optimal policy which recognizes the time inconsistency of 
tI 
the ex ante plan. it comprises the announcement, (it (tit 0))t 0 
coupled with the subsequent departure therefrom and is therefore the 
full optimal policy. The corollary of this is that the ttme i-ncon- 
ststent opttmaL poLtcy ts an opttmaL poLtcy whtch ts ttme conststent 
it is the plan, (It (tit 
S )# . ...... F xl(tits) . ....... ES (tit )) 
tI 
10111 to" 
from which there is no incentive to depart since it is the truly 
optimal strategy and therefore satisfies the principle of optimality, 
What does not satisfy this principle is the ex ante optimal policy, 
S t, QfI(tItO)) to , which is not optimal ex post. This may suggest no 
conflict between optimality and consistency and, to the extent that 
the time inconsistent optimal policy can actually be implemented, 
this is true (in fact, it is the source of the perfect cheattng solu- 
tion discussed in section 1.3(A)). 
There is, however, a funda ntal problem in implementing both the 
ex ante policy and the full optimal policy. in short, the equilibrium 
is unlikely to be sustainable. Since the full optimal policy involves 
announcing the ex ante policy and subsequently reneging, it requires 
the announced policy to carry credibility. But intelligent agents 
surely foresee the incentive for the controller to renege on the 
announced policy which therfore lacks credibility. This is important 
because, in anticipation of the change in policy, private sector 
behaviour will be different from that upon which the full optimal 
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and ex ants policies are predicated. It is precisely this incentive 
to renege and agents, perception thereof which render both the full 
optimal and ex ante-policies weak candidates as-viable strategies. 
Horeover, lack of credibility may well manifest-in greater uncertainty 
and an outcome inferior to that which would occur if, the controller 
does not succumb to the temptation to cheat (that-is, -continues with 
ex ante policy). 
Now, an immediate response to the above is identified by Holly 
(1983)t since the time inconsistent (full) optimal policy is the 
truly optimal policy, why does the controller not simply announce 
this policy in the first place? The answer is that such an announce- 
ment deprives this policy of its optimality property. As we have 
already noted, the optimal policy in period t0 is, in fact, - 
StIS Of, (tit 
0))t 
0, 
so that the 
t 
time inconsistent plan, (y, (tit 0), 
S (tit S (tit ))t I, must involve at least as higher loss as Y, 10 
does (! f 
S (tit The intuition is that the optimality property of 10 to* 
the time inconsistent plan arises because agents expect the ex ants 
policy but are deceived; once the time inconsistent policy is made 
public, there is'-no deception. 
Clearly, the problem of time inconsistency appears to be acute. 
The successful implementation of the full optimal policy requires 
continuous deception and the successful implementation of the ex ants 
optimal policy requires it to carry credibility. The rational 
expectations hypothesis would immediately emphasize the weakness of 
these and it is now that we turn to the control problem in an explicit 
rational expectations framework. As will become evident, there is a 
direct analogy between these models and the standard game-theoretic 
framework studied in this section. 
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1.2(C) Time-Inconsistency and Rational Expectations 
The majority of work on time inconsistency has emphasized rational 
expectations., -',, The seminal contribution by ZCydland and Prescott (1977) 
has been-extended and improved upon by a number of authors and some 
useful illustrations of time 'inconsistency in rational expectations 
models can be found in Calvo (1978), Buiter (1984a), Fischer (1980), 
Kydland and Prescott (1980) and Driffill (1982) (see--also Buiter 
(1980a); Holly (1983); Holly and Zarrop, (1981,1983);, 14inford and 
Peel (1983); Sheffrin (1983)). The'recent'surge of interest in theý 
issue is a reflection of the pioneering work of Buiter (1980a, 1981a, 
b, 1983,, 1984a), Miller-and Salmon (1983,1984a, b, c), "Currie'and 
Levine (1983a, 1984a, b, c, 1985) and Levine and Currie (1983,1984). 
To incorporate rational expectations explicitly into the optimal 
control problem, we retain the system in equations (1.2.3) - 
TTT and partition the nx. 1 state vector such that y- Cz xI. Here, 
2! "IM is an nix 1 vector of predetermined (backward-looking) 
variables and x in x(t) is an n2x I'vector of non-predetermined 
(forward-looking, free or jump) variables (n 1+n2- n). The control 
problem is as befores choose the plan (If(t)) tI which minimizes 
0 
equation-(1.2.4) subject to equation (1.2.3) and-section 1.4. (C) 
solves this constrained optimization, for both an open loop and a 
closed'loop'Stackelberg'game. one analogy with the standard open 
loop Stackelberg game in section 1.2(B) is that a control rule in 
term of the predetermined state variables, z, must be either a 
time-varying feedback rule (equation (1.4.39)) or a form of integral 
control (equation (1.4.40)). 'Note, however, that z are not the only 
state variables in the rational expectations model, the complete set 
of state variables'including also the free variables, x, and though 
it is not possible to derive a time-invariant feedback rule on z, a 
TTT time-invariant feedback rule on the entire state vector, Cz x], is 
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possible (equation (1.4.41)). Levine (1985), however, shows that the 
policy rule cannot be announced in this form (we return to this 
later). In any event, rational expectations complicates the design 
of control rules and this insight owes much to the series of papers 
by Currie and Levine (1983,1984a, b, c) and Levine and Curie (1983, 
1984). 
A second analogy with the standard Stackelberg game is that the 
optimal policy is time inconsistent (Proposition 1.4.5). This is 
seen immediately in the rational expectations model which encompasses 
the jump variables, x; these are forward-looking variables and hence 
reflect the announced policy of the controller. With respect to the 
standard dynamic programming solution, the time consistent policy 
derIved from such an approach is sub-optimal because it ignores the 
non-causalities in the system (that is, it fails to take account of 
the relevance of future expectations for current decisions - 
Proposition 1.4.6). Thus, the optimality of the time consistent 
policy is a special case and, in general, the restrictions required 
for it will be absent 
(13) 
. 
To simma ize this section we have seen that, though the full 
optimal policy is time consistent, its optimality property hinges 
on the capacity to secure agents, credibility of the announced ex ante 
optimal plan which is time inconsistent. The incentive to renege and 
the requirement of successful continual deception render both the 
ex ants and full optimal policies weak candidates as viable strate- 
gies. Clearly, then, attempting to control the system in the 
presence of forward-looking behaviour introduces additional complex- 
ities which are absent in the physical sciences. As mentioned 
earlier, Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Prescott (1977) interpreted 
this to mean the funda ntal inapplicability of optimal control 
techniques to economic problems, though the next section will 
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indicate why this view may be overly pessimistic and how the problem 
of time inconsistency may have been overstated. Simultaneously, 
however, we shall also indicate reasons to believe why the problem 
of time inconsistency is likely to be much more real than apparent. 
1'. 3 The Resolution, Importance and Existence of the Time 
Inconsistency Problem 
Section'1.2 contained a discussion of the fundamental time 
inconsistency of optimal policies in models which envisage the 
controller playing a game against a sophisticated private sector. 
This property of optimal policies has inspired the recent surge of 
interest in the search for time consistent policies which, though 
likely to be sub-opýimal, are' credible. This section critically 
reviews the proposed alternative approaches for'resolving time 
inconsistency and achieving time consistent equilibria. These 
take for granted that time inconsistency actually constitutes a 
problem though it is of-some importance to clarify matters on this. 
In addition, we also address other, possible moreýsubstantive, 
issues which are rarely confronted in the existing literature. 
1.3(A) Perfect Cheating and the Time Consistency of the Time 
Inconsistent optimal Policy 
Miller and Salmon (1983) and'Currie and Levine (1985) show that 
a time consistent equilibrium exists if the controller is able to 
successfully and repeatedly delude the private sector (section 1.4(D) 
shows how this'can be formalised for both open loop and closed loop 
games). This may appear rather peculiar since how is it possible for 
a policy which involves continuous reneging to be an optimal policy 
which is time consistent? rn fact, the answer is quite simple when 
we recall our-earlier observation that the time inconsistent (full) 
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optimal policy is an optimal policy which is time consistent. The 
combination of announcement and reneging in the perfect cheating 
solution is precisely the full optimal policy made, operational and 
not only is this time consistent but the controller is also - 
achieving his bliss point. obviously, however, the perfect cheating, 
solution is subject to the same criticism as the full optimal policy, 
requiring, an implausibly gullible private sector, -and this-makes it 
unlikely that the equilibrium will be sustainable. 
1.3(B) Precommitment and Rules versus Discretion 
ýýOne obvious candidate as-a way of enforcing the-ex ants optimal 
t 
Policy, ly(tito )) to 
is for the controller-to bind-his future actions 
such that this policy is actually pursued-for then this policy carries 
conviction. An interesting type of precommitment equilibria has been 
identified for a specific model by Lucas and Stokey (1983) who 
consider the problem of dynamic optimal taxation along the lines of 
Kydland and Prescott (1977#',, 1980) and Fischer (1980), but, without ',. 
capital., Time inconsistency arises in Lucas and, Stokey (1983) because 
the government is able to influence the value of outstanding debt by 
manipulating the, price level which makes the purchase of debt 
undesirable. -In-the absence of the ability to, bind itself to the 
ex ants optimal tax policy, Lucas and Stokey (1983) consider the 
case-in which all debt obligations, are honoured and it is shown that 
this-makes the ex ants tax policy enforceable (that is, credible and 
time cons*2. stent) 
(14). 
_ An interesting implication of this is*that for 
two sets of instruments under the direction of the controller, X1 and 
w2, which are related in some way, even if precommitment to the plan 
(M 3. (tit .1 is not feasible, a commitment to a particular plan 0t 
Of 2 (tit 1 may ensure that (M 
I (tit')) is enforced. Nonetheless, 0 to 0t0 
as Lucas and Stakey (1983) observe, there is nothing a prtort to 
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indicate why some coomitments are relatively easier than others and 
their particular analysis still rests-on the crucial'assumption that 
all debt obligations are honoured (see Fischer (1983) for further 
di. scussion). More generally, however, 'the'essential problem with the 
precommitment solution seems to'be theýlack of enforeceable contracts 
which'renders any'proposed precommitment suspect. 
on a slightly different note, -it is useful here to clarify the 
relationship between time inconsistency and the *rules versus , 
discretion' debate. - The existence of time inconsistency has prompted 
the argument for precommitment toýfixed rules which has been inter- 
preted as an argument for non-contingent rules. Motivated by this, 
Buiter (1980a, 1981a, b) demonstrates, however, that non-causal models 
still imply the superiority of an 'innovation-contingent' policy over 
a non-contingent policy, with both policies being time inconsistent 
(see also Driffill (2981); Begg (1982b); Miller, and Salmon (1983)(15) 
The logic of the argument is unquestionable but it is an error to 
infer support for non-contingent rules from time inconsistency in the 
above way in the first place. Obviously, someýtype', of rule-is 
desirable'for economic policy but the-desire to-restrict future 
discretion (In order to enforce announcement) is a quite separate 
issue from the relative merits of contingent and, non-contingent 
policies since both types of policies can suffer from time inconsis- 
tency (see, for example, Driffill (1981); Sheffrin (2983); Holly 
(1984))., To argue'that time inconsistency lends support for rules 
rather than discretion is to associate rules with binding commitments 
and discretion with, the absence thereof, and this is clearly distinct 
from the interpretation'of rules'as state independent policies and 
discretion as state dependent policies. As it stands, time incon- 
sistency has nothing to say about the relative merits of these. 
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We hasten to point out, however, that there may be other circum- 
stances under which time inconsistency does have some bearing on the 
issue. one possibility is in the case of uncertainty or, more 
specifically, when the controller and private sector have access to 
heterogeneous information. This is taken up in section 1.3(E) and we 
do not repeat that discussion here. A second possibility is that time 
inconsistency may be seen as an argun*nt for ad hoc non-contingent 
rules which are not derived from an optimization process. When such 
policies are adopted there is no particular reason to suspect that 
the policy maker will renege since the optimization process which 
indicates the incentive to renege has been eschewed. Note, however, 
that this may work the other way: since the policy maker has chosen a 
policy arbitrarily, there is nothing to stop him from choosing a 
different policy in an equally arbitrary way. The outcome is unclear 
and the existing literature has nothing to contribute on the matter. 
1.3(C) Nash EquilibriamdDynamic Programming 
rt will be recalled from section 1.2(B) that time consistency 
characterises standard dynamic ga s when strategic behaviour is 
regulated by the Nash assumption. Naturally, this has motivated 
investigations into whether time consistency is attainable in rational 
expectations models when the controller and private sector act as 
Nash players. Unfortunately, it is here that the terminology in the 
literature has a tendency to degenerate into mild chaos. Different 
solution procedures employed by different authors make it difficult 
enough to make comparisons and this is hindered even more by the lack 
of a unified terminology. Not only is it that many of the solutions 
are more-or-less identical, but that this has been noticeably 
overlooked. 
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Buiter (1983) and Cohen and Michel (1984) (see also Cohen and ý- 
Michel (1985)) purport to discover time consistent solutions which 
are formalised in section 1.4(E). in both cases,, the control rule 
can be formulated as a linear time-invariant feedback rule on the, 
predetermined state variables, z,,, or as a control path (equations 
(1.4.54) and (1.4.75)). It turns out, however, that both of, these 
solutions could have been anticipated from the conclusions of 
standards game theory. With respect to theýBuiter (1983) solution, 
Miller and Salmon (1983) identified the equivalence between this and 
the open loop Nash solution in which the controller takes as given 
(26) 
the level of the free state variables, x Similarly, Currie and 
Levine (1985) have recently identified the Cohen and Michel (1984) 
solution - which is obtained using dynamic programming - with a type 
of cLosed Loop Nash ga in which the controller takes as given the 
reaction function of the private sector (Proposition 1.4.7). rn fact, 
the closed loop Nash terminology used by Currie and Levine (1985) is 
slightly misleading since although the controller is behaving closed 
loop (treats as paramtric the private sector's decision rule), the 
private sector is behaving open loop (takes as given'the control 
vector of the controller);, Killer and Salmon (1984b) make the sa 
observation (as does d'Autu (1984) to which we return below) and to 
emphasize the point, let us denote the Cohen and Hichel (1984) solu- 
tion as quast-Ctosed &oop Nash 
(17). 
In addition, Cohen-and Michel 
(1984) and Miller and Salmon (1984b) denominate the dynamic program- 
ming solution interchangeably-by open Loop Stacke&barg and recurstva. 
Stacketberg equilibria. Though these have some merit, both are some- 
what of a misnomer for, aB we have stated above (and as Miller and 
Salmon (1984b) appreciate), the controller is behaving closed loop. 
Similarly, the Stackelberg concept is only a half-truth though we 
suspect this to be rather more misleading. The leadership role is 
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only realised through the controller's perception of his influence 
on the state variables which feed through to the decision variables 
of the private sector, via their reaction functions and this is quite 
distinct from the usual notion of a dominant player game More- 
over, both Cohen and Michel (1984) and Miller and Salmon (1984b) 
explicitly state that the controller treats as parametric the private 
sector response function, an assumption which is closer to Nash than 
Stackelberg behaviour. Thus, the only asymmetry is the fact that the 
controller behaves closed loop and the private sector behaves open 
loop and we regard it as slightly misleading to designate the Stack- 
leberg terminology purely on the basis of this asymmetry. our view 
seems to have some support from Miller and Salmon (1984b) themselves 
who observe that if the controller takes as given the level, of the 
free state variables, x, (as opposed to the functional relationship 
between x and z in the reaction function), the solution reduces to 
the open loop Nash game. Intuitively this is appealing for it 
states that the open loop Nash solution is nested in the (quasi-) 
closed loop Nash solution in an obvious way (Proposition 1.4.8). 
Let us now turn to some other matters. Typically, the question 
of time consistency propagates the search for appropriate equilibrium 
concepts, specifically Nash equilibria or, more precisely, perfect 
equi-&tbrta 
(19) 
. The notion of perfection of equilibrium will be 
given a precise meaning below. For the moment we merely note that by 
an equilibrium we mean a situation such that given the behaviour of 
rivals, no single player can gain by departing from his own-planned 
behaviour. Returning to the two person ga of section 1.2(B), a 
Nas h equtttbrtum is the couple ((jf*(t)) (t)) such that It It2 t 
00 
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tttt 
J., ( (m (t)) "( *(t))t') 't J., ( (M., (t))t" (* )) 
1) 
It0 3ý2 00 
2f2(t to 
itItI)41tI M) 
tI)- 
(! tl(t))to#' (1ý2(t)lt 
02( 
(EI(t)) to, (1ý2 t0 
(3.1) 
Intuitively, a Nash equilibrium is a strategy for player 2, (t)) 
I 
to 
0 
which is taken as given by player 2 and which is actually optimal for 
player 1, (y (t)) 
I (Y (t))tl and vtce versa. It is usual in the I to It0 
literature to refine the equilibrium concept further by introducing 
the notion of sub9ame perfectton (see Kreps and Wilson (1982a); 
d'Autume (1984)): the strategy. sequence (t)) 
1P (1ý2(t))tl)is said t 
C) 
t0 
to be a perfect Nash equtltbrtum if, at any juncture t (Ocj<-I), 
t, tIi 
"MI("tof (2Y") to ) is a Nash equilibrium for the subga in 
(tift 
1) given 
the history 
11 
of the ga in (to, t i ). Thus, consider a 
subga induced by re-starting the entire game at some point. Then 
perfectness of equilibria guarantees an equilibrium of the subgame 
for. any starting point, which is to say that the strategy sequence 
tt 
l' (! ý2(t)) ) is subga perfect if it is a Nash equilibrium to to 
for any subgame (Kreps and Wilson (1982a)). 
subgame perfection is related to the issue of time consistency in 
a straightforward way. As Cohen and Kichel (1994) point out, their 
dynamic programming solution is, in fact, a perfect equilibrium. To 
see this intuitively, one merely has to realise the recursive struc- 
(20) 
ture of both of the solutions .A perfect equilibrium is time 
consistent because, for each subga at any juncture-of the entire 
game, the optimal strategy for the subgame is the strategy that was 
originally found to be optimal for the entire game. Now, d'Autume 
(1984) defines the dynamic programming time consistent solution as 
the outc of the private sector behaving open loop and the con- 
troller behaving closed loop. The reader will immediately appreciate 
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the similarity between this and our quasi-closed loop Kash interpret- 
ation of Cohen and Michel (1984). In short, the time consistent 
equilibrium is merely a variant of the concept of perfect equilibria. 
We may also note a further (time consistent) equilibrium concept , 
cited in the literature, namely a feedback StackLeberg soLutton (see 
Kydland-(1975,1977)). In order to avoid confusion with the closed 
loop Stackelberg solution (which is time inconsistent and therefore 
a weak candidate as an equilibrium concept) let us follow Cruz (1975) 
and-substitute, for feedback Stackelberg the title of Stacketberg 
equt-ltbrtum. Now, as would be expected, the time inconsistent open 
loop and closed loop-Stackelberg solutions are superior, to the time 
consistent Stackelberg equilibrium and Kydland (1977) reveals this to 
be due-toýthe, fact that, the latter ignores the non-causalities in 
the system. Thus, again we appear to be back to the closed loop Nash 
game and, to-support this, d'Autume (1904) observes the, equivalence 
(21) 
between Stackelberg equilibrium and perfect Nash equilibrium 
The foregoing discussion should, if nothing else, have highlighted 
(and hopefully in part resolved) the acute terminological problems in 
the literature. A closer inspection reveals that, for the most part, 
the conclusions reached by different authors amount to much the same. 
in any event, if all this amounts to demonstrating the time consist-' 
ency of a backward recursive solution, we are a little sceptical 
about the importance of its contribution. The reason for our view is 
as follows. 
The solutions discussed in this. section'may appear a little 
contrived. invoking the Nash assumption negates time inconsistency 
but does so by changing the framework - it does not resoLve time 
inconsistency which arises precisely because of the absence of Nash 
behaviour. The Nash assumption can be justified, however, by noting 
that if future discretion is unrestricted, agents will foresee the 
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incentive for the controller to renege which. makes his announcements 
superfluous. He is then forced to take agents, actions as given and 
(22) the outcome is a time consistent Nash equilibrium . Though 
superficially appealing, this argument is very much incomplete and 
really avoids the main issue. In short, though the ex ants optimal 
policy suffers from dynamic inconsistency, the controller will always 
do better by adhering to this policy than by pursuing the Nash policy. 
All of the solutions discussed so far have assumed that the leader- 
ignores his previous actions because the follower does so. This 
avoids the case of repeated games and the possibility of an equilib- 
rium where it pays the controller to maintain previous policies in 
order to sustain a reputation. The most pressing problem confronting 
the controller is to convince agents of his commitment to the ex ants 
optimal plan and what is required is a framework which indicates 
conditions under which the private sector begins to lose faith in 
the controller. The framework which immediately suggests itself is 
one which models reputatton endogenously. 
1.3(D) Reputation and Credibility. 
Some important recent work has shown that time inconsistency may 
be significantly alleviated if one endogenises this within a framework 
which entertains the notion of reputation. It is precisely the threat 
of the loss of reputation (credibility) and reversion to an inferior 
(Nash) policy which may motivate the controller not to succumb to the 
temptation to renege on the announced ex ante optimal plan. This 
plausible hypothesis enriches the ga in an interesting ways players 
are now engaged in a repeated gcune or suporgcune (see, for example, 
Friedman (1971)) and the temptation to renege must be judged against 
the Punishment for doing so, in which case it may pay the policy maker 
to invest in a reputation. As we shal-1 see, in such ga s, the 
perfection of equilibrium becomes important. 
48 
An illuminating example of reputation building, and its implica- 
tions for time inconsistency, is presented by Barro and Gordon (1983) 
and their analysis has been extended in iMportant directions by , 
Backus and Driffill (1984a, b, 1985) and Canzoneri (1985) (see also 
Driffill (1983,1984); Blinder (1982); Loewy (1983); Anderson (1985)) 
to which we return later . For the moment, we convey the flavour of 
the original study. 
Barro, and Gordon (1983) assu a loss function for the controller 
of the form J- laq 
2_ 
q2 ( ITt _ Ir 
e) (q 0,1 - 1,2) with a the it 1ITt ti 
e 
actual rate of inflation and v, the private sector's expected rate of 
inflation. Following d'Autume (1984) and Backus and Driffill 
(19s4a, b, 1985), it is also useful to conceptualise the loss function 
for the private sector an J (V - IT 
e)2 
(23) 
. The choice (control) 2t tt 
variable of the, policy maker is Yr and the choice variable of the 
private sector is ne the control problem being to minimize a dis- 
t (24) 
counted sum of Jlt, J rA J it, with 04A4,1 a 
discount factor 
Time inconsistency arises in this model because by inducing a 
e 
particular ff t, the policy maker 
is able to exploit the gains from 
inflation. As we shall see, this means that an announced policy of 
Tr t0 
is simply not credible and there must be some positive 
inflation. An important limitation ofl, Barro and Gordon (1983) (to 
which we return later) is that current effects on reputation do not 
influence future reputation. The advantage of this is that the 
optimization problem may be conducted for each period in isolation. 
Barro, and Gordon (1983) distinguish between three types of 
policies, The first is what they term a discrettonarV po&fcy which 
obtains when agents--perceive of the incentive for the controller to 
renege. It is, therefore, the outcome under the Nash assumption, 
eNq being time consistent with v. vT >0 and Jý- 3,0. The second tt it 
policy is termed a po&tcy ruts and corresponds to the ex ants optimal 
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e policy which is time inconsistent. In this case, Yrt w iT t me j it -0. 
The third policy is called the cheattng poZtcy and is the time 
inconsistent (full) optimal policy actually implemented by virtue of 
the ability to perfectly cheat the private sector into believing the 
e-N commitment to the ex ante policy. Hence, Tr t=0 but ntWaMVt and 
'" - 
?-<0. These results accord with our previous intuition - it it 
in particular, JN- >J>j obviously, however, since the it it it' 
cheating solution is non-feasible, neither is the ex ante policy and 
to see this formally, Barro and Gordon (1983) introduce the following 
enforcement ru&es: if private sector expectations are correct in one 
period (ir 
e 
government credibility is enhanced and the, t_1 , 't-l 
private sector believes the comitment to the ex ante (zero inflation) 
e policy next period (YT t. ir t; 
); by contrast, forecast errors in one 
t_l period 
(IT e make agents distrust government announcements, 
eN 
. reputation is lost and the Nash policy 
is enforced (v t" Tr t 
). Thus, 
the gains from reneging must be judged against the costs of'losing 
reputation and these benefits and costs are quantifiable in a simple 
way. The temptation to cheat, rýr say, is merely the difference in 
utility between adhering to the vt policy and cheating on this, 
TjT jit - jit. The cost of cheating, 71 c say, 
is that the policy 
viaker is forced to pursue the vT 
N 
policy in the next period; since t 
this is'discounted at the rate A, n- \(JN- c lt+l - 
J. It+I 
Now, the controller will adhere to the announced vt policy 
provided -nC nT - otherwise he secures a net gain from cheating - 
and this provideg'the equilibrium condition. But if 04A<1, 
11 c< rýr and 
the equilibrium is unsustainable. The commonsense reason 
for this is that the costs of reneging come later and are therefore 
discounted; since agents know this, 'the vt policy is non-feasible and 
there must be positive inflation In'the equilibrium. Note, however, 
that A-3. goes s way towards making vt credible. This is 
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intuitively appealing and is closely related to a recent finding by 
Currie and Levine (1985) in connection with stochastic systems (see 
section 1.3(E)). It occurs because the policy maker knows that by 
reneging be is forced to pursue the Nash policy in the future) but if 
the future is deemed important he will be more inclined to avoid 
reneging. The-private sector knows this so that greater credibility 
is attached to the ex ants policy. The fact that rrt =0 is generally 
unsustainable, however, means fft = ir t --- 0 in equilibrium but reputa- 
tional considerations are still sufficient to avoid the Yr 
N 
policy. t 
Thus,, the most important insight of Barro and Gv6rdon (1983) is 
that a superior policy to the Nash strategy is enforceable when the 
policy maker is concerned with reputation. This implies that a 
resolution of time inconsistency exists which is already endogenous 
to the problem. As mentioned above, however, the most limiting aspect 
of Barro and Gordon (2983) is that reputation effects last for only 
one period which means that the only subgame perfect equilibrium is 
one which entails positive inflation. ' This is so because agents know 
the dominant strategy of the controller to involve inflating, but one 
might envisage the situation in which adherence to the zero inflation 
policy for some time builds a reputation for the controller for being 
tough. 
in a series of papers, Backus'and Driffill (1984a, b, 1985) incorp- 
orate asymmetric information into the Barro and Gordon (1983) fra - 
work by assuming that at least one player is unsure about the payoff 
matrix of his rival (see Kreps and Wilson (1982b)). rn. the case of 
one-sided uncertainty, this a unts to the private sector being 
uncertain of the relative'magnitudes of the qi (i - 1,2) parx ters 
in the controller's loss function so that it must learn about the 
type of controller it is playing against. Restricting the menu of 
e choices to v, v= (0,1), a controller that always inflates (always 
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plays v -, 1) is termed a weak goverriment (associated with relatively 
biqb (low) values of q2(ql)), and a controller that never inflates 
(always plays ir - 0) is termed a hard goverrment (associated with 
relatively'low (high) values of Vq 1) 
). If the goverment's 
preferences are public knowledge, the two alternative equilibria are 
e IT ,I or v- ve ý 0. Thus,, an announced zero inflation policy 
may be credible if the government is believed to be hard; then a weak 
government may resist the temptation to inflate in order to build a 
(25) 
reputation for being tough 
The game involves the private sector assigning a probability, Pt. 
each period that the controller is. hard (this measures the reputation 
for being tough) andýboth players choosing their best strategies given 
the strategies of others and the effect of current behaviour on future 
reputation. During the game, agents have perfect recall and the , 
history of the game up to any stage conveys information about the 
type of policy maker which is processed and the probability Pt is 
(26) 
revised accordingly . The equilibrium is subgame perfect (and 
therefore dynamically consistent) and some characteristics of the 
solution are as follows: for some periods after the start of, the game 
e the policy maker avoids inflating so that vt ý= Vt=0 with certainty 
and reputation is enhanced (in terms of output and inflation, there 
is full employment and zero inflation), After, this, the controller 
still plays wt =0 but the private sector expects positive and zero 
inflation with equal probability (there is equal likelihood of full 
employment and unemployment with zero actual inflation). This occurs 
because a weak government is more inclined to inflate towards the 
end of the horizon. At some point, the, controller inflates after 
e which he loses his reputation and vtý IT t 3. (there is full employ- 
ment and positive inflation). Thus, contrary to Barro and Gordon 
(1983), there is a period during which a zero inflation policy is 
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credible because it pays even a weak government to build a reputation 
for itself. The analysis has been generalised by Backus and Driffill 
(1984b, 1985) to incorporate two-sided uncertainty. The game is now 
a game of 'chicken' with each player testing the nerve of his rival. 
e The theory predicts that a strong private sector (playing Tr W 1) may 
Induce tough action by a government concerned to reduce inflation in 
order to convince agents of its commitment and alleviate the costs of 
disinflation. on the other hand, a strong government may be forced 
to 'give in' and abandon its anti-inflationary stance if the output 
costs are too high. Hence, even a strong government may suffer-output 
losses if its initial reputation is bad. 
one might also mention here a recent approach by Anderson (1985) 
who envisages the problem of asymmetric information as a problem of 
adverse seLectton and the design of tncenttve compattbtltty schemes 
to enforce the true revelation of preferences. Analogous to the 
insurance literature, one can then imagine separattng and pooLtng 
equilibria. In the case of a credibility problem (that is, when 
government announcements about its preferences cannot be relied upon) 
there is a pooling equilibrium with both hard and weak governments 
being offered the same private sector expectation. In the case of 
no credibility problem (that is, when the government can be relied 
upon to. reveal its true preferences) there isla separating equilibrium 
with expectations being geared to the particular type of government. 
Though at first glance this appears to be an interesting approach to 
the credibility problem, we believe it to suffer from a fundamental 
drawback for, as we have already remarked for the Barro, and Gordon 
(1983) model (which Anderson (1985) uses), if the controller is known 
to be weak the equilibrium is the inferior Nash equilibrium with 
e 9 Ir . 1. it is not at all obvious, therefore, that a truthful 
revelation of preferencesis necessarily a Pareto improvement. And 
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one can go further than this. Barro, (1976) has argued that, instead 
of exploiting any informational advantage, an equivalent solution 
would be for the controller to make his information set public; but 
the reputation fra rk seems to offer a plausible reason why an 
informational asymmetry will persist. 
on a slightly more general note, it is important to note, here, 
the crucial role of perfection of equilibrium in the types of models 
considered in this section because the solution depends on the threat 
being credible; the policy maker must regard the loss of public 
confidence as a credible response of the private sector - and the 
threat is credible provided it is the optimal ex post response. There 
may be some problems here: first, such a punishment strategy may 
not, in fact, be credible because it may not be optimal LE it involves 
a cost; second, as Friedman (1971) points out, the notion of a threat 
appears vacuous in non-cooperative games because the coalitions 
required to enforce the threat are ruled out by assumption. These 
issues can be dealt with fairly briefly. Kreps and Wilson (1982b) 
observe that the threat need not actually be optimal ex post) rather, 
all that is required is some probability that it is optimal ex post 
rn addition, coalitions to enforce the threat need not be required 
either; the policy maker merely has to appreciate a loss of public 
confidence if it reneges and, following Friedman (1971), one may 
replace the notion of threat by temptatton. Then the policy maker 
may be tempted to renege but, in doing so, he forces his rivals into 
a safe position which, in the present context, amounts to avoiding 
the risk of believing the policy maker's announcements. The threat 
still exists, but is devoid of any connotations regarding collabor- 
ation. Finally, there is no cost of punishment in the above types of 
(27) 
models since all that happens is a loss of confidence 
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rn conclusion, it is our view that the appreciation of reputa- 
tional considerations constitutes a fundamentally important contrib- 
ution to the time inconsistency literature and it is precisely within 
this framework that the issue should be addressed. There does seem 
however, some grounds for pessimism. First, the theory is devoid of 
any quantitative content. For example, Backus and Driffill (1984a, 
b, 1985) cite a number of applications of their analysis, especially 
as a descriptive device for recent UK experience. Thus, one argument 
is that the present government's commitment to an anti-inflationaxy 
policy was met with private sector scepticism which continued to 
expect higher inflation; a recession was the outcome. This has some 
merit but it does appear to suffer from a major drawback3 put simply, 
it seems to have taken (or is taking) a surprisingly long time for 
the conviction of the government to be refelcted in private sector 
behaviour. The players seem to have been playing the game for an 
implausible length of time and surely one of them would have tired by 
now. Second, perhaps the major drawback of the anlaysis is its oper- 
ational significance. Even for the very simple models that have 
been outlined, the solution becomes extremely tedious and problems 
of generality are likely to limit the applicability of the theory to 
the actual policy making process for some time. 
1.3(E) Stochastic Systems and Simple Rules 
Thus far, we have largely avoided_coumment on the more realistic 
case in which the system is subject to stochastic perturbation. This 
may not be too serious since much of what has been said for the 
deterministic case applies equally to the stochastic case. There 
are, however, some points of interest which are only meaningful in 
the latter and some of these may qualify s of the conclusions 
reached for a deterministic environment. Thus, we begin by writing 
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the stochastic analogues to equations (1.2.3)- (1.2.4) as 
AX - Aydt +Bwdt + du (1.3.2) 
E(J) Et1 Jpt (. y> 
T 
Qy +J RW)dt 
it 
0 
where du is an nxl vector of stochastic disturbances, E( is the 
[! LT (! ýe)T]T expectations operator and gX is now six z with dxe 
2E e (t+dt, t) - A(t). Note also that du C(gul)T (! 2u2)T]T with dul an 
2 (28) + 
n x1 vector and du an n xi vector Defining y and 12 
w+-w-w Levine and Currie (1984) (see also Currie and Levine 
(1985)) show that 
dv Ay dt + By dt 
d jw Ay 
+ dt + By + dt + du (1.3.5) 
E(J) - J* + E(J 
with J* and J74' defined by 
i*= la 
tIe 
-pt ((Y *)TQ. Y 
*+ (M *)T Fýf * )dt 
it 
0 
J+ = 12 
t1e 
-pt ((Z + )'Qj* + (X+)Rý')dt (1.3.8) ito 
The control problem can then be performed in two partst the first is 
to choose (t)) 
I 
which minimizes J* subject to equation (1.3.4) and to 
is the deterministic control problem; the second is to choose 
+tI Ot M)t 
0 
which minimizes %1* subject to equation (1.3.5) and is the 
stochastic control problem. The important property of the linear 
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qua. dratic-framework is that it exhibits certainty equivalence. for 
both the standard control problem and the rational expectations I 
version (see Levine and Currie (1984)). Hence, w Im lw 
+= 
we 
An important insight of Currie and Levine (1985), alluded to 
earlier, is the critical influence of the discount parameter, p, on,, 
the time inconsistency property of the optimal ex ants policy in a 
Stackelberg ga . Specifically, the sustainability of this policy 
becomes more likely as p-falls (Proposition 1.4.10) and the, intuition 
behind this is precisely because the stochastic system mimics a 
repeated ga .ý Since reneging means a reversion to the inferior Nash 
policy and a weaker capacity to stabilize future shocks, the con- I 
troller is more inclined to avoid the temptation to cheat-as hegives 
higher weight to the future (and the private, sector is aware of this). 
Yet the stochastic case should not merely be seen as a repetition of 
the reputation framework in section 1.3(D). On the contrary, it seems 
to offer rather more than this. Specifically, it appears to offer an 
attractive way to investigate reputational issues further which 
avoids the technical difficulties associated with the Kreps and Wilson 
(1982b) and Backus and Driffill (1984a, b, 1985) approach. In any- 
event, the problem of time inconsistency appears to be overstated. 
There are good, reasons to believe, however, why a stochastic environ- 
ment may exacerbate the problem and these have received relatively 
little attention in the literature. 
To begin with, recall from section 1.3(B), tbat, in a stochastic 
environment, the optimal policy permits a response to now information 
and is time inconsistent, (see, for example, Buiter-(1980a, 1981a, b); 
Begg (1982b); -Killer-and Salmon (1983)). Now suppose that the private 
sector is (at least temporarily) ignorant of contemporaneous stoch- 
astic perturbations. Then there is an immediate dilemmai when a 
shock occurs, the optimal response is to stabilize the disturbance 
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but the private sector, being unaware of this disturbance, may 
confuse the observed policy change with an attempt by the controller 
to pursue a cheating strategy. This will remain true even if the 
private sector knows the controller to be pursuing a contingent policy 
and, moreover, even if the controller publishes information about the 
extraneous event since the private sector cannot be sure of the truth 
(29) 
of this information .A specific example of this is given by 
Canzoneri (1984) who considers the case in which contemporaneous 
information about monetary shocks is available only to the controller. 
An ideal (time inconsistent) policy is to accommodate these shocks 
but the private sector's observation of the controller's adherence to 
the ideal policy is not verification of his honesty because he can 
exploit the ignorance of the private sector by announcing spurious 
information about the stochastic innovation. By doing this, he is 
able to make the cheating strategy observationally equivalent to the 
ideal policy. 
what all this implies is the additional complexity on moving from 
a determinstic to a stochastic setting. In general, any observed 
policy change must be decomposed into that change arising from the 
optimal response to unforeseen contingencies and that change which 
reflects the dynamic inconsistency of the optimal policy. The out- 
come of this filtering problem is unclear: at one extreme, it may 
favour the policy maker since private sector uncertainty can be 
exploited; at the other extreme, however, greater confusion might 
induce agents to adopt a safe position and distrust any government 
announc nts. rn any event, consideration of purely deterministic 
systems can obscure s very real problems which have been rarely 
addressed in the literature and this has probably made the resolution 
of time inconsistency appear overly simple. 
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Let us now turn to a slightly different issue. As we have noted, 
the full optimal time inconsistent policy satisfies certainty 11 equiva- 
lence. This is not true, however, of almost all Policies and rAvine 
and Currie (1984) have investigated this issue in some detail. They 
consider stmpLe ruLes which are specified at the outset to be a linear 
time-variant feedback rule on the state vector, y, so that w-D 
say. Then the control problem is to minimize equation (1.3.3) with 
respect to DI .' Equivalently, it can easily be shown that 
dz - Tzdt + du 
I (see section 1.4(F)) in which case the nIxn 
asymptotic variance-covariance matrix of z, Ez, follows as 
1: i! T + Tr + 1: 0 
zz 
(1.3.9) 
where E is the n 1" xn1 asymptotic variance-covariance matrix of 
du 1 
(see Chow (1979)). The control problem is then to minimize Ez with 
rspect to DI and section 1.4(F) shows how strategic behaviour can be 
incorporated into this problem 
(30). 
What we wish to note here is - 
that the simple rule, w-D3. y-, does not satisEy certainty equivalence 
which is immediately realised from equation (1.3.9) where the optimal 
value for 01 is seen to generally depend on the stochastic properties 
of the system, r. -This might incline one to avoid deploying such 
rules as their performance is geared critically to the nature of, 
stochastic perturbations and contemporaneous information about these 
disturbances is likely to be incomplete. There are, however, some 
strong arguments in favour of simple rules., First, it is quite pos- 
sible to identify simple rules which perform reasonably well across a 
wide spectrum of shocks (this has occupied the attention of Levine 
and Currie (1983,1984); Currie and Levine (1983a, 1984a, b, c); 
chapters 2 and 3 in this thesis). Second, the full optimal rule 
is likely to be very complex; simple rules are easier to understand 
which might be especiallY relevant when agents I behaviour rents 
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partly on their understanding of policy. Third, the superiorityof 
complex rules may well be due to their capacity to exploit the dynamic 
configuration of the system, but it is precisely this which the 
controller is least certain about. A-structural shift. may then reduce 
the attractiveness of complex rules and induce a search for more 
simple policies which are more robust. Fourth, in, terms of the main 
concern of this paper, simple rules have a particularly attractive 
advantage in that they are likely to be easier to, monitor whichý, 
makes-it easier to identify a policy maker who attempts to cheat. In 
any event, the stabilizing properties of complex and simple rules is 
just one aspect, of, the debate and the existing literature has little 
to say about the other, possibly more important, issues. 
1.3(F) Final Rema ks: Extensions, Informational Assumptions and 
the Existence of a Problem 
The foregoing sections bave elicited some recent contributions 
to the time inconsistency issue and its resolution. rn the course 
of the discussion we have mentioned other Lpoints of, interest which 
have emerged from the debate and, in this section, we comment on some 
further matters which have. received at most relatively little-atten- 
tion., These issues are, however, of smime substance and strike at the 
core of some of the underlying assumptionslone often, feels to be 
present but rarely revealed. To-begin with, let us remark on s 
issues which, have been touched-upon in the literature., 
in general, both Nash and Stackelberg, solutions are inefficient 
because they axe derived from non-cooperative behaviour (see, for 
example, Buiter (1980a); Miller and Sal n (1983)). 
_ 
Cooperation 
between players may also benefit the enforcement of a (otherwise 
time inconsistent) policy and there may, therefore, exist strong 
incentives to-engage in cooperation. Note, however, that in the type 
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of ga s that we'have considered, cooperation would imply the ability 
of agents to form coalitions - an assumption which is ruled out in 
the dominant player game. indeed, collusive, behaviour, could change, 
the nature of the problem dramatically as the game might degenerate 
into Stackelberg warfare. Now, for the most part, -the issue of 
cooperation has been addressed in the context of seeking inter- 
nationally coordinated policies between different-nations"(see, for 
example, Brandsma and Hughes-Hallett (1984); Hughes-Hallett (1984a, b); 
Miller and Salmon (1983,1984a, c); Oudiz and Sachs (1984a, b); Sachs 
(1983)1 Eichengreen (1984); Turner (1984a, b); Laskar (1984); Currie 
and Levine (1985a, b); Levine and Currie (1985)) and this-raises other 
matters. 'A general problem with cooperation is that the threat of 
punishment for breaking an agreement must carry credibility, but it 
is questionable that such is the case here. Currie (1985a), for 
example, has suggested that simple tit-for-tat strategies, might 
suffice but this is to ignore the fact that countries*differ in'size 
and importance, and it is quite possible for some countries to be 
able to secure gains from cheating on an agreement and incur no 
penalty simply because either other countries cannot devise a tough 
enough punishment strategy or they may fear retaliation on a much 
larger scale. Moreover, even if policy makers were able to design'a 
credible cooperative strategy, the conglomerate controller is still 
playing'a ga against, the private sectors and the optimal policy 
xill still be time inconsistent (see, for example, Miller and SaLlmon 
(19S3)). rn this respect, cooperation does nothing to alleviate the 
problem and might actually exacerbate it if collusion a ng policy 
makers makes it easier for them to cheat the private sector. 
Turning to a slightly different matter, an alternative interpret- 
ation of the game is given by Oudiz and Sachs (1984b) who consider 
a supergame between-successive governments involving the following 
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strategiest first, a government at time to chooses the optimal 
t 
ex ants policy, ()f(tIt 0 
)) t with pre-commitment provided all govern- 
ments in the past have doneýso; secondt, if any government-in the'past 
selects a policy other than this, the goverment at time, tchooses a 
Nash policy, (! ±, 
N(tlto)) 
. Thus, each government operates under the to 
threat that its successors will revert to the Nash policy, if it'fails 
to adhere to the ex ante optimal policy. Provided, this threat-is" 
credible, there are two alternative subgame perfect equilibria: an 
equilibrium inýwhich all governments play the ex ante policy; and an 
equilibrium in which all qovernments play the Nash policy. -Thouqh 
the ex ante-policy miqht beýunsustainable, if, at some time the 
temptation'to depart from it outweiqhs the cost of doinq so, the 
essential point remains, namely that in a model with reputation 
effects, a superior outcome to the Nash solution is attainable. 
Let us now turn to some rather more substantive matters. It is 
commonly alleged in the literature, as if to demonstrate the force 
and generality of the proposition, that dynamic inconsistency arises 
even if the private sector and controller share identical preferences 
(see, for, exam le, Xydland'and Prescott (1977,1980); Calvo (1978); 
Fischer (1980); -Barro and Gordon (1983); Backus and Driffill (1984c)). 
Under such circum tances, however, it is difficult to envisage time 
inconsistency as posing any problem. The controller is surely , 
suspected of reneging and in doing so he achieves a superior outcome, 
but the controller is entirely benevolent. He possesses a true, 
social, welfare function so that private agents are also better off 
when he reneges. Moreover, the private sector is not being cheated; 
it knows-full well the intentions of the policy maker but it pays to 
plead ignorant and the temptation to renege is innocuous. What is 
required for time inconsistency to, constitute a problem is that at 
least some persons are (or assign some-positive probability to being) 
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made worse off following a departure from an announced plan. Need- 
less to say, there seems to be sufficient justification that this is 
the case (for example, a divergence between the preferences of the 
private sector and controller; a divergence between private and 
social interest; lack of a true social welfare function; hetero- 
geneous agents) and we believe, therefore, that there ts a problem 
of time inconsistency, investigations into which being non-trivial 
pursuits. 
A second point that we wish to make concerns the generalisation 
which takes explicit account of the possibility of differentially 
informed agents where, in particular, heterogeneity among individuals 
takes the form of different perceptions about the reputation of the 
controller. This has not received attention in the literature but is 
likely to be non-trivial and may undermine the threat effect for 
enforcing commitment to announced policies. Recall from section 
1.3(D) that the threat need not actually be voiced nor collusion 
requiredýfor it to be credible; all that is required is for the policy 
maker to appreciate the loss of reputation incurred by reneging. 
Clearly, the, threat is credible if all agents hold identical beliefs 
because each agent, knows that his distrust of the policy maker is 
shared by others. But in the case of differential beliefs the con- 
troller-may still-have an incentive to renege in order to exploit 
those agents who remain convinced of his integrity. Horeover, those 
who perceive the incentive to renege are likely to profit at the 
expense of the ignorant. Note, however, that. this may work the other 
way as the policy maker plays a ga of double bluffs rather than 
exploiting the ignorant, he may exploit the wisdom of the other group 
by actually adhering to the announced policy - we now have the 
enforcement of the ex ants policy because of the absence of a credible 
threat. The precise outcome is unclear and it is likely to involve 
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players attempting to assess the beliefs and strengths of others in 
order to predict the intentions of the policy maker. 
on a final point, a further important (but largely neglected) 
issue concerns the informational assumptions made in the literature. 
For the most part, the games that we have considered are full inform- 
ation differential games with every player knowing exactly the payoffs 
and strategies of each and every other player. A small a unt of 
uncertainty would give substance to the problem of time inconsistency, 
enrich the. issues involved and yield a closer approximation to 
reality, together with focussing on the implications of alternative 
information structures. uncertainty about player's payoffs and 
consideration of stochastic systems are important contributions in 
this respect (see Backus and Driffill (1984a, b, 1985); Canzoneri 
In any event, the essential questions that beg consideration 
are precisely those which are endemic to the credibility issue, 
namely the informational assumptions which condition agents' beliefs 
about the comaLitment to a particular policy regime. 
1.4 A Mathematical Interpetation 
By way of completeness, this section formalises much of the 
discussion in the previous sections. The optimal control problem 
is solved using the max: imum (or minimum) principle developed by 
Pontryagin et a7,. (1962) and summa ized in appendix A. The solution 
of systems which include non-predetermined variables follows-from 
append: bc B. 
1.4(A) The Standard (Single Controller) Control Problem 
tI 
-Pt TT +w Rw)dt min. J- 'aft e Qy 
0 problem deftnition 
s. t. AX + Bw 
(1.4.1) 
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Ize-pt (. YTQX + wTRw) + 
J(Ay 
+ Bw) Hamiltonian 
alllag - SE; aHlaýt -0w R-IBTiT 
First order 
conditions 
awax - ir -- Qx +iT IT 
I 
where tz -nxI vector of costate v&riables 
A- pl-A 
(1.4.2) 
(1.4.3) 
and I-L - A(t) as before with I the nxn identity matrix. it is 
useful to note here that the costate variables are the dynamic 
analogues of Lagrange mutlipliers. Hence, they represent the marginal 
contribution to the maximized value of the maximand with respect to a 
change in the constraint. We shall see below that this interpretation 
plays an important role in determining the boundary conditions when 
the control problem assumes game aspects. Substituting for w from 
equation (1.4.3) gives the adjoint system describing the evolution of 
.y and ir under optimal control: 
ir Ir 
It II 
Ir 
-1 T where E BR B 
The boundary conditions for equation (1.4.4) are y(t 
0 yo(n 
initial. 
conditions) and M(t 0 (n transversality conditions). The latter 
imposes the saddlepoint structure on equation (1.4.4) so that v 
contains non-predeteimined costates associated with the predetermined 
y (see, _for example, Miller and 
Salmon (1983)). Thus, the system in 
equat2. on (1.4.4) 2.9 formally analogous to the standard state-space 
configuration of models embodying jump variables and the saddlepoint 
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solution in appendix B applies. Denote by A the 2nx2n diagonal matxix 
of eigenvalues of F and by M the 2nx2n matrix of associated eigen- 
vectors and note the canonical transform MF AM or Fý - 
ýA 
with 
ý- 
M-1. Then'partitioning conformably with Ex 
TM T3T, 
F, . 
F11 F121 
14 
F11 M121 
)AA, 
0 
FFM0 21 22 M21 H22 A2 
and assuming a unique non-explosive solution, A1 is the nxn diagonal 
matrix of stable eigenvalues and A2 is the nxn diagonal matrix of 
unstable eigenvalues. The stable manifold is 
Ü -'M2. y -1 (1.4.5) 22 
; 
2ý.;. 1. y- 
so that substituting equation (1.4.5) into equation (1.4.4) and the 
expression for w in equation (1.4.3) gives the solution 
G(t-to) t-tO)I-l 
e X(t 
0 
eAl( m IJLYý(to) - K(t)X(t 0 
(1.4.6) 
. 
E( t)-- HK( t )y( t 
0) 
R -1 BT ElIV t) . R72 
JliK(t). 
y(t .0 
where G-F 22 -F 12 H. 
(1.4.7) 
(1.4.8) 
PROPOSMýW 1.4.1 : The nxn matrix-H is the solution to the steady- 
state matrix Ricatti equation, H(A + EH) +Q- 
ýTH 
. 0. 
PF40OF : 
T 
Let Cy (t) 
TT 
1[ (t)] - - (b(t, t ) be 
0 
the unique solution of the 
system so that 40(e) is the 2nx2n state transition matrix. Then 
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r (t) (I 
m(, 
I- 40( t, t rm(tl)l 
(t 
'ro "'I (1.4.9) 
TTT 
and partitioning (ý(t, t conformably with CX (t) IE (t)] X(t) 
40 11 
(t't 
I 
)X(t 
I) and E( 
t)- (b 21 
(t't 
I 
). Y(t, ). Hence, 
(t, t ). 0 -I(t, t )y(t fly(t 21 1 11 11 (1 "4" 10) 
(compare with equation (1.4.5)). Substituting equation (1.4.10) into 
equation (1.4.4), t- (A+EH)Y, and from equation (1.4.3) and (1.4.10), 
+ Eli (ý T H--Q). y. Then 
(ä U(A + EH) +Q-iT H)y - (1.4.11) 
so that in steady state, A-0 and H is given as in the Proposition 
Q. E. D. 
PROPOSMON 1.4.2 - The optimal policy is time consistent. 
PROOF : Denote by y(t It the value of y at time t resulting 
from an optimal policy implemented at time ti* Then equation 
(A. 1.6) gives 
A1 (t-t 
3 
AI(t-to)--i 
y(tltj) - M. Ile 141ýy( 
tj Ito e MiY-(tO) 
- y(tlt 0)Q. 
E. D. (1 "4" 12) 
Standard dynamic programming techniques also yield optimal policies 
which are time consistent. An illustration of these techniques, to 
be returned to later in section 1.4(C), is the following two period 
optimization problem (see Kydland and Prescott (1977); Buiter 
(1980a); Solly and Zarrop (1983)): 
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min. jm J( Y-1 " Y-2 " 3fl '1ý2 
! fl'1ý2 
Y-1 ' yl(ltl); Y-2 ý 
where the subscripts denote the time period. The terminal period 
optimization problem involves minimizing J with respect to L42 treating 
xI and !fI parametric which yields first order conditions, 
aJlaw2 - aJlay aylaw2 + aJlaw2 -0* ! t2 -w (w 1 222ý; 
The first period optimization problem is to minimize J with respect 
to Lf I and subject 
to the constraint that If2 - w2(M, ). For our 
purposes, equation (1.4.14) will suffice. 
1.4(5) The Two Person Nonzero-Sum. Dynamic Came 
(a) Open Loop Nash 
t2 
-pt( QI-Y + týý%)dt min. Jk= fal tIeT iv- 
T 
Yk 0 h=1 
Problem definition 
(players I and 2) 
2 
s. t. AX +E Býý 
k=1 k 
(1.4.15) 
TTRAT 
Ay- B 14C lee-pt( Y- Qky- + khN k'k Hamiltonian 
hI k4ul 
)++r 
(1.4.16) 
-1 T Y-1 aIV aw"k 0* ! fk RkjB "Ir 
first order 
AT jEk 
conditions 
ýk Qky- +ý 
with e 
Pt 
A -1,2). The expression for yk in equation (1.4.17) K 
(k 
is the reaction function for each player. It is each player's 
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optimal response given the controls of his rival. The adjoint system 
describing the dynamic behaviour of the system under optimal open loop 
Nash control is 
AEE2 Y- Y- 
ýT 
0 FN 
0 
iT 
2..!! 2J 
-1 T where Ek BjCFI&Eý (k - 2,2). 
The boundaxy conditions are the n initial conditions, y(t )- yo, and 
0 
the 2n transversality conditions, ak(tl) -0 (k - 1,2). Following 
appendix B, therefore, the solution is 
N( N 
NG t-to) Nl(t-tO) 24(t)x t y (t) -e y(t e 
00 
N t) 
.Z( 
(1.4.19) 
(1.4.20) 
-1 T HlýkX(t) 
T 
&Bý(BN)Y(t)y(to) nc(t) Rkl 
NT TT 
where !E. QE1 ! E2] and EP has been paxtitioned conformably with 
-FIT BN .C ((E? 
I)I)T ((EIN)2)TJT. , Yr I tý -. z 
PROPOSMON 1.4.3 : The optimal policy is time consistent 
Pxvpeall.. the proof of Proposition 1.4.2 using equation (1.4.19) 
so that 
(tlt Wi AN,, 
(t-tj) 
it )-7A -to)(;? )-I 11 i0 . 13. 
e I(t 11 Y(to) 
N 
(tit ) Q. E. D. (1.4.22) 
0 
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Open Loop Stacketborg 
Player 2 acts as a Nash Player so that equations 
(1.4.17) apply with k-2. In contrast, player I takes into account 
player 2's reaction function which is encapsulated analytically by 
player I optimizing conditional on the behaviour of player 2 
described in equations (1.4.17) (that is, player 2's first order 
conditions). Then substituting for player 2's reaction function, 
min. 18f 
t1 
e-pt(XTQIX +T 
T- JtyRw+ ir R Yr 2 )dt 101 11 12 22ý 
Problem definition 
(player 1) 
AX + BL# +ET 1 2112 
ý2 1 12 -Q2y- +A 
(1.4.23) 
-pt TT T- T H- 'lite (X Qly + jtRllýtl + E2 R 1212) + JA,, 
(Ay + Blt! I+E 212) 
+T (--Q2X +A 'T) P-1 2 1ý2 
ý21 
Hamiltonian (1.4.24) 
QJY + 
Wir + QT, IE12 n 
T 
-'3Bl /'31E2 'o A12 * ý-r12 ý -R 121E2- 
E2Ell + A""12 
R -1 8T. 
first 
order 
condi- 
tions 
(1.4.2S) 
where -B -1 -1 
T 1ý12 
2R22Rl2p'22B2 
Pt and ! Elk eR1. k (k - 1,2). It is now noted that the costate variable 
'ýL-_12 is a costate on the non-predetermined costate variable of player 
2s, ff2. Just as the costates on predetermined variables are non- 
predetermined, likewise the costates on non-predetermined variables 
are predetermined. Thus, the adjoint system describinq the dynamic 
behaviour of the system under optimal open loop Stackelberg control is 
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ts A0E, E2 X3 8 
t12 0AT -E 2 _; 12 ! E12 
Fs 
E12 
(1.4.26) 
jill --Ql -Q2 
ýT 
o E23. ! III 
*2 -Q2 00 
ýT 
! E2 ! E2 
with 3n boundary conditions, Y-(t )-y. and E 3. 
(tl) = E2(tl) -0 as 01 
before so that there remains n further conditions associated with 
rr . Recall from above that are costates on the non-predetermined ýý-12 IE12 
costates of player 2, ! E2 , and are themselves, therefore, predeter- 
mined. rn addition, since ! E2 are jump variables, there is a freedom 
to choose any initial value for these, ! r2(to, ), which will alter the 
value of the maximand; but this change must be zero at the optimum 
and since ir 12 
(t 
0) measures 
this change, ! E12 (t 
0)-0 
provides the 
remaining n boundary conditions (see Driffill (1982)). The solution 
of the system now follows as 
8 'X(t )3 Y(to) 
eG 
(t-to) 0 A3. (t-to) e 
00 
(1.4.27) 
IT -HK, (t) 
Vto) 
0 
T TT 
where EB(t) - [! r IIE23 . 
To obtain expressions for w in terms of 
proceed as follows. 
Note first that a -H 
3 UY 8TT]T defines the stable trajectory ) '[12 
so that partitioning E? as before, Hs - [((Hs) 
1)T ((LIS) 2)TIT, we have 
IC(. s)T T 3T and S)T 
T 3T. Y E2 Y Ell ! E12 _(33)2[(, - 
412 Substituting 
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into equations (1.4.17) and (1.4.25), 
PýýBi7( El, )k (1.4.29) y1c 
2121 
' 
s 
Then from equation (1.4.27), 
s 
-1 Tsks 2ýk(t) - Fj&Bý(H ) K. I(t), Y(to) 
(1.4.30) 
with Ks(t) - CK 1 
(t) K23(t)]. An alternative way of deriving equation 
(1.4.30) is to note from equation (1.4.27) that ys(t) - K'131(t)y(to) 
and Yr (t)-Ks 
ss-: L 0 (t) and 
-12 '21(t)y(to) 
so that iT 12 
(t) -X 21 
(t)(K 
11 
(t)) X 
therefore 
ysR -1 8Tsk91 (1.4.31) ks 
K' (t)(K (t)) 
21 13. 
Finally, a further way of writing !t is obtained by recalling that 
412(t) - G291'y'g(t) + G2S2112(t) in which case 
ts 
-712(t) -t 
eCrý2(t-r) Gsly s (-r)dr (since E12(to) m 0) and 
0 
tsx 
(1.4.32) R)-ýX(Eýly(t) + E, 9 eG22(t-T)G28, 
S(r)dr) 1ý2ft 
0 
W'th ('? )k - CH: l 1ý2] 
(k - 1,2). 
PROPOSMON 1.4.4 : The optimal policy is time inconsistent. 
PRoop : Repeat the proof of Proposition 1.4.2 using equation (1.4.27) 
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and recall that it is always optimal to set IE12 M-0 at the date 
of optimization. Then 
x3 (tit ys (t. ) s Vt Ai(t-tj) 6 -1 3 ;d is e 
AJL( t-to) (ý, SLL)-, 0 e ?-)- 
.! 
E12 (tit j)l 
11 11 
.0 
11 
.01 
(tit 0 E. D. 
IE12 (tit O)l 
(1.4.33) 
Formally, the source of time inconsistency is found in the follower's 
costates, IE2 , which are forward-looking variables and reflect the 
announced policy of the dominant player who exploits this fact. 
1.4(C) The Rational Expectations Dynamic Game 
(a) Open Loop StackeLberg 
The control problem is given in equation (1.4.1) - (1.4.3) 
yielding the adjoint system in equation (1.4.4). Note, however, 
TT T that y is now paz-titioned into y where z is an nxI 
vector of predetermined variables and x is an n2xI vector of non- 
predetermined variables. In addZtion, v is partitioned conformably 
with [z 
TxTIT 
so that ir -[TTIT ith ll,., an nxI vector oE E111ý12 wI 
free costates (associated with z) and v 12 an n2xI vector of pre- 
determined costates (associated with X). The analogy with the 
standard Stackelberg game in section 1.4(8) is straightforwaxd: 
x contains forward looking variables ind is the analogue to 42 (where 
a2 was the follower's vector of costates); the costates on x axe in 
1E3.2 which is the sa as before (where 412 was the leader's costates 
on g2). Since both y and rr contain both predetermined and non- 
determined variables, therefore, equation (1.4.4) is re-ordered to 
give the adjoint system for the rational expectations open loop 
Stackelberg game, 
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.S A 
11 E 12 
E 11 
A 12 
s s 
z 
ir 
12 
'T -T 
-Q21 A22 A 21 -'022 ! E12 
I 
'. L 
! E12 
(1.4.34) 
A12 "T 'T -Qll Ai2 Aj., -'Q12 Ell E23. 
.S ?E A 21 E 22 
E 21 A 12 
s x x 
with. 2n boundary conditions, z(t 0)-z0, ! Ell(tl) - 2E(tl) -0 
and 
a (t 0. Then equation (1.4.34) has solution `, 12 o 
zsMTs (t-to) Z(to) Ai(t-to) -3. 
A(to) 
Me0 
(N 
0 12 
A(t 0 
ill Mps 
LT, (t) 
(to) 
2SSM 
Ii 
0 
where the definitions of T, A, N (N) and P should be clear from 
section 1.4(A). Analogous to the standard Stackelberg game in 
section 1.4(B), j! can be expressed in the following forms (see 
Levine and Currie (1984)). Using CT (XB)TjT = _. PsC(zs)T 
TIT 
lu M12 
(defining the saddlepath), !E31sTT 1T 11" -cp 
) Ua ) M12 u5 
pS with Ps- [((P 
s)I)T ((P 5)2)TIT, so that using equation 12712 
(1.4.3), 
k-'; T 
1121 
'a - R-'IB V 
IE121 
(1.4.37) 
zTz 
-T s8 where B BIP. I., B2- BIP 123 
-P 
s 
vim 
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and 5 has been partitioned, a- [B 1B 21- Hence, from equation 
(1.4.35) 
3 1-T 
22 (t) -- R7 B1 (t)A(t 0) 
(1.4.38) 
with Us(t) - Eus-(t) E? -(t)]- Alternatively, note from equation 12 
(1.4.35) that A8M- Us- (t)z(t ) and U's (t)A(t ) so that 11 -o ! 
E12(t) ý 21 0 
(t) - U'- (t)(U, - 
(t)) -1 K(t) and therefore 12 21 11 
r 
s 3f M 
U281C t)(U. 1131(t))-Il 
AM (1.4.39) 
In addition, since ir (t) - T28., K(t) +T 
13 
12 22M12(t) cJ'ves 
E. 12(t) -fte 
T281 (t-, r ) T21 
I A(t)dr 
(since E12(to) m 0), 
t 
0 
t To (t) -+; 2f te 
22(t-T)T 
2 la(t)dr 
(1.4.40) 
0 
'T 
with B1; 2 Finally, from the stable trajectory defined 
2TTT 
above, [z E3.23 m "281, ý + P822! EI2) so that ! E12 
-(PS ) 
-1 + PO z) and 22 21- 
IcliTy -113T; w (t) -- li y(t) 
s1ssI where BT C; 1 2(p 22)- 
p 
21 2(p 22)- 
-p 
s0 -1 p3p3 (PS -l' 3 
11 
' pä12(P22) 
21 12 22) 
-(P 
0 )_i 9 -(P 
a )_i 
22 
P'21 
22 
(1.4.41) 
PROPOSrTrou 1.4.5 s The optimal policy is time inconsistent. 
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PROOF t Repeat the proof of Proposition 1.4.2 using equation (1.4.34) 
and recall that it is always optimal to set E12 M- 0 at the date of 
optimization. Then 
As (tit st 
Z(t 
3 (t-tj ) 's I &Sl( t-t. ) s 13 e4i Pi ;., eI 11 11 1 ; ',: L) IE12 (tit J)l .00 
(tit 0 
Q. E, D. (1.4.42) 
PROPOSrTroN 1.4.6 : The policy obtained Erom standard dynamic program- 
ming is generally sub-optimal. 
PROOF : Recall the system in equation (1.4.13) and substitute for the 
Y-3. relationship the non-causal relationship yl m yl(3±,, x2). Then 
first order conditions for the terminal period optimization are 
J/0 + Oy /'3w ailay + ailay ay /ay )-0 '3j/ow-2 ý '9j/OY2 "IYZ"W-2 + '3 W-2 1 -2( 12.21 
(1.4.43) 
which reduces to equation (1.4.14) only for the special case in which 
ayl/aw2 -0 (or OJlay I+ ailay 2 ay 2 /aX, - 0) Q. E. D. 
(b) Cl-osed Loop StackeLborg 
Currie and Levine (1985) conceptualise the reaction functions of 
the contxoller and privaLe sector as follows. For theýformar, this is 
just the control rule in equation (1.4.3) which can be re-written as 
in equation (1.4.37). The reaction function for the private sector 
TT is the saddlepath relationship between x and CS it 12 
jT. In general, 
therefore, the reaction functions for the controller (player 1) and 
the private sector (player 2) are 
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2121 
A 
D 
2121 
(1.4.44) 
TTT Note also from equation (1.4.35) that k12 ý cc ý ! El2j 7bus, 
,, T2TT partitioning 8- [(B") (B )], Dkm [(D Ol (Dk)2' (k 1,2) and 
c ý'Cc IC23" 
1: 3 11 .8.. 13 A 
11 
+B (D 
I)3. 
+ A. 
12 
(D 
2)1 
B (D 
1)2 
+ A12 (D 
2)2 zz 
I-T ir 
12, c1c2 IE12, 
.! 
E12, 
(1.4.45) 
j- la 
t 
le-pt [Z TT IG 
K 
dt (1.4.46) 
t0 
Z12 
11121 
T 
where Q- DjIRD, + Q) 
Q +(D TQ +Q (D ) +(D TQ (D )Q (D ) +(D )T9 (D ) 11 21 21 12 2122 22 21 12 2221 22 22 
(D )T +(D )Q (D T (D )TQ (D 2222 22 2122 22 22 
The control problem is then to minimize equation (1.4.46) with respect 
to DI subject to equation (1.4.45). Note that the functional rel- 
TTT 
ationship between x and E,! Z123 in equation (1.4.44) summarised in 
D 2' 
is a function of D,, indicating the dependence of the private 
sector's decision rule on the controller's policy rule. 
1.4(D) Perfect Cheating 
(a) Open Loop 
Killer and Salmon (1983) show that the ability to perfectly cheat 
the private sector amounts to making the equation for k redundant 
(since x reflects complete credibility of the announced policy and 
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is therefore effectively immune to the actual course of events) and 
recalling that continuous re-optimizing implies E12 (t) -0 at all 
times so that A12(t) - 0. Then equation (1.4.34) becomes 
ipc, -A 
11T PC' . 
APC All 12Q-22Q21 
E 
21+Al2Q; 22 
A 21 1- 
w- LlIc (. 1.4.47) 
-I -T -1 -Q Q. Q -Q A -Q Q22ý rr 
P- C- Aýcl 
12 22 21 11 11 12 21 11 
with 2n boundary conditions, A(t 
0)-za 
andE I I(t. 1) - 0, which 
has 
solution 
. Rp, 
(t) 
.- rjp, 
(t)A(to) 
PP'UP'(t)A(t (1.4.49) 
h, 
PC(t) 
- R-3'B 1 Pjpca(t) - 
R-'IB lppcupc(t)Ap, 
(to) (2.4.50) 
(31) 
which is obviously time consistent 
(b) Closed Loop 
Currie and rAvine (1985) qive the closed loop representation of 
perfect cheating as involving the controller announcing a policy in 
the form of equation (1.4.44) and deliberately re-optimizinq at each 
time by setting 412 (t) -0 which amounts to actually implementing 
lt(t) - (D I)I: K(t). 
1.4(E) Hash Equilibria 
(a) Open Loop Nash and the Bufter (1983) SoLutton 
Buiter (1983) exploits the fact that '[12 (t) -0 at all times for 
time consistency which amounts to simply deleting the row and the 
column corresponding to a 12 
in equation (1.4.34). 
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A1 
.1 
E3.., A. 12 
'T 
-Qll A 11 -Q12 Mll 
(. 1.4.51) 
AEAN 21 21 22J 2ý j 
with K(t z and v 11 
(t 0. The solution is 
ANM-U, (t). K(to) 
Ell M 
? E( t) 
2t 
N (t) -R -1 BI (P 
N)1AN (t) -R -1 BI (PN)le(t)z(t 0) 
(32) 
which is obviously time consistent 
PROPOSITION 1.4.6 s The Buiter (1983) solution is equivalent to the 
open loop Nash solution. 
PROOF : Currie and Levine (1985) show that the open loop Nash qame 
can be formalised as in equation (1.4.1) and the condition that x 
is given. Hence, 
-pt yTQY + WTRW) + RT 
1w) (1.4.55) El - lae I.., 
(A,., A +A 122ý +B 
alllaw 0R -1 (B 
I)T 
rr 
-T N 
- nvaýz - All 11 Q11A "I A 1.1-2.1.1 - 
Q122S 
and introducing the actual dynamics for ?E yields equation (1.4.51) 
with E 21 m-82, 
cl (B I)T. Q. E. D. 
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Mosed Loop Nash and the Cohen and Htchal. (1984) 
(dynamic programming) so&utton 
Cohen and Michel (1984) (generalised by Currie and Tavine (1985)) 
show the continuous time dynamic programming solution to involve 
minimizing 
j0 lae-pt (y T Qy +wT Rw) + (aJ I 
/Oz): i 
I -P(t--r) (y T Qy +wT Rw)dt 
t 
0 
yielding a control rule of the form 
-N )TY-N(t) . 
*"N(t) 
It (t) - -R-I(BI zD IR 
(1.4.58) 
The matrix Y is a solution to a Ricatti equation derived as follows. 
From equation (1.4.57) 
ajllat - 18(y 
T QX +wT Rw) + pi 1 
a(e i 
lae-pt Cy TT +w Rw). 
Ot 
(1.4.59) 
000 -92pt Define ii - J., (A M) where z (t) me z(t) so that 
a(e-ptjl)/at . ajq -lapt . /at _ (aj la, 
T. o .00+e 
1 Then since z PA 
and using ?E- D2, R and w- Dla, 
(A 81D* 
. 11 
+ A12D2 + 
I)z 
(A 
11 +A 12 D2+BD1 
(1.4.60) 
Setting aJ I 
/az -- Yzo then yields an expression for e 
Pt a(e-Pt JI)Iat. 
An alternative expression for e Pt a(e -Pt iI )/at can be obtained directly 
fzxxu equation (1.4.59) so that equating these relationships gives 
so 
TT -* T1 -1 1 'r y (A 11 +A 12 
D 2-'apl)+(All 
+A 12 D 2-'Zpr 
) Y+Q, I-Y BRC8)T-0 
(1.4.61) 
using the definition of D in equation (1.4.58) and where Q 11 ý 
Qll 
(D*) TQ+QD*+ (D *)TQD*. 
2 21 12 22 22 2 
PROPOSMON 1.4.7 t The Cohen and Kichel (1984) dynamic programing 
solution is equivalent to a closed loop Nash solution. 
PaDor : Recall the closed loop Stackelberg qame in section 1.4(C). 
For the Nash ga , the optimization problem is to minimize equation 
(1.4.46) by choice of D1 subject to equation (1.4.45) and the con- 
dition that the private sector response function is parametric (i. e., 
D2 is given). This can also be expressed as minimizing equation 
(1.4.62) subject to equation (1.4.63) below which is in the 
standard form: 
tI 
-pt rTT jaj! 
E 
7, T 
je7.9 +X RXIdt 
12 
t 
ci 
1 
121 
iA 
11 +A 12 
(D 
2)1 A 12 
(D 
2)2 
cc 
.! 
E121 12 
and the optimal control rule will be of the form 
-N 1T 
32 , -R71[(B ) 01; iliý 
121 
with Y the solution to the matrix Ricatti equation 
; (w L-; ) +5- ; 
T; 
- 
(1.4.62) 
.BI. 
zB1 
W+ 
121 
01 
(1.463) 
(1.4.64) 
(1.4.65) 
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1T OITR71C(BI)T 01. (Thia j. where W- PI -W and E [(B )s eaj3ily 
verified by writing the Hamiltonian as 
-pt TT7, 
,T. 
wz H- lae + wTRw + A-11 
.1 
12. 
minimizing with respect to p1l, !t and 
TT]T 
and noting, in C& '-L12 
particular, that w R71CC81)T OJE 1 . 1. 
Then the adjoint of this 
system gives the saddlepath rr 
ýr TT jT which, when substituted 11 ý E12 
into w gives equation (1.4.64). ) Now, recall that a time consistent 
solution obtains if v (t) -0 at all tims. ý-l 2 
becomes 
-1 1 T' (8 )Y 
with 
; 
11 the solution 
to 
(1.4.67) 
_ 
'T - 
'11 y 11) + 
511 w 11 y 11 m0 
(1.4.68) 
and E8 
Y-1 (B I)T. Substituting for W 11 mA 11 +A 12 
(D 
2)1 
from 
equation (1.4.63) into equation (1.4.68) 
; 
11 11 +A 12 
(D 
2)1 - 
lapt) + (A 
11 
+A 12 
(D 
2)1 - 
lapr)T; 
Ll 
1 -1 1 T- YBR (B )T (1.4.69) 
so that with (D 2)1 = 
D2 (and therfore 11 '0 Qll 
) and with Y, Y 11 
symmetric, equations (1.4.69) and (1.4.61) show that Y-ý,,, or that 
Y in equation (1.4.58) satisfies the same matrix Ricatti equation as 
Then equation (1.4.64) 
does Y 11 
in equation (1.4.68). Q. E. D. 
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(c) R@Datfonshfp Between the Butter (1983) and 
Cohen and MtcheZ, (1984) SoLuttons 
An alternative way of deriving the Cohen and Michel (1984) solu- 
tion is presented by these authors and Miller and Salmon (1984b). 
This particular method gives the following proposition. 
PROPOSMON 1.4.8 : The Buiter (1983) (open loop Nash) solution is 
nested in the Cohen and Michel (1984) (closed loop Nash) solution. 
PF=F : The Cohen and Michel (1984) solution proceeds with the 
controller, treating aspara tric the private sector's response 
function in equation (1.4.44) and ignoring E12 for time consistency. 
Hence, x- tR say, with j an n2xn1 matrix which is treated as 
parametric by the controller. The analogues to equations (1.4.55) - 
(1.4.56) are therefore 
-pt TTT1 Ize A+A C)z +B W) (1.4.70) Y- Y- +w Rw) + gll(( 11 12 -- 
alllaw -0*w-- R-1 (B 
I)T 
Mil 
aala-Z 
TQ )A+(A TtTATT )2s All I'll (Qll+' 21 11- 12)! Ell-(Ql2+ 
t Q22 
(1 "4" 71) 
giving the adjoint system 
&. 4 - 
AE 
. 13.11 
-T TT 
-(Q +4TQ *) (A -j A 11 21 11 12 
A21 E 
21 
-N 
A 
12 A 
-(Q +tTQ m 12 22 11 
-N mu 
A 
22 AA 
(1.4.72) 
with E 21 =-B 
2R71 (a 
I)T 
and A( t0)-z0,11 13. 
(t. 
1) - 2S(tl) - 
0. The 
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solution is 
-N ; N(t)A(t 
0) 
(1.4.73) 
Zii(t) 
-N .-;,; 
N(t)ýý(t 
. 
gE (t) 
1 
(1.4.74) 
-N -1 -N 1-H -1B N X (t) -R B_I(P )A (t) - li , 
(; )I; N(t) A(to) (1.4.75) 
which is obviously time consistent. The Buiter (. 1983) solution 
obtains when the leve-I of x (as opposed to the functional xelation- 
ship between x and z) is treated as given which occurs when C-0. 
Q. E. D. 
1.4(F) Stochastic Control 
tI 
-PttZTQ T ), at 
-+ min. 
E(J) - I&E ew Rw 
t0 problem definition (1.4.76) 
s. t. gx - AYdt + Bwdt + du 
I 
As stated in section 1.3(E), the stochastic control problem can be 
redefined (see loevine and Curie (1984)) such tht the optimisation is 
decomposed into detexministic and stochastic components. Levine and 
Currie (1984) show that the optimal control rule satisfies certainty 
equivalence. 
s Tbe optimal policy is tisme inconsistent. 
PROOF . An alternative proof of Proposition 1.4.5 which is useful for 
future purposes is as follows. Consider the deterministic ca e. 
Then by the maxi um princip-le, dJ/! gy -T so that J(t) 
T 
a (t)x(t) 
Recalling the saddlepath relationship in Section 1.4(C), 
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ff --(Pz+Pa) and -x 
P ). Note also that 12 lk-- 12-22 21ý 
+ P22! EI2 
pTp and PTp (see Levine and Currie (1984)). Then the 11 11 12 21 
loss associated with the ex ants optimal policy is 
J*(t) 
T t) T)3 
-pil 
it 12 
t0 
01r z(t))l 
-P 22 IE12 (t 
T 
(t)p Z(t) +T (t)P IT (t)) - -latr(]? Z(t) +P .K llý 
! E12 22-12 11 22L'12(t)) 
(1.4.77) 
T (t) T (t). where Z(t) ý(t)ý (t); rl 12 
(t) - !E 12 ! E12 But since P 22 
is 
non-positive definite (see Levine and Currie (1984)) the policy 
becomes suboptimal at ti>t0 because welfare loss can be reduced 
by an amount '-Iatr(P 22 11 22 
(t)) by re-optimising and 3ettinq ! [22 (t) - 0. 
This holds for the stochastic case since equation (1.4.77) just 
becomes 
E(J (t)) -- latr(P 11 
(Z(t) +p -1 r. ) +P 
22 
17 
12(t)) 
(1.4.78) 
where 1: - cov(Aul); [(! gul)T (! ýu)TIT _ du. Q. E. D. 
PROPOSITION 1.4.10 : In the stochastic system, if the rate of discount 
is sufficiently low, there is no incentive to renege and the optimal 
ex ante policy is enforceable. 
PROOF - First derive the welfare loss associated with the Nash 
policy. By analogy with equations (1.4.77) - (1.4.78)p 
JRM- letr(Yz(t)) (1.4.79) 
E(J 
N (t)) - latr(Y(Z(t) + P-1 1: )) 
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where Y is the solution to the Ricatti equation (1.4.61). In 
addition, from the proof of Proposition 1.4.9, the welfare loss 
associated with the time inconsistent (full optimal) policy is 
ý(t) 
-- *atr(P IIZ(t)) 
(1.4.61) 
latr(P 
11 
Mt) + P-1 E)). (1.4.82) 
The temptation to renege can now -be measured by rtr - E(J (t)) - 
E(ý(t)) whilSt the cost of reneging is revexsion to the Nash policy 
or nC - E(J'M(t)) - E(J*(t)). Equations (1.4.78) - (1.4.82) give 
nc M latr((Y +P 11)(Z(t) 
+ P-1 r) +P 22 
17 
12 
(t)) with rkr - 
- latr(P 22 LI 12 
(t)). Hence, as p falls, nC increases until such point 
when there are no gains from reneging. Q. E. D. 
Turning to the formulation of simple rules, assume no discounting 
so that 
min. E(J) - E(y. 
Týý + WTRW) 
!t 
s. t. Aydt + Bw dt + du 2- 
problem definition 
Substituting !t-. D IX-f 
dy - Aydt + du 
where Tk -A+ BD I. 
(1.4.83) 
(1.4.84) 
Assuming i has the saddlepoint property, the stable trajectory is 
x- D2z and the feedback rule becomes 
- (1.4.85) 
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where 
ýJL 
m (D I)i + 
(D 
1)2D2 
and D, - C(D, )., (D., Y* Then x- D2. K and equation (1.4.85) can be 
substituted into equation (1.4.83) so that 
dz - Tzdt + du 
whexe T-A 11 
+A 
12 
D2+BD 
Following Chow (1979) the asymptotic variance of z can be computed as 
stated in-appendix, E. -Note 
that the solution will depend on the 
assumption made about strategic behaviour. Cearly, D2 is a function 
of DI. Hence, a closed loop Nash solution obtains if the controller 
treats as given the functional relationship, otherwise a closed loop 
Stackelberg solution is derived. 
This completes our mathematical treatment of the issues discussed 
in sections 1.1 - 
Summary and Concluding Remarks 
The ebapter bas been motivated by a recent rapidly growing reseaxcb 
programme on macroeconomic policy design in the presence of forward- 
looking behaviour. The major insight of this research is the 
appreciation of the policy problem as a dynamic game between intelli- 
gent players - the goverment and the private sector - and the 
implications thereof. The scope of the paper reflects the rapid 
growth of interest in the area, the need to clarify some matters and 
the attempt to provide a comprehensive and unified discussion. It is 
hoped that we have been successful in achieving these and our final 
thoughts can be summarized fairly briefly as follows. 
The fundamental. dilemma of optimal policies when the controller 
assumes the role of a dominant player is that they are dynamically 
inconsistent (that is, do not satisfy the princiPle of optimalitY). 
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As such, there is always an incentive to renege on an announced 
policy which therefore lacks credibility and one must then seek 
policies which are optimal within the subset of credible (and hence 
time consistent policies). Time consistent equilibria can be obtained 
with precommitment and perfect cheating. We are sceptical about the 
former because the lack of enforceable contracts will always render 
any proposed precommitment suspect since the incentive to renege 
persists. The latter solution is simply inconceivable because it 
requires an implausibly gullible private sector. Researchers have 
then turned to examining Nash solutions which eschew the strategic 
asymmetry inherent in the Stackelberg game. Typically, these 
investigations have exploited the concept of perfect. equilibria and 
the time consistency of backward-recursive optimization techniques 
analogous to standard dynamic programming approaches. Though time 
concistency is guaranteed in these frameworks, it is our view that 
there has been an over-preoccupation with them since they really 
avoid the main issue at stake which is the problem of enforcing the 
ex ants optimal policy. Moreover, it is precisely the loss of 
leadership and reversion to the inferior Nash solution which may 
motivate the controller to avoid the temptation to cheat. The 
reputation framework in which players are now engaged in a repeated 
game offers a resolution of time inconsistency which is already 
endogenous to the problem and we believe that this is the only 
plausible framework in which to address the issue. Unfortunately, 
the reputation framework appears to suffer (even for very simple 
models) from severe problems of tractability and is certainly devoid 
of any quantitative content. We urge research to be directed towards 
these matters if the reputation approach is to sustain and enhance 
the respect which we believe it deserves. An alternative approach 
for examining reputation issues which might prove particularly useful 
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here is to exploit the stochastic control problem which appears to 
mimic a repeated game. 
Whilst on the subject of stochastic systems, it is work pointing 
out, however, that relatively little attention has been given to 
these. But the policy problem is likely to take on additional inter- 
esting dimensions under such circumstances as there is a potential 
confusion between an optimal response to stochastic perturbations 
and an attempt by the controller to cheat. The precise outcome is 
unclear and we believe that the stochastic case in general should be 
explored in more detail. It may turn out that consideration'of 
purely deterministic systems has made the resolution of time incon- 
sistency appear far more easy than is actually the case. 
we also believe that greater insight could be gained by relaxing 
the informational assumptions that characterise most of the litera- 
ture. An interest filtering problem would involve agents attempting 
to identify the intentions and current behaviour of others. The 
reputation of the policy maker may not be uniform across individuals 
and the credibility of threats could be undermined, though we have 
also suggested that this might actually help in enforcing the 
announced policy. rn any event, preoccupation with full information 
games has probably meant a neglect of possibly more substantive issues 
associated with a greater degree of realism. 
our overall thoughts on the literature are guarded. There are 
sufficient grounds for regarding time inconsistency as posing an 
acute problem and we believe that the recent research has been 
crucial in yielding new insights into the problem of policy design. 
Note, however, that the literature has little or nothing to say about 
particular policy recommendations; rather it identifies general 
themes which are likely to apply globally. The ultimate anxiety is 
the question of its operational significance and whether the advances 
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made in control theory and macroeconomic policy evaluation will go 
unheeded by the afficianados of the policy making process. To enable 
the abstract ideas appear more relevant, empirical work is called for 
and the investigations into international cooperation and policy 
coordination seem especially useful here. Another potentially 
fruitful line of inquiry stressed by Chow (1976a, b) and Currie (1985) 
a ng others concerns the systematic investigation into policy rules 
which perform reasonably well not only in the face of different 
stochastic shocks but also across different models. Given the lack 
of consensus on the appropriate model of the economy, this would 
appear to be an especially useful area for research and chapters 2 
and 3 in this thesis are directed towards this issue. To end on a 
more optimistic note, however, one may find some comfort in the pace 
at which the research is developing. If this continues we may find an 
answer sooner, rather than later, on whether, in fact, the research 
has merely been a ga between economists. We suspect not. 
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Notes to Chapter one 
This chapter can be found in Blackburn (1906a). 
(1) One might argue that it is unfortunate that so much attention 
should have been devoted to the debate for it is an issue which 
rational expectations per so cannot resolve. At the same time, 
however, it provided the opportunity for economists to become 
familiar with the hypothesis and prompted awareness of other 
issues. 
(2) As Buiter (1980b) observes, this does not necessarily rely on 
rational expectations but merely the fact that agents condition 
their expectations partly on their perceptions about the policy 
regime. 
(3) Time inconsistency may also arise if tastes change, as identi- 
fied by Strotz (1956) (see also Begg (1982b)) Holly (1983)). 
This should be obvious and we are concerned with the more 
interesting case in which time inconsistency occurs in the 
absence of changing tastes. 
(4) Causal dynamic models are models in which the current state of 
the system is determined solely by its present and past 
history. rn non-causal models, however, the current state of 
the system is determined not only by its present and past 
history, but also by future expectations. The excellent volume 
by Chow (1975) focusses on causal models. 
(5) Two further categories of control rules are work mentioning. 
First there is feedback control. This is more general. than 
closed loop control (though the two terms are often used inter- 
changeably) in the sense that it involves aspects oflearning 
and probing. Second, there is sequenttaL open loop control. 
In this, the controller responds to an observed departure from 
the optimal trajectory by recomputing an optimal open loop 
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plan. The fundamental difference between this type of 
response and the response exhibited by a closed loop rule is 
that the latter is entirely automatic. Clearly, sequential 
open loop control endows the controller with greater scope for 
discretion. 
(6) Since it is not obvious the significance of the off-diagonal 
terms, it is commonly assumed that Q and R are diagonal. This 
is unimportant here. In addition, a term yT Sw is also some- 
times found in equation (1.2.4) where S is an nxm time- 
invariant matrix. The inclusion of this adds nothing to the 
analysis and merely complicates the algebra. 
(7) Generalization to the n-person game is straightforward, though 
tedious (see, for example, Miller and Salmon (1983)). 
(8) Though collectively they may exert strong pressure on the 
government, individually each agent does not have such power 
and all agents know this. Moreover, it is unlikely that there 
is any mechanism through which any potential combined strength 
could be demonstrated. Indeed, if there was such a mechanism, 
the ga could possibly degenerate into Stackelberg warfare. 
we return to this issue later. 
(9) obviously, m1Am2 is possible. 
(10) As shown in Section 1.4, there is a close relationship between 
the standard game-theoretic framework and the rational expecta- 
tions framework. We consider both open loop and closed loop 
games in the latter and because of the close relationship, the 
closed loop ga in the standard ga is easily retrievable. 
(11) Thus, resorting to the terminology often encountered in the 
literature, a closed loop decision rule can be a solution to an 
open loop game; hence the use of our own terminology. 
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(12) Levine and Currie (1984) argue for the desirability of imple- 
menting control rules in terms of the state vector because they 
avoid feedback on the (possibly unobservable) costate variables 
(see Section 1.4 for the definition of costate variables). 
This argument has some merit, though it is not a complete 
solution to the problems first, the controller could presum- 
ably merely divulge information about his costates) second, it 
it likely that contemporaneous information about some state 
variables is unavailable. 
(13) One condition is that the effect of changes in the initial 
state on the performance measure, both directly and indirectly 
through the influence of future expectations, is zero (see 
Proposition 1.4.6 and its proof). Buiter (1980a) observes that 
this is satisfied if the preference function is independent 
of control variables and Holly and Zarrop (1983) explain this 
by noting that, under such circum tances, the controller is 
able to costlessly achieve his targets and there is no gain 
from altering controls in subsequent periods (see also 
Turnovsky and Brock (1980) for a related observation). Begg 
(1982b) and Hillier and Malcomson (1984) observe that time 
inconsistency would disappear If there are sufficient numbers 
of instruments. 
(14) This is essentially because the government at time ti(i > 0) 
inherits an exogenous expend-iture pattern and debt commitments 
and the-budget constraint then dictates the tax policy which is 
the same as the tax policy computed at time t0. 
(15) The 'innovation-contingent' policy embodies the state 
independent ex ants optimal policy plus a feedback on stoch- 
astic realizations. Buiter (1980a, 1981a, b) also shows that 
even a time consistent policy derived from standard dynamic 
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programming or ad hoc simple feedback rules may dominate 
the non-contingent (time inconsistent) policy because, though 
these rules eschew the non-causalities in the system, they 
permit a response to new information. 
(16) Recall that these reflect the announced policy but, in the 
present case, the controller ignores bis influence on bis rival. 
(17) it could also be called quasi-open loop Nash. 
(18) In fact, we observed in section 2.2 that a closed loop Nash 
game has exactly the same feature only in this case it is 
symmetric, applying to both players. 
(19) As d'Autume (1984, p. 1) notes, "... one often finds in the 
literature hints that the quest for a time consistent policy 
is really the quest for a perfect equilibrium". 
(20) The perfect equilibrium solution involves players making 
current decisions in the knowledge that future equilibrium 
decisions will be followed, a backward recursive structure 
which is analogous to standard dynamic programaing. 
(21) To confuse matters further, Backus and Driffill (1984c) 
propose a feedback Nash equilibrium as another equilibrium 
concept. 
(22) Begg (1982b) has used this argument to justify the use of 
standard dynamic prograviming techniques. 
(23) Thus, the policy maker dislikes inflation, but prefers more 
inflation to less. The benefits from inflation are really the 
benefits from surprise inflation, reflected in the term 
q2( Irt-9 
e) 
and include expansions in output and employment. The t 
2 
costs of inflation, reflected in Iaqirt, are a little more diffi- 
cult to identify but could comprise some distortionary effect. 
The private sector is assumed unable to influence aggregate var- 
iables and merely attempts to avoid making forecasting errors. 
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(24) ir can be considered as a choice variable by envisaging some 
monetary instrument by which the controller can engineer a 
paxticular v (see Barro and Gordon (1983)). The treatment of 
ff 
e as a strategic variable may appear a little more contrived, 
though this interpetation should not be taken too literally. 
It is true that iT e cannot be chosen arbitrarily but must be 
rational and consistent with actual events as perceived by the 
private sector. The foregoing interpretation serves to 
emphasize the inter-relationship between players, the con- 
troller taking into accounthis influence on expectations 
which are conditioned by policy announcements. 
(25) There need not be any pecuniary benefits of a strong reputa- 
tion. The benefits would arise because if the controller is 
e known to be weak, the solution is a- ir .I with no gain 
in output. By inducing agents to believe he is tough, the 
controller may be able to sustain an-0 policy for some time 
and eventually exploit the low inflation expectations by 
engineering a higher actual inflation. 
(26) specifically, the probability of observing at =0 in any period 
is Pr(yrt = 0) =Pt+ (I-P t 
)gt where gt is the probability that 
a goverranent will not inflate. Then given that Yrt w0 is 
actually observed, the probability next period that the govern- 
ment is hard is P t+2 = 
Pt/[P 
t+ 
(I-P Ogt]. 
(27) This is not strictly correct since reversion to the Nash 
solution might involve a cost. 
(28) Note that du is cleansed of any autoregressive disturbances by 
suitable definition of the state vector, y. Then du - edt, say 
where q has independent incr nts so that du is pure white 
noise. 
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(29) Holly and Zarrop (1961) identify a similar feature associated 
with sequential open loop control. 
(30) As a digression, recall from section 1.2(C) that we pointed 
out that the full optimal rule is expressable in terms of a 
linear time-invariant feedback on just z. it is straightforward 
to show, however, that the simple rule, w- Dy, can be 
expressed as a time-invariant feedback on just z (equation 
(1.4., 85)). Levine (1984) observes this peculiarity to be due 
to the fact that the linear relationship between w and y in 
the full optimal rule does not constitute the optimal policy as 
announced by the policy maker because announcing the optimal 
policy in this form changes the dynamics of the system. 
(31) For the stýýndard Stackelberg game without rational expecta- 
tions, the perfect cheating solution obtains by setting 
'T12(t) - A12(t) -0 and dropping the equation for E2 in 
equation (1.4.26) (see Miller and Salmon (1983)). 
(32) For the standard Stackelberg game without rational expecta- 
tions, the Buiter (1983) solution obtains when the row and 
column corresponding to M 12 
(t) in equation (1.4.26) iZ 
aletecl. 
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CTUMMR 2 
MONETARY INSTRUMENTS AND THE CONTROL PROBLEM 
AN INTRODUCTION AND APPRAISAL 
2.1 Introduction 
The issue of monetary control continues to receive widespread 
attention. In recent years most industrialised countries have 
witnessed the adoption of monetary targets as the anchor for macro- 
economic policy. The arguments for and against such policies and the 
opinions expressed about the realised consequences thereof are numer- 
ous and varied. In this chapter we concentrate on one particular 
justification for their deployment in the context of a control 
framework. 
To be specific, the issue is which potential monetary instrument 
variable the policy maker should choose for the purpose of stabiliz- 
ation policy. In particular, the set of alternatives includes the 
money stock, interest rates and the exchange rate. Control cannot be 
administered simultaneously over all three for the simple reason that 
at least one requires to be free in order to equilibrate the money 
market. It is well known, and will be proved below, that in a deter- 
ministic setting and provided the instruments do not enter into the 
policy maker's utility function, the problem of instrument choice is 
redundant. This is not true, however, in a stochastic environment; 
the choice of instrument is then non-trivial. 
It will be recalled from chapter I that we emphasize the need to 
adopt a particular methodology for policy evaluation. This motivates 
the testing of alternative policies across divergent model structures 
with the view to seeking model-robust policy rules. This has been 
emphasized by Chow (1976a, b), Johansen (1979) and Currie (1985a, b). 
In chapter 3 we apply this methodology to the monetary instrument 
problem. it is useful, therefore, to be acquainted with existing 
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literature on the issue. This is the purpose of section 2.2. (The 
discussion is concerned with the standard and popular approach to the 
problem. This eschews potentially more interesting issues that will 
be coamtented upon in chapters 5 and 6. ) A conclusion which emerges 
is that, despite the extent of research into the problem, the litera- 
ture has little or nothing to say about model-robust policies. In 
chapter 3 no fewer than six different rational expectations models 
are employed in order to correct for this. A justification for our 
choice is given in section 2.3. Section 2.4 is a digression on an 
issue raised in the literature on the possibility of price level 
indeterminacy when control is administered over interest rates. 
such an outcome would render this policy redundant as a viable strat- 
egy. we offer a resolution of this problem by demonstrating that 
there will generally exist a policy rule for which the solution of 
the system is uniquely determined even when the interest rate is 
arbitrarily fixed. The chapter concludes with section 2.5. 
2.2 The rnstrument Problem 
Consider the stochastic IS-IM system 
Y 30 -01R+e101 2ý 0 (1 - 0,1) (2.2.1) 
14 Yo 4" YI Y- Y211 + '02 YJ ). 0 (j - 0,1,2) (2.2.2) 
where Y- real. income 
nominal (and real) interest rate 
nominal (and real) stock of money 
ek - stochastic disturbance (k - 1,2) 
and the upper case notation indicates that variables are not measured 
as deviations from long-run equilibrium. Equation (2.2.1) is the IS 
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curve; aggregate demand is negatively related to the rate of 
interest. Equation (2.2.2) is the LH curve; nominal money demand 
depends positively on real income and negatively on the rate of 
interest. The disturbance e1 is an expenditure shock; e2 represents 
random portfolio behaviour. We assume these to be Gaussian and 
-2 (k - 1,2). The independently distributed with asymptotic variance cr k 
performance measure is 
E(J) za ', tE(Y - Y*) 
2 (2.2.3) 
where an asterisk denotes the target value of a variable and the 
control propblem is to minimize the value of equation (2.2.3) subject 
to the system in (2.2.1) - (2.2.2). The instrument is either H or R. 
(Alternatively, one may question the direct controllability of the 
money stock and consider as a substitute the monetary base; the 
analysis that follows may then be applied- see, for example, Friedman 
(1975)). 
The reduced form expressions for when the money stock or the 
interest rate is the instrument follow from equations (2.2.1) - 
(2.2.2) as 
Y(M) - (Y2 + Y1,3jL )-l (y2j3o - 01(yo - M) + Y241 - J31'62) (2.2.4) 
R(H) - (y2 I yl, 01) -1 (yo -H+ ylj3o + yl, 61 + 452) (2.2.5) 
Y(R) - Oo - 01R + el (2.2.6) 
M(R) 8* y0+ 'yl J3 
0-( 
ylj3l + Y2 )R + yle, + e2 (2.2.7) 
where the notation emphasizes the particular policy reginie. From 
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(2.2.4) and (2.2.6) the optimal values for M and R, M and R* respec- 
tively, are 
11 
((V2 + yl'pl)y Y2 13 0+ io 
'/ 
0 
(2.2.8) 
(2.2.9) 
Equations (2.2.8) - (2.2.9) hold for both deterministic and stocb- 
astic cases. They are true for the latter by the certainty 
equivalence principle. Substituting (2.2.8) - (2.2.9) into (2.2.4) - 
(2.2. '7) we find in particular 
Y(M Y2+ yl'ol)-l (y (2.2.10) 20-1 - '31452) 
Y(R Y 
in the deterministic case (ek 0 (k 1,2)), therefore, the 
choice of instrument is innocuous: Y(M Y(R Y and R(M 
R M(R H also. By contrast, the presence of stochastic shocks 
(ek 00 (k 1,2 implies Y(M 0 Y(R ;9Y and R(M 0R 
M(R N in addition. The choice of instrument is therefore non- 
trivial in the stochastic setting. 
Poole (1970) provided the seminal contribution to the analYsis 
of the monetary instrument problem (see also Holbrook and Shapiro 
(1970); Kareken (1970); LeRoy and Lindsey (1978)). His main 
conclusions cars be obtained from equations (2.2.10) - (2.2.11) in 
conjunction with equation (2.2.3). - 
-2(Y2 2+ J32-2 E(J(M (y. + y3. j3lL) a cr (2.2.12) 22112 
E(J(R (2.2.12) 
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where E(, ) is the expectations operator. Thus, the relative merits 
of alternative instruments depend, in general, on the variance- 
covariance structure of stochastic disturbances and the structural 
para ters of the model. In particular, a relatively large value for 
-2 -2 a1 implies E(J(M < E(J(R whilst if a2 is more prominent, 
E(J(M E(J(R 0. in short, the optimal instrument is deter- 
mined by the relative stability of the goods and money markets: 
controlling the money stock is optimal in the face of aggregate 
demand shocks; interest rate control is superior for the case of 
monetary volatility. 
These results are explained as follows. Control over the money 
supply permits endogenous fluctuations in the interest rate. These 
variations are stabilizing for expenditure shocks, causing demand 
movements which partly offset the initial perturbation. By contrast, 
they allow monetary disturbances to spill over onto the goods market, 
which effect is neutralized by following an accommodative monetary 
policy. As shown by Poole (1970) such 'pure' policies can generally 
be improved upon by adopting a combination policy in which the money 
stock is contemporaneously related to the interest rate. The ability 
to respond to new information provides, the reason for the superiority 
of this policy which encapsulates the pure, policies as limiting 
cases(l). 
The above analysis has been extended in a number of important 
directions. which overcome some of the weaknesses of the simple 
cr istem in. equations (2.2.. 1) - (2.2.2). 
I: n a recent paper, Craine and Havenner (1981) investigate the 
case of supply shocks. An aggregate supply function relating out- 
put (positively) to prices is appended to equations (2.2.1) - (2.2.2) 
and the superiority of interest rate control is demonstrated. The 
reason is straightforward. Exogenous supply shocks cause incipient 
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movements in prices and interest rates. An accommodative monetary 
policy prevents interest rate fluctuations by exacerbating the 
initial price movement. This shifts aggregate demand and supply 
such that they equilibrate at the original level of output and the 
supply shock is completely neutralized. By contrast, and as a 
consequence, price volatility is greater than under money supply 
control. Moreover, the Poole (1970) criteria for demand and monetary 
disturbances carry over to the case of price stabilization. Thus, 
with regard to the latter two shocks, there is no conflict in 
optimal policies in terms of minimizing output and price fluctu- 
ations. This ceases to be true for supply disturbances. This was 
overlooked (or at a minimum not stressed) by Craine and Havenner 
(2) (1981) 
The analysis of the instrument problem in dynamic systems can be 
found in Poole (1970) and more rigorously in Sargent (1971) and Moore 
(1972). rn the latter two, a modified multiplier-accelerator model 
is employed. The specification of policy describes lagged feedback 
rules some of which are in the derivate or proportional form, (see 
Phillips (1954)). The control problem is to minimize the value of 
(2.2.3) by appropriate choice of feedback para ters with the money 
stock and interest rate as alternative instruments. The dynanLic 
structure may qualify the earlier results in two ways. First, the 
absence of lagged response in money demand appears important for 
the validit-i of these results. 5, econd, pure policies which avoid 
feedback are likely to be especially unattractive when the system 
exhibits dynamic behaviour. This is another illustration of the 
view that contingent rules are generally superior to non-contingent 
rules by virtue of the dependency of control instruments on new 
information (and it always makes sense not to waste any 
information) (3). once non-contingent policies are adopted, the usual 
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results of Poole (1970)'apply. As Moore (1972) shows, the case for 
such rules is strengthened as the lags in the system decline. Under 
such circumstances, lagged feedback rules may be destabilizing 
because the operation of control is effectively out of phase with 
current perturbations. 
The multiplier-accelerator model is adopted by Turnovsky (1975) 
in a further extension. The particular analysis by this author is 
tedious and the general point was demonstrated more succinctly by 
Kareken (1970). Both studies are motivated by the problem of control 
when the para ters of the system are stochastic. This escapsulates 
a further type of uncertainty facing the policy maker, originally 
explored by Brainard (1967). To incorporate this, Kareken (1970) 
modifies the basic structure in (2.2.1) - (2.2.2) such that 01 
(i - 0, I) and yj (j - 0,1,2) are random. The obvious implication 
-2 is that the optimal policy is now determined not only by ak (k - 1,2) 
but also by 
2 (i - 0, I) and a2 (J - 0,1,2), the variances of the C10i YJ 
stochastic coefficients. This is not surprising given our earlier 
remark concerning the relevance of parameter values for determining 
(4) 
the optimal instrument 
As yet, the transmission mechanism of monetary policy operates 
exclusively through interest rate induced changes in aggregate 
demand. Moreover, fiscal policy has been entirely eschewed. Currie 
(1980c) conducts a preliminary investigation into the implications 
of wealth accumulation arising from endoqenous shifts in the state 
of the government budget, which imbalances must be financed by the 
issue or retirement of asset stocks, either money or government debt. 
The rs and LK functions now have wealth as additional arguments and 
the economy fluctuates until stock-flow equilibrium obtains. There 
is a vast literature on the government budget constraint and chapter 
4 addresses the issue explicitly. Suffice to remind the reader of 
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the well-known dynamic implications pertaining to the stability 
properties of the system. Thus, choosing the stock of bonds as the 
residual financing instrument is likely to generate cumulative 
explosive behaviour. 
Currie (1980c) demonstrates that even in the face of expenditure 
disturbances, a money stock peg policy is likely to be qualified 
precisely because of the above possibilityj money stock control 
requires residual budget financing by bonds so that for stability 
considerations, the optimal policy is likely to involve some 
(5) 
monetary accommodation 
An additional extension is the consideration of autocorrelated 
disturbances. This is not trivial for the reason that financing 
flows tend to be distributed over time and it is therefore of 
interest to consider systems which exhibit some persistence of 
fluctuations. Currie (1980c) shows that the degree of monetary 
accommodation is likely to increase with the degree of autocorrel- 
ation. Thus, as the degree of autocorrelation of expenditure 
disturbances falls, subsequent changes in asset holdings will be 
poorly correlated with the initial perturbation and will contribute 
additional noise to the system. The degree of monetary accommodation 
is determined by the private sector's optimal portfolio composition. 
As the degree of autocorrelation increases, however, the time phase 
aspects of budget financing tend to act as a stabilizing mechanism: 
persistent low levels of demand can be offset by residual financing 
through monetary expansion. In the limit, the interest rate is the 
control instrument and the automatic stabilizer role of money 
financing is fully exploited. There is, then, a reversal of the 
Poole (1970) critera for expenditure shocks. (The case of money 
demand disturbances is not qualifed. ) The conclusion is important 
since the problem of bond financing instability is strikingly robust 
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across a wide variety of divergent models. Nonetheless, the analysis 
by'Currie (1980c) depends on the assumption that tax rates and 
government expenditure remain fixed. Though it is unlikely that 
fiscal para ters are sufficiently flexible to offset short-run 
fluctuations in the budget, the instability issue is really a 
long-run phenomenon. To the extent that fiscal para ters can 
eventually be altered, this may overcome the instability problem. 
rn this respect, the analysis is rather specific and the results 
not without qualification. 
The budget constraint plays a slightly different role in the 
study by Roper and Turnovsky (1980a). Assuming a continually 
balanced budget, the authors investigate the optimum monetary 
aggregate. To be clear, a general monetary aggregate, Q, is defined 
as a weighted sum of individual monetary assets. For the rs-LH 
system this has the form Q XM + (I - X)PB, X lit' 0, where B is the 
stock of government bonds and P is their price. The control problem 
requires choosing the appropriate composition of Q which involves 
optimizing with respect to X. It is shown that x 1-1 is optimal 
for monetary shocks and that this is inferior to XI in the face 
of demand shocks. The parallel with the standard analysis is that 
(6) 
x I-z is an interest rate peg and X-1 is a money supply peg 
rt is difficult to see how this analysis could be extended to the 
case of many assets including non-goverrment monetary assets; for 
then both the absolute value and composition of Q are no longer 
decision variables of the policy maker. Horeover, assuming a contin- 
ually balanced budget abstracts from the financing problems discussed 
above and its relaxation makes the composition of Q endogenous. For 
these reasons, this alternative approach to the instri nt problem 
appears rather inferior to conventional analysis. 
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All of the foregoing research, with the exception of one, 
abstracts from expectations. The exception is Sargent (1971) but 
in this, expectations are merely extrapolations from the past. 
Craine and Havenner (1981) do address the issue but ignore it on 
the grounds that it is irrelevant for the instrument problem. 
Jansen (1984), however, shows the proposition to be true only when 
expectations are predetermined (that is, conditioned on a lagged 
information set). This is acknowledged subsequently by Craine and 
Havenner (1984). 
rn the classic paper by Sargent and Wallace (1975) the very 
existence of an instrument problem was questioned, even in a 
stochastic setting. The precise details of their model are described 
in section 2.3 and formalised in chapter 3 (section 3.2, equations 
(3.2.1a), (3.2.2a), (3.2.3a), (3.2.4) - (3.2.5)). Briefly, the IS-LH 
system is augmented by a supply function and flexible prices. Price 
expectations are crucial. When these expectations are assumed to be 
formed adaptively, the control problem is in the standard form. 
Substituting in rational expectations alters the problem drastically: 
first, interest rate control generates price level indeterminacy 
thus, second, the optimal policy inclines towards some money supply 
rule; but, third, the distribution of real variables are independent 
of any deterministic feedback rule; therefore, fourth, one might as 
well peg the money stock which eases computational difficulties for 
the private sector. 
The third and fourth points have been touched upon in chapter 1 
(section 1.1) and will receive further attention in section 2.3. 
The first is explained as follows. When control is administered 
over the interest rate, the money stock is the equilibrating variable 
in the money market. This is impounded in agents' expectations. To 
be sure, they know that whatever the price level is, the money supply 
106 
will adjust in order to ensure money market equilibrium; but then 
there are an infinity of price distributions which are entirely 
consistent with money market clearing. There is no anchor for price 
expectations and actual prices are therefore indeterminate. 
Clearly, the conclusions of Sargent and Wallace (1975) imply a 
drastic re-evaluation of the instrument problem. They are not, how- 
ever, without qualification. For the present, it is merely noted* 
first, that the policy ineffectiveness proposition is far from, gen- 
eral-and, second, that indeterminacy under an interest rate policy 
is not unequivocable. In fact, section 2.4 is concerned precisely 
with demonstrating the general determinacy of the system even under 
an interest rate peg when policy is specified appropriately. Thus, 
the instrument issue is still a non-trivial control problem. 
in a Sargent and Wallace (1975) type framework, Woglom (1979) 
addresses explicitly the control problem under rational expectations. 
Though the early results are shown to be robust, the analysis offers 
little more to the literature: neither supply shocks nor price 
stabilization are dealt with. By contrast, Turnovsky (1980a) con- 
ducts a fairly rigorous investigation. The main innovation here is 
the assumption of dtfferentta& information sets. Thus, whilst 
suppliers formulate expectations conditional on lagged information, 
investors have access to contemporaneous price information. The 
formal structure of the model is in all other respects identical to 
that of Sargent-and Wallace (1975) and is set out in chapter 3 
(section 3.2, equations (3.2.1c), (3.2.2c), (3.2.3c), (3.2.4) - 
(3.2.5)). 
The usual results for expenditure and money demand shocks are 
valid. This is not true, however, for supply disturbances. Though 
a conflict of optimal policies (with respect to output and price 
stabilization criteria) still exists, the conflict is no longer 
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unambiguous. On the contrary, it is now possible that a money supply 
(interest rate) peg is optimal for output (price) stability. This is 
explained in terms of the information structure and is explicated in 
chapter 3 (section 3.3). The analysis is particularly interesting 
for this reason. Nonetheless, it is not entirely without criticism 
to which we return in part U of the thesis (chapter 5), which focus 
of attention is on the information structure(7). 
Three further papers dealing with rational expectations are those 
of Benavie (1983), Siegel (2983) and Fethke and Jackman (1984). The 
emphasis of Siegel (1983) is on the combination policy and rethke and 
Jackman (1984) examine optimal wage indexation. For our purposes, 
nothing further is gained from either of these. Of more importance 
is the study by Benavie (2983) who shows a qualification of certain 
of the earlier results. The analytical framework is given in chapter 
3 (section 3.2, equations (3.2.1b), (3.2.2b), (3.2.3b), (3.2.4) - 
(3.2.5)) and discussed informally in section 2.3. Some drawbacks of 
Benavie (1983) motivate us to investigate the issue in more detail. 
it was remarked in section 2.1 that there is an alternative 
monetary instrument available, namely the exchange rate. moreover, 
open economy models introduce additional noise by virtue of the 
impact of foreign or external disturbances. The control problem is 
therefore broadened in two respects. 
Preliminary investigations using an open economy framework can be 
found in Turnovsky (1976), Parkin (1977), Boyer (1978) and Roper and 
Turnovsk-y (1980b). These consider the choice between fixed exchange 
rate (endogenous money supply) and floating exchange rate (exogenous 
money supply) regimes. Several criticisms, either individually or 
collectively, can be made of these studies. In Turnovsky (1976) and 
Parkin (2977), the relative merits of alternative policies are evalu- 
ated with reference to just the initial impact effect of exogenous 
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shocks. For the latter, this is unimportant since the model is 
entirely static. Emphasis on comparative statics by Turnovsky 
(1976), however, is more serious, given the dynamic configuration of 
the model(8). in addition, both Turnovsky (1976) and Boyer (1978) 
abstract from expectations which is probably of more importance in 
the former than in the latter whose framework is again static. 
Nonetheless, the literature on exchange rate dynamics clearly indic- 
ates the need to incorporate exchange rate expectations. A further 
limitation of Boyer (1978) is the restriction to just domestic 
disturbances. Though this means a direct comparison with Poole 
(1970) it has only limited appeal. Roper and Turnovsky (1980b) 
include foreign shocks in a model similar in spirit to that of Boyer 
(1978). Unfortunately, prices are still fixed. In spite of these 
drawbacks, however, these analyses yield some common results, which 
are worthwhile noting(9). 
Boyer (1978) and Roper and Turnovsky (1980b) find that flexible 
exchange rates are optimal (in terms of output stabilization) in the 
face of domestic expenditure shocks. Turnovsky (1976), however, 
points out that this is critically dependent on the degree of capital 
mobility. Thus, if capital is highly mobile, the implications of 
demand shocks for the exchange rate focus on the capital account. 
Under an exogenous money stock policy, the exchange rate fluctuates 
and these fluctuations are stabilizing. rf exchange rates are fixed, 
the ensuing change in reserves is destabilizing. These effects are 
reversed when the degree of capital mobility falls and the exchange 
rate response is then determined by the trade balance; for under 
such circum tances, the exchange rate response observed under perfect 
capital mobility is reversed. rn the case of domestic money demand 
shocks, all three analyses reach the conclusion that a fixed exchange 
rate policy is superior because of the accommodating money supply 
109 
movements which, prevent spillover onto the goods market. Turnovsky 
(1976) also examines a variety of foreign disturbances and indicates 
that the output response will be lower under flexible exchange rates 
for foreign trade and foreign price disturbances whilst the effect of 
shocks to capital flows is rather more ambiguous. Nonetheless, we 
are reluctant to put too much weight on the implications of these for 
the overall volatility of the system GOM-11). 
Parkin (1978) and Weber (1981) employ an open economy Sargent 
and Wallace (1975) type framework. The latter can be considered a 
limiting case of the former. In fact, the emphasis in Parkin (1978) 
is on the precise mechanism of monetary control. Thus, the money 
supply ceases to be an instrument and becomes an intermediate target; 
control over the money stock is administered by some other variable 
such as the monetary base or interest rate. A number of control 
mechanisms are considered and the reader is referred to Parkin (1978) 
for a thorough discussion. Some general observations are as follows. 
The results for expenditure and monetary shocks are as before. 
For supply volatility, and under perfect capital mobility, Weber, 
(1981) shows the dependency of optimal policy on the income 
sensitivity of money demand and real exchange rate sensitivity of 
expenditure. Relatively high values for both of these favour money 
stock control. To see this, note that a supply disturbance induces 
opposite output and price responses. if money demand Is sensitive to 
income fluctuations, interest rates tend to move in the same direct- 
ion as the supply shock. This exerts a stabilizing effect. This is 
compounded by exchange rate movements. The more open is the economy, 
the greater the stabilization through the second channel. Exchange 
rate control has the obvious implications. Parkin (1978) notes 
similar complications for supply disturbances. In addition, this 
author shows that the domestic economy can be insulated entirely 
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from external shocks if exchange rates are pegged. This may appear 
somewhat surprising but is easily explained by the fact that, in this 
model, exchange rate control is coupled with either interest rate or 
monetary base control: the induced change in the stock of reserves 
can therefore have no consequences for output or prices. 
Money supply and exchange rate control are the central elements 
in Artis (1981) and Artis and Currie (1981). The major contribution 
is the re-specification of supply behaviour which envisages the 
rtance of cost-push elements in determining prices. Thus, import 
prices and exchange rate fluctuations feed through to domestic prices 
via a mark-up on domestic costs of production. Wages, in turn influ- 
enced by domestic prices, react back onto the system. The exchange 
rate-price-wage nexus provides the anchor for the results. Perfect 
capital mobility is assumed throughout. 
Pegging the money stock is optimal for output stabilization in 
the face of demand shocks. In terms of price stability, however, 
the optimal policy depends critically upon the degree of openness of 
the economy. If the closed loop network of exchange rates, prices 
and wages is strong, optimal policy may incline towards an exchange 
rate peg in order to break the vicious circle. Needless to say, the 
implication of monetary shocks is unqualified. Aggregate supply 
disturbances exhibit the usual complications. When competitiveness 
effects an aggregate demand are important, a money supply peg is 
likely to exacerbate the initial price movement whilst the converse 
is true if the economy is relatively closed. Though shocks to 
capital flows deliver similar ambiguities, money stock control is 
unambiguously superior for foreign price disturbances. 
A conclusion of Artis and Currie (1981) is the ambiguity of the 
comparative advantage of one policy over the other; more provoca- 
tively, exchange rate control appears just as good as money supply 
ill 
control. in view of this, and the undesirable consequences of 
exchange rate volatility, the authors are led to advocate a policy 
regime which conditionalizes monetary policy on the behaviour of 
the e=hange rate. The type of conditionality envisaged by Artis 
and Currie (1981) is encapsulated in their policy rule specifying 
a contemporoneous relationship between the money stock and the 
exchange rate. A much stronger form of conditionality takes the 
form of zonest money stock control is administered provided exchange 
rate fluctuations remain within certain pre-specified bands. Incip- 
ient exchange rate movements beyond these bands provoke abandonment of 
the monetary policy in order to alleviate exchange rate volatility. 
Though at first glance this might appear a viable strategy, it raises 
several crucial issues to which we are sympathetic. A complete and 
rigorous appraisal is beyond the scope of the thesis. it is useful, 
however, to note the salient points. This will serve to clarify the 
type of conditionality envisaged in Artis and Currie (1981) (and the 
majority of the monetary instrument literature) and the stronger type 
discussed above. 
First, and most obvious, it is no good for the authorities to 
announce just the conditions under which the particular monetary 
regime would be abandoned. As a pre-requisite for this course of 
action, they must also disseminate information about the subsequent 
regime. In its absence, the conditional policy, would serve only to 
increa the a unt of confusion and encourage speculation about 
future policy. Second, it is not at all obvious the way in which 
the upper and lower limits of exchange rate variation would be 
determined. This is not just expressing caution over the use of 
arbitrary standards and the operational content of the policy. To be 
sure, there are more substantive problems. Presuma ly, the reason 
for adopting the conditional policy is to limit exchange rate 
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fluctuations. For this purpose, narrow bands are motivated; but then 
this may well require frequent shifts in policy regime to which the 
private. sector must adapt quickly. Third, there is the likelihood 
that private speculation would be encouraged as agents observe the 
exchange rate approach its critical value. This, in turn, may 
generate large swings in competitiveness which is what the policy 
set out to prevent. 
All the above is to say that the strong form of conditional policy 
is unlikely to be feasible. There is a very real difference between 
making control vartabLes and control rutes contingent on new informa- 
tion. We are sure that the above arguments could be formalized, 
though this is not attempted here. It would certainly represent an 
interesting line of enquiry. 
For further discussion of money stock and exchange rate control 
the reader is referred to the fairly comprehensive, though non- 
analytical, study by Blundell-Wignall and Chouraqui (1983). Supple- 
ments to the analytical investigations using larger econometric 
models can be found in Currie and Karakitsos (1981,1983) and Artis 
and Karakitsos (1982). 
in concluding the section we make the following observations 
concerning the relative merits of alternative monetary instruments. 
First, money supply control is generally superior to either 
interest rate or exchange rate control in the face of expenditure 
disturbances. This may be qualified in two main waysi sufficiently 
ile international capital and a cost mark-up price determination 
reflecting foreign price and exchange rate pressures. 
Second, for monetary volatility there is an unambiguous bias in 
favour of interest rate or exchange rate control. Indeed, accommo- 
dating these shocks prevents any spillover effects onto the goods 
market. 
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Third, supply and foreign disturbances appear to be rather less 
definitive in their implications for optimal policy. 
Fourth, interest rate and exchange rate control are more closely 
related as the degree of capital mobility increases. controlling the 
money stock implies equilibrating movements in the interest rate. 
The consequences of these are reinforced by the exchange rate. 
Despite the apparent preoccupation with the issue, however, any 
conclusion regarding a model-robust policy (or lack thereof) is 
vacuous. To be sure, it is surprising that any consistency to be 
found in the variety of results is not more visible; for a major 
drawback of the existing literature is the similarlity of the models 
employed. Thus, ignoring those analyses which abstract from rational 
expectations, the reader is invited to compare the remainder (Parkin 
(1977,1978); Woglom (1979); Turnovsky (1980a); Weber (1981); 
Siegel (1983); Fethke and Jackman (1984))(12). This is not trivial. 
it means that the payoff matrix associated with this literature has 
a negligible information content. In view of this, and the continued 
Interest in the issue, chapter 3 performs a systematic and fairly 
comprehensive re-evaluation of the instrument problem. To do this, 
six mc)dels are employed with significantly divergent structures. As 
a prelude, section 2.3 that follows contains an informal discussion 
of the analytical framework and justifies the choice of models(13). 
... 3 An Analytical rrim-ne-work for a Non-Irrelevant Payoff Matrix 
Ea--ly literature on rational expectationa culminated in the 
well-known 'policy-ineffectiveness debate, (McCallum (1979b)). The 
proposition derived by Lucas (1972b, 1975), Sargent (1973), Sargent 
and Wallace (1975,1976) and Barro (1976) was that systematic (and 
bence anticipatory) monetary policy is impotent in terms of influen- 
cing the distribution of real economic variables. Subsequent 
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research showed the proposition to be valid under only special 
assumptions. The debate has been amusingly characterized by Tobin 
(1980a) as 'the algebraic war about policy-ineffectiveness'. 
Rational expectations per so had no possibility of resolving the 
issue of neutrality, and the importance of distinguishing between 
the rational expectations assumption and the model in which it is 
embedded is now fully acknowledged (as emphasized, for example, in 
Laidler (1982)). We choose, as one basis for our robustness tests 
of the optimal instrument, the stylised models that emerged from 
the debate. . 
It is unnecessary to review the literature in any detail here. 
This has occupied the-attention of many other authors and the 
issues involved should The familiar. Excellent surveys can be found 
in McCallum (1979b , 1980), Buiter (1980a, b, 1981b), Begg (1982a), 
Kinford and Peel (1983b) and Sheffrin (1983) (see, also, Modigliani 
(1977); the symposium in the 1980 edition of the Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking). Rather, we confine attention to certain aspects 
of the debate which are most relevant for our particular purposes. 
Thus, we are concerned with stabilization policy and weak neutrality, 
not strong neutrality (see, for example, Begg (1980); Hahn (1982) in 
addition to the aforementioned surveys). Moreover, and as usual, 
the models that we consider are linear (see, for example, Snower 
(1984)) and the implications of, learning and convergence to rational 
expectations equilibria are abstracted from (see, for example, 
Taylor (1975); Shiller (1978); rriedman (1979)). The following pre- 
amble concentrates on four of the more well-known arguments against 
the orthogonality proposition. Anticipating somewhat, the orthogon- 
ality proposition rests on the following assumptions. First, there 
is market clearing and no institutional rigidities (all agents pos- 
sess the same opportunity sets). Second, any disappointment in 
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plans is the result of information imperfections. in particular, 
supply decisions are motivated by percetued relative price changes. 
Third, all agents have identical information sets. Five of our 
chosen models are motivated by these arguments. in any event, the 
efficacy of stabilization policy is inevitable in our framework even 
for those models in the market-clearing tradition. This is by virtue 
of the description of policy which, in accordance with the monetary 
instrument literature, assumes a contemporaneous relationship bet- 
ween the money stock and the interest rate, whilst the private sector 
acts on the basis of lagged information. 
our first choice of model is that of Sargent and Wallace (1975) 
in which the demonstration of the neutrality proposition was stmplex 
mundtttts. The essential feature of this (and the models of Lucas 
(1972b, 1975), Sargent (1973), Sargent and Wallace (1976) and Barrio 
(1976)) is the description of supply behaviour for a representative 
producer of a commodity in a market, h. A more detailed description 
of this can be found in chapter 5 (section 5.2). Measuring variables 
as deviations from long run equilibrium, this has the formal 
structure 
f(h) 
- (x(pt(h) _ 
eh 
Yt pt, t-1) 
(2.3.1) 
where y(h) - natural logarithm of the real supply of the counodity 
in market h. 
p(h) - natural logarithm of the price of the commodity in 
market h. 
p= natural logarithm of the aggregate price level. 
The term eh is the expectation formed by agents in market h about pt, t-1 
the aggregate price levels p eh 
_1 
= E(p in 
_. I(h)), 
where E(-) is t, t tt 
the mathematical conditional expectations operator and n(h) is the 
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information set in market h. The motivation for equation (2.3.1) is, 
of course, that supply variations are the result of misperceived 
(14) 
changes in relative prices Making the appropriate assumptions, 
equation (2.3.1) is aggregated over h to yield an aggregate supply 
function 
e, yt IX(pt pt t 
(2.3.2) 
e where Pt, t_l " E(ptjnt_l), the average expectation of the aggregate 
price level. Systematic feedlack monetary policy is irrelevant for 
output here because the implications of this policy are entirely 
impounded in pe By suitable re-specification of the model t, t-i* 
structure, however, effective stabilization policy can be shown to 
be entirely consistent with rational expectations. 
Consider, first, the aggregate supply hypothesis in equation 
(2.3.2). A popular alternative derived by Lucas and Rapping (1969) 
(see, also, Sargent (1979)1 Benavie (1983); Minford and Peel (1983b)) 
is, in its most general form, 
eee cl ( pt - (1 )+a (r +p yt 1 2pt+l, t-1 3t- Pt+i, t-i t, t_i 
-a 4(Int - pt) a1> 01 ai >< 0 (j - 2,3,4) 
where r- nominal rate of interest 
m- natural logarithm of the nominal stock of money. 
(2.3.3) 
Equation (2.3.3) is motivated in terms of the speculative inter- 
temporal. aspects of labour supply in conjunction with a labour demand 
derived from a present value maxintizing competitive firm. The signs 
of the parameters a10-2,3,4) are, in general, ambiguous because 
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of the income and substitution effects. Typically, however, it is 
(15) 
assumed a>0 (j - 2,3,4) it is also common to set a2 m1 
and a3ma4m0. Systematic stabilization policy is'effective 
in this framework because the supply function (2.3.3) breaks the 
block-recursiveness of the model. 
The limiting case of a2m1, a3ýa4"0 has been criticized 
by a number of authors. McCallum (1978b) shows that neutrality 
re-obtains if future prices are appropriately discounted. Further 
modification by Hinford and Peel (1981) shows the McCallum (1981b) 
result to 'be ephemeral. More importantly is the criticism by 
Fair (1978) who questions the combination of rational expectations 
with non-rational models; since there is no a prtort reason for 
imposing a2m1, a3wa4-0, to do so is ad hoc and departs from 
the attractive optimizing characteristics of equation (2.3.3). In a 
recent paper, Benavie (1983) demonstrates the importance of such 
restrictions'in the monetary instrument problem. There are, however, 
some drawbacks of his analysis which motivate a more rigorous 
appraisal of the issue. Thus, this constitutes our second choice 
of model. To be sure, unlike Benavie (1983), we permit a4 ;d0. This 
has some important implications which the former author necessarily 
overlooked. In addition, the precise transmission mechanism is out- 
lined in greater detail. Finally, we continue to adopt the more 
popular approach by dating expectations at time t-1 (in contrast to 
Benavie (1983) in which the conditioning date is t'). 
The. existence of differential information sets is a second well- 
known way of obtaining policy effectiveness. This was pointed out 
in the original contributions by Sargent and Wallace (1975) and 
Barro (1976) in the context of an informational advantage in favour 
of the policy maker. There are, however, some features of this which 
-render it a questionable base upon which to advance control rules. 
Ila 
Sargent and Wallace (1975) point out that in order for control to 
have its planned effects the controller must presumably know the 
precise form of the differential information structure. This is a 
general point pertaining to such information structures. A more sub- 
stantive issue raised by Barro (1976) is that the controller could 
presuma ly achieve the same outcome by divulging any extra informa- 
tion be has to the private sector. The attractiveness of this would 
depend on the costs of making this information known and any diffi- 
culties for the private sector in processing, interpretating and 
making effective this information (relative to those incurred by the 
controller). Studies which avoid this particular information struc- 
ture but retain the essential characteristics of differential 
information were originally conducted by Peel and Hetcalfe (1979), 
Turnovsjcy (1980a) and Weiss (1900,1962) (see, also, King (1982, 
1983); Anderson (1983)). In these, the efficacy of stabilization 
policy emerges as a result of differentially informed private agents. 
I: n Peel and Metcalfe (1979) this takes the form of divergent expect- 
ations mechanism (adaptive expectations in the labour market, 
rational expectations in financial markets) and this begs rather more 
(16) 
questions than any that it answers . The most satisfactory 
analyses are those by Weiss (1980,1982), King (1982,1983) and 
Anderson (1983). 
- 
We return to these in part: II of the thesis 
(chapter 5). 
we choose Turnovsky (1980a) as the third model partly because 
of its simplicity, AM partly because the analysis based on which. 
addresses the monetary instrument problem explicitly (see section 
2.2). The innovation, it will be recalled, is the conditioning of 
investors, expectations at time t. in te, of the IS curve, 
yd. _j3( rt _e1#t+ pt J3 20 0 (2.3.4) t Pt+ 
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where yd- natural logarithm of real aggregate demand. 
V 
All other expectations in the model are conditioned on a lagged 
information set. Systematic policy is effective here because some 
expectations are no longer predetermined. The real interest rate is 
observed to fluctuate not only via variations in the nominal interest 
rate, but also through discrete jumps in actual and expected prices. 
Aggregate supply, however, is still described by equation (2.3.2) in 
which expectations are still predetermined. This permits the consequ- 
ences of additional information about the real interest rate to 
induce unanticipated price movements. The particular specification 
(2.3.4) is subject to some criticisms. We remark on these in part 11 
of the thesis (chapter 5). 
The fourth choice of model is motivated by the negation of the 
policy ineffectiveness proposition when there exists, non-ma ket 
clearing or institutional rigidities. To some, the absence of 
these is the most objectionable feature of models which exhibit 
policy ineffectiveness (see, for example, Grossman (1982) for a 
critical appraisal). Phelps and Taylor (1977) showed that if firms 
set prices in advance of the period in which they apply, systematic 
monetary policy is able to influence the volatility of output. 
Subsequently, this occupied a, fairly lively debate involving the 
construction of example and counter-example of the proposition (see, 
for exam le, McCallum (1977,1978a, 1979a); Green and Honkapohja 
(1983); Nickerson (1984)). 
in contrast to the-above, rather less controversy has surrounded 
the popular analysis of Fischer (1977a), which interest was directed 
towards wage inertia. rn this, wage stickiness is the outcome of 
long-term labour contracts which are both overlapping and non- 
contingent; at any time, at least part of the labour force is covered 
by pre-existing contracts which are independent of current news. The 
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stylized supply function for the two-period contract case has the 
well known form 
ys (p 
e-)+ye- pt, -t-2) (2.3.5) tt- Pt f t-1 
pt 
which is the fourth choice of model. Clearly, non-neutrality obtains 
because some workers are locked in to pre-commitments which the 
policy maker is able to exploit. For one period contracts, of 
course, the supply function (2.3.5) reduces to just equation (2.3.2). 
A criticism of the Fischer (1977a) framework relates to the 
persistence properties. An intrinsic feature is that exogenous 
shocks persist for only as long as the longest outstanding contract, 
after which time renegotiation nullifies any further persistence. 
This is at variance with the stylized facts of highly serially 
correlated movements in output and employment. A more pronounced 
disequilibrium framework motivates our fifth choice of model. The 
seminal contributions of Taylor (1979,1980) combine the staggering 
of contracts with the assumption that one objective of workers is to 
ntain their relative wage positions. A contract wage for one 
particular cohort of workers then depends on previously negotiated 
contracts of other cohorts (which are still in operation), forecasts 
of future contracts of other cohorts (to be negotiated during the 
lifetime of the particular cohort's contract), and expected excess 
demand pressure. Clearly, exogenous shocks persist even after the 
longest outstanding contract here because they are passed through 
a succession of contracts as workers attempt to maintain their 
relative wage position. This contrast, and the implications there- 
of, between the Fischer (1977a) and Taylor (1979,1980) paradigms 
is stressed by Canzoneri and Underwood (1982) in their analysis of 
exchange rate dynamics. 
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The particular version of the disequilibrium contract framework 
that we adopt is that of Calvo (1981,1982,1983). Following Taylor 
(1979,1980), the current contract price of a firm's output is a 
forward-looking moving average with exponentially declining weights 
of expected future aggregate prices and excess demand: 
q(t) 
00 
y(s))e 
(S-t) 
do (2.3.6) i (P( s+ ()2 
t 
where q- natural logarithm of the contract price. 
By conrast, actual aggregate prices are assumed to be a backward- 
looking exponentially declining moving average of past contract 
prices: 
00 -0 (t-3) 
p(t) 
j 
q(a)e da 
t 
(2.3.7) 
Differentiating equations (2.3.6) - (2.3.7) with respect to time then 
yields the relevant structural equations, 
dqe . el (q -p-e2 y)dt (2.3.8) 
dp -eI (q - P)dt (2.3.9) 
(For some criticiinns of the contract framework and further discus- 
sion, see, for example, Barro (1977); Fischer (1977). ) 
. Lhe final model that we consider is an open economy. Following 
Dornbusch (1976), uncovered interest parity determines capital flows. 
Unlike this author, however, we depart from fixed output and permit 
rfect capital mobility (some analyses, related to ours, examining 
the implications of these can be found in Driskill and McCafferty 
(1980); Turnovsky and Bhandari (1982); Papell (1983)). The resulting 
framework is similar to those to be found in Bhandari (1981), 
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Bhandari, Driskill and Frenkel (1984), Driskill (1981), Frenkel. 
and Rodriguez (1982) and Gazioglou (1984) in their analysis of 
exchange rate overshooting. it will be seen in chapter 3 (section 
3.3) that the model exhibits some interesting features. in partic- 
ular, it is not the degree of capital mobility per so which is 
important for dynamic stability but rather the relative importance 
of trade balance parameters. This is reflected in some possible 
perverse exchange rate responses to domestic price movements and is 
explained by the forward-looking behaviour of the private sector. 
Chapter 3 (section 3.2) formalizes each of the above six models. 
The control problem is defined as minimizing some loss function 
subject to the constraints of these models. The choice variable is 
the parameter in the control rule which specifies a contemporaneous 
relationship between the nominal money stock and the nominal rate 
of interest. By virtue of this specification, it is necessarily 
the case that there is policy effectiveness, even in the Sargent and 
Wallace (1975) model. Moreover, encapsulated in this control rule 
are the polar cases of a money supply and an interest rate peg. One 
might also consider the alternative rule which embodies exchange rate 
control. We choose to focus on the money stock-interest rate rule 
partly because it is this which has received most attention in the 
literature and partly because of our own reservations about the 
viability of exchange rate control. 
- The purpose of chapter 3 is to test the optimality of different 
policies across the six models. By. virtue of the significant 
differences between these, this yields a payoff matrix, the informa- 
tion value of which about model-robust policies is non-negligible. 
This is in contrast to the existing literature. 
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2.4 A Diciression on Price Level rndeterminacy under rnterest Rate 
Control :A Resolution of the Problem* 
It will be recalled from section 2.2 that Sargent and Wallace 
(1975) raise a serious objection to the pursuit of polices designed 
(18) 
to control the interest rate . To be sure, an arbitrary choice 
of interest rate rule (such as a pegged interest rate) generates an 
indeterminate equilibrium price level (and an indeterminate equilib- 
rium money stock) in models with forward-looking expectations. This 
is explained in terms of autonomous changes in expectations arising 
from private sector foresight of multiple money market equilibria 
associated with an accommodative monetary policy. Clearly, this 
would rule out an interest rate policy for the purpose of stabiliz- 
ation policy. Turnovsky (1980a) eschews the problem of indetermin- 
acy by invoking stability and obtaining a finite price variance. 
rn terms of price stabilization, therefore, the merits of an 
interest rate policy may still be evaluated. This seems rather 
peculiar for, as the author acknowledges, the equilibrium price 
level remains indeterminate and it is not clear how one is able to 
measure the variance around a non-unique equilibrium. Taylor (1977) 
observes that a finite (infinite) price variance and stability 
(instability) is true only in stochastic models for which the mean 
of the price level is well-defined. in any case, the fact that the 
price level is indeterminate under an interest rate policy would seem 
to rule out this policy as a viable strategy. Given this, it is not 
surprising that various attempts have been made to resolve this 
indeterminancy. These may be summarized brie fly as follows (for 
further discussion, see McCallum (1984)). 
Note first that the problem of indeterminacy- would vanish if 
sow variation in the interest rate were to be permitted. Thus, 
McCallum (1984) (see also Blackburn (1984a)) shows that a unique 
solution obtains under near, but not absoLute, smoothing of the 
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interest rate (we show how this can be incorporated into our 
framework that follows). Though the outcome under such a policy 
would approximate a pure interest rate peg, the fundamental problem 
remains, namely the indeterminacy associated with absolute fixing 
of the interest rate. Attempts to resolve this problem appeal to 
some consistency requirement in the setting of interest rate and 
monetary targets. McCallum (1981) identifies a possible resolution 
of the indeterminacy problem by envisaging an interest rate policy 
with the view to having some specified effect on future money. 
Specifically, the target for the interest rate is set such as to 
make the expected value of the money stock equal to some desired 
level. Then expectations are tied to the monetary target and the 
equilibrium is well-defined. Dotsey and King (1983) similarly 
suppose that monetary expectations be consistent with a predeter- 
mined monetary target. In this case, however, the justification is 
that policy is revised sequentially and, in particular, an interest 
rate peg is defined for only one period. After this period has 
elapsed, the authorities re establish the monetaxy target. 
canzoneri, Henderson and Rogoff (1983) aBsi a given initial value 
for the money stock. In conjunction with the interest rate peg, 
this determines the initial mean price level. Then subsequent trend 
money is to be consistent with the initial condition and the interest 
(19) 
rate peg As above, this provides an anchor for price 
expectations. 
These attempted resolutions aim to deal at best. with the problem 
of price level indeterminaray only for the case where the authorities 
are careful in their choice of interest rate peg, ensuring consist- 
ency between the cboice of peg and the desired long-run money stock; 
but even in this, they are riot successful. Even if initial conditions 
are chosen carefully, there is nothing to prevent a self-fulfilling 
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shift in private sector expectations concerning the expected long- 
run price level. So long as the authorities peg the interest rate, 
no matter at what level, such a shift will call forth an accommo-, 
dating change in the money supply, underwriting the shift in expec- 
ations. since this may occur at any instant in time, the price 
level is fundamentally indeterminate under an interest rate rule, 
irrespective of the choice of initial conditions. 
In this section we show that there generally exists a policy rule 
which admits a unique well-defined solution even under an arbitrarily 
selected value for the interest rate. This policy comprises two 
components. The first is the usual contemporaneous relationship 
between the interest rate and the money stock. The second is the 
novel aspect of our analysis and involves a feedback on the forward 
price level expectations of the private sector. This serves to 
anchor expectations. In this second term there is also a pre- 
specified price level target. We show that, under such, a rule, the 
long-run man price level is equal to the authorities, price target 
and is therefore determinate. Moreover, along the unique convergent 
path to equilibrium, this policy rule is observationally equivalentto 
thesimple contemporaneous feedback rule between the interest rate 
and money stock. 
We illustrate our results using stripped-down versions of two 
well known rational expectations models. Section 2.4(A) contains 
a static model for which our results are most easily realised. 
Section 2.4(B) then generalizes the analysis for-a dynamic model. 
This section also contains some intuition behind our results. 
2.4(A) A Static Model 
rn this section we consider the following fixed output variant 
of the model of Sargent and Wallace (1975), as employed by 
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McCallum (1981,1984) 
(20) 
: 
Y;. 
3 
+e 
t it 
yt - 130 - ol (R_ pe J, t 
+ pt +e t t+ 2t 
Mt m Yo '4' pt - YlRt + y2yt + 453t 
Tst -Y- yt 
where Y' - natural logarithm of aggregate supply 
s 
Y- natural logarithm of aggregate demand 
nominal rate of interest 
natural logarithm of the aggregate price level 
(2.4.3) 
(2.4.4) 
Hd- natural logarithm of the nominal demand for money 
45k - stochastic disturbances (k - 1,2,3) 
and bars over variables indicate long-run mean values (hence the 
upper case notation). The term Pe is defined by Pe t+lIt t+l, t 
E(P t+I 
in 
t) where E(*) 
is the mathematical conditional expectations 
operator and n is the information set. Stochastic distuxbances, 
ek (k - 1,2,3) are assumed to be independently distributed white 
noise error teruas. 
Equation (2.4o'l) is an aggregate supply schedule with output 
equal to its mean value except for random error, e1. Equation 
(2.4.2) is the aggregate demand schedule where aggregate expenditure 
depends negatively on the real rate of interest plus an excqenous 
(2.4.1) 
J3i ). 0(i-0,1 ) 
(2.4.2) 
0 (1 - 
shock, e2. Equation (2.4.3) is a standard money demand function 
with the demand for nominal balances depending positively on prices 
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and income and negatively on the nominal interest rate. Random 
portfolio behaviour is captured by 4s 3 Equation 
(2.4.4) gives the 
goods market equilibrium condition. 
To close the model we introduce a policy rule, equation (2.4.5), 
and the equilibrium condition for the money market, equation (2.4.6)s 
pe (2.4.5) 
I(Mt + 02( t+l, t 
d (2.4.6) 
tN- mt 
where t? - natural logarithm of the nominal supply of money 
and tildes over variables denote target long-run values chosen by 
the authorities. Equation (2.4.5) is, the main innovation of our 
analysis. It states that policy is comprised of two elements. The 
first is the standard contemporaneous relationship between the 
interest rate and the money stock witb (03. M0 representing an 
arbitrary interest rate peg, Rt = ft. The second component of policy 
is a feedback on the deviation of forward price expectations from 
some price level target. The approximate solution alluded to earlier 
a unts to assuming 40 2-0 
in which case the mean price level is 
indeterminate if (01. = 0. Uniqueness can, however, be obtained for 
4ý 1 arbitrarily close, 
but not equal, to zero. That is, near but not 
absolute smoothing of the interest rate is a well-specified policy. 
In what follows we show that a non-zero value for (b 2 
iS 
sufficient to eliminate indeterminacy even when ip 0. When 
.1 
ýj A 0, then 4* 2 can 
be zero as suggested by the literature. In 
both cases, the long-run mean price level is equal to the price 
level target, i-;. It is then straightforward to show that 
equation (2.4.5) is observationally equivalent to the simple 
rule 
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Rt-R- (b i( "t - M) 
with H 
(2.4.7) 
To solve the system (we exclude unstable solutions), we first 
eliminate mt from equation (2.4.5) using equations (2.4.3) and 
(2.4.6). Then Yt is eliminated using equations (2.4.1) and (2.4.4). 
This gives 
Rt = (1 + 4) y+0 (Y. + 'yj 11 
p+ .6pe++ (2.4.8) 1t2 t+l, t12 It 3t 
An alternative expression for Rt can be derived from equations 
(2.4.1) - (2.4.2) as 
Rt -Pe-p+ J3-1 (2.4.9) t+l, tt1 
Po -y+ 42t - '61t) 
so that equating equations (2.4.8) - (2.4.9) yields 
)pe + ob '02 t+l, t ly, + Ypt + vt 
(R + 40 1(yo + y2y - 
H) - (1 + Oly, )Ol (j3o - Y) - '02p) 
(2.4.10) 
where vt -B ( 4) 172 +ýI+ 40 lyl)ic I 
)'Olt - (3' + 4ý lyl)131 '02t + '0103t* 
Now note from equation (2.4.9) that long-run equilibrium implies 
ft - l3-'l(j3 - 
i). In addition, given i and i, equation (2.4.3) 10 
implies that the authorities* targets for M and P are related through 
the relationship 
i- 
yo +; - y1i + y2i. Then equation (2.4.10) can 
be re-written as 
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(i + '0 )p 
e= (I + (b y 40 0 lyl '02 t+l, t 11+ '01)pt + t*'t -(I+ 2)ý 
which, on taking means, gives 
((b 
1+02 )6; - 
;)-o. 
(2.4 " 11) 
(2.4.12) 
Equation (2.4.12) gives our main result. It shows that provided 
01+ '0 2 ;d0, 
i-;; the mean price level is determinate and equal to 
the authorities, price level target. The limiting case of interest 
is 4), ý 0. Under such circumstances the interest rate is pegged at 
ii (this continues to be true if (V 200 as shown below). Provided 
that 40 200, 
the mean of the price level is determinate, being equal 
to the authoritiest long-run target irrespective of the value of 
01 and hence including the case (V I- 
The solution of the model is easily obtained using the method of 
undetermined coefficients in appendix C applied to a trial solution 
(see, for example, Lucaz (1972b, 1973,1975); HcCallum. (1983); 
Kinford and Peel (1983b)). Thus, from equation (2.4.11) we conjec- 
ture the solution 
pt =P+ ; Lv t (2.4.13) 
where A is a coefficient yet to be determined. Provided (0 1+ 't 2 id 0, 
the solution to the system is obtained by substituting equation 
pe (2.4.13) with t+l't P) into equation (2.4.11) and equating 
coefficients to obtain -; and A- -(1 + 1$ly 1+ (0.1)-l . Hence, 
p am 
;-(i+*Iy1 
00-1ý"t * (2.4.14) 
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The interesting feature of equation (2.4.14) is that it does not 
depend on the particular choice of 402. This is because Pe P t+l, t 
so that equation (2.4.5) and the behaviour of the system is 
observationally equivalent to the case 02m0. The sole function of 
the second term in equation (2.4.5) is to anchor the long-run 
nominal equilibrium of the system, and it does not influence the 
short-run dynamic response of the system to exogenous disturbances. 
For the case 0 and 02A0, the rule is therefore observationally 
equivalent to a rule of pegging interest rates, whilst avoiding the 
difficulties of price level indeterminacy noted in the literature 
ý21) 
Finally, we note that if disturbances are directly observable, 
equation (2.4.5) may be implemented as a feedback on these distur- 
bances (and current prices) rather than on private sector expec- 
tations. To see this, using equation (2.4.11) we may re-write 
equation (2.4.5) as 
Rt -R1 (Kt-m) + .02 (1, + 40 lyl 2)-l 
[(I + 401 y1+ It 1 
)(Pt +v 
t] 
(2 "4" 15) 
which may be implemented if vt is observable. It is straightforward 
to check that equation (2.4.15), like equation (2.4.5), serves to 
determine the mean long-run price level while being observationally 
equivalent to equation (2.4.7). 
2.4(8) A Dynamic Model 
The model of the previous section is particularly simple, being 
essentially static in character. it is therefore of interest to 
extend the analysis to a dynamic model, and here we do that in the 
context of the following discrete time version of the model in 
Dornbusch (1976): 
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p t+l -ptm x(S t-pt)+ 46 2t 
(2.4.16) 
7o + pt - 71 Rt+ 453t 
f St - Rt -R+d 4t 
where S natural logarithm of the nominal exchange rate 
f 
exogenous foreign nominal rate of interest 
e4m stochastic disturbance 
(2.4.18) 
and all other variables are defined as before. Similarly, Se t+l, t 
E(S t+I 
in t) and e4 
is an independently distributed white noise 
error term. 
Equation (2.4.16) is the inflation generating mechanism with 
prices responding sluggishly to real competitiveness and stochastic 
realizations,, e 4. Thus, 
the nominal exchange rate, S, is the 
domestic currency price of foreign exchange so that a rise in S is 
a depreciation. Equation (2.4.17) is the money demand function. 
Equation (2.4.18) is the uncovered interest parity condition where the 
expected rate'of depreciation is equal to the interest rate differ- 
ential. Random deviations from interest parity are captured by e4. 
For this model we assume a policy rule of the form 
R-R= 4) (mt - M) +. 4b ((P, - P) +0 (P 
e 
t22 t+2, t3 t+l, t P)) 
(2.4.19) 
and the model is closed by the money market equilibrium condition 
In equation (2.4.6). 
Yi >0 (1 - 0,1) (2.4.17) 
The solution proceeds as follows. From equation (2.4.16), 
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pe- As + (i - \)P (2.4.20) t+l, ttt 
pe 1\5 
e- A)(As + (i - A)p (2.4.21) t+2, t t+llt + (i tt 
Substituting equations (2.4.20) - (2.4.21) into equation (2.4.19) 
and eliminating Ht using equations (2.4.6) and (2.4.17), 
R -m (1 + 4ýjyj)-l((R + (0 (Yo 10 (1 + 4ý ); ) + 'o AS 
e 
t1232 t+l, t 
gto 1+ '0 2 
(1 - x)(l -A+ 't 3))Pt 
+02 A(i -A+ '0 3 
)s 
t+ '0 1d 20 - 
(2.4.22) 
Now substitute equation (2.4.22) into equation (2.4.28) and note that 
f 
R. Then 
)(s, -s+ to (i - x)(l -x+ 't ))P + co AS 
e 
t+l, tt123t2 t+l, t 
T) t- 
(ýOl( y Iii -yo+ 
ý) 
+ (02(l + 03) 
;) 
(2.4.23) 
where ilt m01e 2t + 
(I + 10 1 yl)e3t* 
In the long-run, Se-S-0 from equation (2.4.113) and t+1't t 
from equation (2.4.16). In addition, given -yo + yFR 
from equation (2.4.17). Thus taking the long-run mean of equation 
(2.4.23) yields 
2 
(1 + (b 3))(ý - P) 0 (2.4.24) 
which is our basic result for the dynamic model. Provided 41 2 ;90 
(and assuming 03 ;oP even when o (that is, even when 
133 
the interest rate is arbitrarily fixed at R). t02 -0 is admissible 
for a well-defined solution only if 4) 1A0. These results accord 
with those obtained for the static model of section 2.4(A). It 
remains to show that the general policy in equation (2.4.19) is 
observationally equivalent to the simple rule in equation (2.4.7) 
and that the general rule may also be implemented as a feedback 
rule defined on disturbances and other current variables (provided 
the disturbances are observable). We prove these as follows 
Equation (2.4.23) can be written as 
se8p+8s+ (2.4.25) t+l, t1t2tt 
where 81 (1 +0 lyl -0 2'k) 
(01 + 't 2(l + ok 
a2" (i + 'o lyl - (b 2 X) 
-1 (1 +, 4) lyl + '0 2x(1-x+ (o 3)) 
ft ý(I+ ýo 172 - 402'1*)-l(nt - 
(0 
1+ 40 2 
(1 + 'o 3)); 
)' 
Then the state-space representation of the system follows from 
equations (2.4.16) and (2.4.25) as 
p t+l t, 2t' 
+ (2.4.26) 
sea8s 
t+l, t2tt 
The saddlepoint property requires that there be one eigenvalue which 
lie inside and one eigenvalue which lie outside the unit circle; 
I -r 11<I and I -r 21), 
1, say. It is instructive to examine this in aL 
little more detail. Thus, the characteristic equation of (2.4.26) is 
f(r) -A+82 )T + (a 2-A62-A81)mo 
(2.4.27) 
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and the precise conditions for saddlepoint stability can be derived 
by computing the test functions of equation (2.4.27) as demonstrated 
in appendix D. The, condition is that there be one and only one sign 
change in the sequence 
1, %P[(2-X)(14-40 lyl) - A( 4ý 1+ '02)3' -"('01 
+ '0 2 
(1 + ý6 3 
)) (2.4.29) 
where %P - C2(2-A)(1+0jYj) - '\(40 1 4' '02('l - '03))J-I' 
Equivalently, the model has a unique convergent solution if 4# 
which we assi is satisfied. The indeterminacy problem can be seen 
directly from equation (2.4.28) by setting ýI ý '02 -0 in which case 
the relevant (third) test function has a zero value. This indicates 
the presence of a unit root as, for example, in the model analysed by 
Canzoneri, Henderson and Rogoff (1983), and in all the models that we 
(22) 
employ in chapter 3. To be sure, imposing ý01 = 4ý2 m0 gives 
83. =0 and 82-I so that equation (2.4.27) reduces to 
Cr (2.4.29) 
where the notation emphasizes the interest rate peg policy. Thus, 
provided 40 1+02 
(1 + 40 3)00, we 
have that 
e 1-3 e p t+ilt -p1 (P t+J, t - P), i>J. (2.4.30) 
Now choose 40 3" -T 1. 
In particular, equation (2.4.30) gives 
ee p t+2, t-P3 (P t+l, t- P) (2.4.31) 
Then along the stable trajectory, the general policy rule in 
equation (2.4.19) is observationally equivalent to the simple rule in 
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equation (2.4.7). Moreover, 'r, does not depend on the choice of 0 2' 
As before, go 2_' acts solely 
to anchor the long-run equilibrium of the 
system, and the response of the system, to short-run perturbations is 
identical under-rules (2.4.7) and (2.4.19). The general policy rule 
works by anchoring expectations so as to be consistent with the 
saddlepath solution. I 
As for the model of section 2.4(A), if disturbances are 
directly observable, then-rule (2.4.19) may be implemented as a 
rule defined not on private sector expectations, but on disturbances 
and other current variables. Thus, from equation (2.4.26), 
pe (i \)P +"\s (2.4.32) t+l, ttt 
\)2 + p t+2, t .81 
)p t+ A(i -A+a2 )s t+ xt t (2.4.33) 
so that equation (2.4.19) becomes 
2 
Rt -R 1(mt - M) + 46 2((l-'\) + 
(I - "'03 + 1\8 1 
)p t 
+ býA(i -A+62+ (b 3 
)S t+ '* 2 At t- 
(l* 
2+ (b 3 
);. 
(2.4.34) 
As before, the rule in equation (2.4.34) serves to anchor the long- 
run ruean price level, while being observationally equivalent to 
equation (2.4.7) along the stable trajectory. 
It is useful here to summarize this section and offer an inter- 
pretation of our results. We have provided a resolution of the 
problem of price level indeterminacy associated with an aribtrarily 
chosen peg for the interest rate. It has been accomplished by 
specifying a policy rule which involves feedback on forward Price 
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expectations This rule has some intuitive appeal. it states that 
if price expectations were to be higher than those implied by the 
unique, saddlepath solution, interest rates would be raised to 
offset these expectations. Conversely, if price expectations were 
to be too low,, interest rates would be reduced. in some respects, 
this is similar to the rules advanced by McCallum (1961) and Dotsey 
and King (1983). The difference is that in our analysis the threat 
of this rule serves to anchor expectations so that, in fact, no 
action is actually required. In their analyses, however, an arbit- 
rarily, chosen value for the interest rate peg continues to generate 
indeterminacy. In our analysis, an arbitrary interest rate peg is 
entirely consistent with a well-defined solution. 
we showed how the results for a static model are robust with 
respect to a dynamic model. The latter possessed only first- 
order dynamics. The results are clearly generalisable, however, to 
higher order systems. -The essential 
feature of the additional 
term in the policy rule is that it should be zero on the stable 
manifold consistent with the long-run target of the authorities, and 
non-zero off it. Such a term then serves to anchor expectations 
to this stable manifold, ensuring price level determinacy, while 
not influencing observed policy actions on this manifold. 
An important property of our general policy rule is that the 
expectations feedback term acts solely to pin down the long-run 
state of the system and does not affect the response of the system to 
short-run shocks. In terms of the latter, this makes the general 
policy rule observationally equivalent to the simple contemporaneous 
feedback rule between interest rates and the money stock. Analyses 
employing the simple rule (as in the literature reviewed in section 
2.2 and as in chapter 3) are, therefore, not necessarily misguided. 
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on a final note, we appreciate two fundamental conditions for 
our analysis to make sense. The first is that the announcement of 
the general policy rule must carry credibility. The second is that 
the authorities must have knowledge of either private sector 
expectations or the current values of certain variables and stoch- 
astic disturbances. An interesting line of inquiry would be to see 
the extent to which relaxation of these assumptions modify our 
results. 
2.5 Sunmary and Concluding Remarks 
The chapter has been motivated by the continuing interest in 
the monetary instruments issue and the control problem to which it 
gives rise. It is by way of a prelude to chapter 3 which tests the 
robustness of optimal instruments across a variety of divergent 
model structures. This has been made necessary owing to what we 
feel to be the rather inadequate treatment of the issue in the 
existing literature. The justification for this criticism is the 
outcome of the literature review that was given in section 2.2. We 
concluded that the similarity of the models employed in the liter- 
ature made it difficult to say anything about the existence of 
model-robust policy rules. 
rn section 2.3 we constructed informally the analytical fra - 
work which is to be adopted in chapter 3. This discussed what are 
probably the six most well-known rational expectation models. 
Section 2.4 took up the issue of indeterminacy associated with 
a policy which attempts to exogenise the current interest rate. We 
offered a resolution of this problem. We showed that there generally 
exists a feedback policy which admits a unique solution even when 
the interest rate is pegged at an arbitrary value. One component of 
this policy rule is the usual contemporaneous relationship between 
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the interest rate and the money stock. A second, and novel, element 
is a term which expresses a feedback on forward price expectations. 
Announcement of this general policy rule is sufficient to anchor 
these expectations. An identical policy is one in which the feed- 
back on expectations is replaced by a feedback on the current values 
of certain variables and stochastic disturbances. The second 
component of the general policy rule serves solely to tie down the 
long-run state of the system and does not affect the response of the 
system to short-run perturbations. As shown formally, this makes the 
general rule observationally equivalent to the simple contemporaneous 
feedback rule between the interest rate and the money stock. This 
is attractive for the analysis in chapter 3; for we may solve the 
models under the assumption of the simple rule. 
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Notes to Chapter Two 
(1) Clearly, as stated, the optimal instrun-ent is also determined 
by the structural parameters. Thus, the loss associated with a 
money stock policy is a decreast-ng function of y2 since as 
Y2 increases, the effect of money market disequilibrium on 
interest rates is reduced. By the same token, the loss 
associated with a money stock policy is an tncreastng function 
of v2; expenditure induced money demand fluctuations imply 
lower interest rate movements as y2 increases but it is pre-, 
cisely these variations which exert a stabilizing force on 
income. obviously, the opposite can be said of the effect of Y, 
since, the ratio of yl to y2 determines the slope of the LM 
curve. Finally, the effect of j3 1 
is similarly straightforward 
analyse, 
(2) A peculiar feature of the analytical model used by Craine and 
Havenner (1981) is the dependency of aggregate demand on the 
nominal interest rate despite the endogeneity of prices. 
Nonetheless, their results are shown not to be qualified in a 
larger econometric model. 
(3) Recall that this was the reason for the superiority of the 
contemporaneous combination policy. 
(4) in general, the optimal policy will depend on the covariances 
between different exogenous shocks, between different random 
coefficients and between exogenous shocks and random 
coefficients. 
(5) Obviously, this depends on the assumption that tax rates and 
government expenditure remain fixed. we return to this issue 
below. 
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(6) As is Usual, the impact of expenditure abocks can be reduced 
further 'by penmiting some (countercyclical) monetary response. 
This requires A ). 1. 
(7) It may also be noted that, in considering adaptive expectations, 
Turnovsky (1980) shows the instability of an interest rate peg 
policy. This occurs because the expectations mechanisms permits 
disturbances to feed through indefinitely. In addition, 
pegging the money stock may also generate explosive behaviour 
if the expectations adjustment coefficient is sufficiently large. 
(8) In defence of this criticism, Turnovsky (1976) does compute 
the asymptotic variances for special cases. Nonetheless, 
for the most part, it is paradoxical that wealth accumulation and 
stock-flow interactions which are emphasized in the basic model 
are accorded no role in the comparative static exercises. 
ASstated, Ihe models of these particular authors are strikingly 
different. Turnovsky (1976) employs a fifteen equation system 
incorporating flexible output and prices together with stock- 
flow interactions. Boyer (1978) and Roper and Turnovsky (1980b) 
adopt a simple open economy IS7LM system. 
(10) All of these results hold for price stability in Turnovsky. 
(1976), where prices are determined by excess demand. 
(11) As in Poole (1970), Boyer (1978) and Roper and Turnovsky 
(1980b) show the general superiority of a combination policy 
specifying a contemporaneous relationship between the money 
stock and the e=hange rate. The policy is therefore 
analogous to a 'dirty float'. 
(12) All of these employ a Sargent and Wallace (1975) framework or 
some minor variant thereof. An exception is Artis and Currie 
(1981). 
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1 have just discovered another paper on the instrument problem 
by Benavie and Froyen (1983) which shows that a developed 
financial sector may qualify some of the standard results, 
especially with respect to pure policies (see also, Benavie 
and Froyen (1984)). 
(14) This supply function can also be motivated in terms of Phillips 
Curve arguments and wage contracts (see, for example, 
McCallum (1980); Fischer (1977a)). 
(15) In terms of labour suppliers, this amounts to assuming that 
future goods and leisure are substitutes for current leisure, 
that leisure is not an inferior good, and that the substitution 
effect dominates. 
(16) To be fair, the main concern of Peel and Metcalfe (1979) is 
dynandc stability, though our point is nonetheless true. 
(17) The proportions pre-multiplying the parenthesized terms merely 
reflect the proportion of firms operating under contracts 
negotiated at different dates. This is innocuous. 
This section is based on Blackburn and Currie (1985) 
(18) rnterest rate control is defined here as policies which make 
the current interest rate exogenous. These include lagged 
feedback interest rate rules and obviously an interest rate 
peg. 
(19) This is also discussed by Giavazzi and Wyplosz (1985) who 
observe that, since the equilibrium is undefined, the 
dynamics of the system are non-unique and depend upon the 
initial values of variables. This can. obviously be overcome 
by appropriate choice of the initial conditions. 
(20) The assumption that output is fixed is innocuous, serving only 
to simplify the algebra. 
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(21) This is not to say that announcement of rule (2.4.5) is 
equivalent to announcement of rule (2.4.7). If the 
authorities announce the latter, then the usual indeterminacy 
obtains. The determinacy result obtained above arises by 
the authorities announcing rule (2.4.5) which turns out 
to 
be observationally equivalent to rule (2.4.7). 
(22) The continuous time analogue is the presence of a zero root, 
as observed by Giavazzi and Wyplosz (1985). 
CHAPTER--T)4RZre-- -- 
ROBUSTNESS TESTS OF THE OPTZHAL CHOrCE 
OF MONETARY INSTRUME2C 10 
3.1 Introduction 
The issue of the appropriate choice of monetary instrument for 
stabilization policy continues to attract a lively debate. The 
general conclusion offered by the literature is that this choice 
is determined, to a lesser or greater degree, by the particular 
variance-covariance structure of stochastic disturbance, the partic- 
ular model, the values- of the structural paza ters of this model, 
and the particular objective function of the authorities. Unfor- 
tunately, the inexorable- conclusion that emerged from chapter 2, 
(section 2.2) was that the existing literature has' important draw- 
backs which render it inappropriate for diagnosing the relative 
merits of alternative monetary policies. rn particular, if one is 
seeking 'model-robust' policy rules, the information value of the 
payoff matrix derived from the prevailing orthodoxy would be at best 
mi. nimal. That this is so arises from the similarity of models 
examined in this literature. Since we argue this to be undesirable, 
it is of some necessity that it is rectified. It is the purpose of 
this chapter to conduct'such corrective action. 
. his is not to suggest, ' of course, the unimpor-tance of other 
issues. In particular, one-might wish to investigate the possibility 
of control rules which perform well under a variety of different 
stochastic shocks (as opposed to different models). A full' appre- 
ciation would then take into account the possibility that the actual 
shocks occurring are different from those expected. Such concern has 
occupied the interest of the series articles by Levine and Currie 
(1983,1984) and Currie and Levine (1983a, 1984a, b, c). Though 
clearly of some importance, we feel it not to overshadow the problem 
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of model uncertaintys for suppose-one discovered a policy which 
actually performed well in the face of a., variety of disturbances. 
Then its, usefulness for practical purposes is immediately undermined 
if the particular model conditioning the result is not reflective of 
the true system. A rigorous treatment of the policy problem would 
take account of both types of uncertainty simultaneously. This is 
beyond the scope of the thesis and we concentrate our attention on the 
possibly more interesting and relevant (but less addressed) issue of 
model uncertainty. 
The analysis is motivated towards the construction of a payoff 
matrix with elements defining the optimal monetary instrument for 
particular. types of stochastic disturbances and for each of the six 
rational expectations, models discussed informally in chapter 2 
(section 2.3). ., Owing to the significant differences between the 
modelýstructures, the information content of the payoff matrix for 
indicating 'model-robust Ii policy rules, is far from non-zero. The 
analytical approach adopted-in the chapter is in the spirit of the 
majority of the literature on the, issue. In chapter 6 it will be 
seen that such an approach eschews potentially more important aspects 
of the problem. 
Section 3.2 provides the formal schema in which the six rational 
expectations models are defined in terms of a broad taxonomic fra - 
work. Section 3.3 then solves each of the models and addresses the 
control problem. It should be noted that, from the discussion in 
chapter 2 (section 2.4), we discount the redundancy of the control 
problem arising as a consequence of price level indeterminacy under 
an interest rate peg. 
During the course of the analysis certain additional issues 
&rise as a by-product which are important in their own right. In 
particular, the open economy model exhibits some apparently perverse 
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features which are explained by the forward-looking nature of private 
sector expectations. These are particularly relevant for the 
stability properties of the model and indicate an error in thinking 
solely in terms of the absoLute degree of capital mobility. 
The profuse number of results derived in section 3.3 motivates 
the content of section 3.4 which constructs the payoff matrix and 
summarizes the main findings. Concluding remarks are contained in 
this section. 
3.2 The Formal Taxonoury 
A convenient and self-contained schema which captures the formal 
characteristics of each of the six models described informally in 
chapter 2 (section 2.3) is given below. The taxonomy comprises six 
partitions: equations describing aggregate demand; equations descri- 
bing aggregate supply; expected inflation formation; money demand 
functions; the authorities, policy rule; and a balance of payments 
equation. All variables are defined collectively at the end. The 
use of both discrete and continuous time formulations reflects merely 
analytical convenience. 
(a) Aggregate demandi 
dr 
-ff )+e yt tt it 
d 
-j3(r-iT) +e 
ydm -0 1 (r-yr) 
+02 (e-p) +e1 
(Sargent-Wallace) (3.2.1a) 
(Lucas-Rapping) (3.2.1b) 
(Turnovsky) (3.2.1c) 
(Fischer) (3.2.1d) 
(Calvo) (3.2.1e) 
(open economy) 
ß, ßi (i - 1,2) > 
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(b) Aggregate supply: 
se 
yt apt- pt't-I )+e 2t 
(Sargent-Wallace) (3.2.2a) 
(Turnovsky) (3.2.2c) 
8m (X 
e yt I(pt, 2pt+I, t-i 
+a3 (r t -ff t 
(Lucas-Rapping) (3.2.2b) 
- (X 4 
(M 
t-Pt 
)+e 
2t 
see 
yt 12 (Pt-Pt 
, t-. l 
+ 17 (Pt-Pt 
, t-2 
+d2t 
(Fischer) 
d 
dy - A(y - -y)dt 
dp -G 1((q-p) + 0-2 
)dt 
e dq .91 (q-p--e 2 y)dt 
dy - A(y 
d 
-y)dt 
dp - G(y +d2 )dt 
(Calvo) 
(3.2.2d) 
(3.2.2e) 
(open economy) (3.2.2f) 
a, 1,2), A>0; a. (j - 2,3,4) ;k0. 112 
(c) Expected inflation: 
ee yrt = Pt+: L't-I - pt, t-I 
e Tr t- Pt+i, t- Pt 
(Sargent-Wallace) (3.2.3a) 
(Lucas-Rapping) (3.2.3b) 
(Fischer) (3.2.3d) 
(Turnovsky) (3.2.3c) 
.e. dp IT P 
dt 
(Calvo) (3.2.3e) 
(open economy) (3.2.3f) 
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(d) Money demand: 
(Sargent-Wallace) 
d 
(Lucas-Rapping) 
mt +YY rt +6 it 3. t Y2 3t Turnovsky) 
(3.2.4) 
(Fischer) 
d 
(Calvo) 
mP+YIY- y2r +e3 
(Open economy) 
Yi (i 2,2) >0 
e) Money supply: 
(Sargent-Wallace) 
(Lucas-Rapping) 
mt t (Turnovsky),, 
(Fischer) 
(3.2.5) 
(Calvo) 
m (Or 
(Open economy) 
0. 
f Balance of payments 
TI 1 (r-6 
e 
n2 Yý+ Tj 3 
(e-p) +v0 (Open economy) (3.2.6) 
rlký (k 1,2,3) ), 0. 
d 
where Y natural logarithm of real aggregate demand 
s 
Y natural logarithm of real aggregate supply 
r nominal rate of interest 
Yr expected rate of inflation 
e natural logarithm of the nominal exchange rate 
p natural logarithm of the aggregate price level 
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mdm natural logarithm of the nominal demand for money 
ms " natural logarithm of the nominal supply of money 
q- natural logarithm of the contract price 
ek (k 1,2,3), v- stochastic disturbances. 
All variables are measured as deviations from their long-run equilib- 
rium levels. I 
Aggregate demand is specified in equations (3.2.1) in part (a) 
as a negative function of the real rate of interest. The latter is 
given by equations (3.2.3) in part (c) as the difference between the 
nominal rate of interest and the expected rate of inflation. For the 
continuous time models we have dp 
e. pe (t+d, t) - p(t). In the open 
economy model, aggregate demand is also a (positive) function of 
the real. exchange rate so that the nominal exchange rate, 'e, 
is the 
domestic currency price of foreign exchange. 
Equations (3.2.2) in part (b) describe aggregate supply. Both 
Sargent-Wallace and Turnovsky models employ the Isurprise, supply 
function. The Lucas-Rapping and Fischer models have similar supply 
structures though the important difference is obvious. For the Calvo 
model, the inflation and contract price determination equations 
discussed in chapter, 2 (section 2.3) are supplemented with an expres- 
sion which specifies a sluggish adjustment of actual output to 
aggregate demand pressure. In the open economy model, output is 
again demand determined and inflation responds. directly to excess 
demand. 
A standard money demand function is written in equations (3-2.4), 
part (d)s the nominal demand for-money depends positively on prices 
and output, and negatively on the nominal interest rate. 
Equations (3.2.5) in part (e), describe the authorities policy 
behviour for determining the nominal money supply. This is in terms 
of a contemporaneous relationship between the nominal money supply 
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and the nominal interest rate, with no a prtorf, -'sign attached to the, 
policy feedback parameter 0. ", in fact,, the optimization, process may 
well yield an'optimal value-$, - 0* < 0. -For most ofýwhat follows the 
polar, cases .0-0 (money supply'peg) and 0-m (interest-rate,, peg) 
will be considered, though a derivation of 40* is possible and is 
executed for, the discrete time models. Recall that the discussion in 
chapter 2'(section 2.4)-alows US to consider the-simple ruleAefined 
in equation'( 3.2.5 ) for analytical convenience, Any unit, ormeroroct 
arising, as a consequence of an, interest-, ratezpeg (4)-w) may be ignored 
and treated as unstable. 
Equation (3.2.6) in part (f)-is the balance of payments equilib- 
rima condition for the open economy model. ý The precise derivation 
of this follows Bhandari (1981), Bhandari, Driskill and Frenkel 
(1984), Driskill (1981), Frenkel and Rodriguez (1982), and Gazioglou 
(1984) (for the continuous time case). Thus, we postulate the 
capital and current accounts of the balance of payments as respec- 
tively 
e 71 1 (r e+v (3.2.7) 
-11 2y + n3 (e -p+v 3) (3.2.8) 
e, ee where-4 , the expected rate of depreciation, is de .e (t+dt, t) - 
e(t)'and vh '(h - 1,3) are stochastic disturbances. Summing 
equations (3.2.7) - (3.2.8) then yields-(3.2.6) with v- -n 1V+ 
n3 V3 The, flow view of capital movements implicit in equation 
(3.2.7) is probably innocuous given the results in Bhandari, Diskill 
and Prenkel (1984) and Gazioglou (1984). 
Exogenous shocks in the ta nomy are denoted by ek (k 1,2,3) 
and v. These have the following interpretations. In part (a), e 
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is an exogenous shock to aggregate expenditurel e2 in part (b) is a 
random supply shock; e3 in part (d) represents random portfolio 
behaviours and v which impinges on the balance of payments in part 
(f) comprises shocks to capital and trade flows (. gee equations 
(3.2.7) 
- 
(3.2.8)). 
We assume that ek (k - 1,2,3) and v are independently distrib- 
uted. For the discrete-time models we also assume that each 
ek (k - 1,2,3) is purely white-noise with asymptotic variance 
-2 cr k 
(k - 1,2,3). The continuous time analogue is that each ek (k 
1,2,3) has independent increments so that dek (k - 1,2,3) is white 
noise. For the two external shocks, vh (h - 2,3), 
we assume a first-ordeýr autoregressive process 
dvh -- P(vhdt - dwh) (h - (3.2.9) 
where wh (b - 1,3) is independently distributed and has independent 
increments, and where the degree of positive autocorrelation is a 
decreasing function of p. Thus, the composite disturbance v has the 
form 
dv -- P(vdt - dw) (3.2.10) 
where dw - -ni dwl. + 113 dw 3' 
The autoregressive representation for v is used solely for 
analytical purposes. 
In order that policies may be defined in terms of optimality, we 
assu a performance measure 
E(J) 12 (aa 
2+ 
a) a2 
yp 
where a2 and a2 are the asymptotic variances of output and prices yp 
respectively. Hence, the control problem involves minimizing the 
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value of (3.2.11) with respect to 0 subject to the constraints 
imposed by each of the model structures. Clearly, a-0 and a-1 
represent the extreme cases in which the authorities pursue only one 
objective. 
This completes the formal taxonomy. We now turn to the control 
problem. 
3.3 Robustness Tests'of the Optimal Choice of Monetary rnstrument 
This section is divided into six parts, 3.3(A) 3.3(F), each 
one being concerned to examine the control problem in each of the 
foregoing six models. Parts 3.3(A) - 3.3(D) analyse the discrete 
time models, the solution procedure for which is the method of 
undetermined coefficients, summarized in appendix C. Parts 3.3(E) 
3.3(F) contain the analyses for the continuous time models. 7be 
solution technique for these is the saddlepoint solution reviewed 
in appendix B. 
3.3(A) The Control Problem in the Sargent-Wallace Model 
The system is described by equations (3.2.1a), (3.2.2a), 
(3.2.3a), (3.2.4) - (3.2.5). we obtain a quasi-reduced form for 
d8 
prices as follows: set mt - mt - mt and use equations (3.2.4) - 
(3.2.5) to. solve for rt; substitute this expression into equation 
(3.2.1a) and eliminate 'Tt using equation (3.2.3a); finally, set 
d8 
yt - yt - yt and apply equation (3.2.2a). Rearranging terms then 
yields 
(j3b + ac)pt + (J3 - C)pe - j3p 
e+u 
tlt-l t+l, t-I t 
where b + /2 
c+ gby3. 
ut -e it 
+ ce 2t + obe 3t 
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Positing a solution of the form 
co 
pt --. 1: A 2. 
u t-i 
(3.3.2) 
1-0 
and substituting into equation (3.3.1) gives the set of identities 
juo - -03b + ac) 
-1 
Ai" (I + b); Aj_lp ja 
(3.3.3) 
(3.3.4) 
-1 Clearly, 4b -0 Y2, ) necessarily makes equation (3.3.4) an 
unstable process. Moreover, it - (z (b-0) implies a unit root which, 
from the argument'in chapter 2 (section 2.4), can be ignored. Hence, 
imposing stability, A0 (j 4 1) and the solution for prices is 
just 
Pt-, " "O't (3.3.5) 
The solution for ouptut is obtained by noting that 
pe 4M so that from equation (3.2.2a), t- Pt, t-l "Out 
yt r- C%Ut + 452t * (3.3.6) 
From equations (3.3.5) - (3.3.6) and recalling the definitions 
of go and ut, the usual comparative statics emerge 
ap t, 
-Ao . )1 0 
ayt 
-ago 0 
ae 
it it 
apt 
Aoc 0 
ad2t 
apt 
-. 
; Loeb 
ae 3t 
ayt 
-gollb 0 
ad 2t 
ayt 
agol3b <0 
ad 3t 
(3.3.7) 
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which require no further comment. It is now apparent from equations 
(3.3.5) - (3.3.6) that if a2 is the asymptotic variance of u and a u uk 
is - the asymptot ic covariance of u and ek 
(k - 1,2,3), then 
22 (3.3.8) Aocru 
2222 -2 
aywa AL 0au+a2+ 
2aA 
oa u2 
(3.3.9) 
Table 3.3(A) summarizes the results of the control exercise. We 
set each ek m0 (k -. 1,2,3) in turn and apply (OL- 0 (money supply 
peg, ; n-) and (0 -w (interest rate peg, ý). Casual inspection of the 
direction of the inequalities reveals the Poole (1970) and Craine and 
Havenner (1981) results to be unchanged. The intuition is as usual: 
for expenditure shocks, fixing the money stock provides a stabilizing 
role for the endogenously determined interest rate; by contrast, 
this policy is inferior in the case of money demand disturbances 
because it permits these to spill over onto'-the good market; finally, 
though the foregoing optimal policies apply to both output and price 
stabilization criteria, there is a conflict in optimal policies in 
the face of supply shocks, with'a money supply peg being superior 
(inferior) for price (output) stabilization (this conflict obtains, 
it will be recalled, because an accommodative monetary policy 
exacerbates the initial price movement which, since it is unantici- 
pated, offsets the supply shock by virtue of the surprise, supply 
function). 
it is instructive to show the relationship between the above 
results and those which'are implied by acombination policy in 
which 40 is determined optimally. To do this, it is convenient to 
rewrite the solutions (3.3.5) - (3.3.6) by multiplying through by 
(Db)-i /(j3b) -1 such that 
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04 
Ib 0 0 
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>1 
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xH 
>ýl 
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-, ? 
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.0 
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t (13b)-lu t+ 
ye't ++y+yI )d 
2t +e 3t 
(3.3.10) 
A00+ cx(ý-'(ýo + 
(Jab)-l 
using the definitions of ut, b, c and g0. The optimal value of 
0,4) A, 
is now derived by minimizing the loss function in equation 
(3.2.11) with respect to 0. Hence, substituting for a2 and a2 from yp 
equations (3.3.8) - (3.3.9), 
2-2-2 -2 '2-2 E(J) a( a ; LO(7 u+a2+ 
2cqL 
0a u2) 
+ ('-a)Aoc7u) (3.3.12) 
-2 
where a and a are appropriately defined from equation (3.3.10). 
1u u2 
Thus 
a -2afl 
2+ (ý 
aE(J) 
2. 
(ýLo 
u 
aa I-a)) + 2aa'3 
[Aoau2l 
-0 (3.3.13) 
a(p a(v ft 
I 
Some tediouscomputations yield the following expressions 
2-21 a 
11-LOCIU 
2- 3 
[ý-2(, 
o -+ V2)(,, + (XYJ)32, 
a(o 
ILO 1 
-2 -132 y 2) + yl 
)a2- aA 31 
(3.3.14) 
'3[; oýU2] -2 -1-2 M. ß cr2 , (3.3.15) 
ae 
Substituting equations (3.3.14) - (3.3.15) into equation (3.3.13), 
some further algebraic manipulation reveals i0A to be 
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-2 -1 -2 -2 ah 3 (7 3-ß, y2h 1 (r 1+h2 cr 2 
(b A' m 
Ei 
where h, =h3 (1 + aý, ) 
h2ý aa - (1-a)0-1 Y2 4* YI ) 
aa 
2+ (2-a) 
07l( ý2 + (, _a)-2) . Ei m 
Consider, first, the case of expenditure shocks. Setting 
(3 " 16) 
-2 -2 22 (7 2"a3m0, we 
have 4Y451) Y2 and ay (d ap (41) - 0. 
This is an immediate corollary of the superiority of a fixed money 
supply policy over a fixed interest rate policy which arises from 
the endogenous movements in the interest rate under the former. 
By following a counter-cyclical monetary response, the stabilizing 
interest rate fluctuations are reinforced. 
-2 -2 For money demand disturbances, a, Ma20 and it is obvious 
that ý*A(0-3) - co, which confirms our previous intuition. 
Aggregate supply shocks imply the optimal policy 4V02) 
(13 -1 (1-a)) -1 (aa-(I-a)(13 -1 Y2 + Y,. )) which demonstrates the conflict 
in optimal policies. Thus, when the sole objective is to minimize 
output fluctuations, a-1 and an interest rate peg is optimal. 
By contrast, a-0 implies a counter-cyclical monetaiY response for 
the reason discussed earlier. (Note, however, that in contrast to 
that policy, the optimal value for co here is constrained by the 
stability conditions. This is easily seen by substituting for 40 in 
equation (3.3.4) the value for 4OA('62) when a-0, in which case a 
well-defined non-explosive solution is violated if 0 4- (. ByJ-1 4 2. ) in I 
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general., when 0<a<2, the value for (0 A will depend on the value 
for a together with the structural parameters of the model. 
3.3. (B). The Control Problem in the Lucas-Rapping Model 
The relevant equations are (3.2.1b), (3.2.2b), (3.2.3b), (3.2.4)- 
(3.2.5). In deriving the quasi-reduced form expression for prices, 
d it is useful to note the supplementary expressions for y 19 and yt, t 
dS 
Thus, eliminate mt mt mt from equations (3.2.4) and (3.2.2b) 
using equation (3.2.5); similarly, solve for rt from equation (3.2.4) 
and substitute this expression into equations (3.2.1b) and (3.2.2b); 
finally, eliminate vt usingequation (3.2.3b). Then 
ya- [a +a+ (a a (a +a t143 4'0)lf(" + yl I 4))lpt 
-Ca -+ a-a )fy, (aa +a3 ý12 23+ 
(a3 
4(o 2 3)jp4t+2, t-2 
ca + (a - a4(o): fya3 jpe 33 
+ (a 3a 441)fyl)62t 
+ ((X3 -'%40)f'o3t (3.3.17) 
d 
t, 13f(3,, + y3. (4x3. +'a, 
))pt 
t+2' -1 
y4 -' + 0('l +(a a2 +a 3)fyl)p 
e, 
t 
- Ni + cc fy )p 
e Ofy e- Ofe 31t, t-1 it I 2t 3t 
Where f (Y2 - a3y, + 40" +a 4YI 
The quasi-reduced-form, expression for prices follows by equating 
equations (3.3.17) - (3.3.18): 
'm''«cxl + <x4) (1 + fcjyl) + fg)pi + «xl(1 + fgyl) + ß) 
9t 
Pt, t-i 
- ((aa + a. ) . 1. J3 
e+v (3.3.19) 2("+ f9y3. ) Pt+. i, t-l t 
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where g-0+a3- a440 
vt =-e it + 
(1 + fgy 1 
)d 
2t + 
fge 
3t* 
For a solution of the form 
pt .. 
I 
8i't-i 
10 
(3.3.20) 
and substituting this into equation (3.3.19), the following ident- 
ities obtain: 
80 =- ((al + CY (I + fgyl) + fg)-l (3.3.21) 
8a2+ 
a3 4, a 4)( 
1+ fgy 
2) 
++ fg 
j42. (3.3.22) 
a IC12 
+ a3 )( I+ fgyl )+ 13 
Thus, for a unique convergent solution, equation (3.3.22) must define 
an unstable process so that 83-0 (i ), 1) by requirement. Unlike 
the Sargent-Wallace model in section 3.3(A), a money supply peg no 
longer guarantees a well-defined solution. This is most easily seen 
by setting a2=1 as usual. Then imposing 10 - 0, equation (3.3.22) 
can be written as 
%( Y2 + j3yl + J3 +a3 
+a 
1(Y2 + oyl) 
+ Y2(J3 + a3) 
Sj_, (M), j ), 2. (3.3.23) 
clearly, the stability of equation (3.3.23) depends critically on 
all of the structural parameters of the system. The usual assumption 
that a, ja3'a4). 0 is sufficient to yield a well-defined solution. 
Nonetheless, there is the possibility that this is violated if 
(X 3' a4<0. Naturally, we rule this out. Unlike the Sargent-Wallace 
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model again, an interest rate peg does not necessarily, imply a unit 
root: invoking 4) -w in equation (3.3.22) we have 
a1+a3+ ß( 1+4y1) 
(X 1 cl 2+ (X 3+ 
ß(1 +a 4Y1) 
(r), j >, 2 (3.3.24) 
Obviously, the usual assumption of a2m1 is necessary to generate 
a unit root; otherwise uniqueness and stability will depend on the 
structural parameters of the system. In any event, we assume the 
relevant condition to be satisfied. It may also be noted that for 
the orthodox version of the Lucas-Rapping model, a 1, aa"0 
1234 
so that f-b, g and 80 - go, where'b and juO are 
defined in 
section 3.3(A). In addition, there is necessarily a unit root under 
an interest rate peg, and an unstable difference equation under a 
money stock peg. Anticipating somewhat, therefore, the orthodox 
Luca -Rapping system will have identical results to those derived 
from the Sargent-Wallace model. 
Thus, assuming a unique and non-explosive solution, 
0 (j -)ý 1) and the price solution is 
0 vt 
where a0 and Vt are defined above. 
output recall that 8ja. 0 (j ), 1). 
Ift Ab 
(3.3.25) 
To obtain the solution for 
Then from equation (3.3.20), 
p--0. Substituting these into equaiton (3.3.18), t, t-i , -. Pt+i, t-i 
yt ý C(al + a4)(1 + f(a3 - a4i*)Y, ) + f((13 - a, ýO )I 80vt 
f(a 
3- a44b)y, 
)d 
2t + 
f(a 
3-a 40)e3t * 
(3.3.26) 
The impact effect of exogenous shocks are of rather more 
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interest here than in the Sargent-Wallace modelf, indicating some 
apparently perverse responses. - From equations (3.3.25) - (3.3.26) 
and using the definition of vt,, these are given by 
apt ept ept 
60; 
-ma 0(, 
+ fgyl) ;'m6 
ofg ae it ae2t ae 3t 
[(a, +a )(1 + f(a -a)+ f(a -a 4 3,40)yl 3 40) Bo 
it 
(3.3.27) 
ay t Ual +a4 )(1 + f(a 3- CC4 0 
)YI) + f(a 
3- a 4'0)1 8o(l 
+ fgyl) 
ad 2t 
(1 + f(a 3- cc 4 : O)yl) 
ayt 
[(a 1+a4 )(1 + f(a 3-a 4ý0)yl) + f(a3 -a 440 80fg 
3t 
f(a 
3-a4 to) * 
The expressions in equation (3.3.27) appear rather forebidding but 
may be simplified greatly by substituting for f, g and 80. In terms 
of the latter, 
Y2 -a 3yl + (0( 1 1+ a4y., 
) 
(3.3.28) 
a1+a4) (y 2+y10)+ 
(13 +a 3) +a1 (p 
I 
so that apt/aelt >c 0 according to whether 8050, or a positive 
deutand shock may actually redUce prices. Similar perverse results 
occur for money demand and supply disturbances. Rather than comment 
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further on these here, however, it is useful to return to them in 
conjunction with the control problem. For the moment, the following 
expressions are noted which are fairly straightforward, though rather 
tedious, to derive: 
(a 1+a4) Y2 + CTO + CX3 (3.3.29) 
ae it (a 1+a 4)(Y2 + y1o) + (J3 + a3) + a, 4ý 
apt Y2 + ylo + 'o 
(3.3.30) 
ae 2t (a I+a 4)(Y2 + yl'3)'+ 
(o + %) + al, 01 
ayt 
(3.3.31) 
ae 
2t 
(a 
1+a 4)(. /2 
+ 710) + (J3 +a 3) 
+ al4p 
ap tß+ 
(a 
3-a4 (3.3.32) 
ae 3t 1+a 4)(y2 + ylß) 
+ (ß + '33) + '3141 
ayt + CZ4)ß '1 
(3.3.33) 
ae 3t -(a1+a 4)(y2 + ylß) + 
(ß +a 
3) + cgl'b 
It is of interest to note that all of the above responses reduce 
to those for the Sargent-Wallace model for the special case in which 
a3"a4"o and the conventional'Lucas-Rapping framework obtains. 
This illustrates the observation made earlier that for a3ýa4"0, 
f-b, g-p and 80 - go where b and juO are defined as before. 
From equations (3.3.25) - (3.3.26) and recalling the definition 
of vto 
162 
222 
cr 
0v 
2222 
aym C(cx I+a4+ 
f(a 
3- cx44))y., 
) + f(a 3- '0140) 
36o cy v 
2-2 ); 2 (1 + f(a 3-a4 10)Yl) a2+ 
f(a 
34 40 3 
(3.3.34) 
2[(a 1+a4 
)(1 + f(a 3-a4 (p)yl) 
+ f(a 3- a44))]80f(a 3-a 4'0 
)a 
V3 
2[(a 1+a4 
)(1 + f(a 3-a, ýP)yl) 
+ f(a3 - a44)) 3a o(l 
f(a 3-a 4'0)yl)crv2 
(3.3.35) 
where a2 and a (k - 1,2,3) have the usual interpretations. v vk 
The results of the control exercise are summarized in table 
3.3(B). These are of some interest for they imply a reversal of 
optimal policies (relative to the Sargent-Wallace model) in some 
cases. The precise conditions for a particular policy to be optimal 
are rather involved, reflecting the high degree of simultaneity in the 
model. Nonetheless, some fairly intuitive remarks can be made with 
minimal algebraic complication. The following discussion is con- 
ducted with reference to the responses given in equations (3.3.29) - 
(3.3.33). 
Thus, consider expenditure shocks. Then 
2-2- 
I)IC, 
I-22 
ap (m, 0ap (r, e YZ - cc 3)' 1(1+ a4y, I)Kz >c 0 
(3.3.36) 
2-2-2_2 
ay (m, e1ay (r, d1 ((a 1+ cx 4)Y2 + cx 3) K2Zo (3.3.37) 
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2- Assuming appropriate values for a3, a4 3' 0' therefore, ap (m, el) 
2-2-2 
ap (r, e 1) and ay 
(m, e 1)< Cr y 
(r, e and a money supply peg is optimal. 
The reason is as follows. If a 3' a4 )- 0 and 
the money supply is 
fixed, the initial rise in prices following a positive demand 
perturbation increases output not only through the usual unantici- 
pated price effect, but also via the induced increase in real 
interest rates and induced fall in real balances. The rise in 
supply dampens the price movement which feeds back onto output. In 
fact, from (3.3.28) a sufficiently high value for a30 implies 
aptlad it < 0, whilst a sufficiently 
high value for a40 requires 
40 -0 for this not to be offset. When interest rates are pegged, 
however, the stabilizing effects on and of prices are reduced: in 
particular, real interest rate and real money balance fluctuations 
are dempened . The opposite line of reasoning can be applied for 
the case in which a 3' a4c0 
imply the superiority of an interest 
rate peg. 
Turning next to supply disturbances, 
22 3)2cl2 _2 ap (m, e2ap (r, e 2 Y2 t yl .1K2Z0 
(3.3.38) 
22 
whilst a (m, e a (r, e 0 unambiguously. Thus,, sufficient y2y2 
values for a ly (T 
2 (;, e a2 (r, e ) and there is a 3' N0 
imp 
p2p2 
conflict in optimal policies, This is consistent with the usual 
result. Nevertheless, there is still the possibility that 
2-2- 
ap (M'd 2ap (r, e 2) if a 3' a40 sufficiently. Under such circum- 
stances, the initial tendency for prices to fall following a 
positive supply shock may be reversed as evidenced by equation 
(3.3.30). The reason is most easily seen by rewriting the denomin- 
ator as a 1(71 + 'ý) 
+ IX3 + 13(l + (a, + cK4)yl) which indicates that 
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ap t/ae2t > O., is more likely as (XV a4 <0 increase in absolute value 
and providedýthat 0 and y1 are also relatively large. In such a 
case, the tendency for interest rates to fall induces a potentially 
large increase in excess demand as 0 rises in value which tends to 
exert upward pressure on prices. Provided y I' 
is relatively large 
and (V -0 this may-ýmanifest itself in htgher interest rates. With 
a3<0 sufficiently, this causes a contractton in output (see 
equation (3.3.31)) and, further upward pressure on prices. In 
addition, with a4<o, the fall in-real balances exacexbates the 
supply response. - Adopting an accommodative monetary stance will 
offset-the destabilizing effects of real, interest rate and real bal- 
ance variations. Hence, the conflict in optimal policies may be 
resolved. 
consider, finally, money demand disturbances for which we have 
2222_22 
a (M' e3) >< ap (rie 3)4. * 
(j3 +a3)a1a4K2Z0 (3.3.39) 
2-2- 
and ay (M, C 3ay 
(r, e 3 0. The. 
interesting-feature here is that 
2-2- the normal result, ap (m, e 3ap 
(r, e 3 0, -holds only if a4m0. By 
contrast, (x4 00 implies that money ma ket disturbances are able to 
impinge directly on prices via the non-zero real balance effect. In 
particular, a4-. o sufficiently may even incline the optimal policy 
towards a money stock peg. This is because the incipient fall in 
prices following a random increase in money demand causes an increase 
in real balances. There is a further contraction in aggregate supply 
and the fall in prices is dampened. Alternatively, fixing the 
interest rate may cause real balances to rise temporarily to the 
extent that prices actually exhibit a net upward movement (in terms 
of equation (3.3.30),. apt"43t 3.0 is more likely as a4-. 0 increases 
and 40 - w). 
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Two further features of table 3.3. (B) are worth noting. First, 
when interest rates are fixed the variance of output in the face of 
each type of disturbance are identical to those for the Sargent- 
Wallace model. Second, when a3" CK 4 '0 0 
(and a, m a), the equiv- 
alence between the two models is complete. In this respect, the 
generalized Lucas-Rapping framework offers an important contribution 
to the monetary instruments problem since it implies the possibility 
of a reversal in the usual results. Though Benavie (1983) was the 
first to suggest this conclusion, we feel that the current treatment 
is more satisfactory for a number of reasons. First, the precise 
economic mechanism underlying the results has been explicated in more 
detail. Second, and as a consequence, the current exposition is 
much more rigorous, yielding insights which were overlooked by 
Benavie (1983). Third, this author is very much mistaken when he 
abstracts from wealth effects on aggregate supply on the grounds 
that they are unimportant. 
As in section 3.3(A), it is possible to derive an optimal value 
for 0 which minimizes the loss function in equation (3.2.11). The 
simplest way of executing this here is to note that 
E(J) 1 aL 
ý ady j 2 -2 + (1-a) cr 
j 
- 
ap t 2_21 
" (3.3.40) 2 k"I ;ý k JL k t ek 
k 
in which case, the optimal value for 40,03 v is given implicitly by 
aE(J) ja 
a(b k-1 
[Taytt 
-2 
ektj 
2] 
ýk 
ek 
ap 
. tj 
2j 
t -21 .0 (3.3.41) Irk 
ao k-I ýk 
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Thus, using equations (3.3.29) - (3.3.33) in (3.3.40), 
. 't 
--2 2-2 2-2 2ý2] 
E(J) 2 PC 2 
fafa 
1a1+ J3 cr 2+a23 
[C2-2 2-2 
g2-211 (1-a) aI+a3a2+ cr 3j 1' 
(3.3.42) 
where 
;2ý 
(a 
I+ %) 
(Y2 + ylj3) + (13 + a3) + al4o 
Am (a14N )Y2 4 CK 3+a lo 
(a 1+a 4)3 
3m y2 + ßyl +0* 
It is useful to note that the expression for K2 can be rearranged 
such that 
;2ýa. 
"27, + J3 -a1a3+a 4(Y2 + Y113) + 
(J3 + a3)* 
Equation (3.3.42) is now differentiated with respect to (0 after which 
acme lengthy manipulation reveals (OB to be 
[K ;24. X ;24. X ;2 22223 31 
Its 
where K1ma. Ga ( (a I+ ct4)y2 + ct, 
)l, + (1-a)(y2 -a 3YI 
) 12 
K2" -aa 1 J3 
2 
4, (, I-a)( 'Y2 + YIO)13 
K3" aa I 
(a 
I+a4)0- 
(1-a)(a +a 
3) 
14 
11 m (a 1+ a4)yl + 
(3.3.43) 
+ '24yl CKI + Y2 + YlJ3 + C13 ++ CY a3y I-Y2 
13 -a4 (y 2+ YID) 
+a+ a3 
14m a4«cll + C[4)(y2 + ylß) + a4(a3 + ß» + cxl(C[3 + ß) 
011,1ý2 1 32 + cr 
2+( 
1-a)(x -2 11+ (1-a)(I + cxel)12)cr, 
('-a)1332 
, 
14: a 3 
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The complexity of the expression (3.3.43) is again a symptom of 
the high degree of simultaneity in the model. For isolated expen- 
diture shocks, however, (3.4.33) reduces to (V*(e -(aj3a2 I+ BIII 
'+'OV1 ) 12 Kl, in which case appropriate values for '33 ' '34 )' 0 
imply 'OB (e 1 0. 
This follows intuitively from the earlier results 
concerning the superiority of a money supply peg: a counter-cyclical 
monetary response enhances the stabilizing properties of endogenous 
inter I est-rate movements. Moreover, appropriate values for a 3* cc 400 
may imply %(el) % 0. 
For the case of supply shocks, OB (d 2 -((I-a)l 3)K2 which, 
recalling the definition of K 2' 
indicates a source of conflict. When 
a-1, it is obvious that an interest rate peg is optimal. When 
a 0, a counter-cyclical responses is required. The latter is 
inte .rI esting since it is independent of the parameters a3 and a.. For 
I 
a3, a4 5' 0' the counter-cyclical response is not surprising since 
it has already been shown that a fixed money stock policy is superior 
to a fixed interest rate-policy. The 'reason why this appears still 
true for a 3' a4c0 is not immediately obvious and is more than 
likely unsustainable as'a policy which is conducive to stability. 
Money demand volatility yields 0)- -((I-a)a I )-lit so 4 B(453 443 
that a-I implies, the usual interest rate peg optimality whilst 
a-0 is associated with either a pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical 
policy depending on whether a 3' a4>, 0. The reason 
is that with 
0, the fall in prices following an increase in money demand is 
dampened via the contraction in output resulting from the increase in 
real balances. This stabilizing effect can be enhanced by expanding 
the money stock. By contrast, a3), 0 has the opposite effect to 
CK 4 3.0. Hence 
the appearance of a3 in the numerator of (b B 
(d 
3) 
in 
order that interest rate fluctuations are subject to greater 
stabilization as a31,0 increases. 
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The above optimal policies for price stabilization (a - 0) coin- 
cide precisely with those derived by Benavie (1983)(1). Those for 
output stabilization (a - 2) are slightly different which is probably 
due to the fact that Benavie (1983) dates expectations at time t. 
In addition, by setting a3 =a4=0 (the popular version of the 
Lucas-Rapping model), the optimal policies reduce to those for the 
Sargent-Wallace model. Though this was anticipated earlier, the 
reason has not been given. It 
nothing essential has been cha: 
exclusively by price movements 
P e' retains predetermined t+l, t-1 
is, in fact, simples with a3ýa4w 
nged. Aggregate supply is determined 
and the replacement of pe by t't-I 
expectations. 
3.3(c) The Control Problem in the Turnovsky Model 
The model is given by equations (3.2.1c), (3.2.2c), (3.2.3c), 
(3.2.4) - (3.2.5). Proceeding as usual, obtain the expression 
(j3(1+b) + ac)p acp 
ee (3.3.44) t 
I- 
t, t-I - Jpt+l, t+ ut 
where b, c and ut are defined as before. For the solution 
Go 
pt ýr 
't 
iu t-i (3.3.45) 1-0 
the relevant identities are 
(j3(1+b) + ac)t 0 
Ati + 
fi '" (1 + b)tj_lo 
Ij 
1ý 
(3.3.46) 
(3.3.47) 
so that stability requires j0 1) and from (3.3.46) 
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f0= -(j3(l + b) + ac)-l. (3.3.48) 
Solutions for prices and ouput are therefore 
pt =c0ut (3.3.49) 
t- af out+e 2t 
(3.3.50) 
and it is easily verified that the partial derivatives, op t/aokt and 
'3ytý" kt (k - 1,2,3), have 
the usual signs. The precise values of 
these terms can be obtained by substituting for g0 in equation 
(3.3.7) the expression for t0 given in equation (3.3.48). It is also 
ev. ident that 
a cr (3.3.51) p0u 
cr 
2 
cc 
2c2 
cr 
2+ ýi2 + 2at cr (3.3.52) y0u2o u2 
from which the elements in table 3.3(C) emerge (K I 
is defined as 
previously). 
The results for expenditure and monetary disturbances are stan- 
dard. It is of interest to note, however, that with the exception 
2-2- 
of ap (r, e 3ay 
(r, e 3 0, 
the variances of prices and output are 
-always less than their Sargent-Wallace counterparts. This was over- 
looked in the original analysis by Turnovsky (1980) but is of a 
importance because it emphasizes the role of the information struc- 
ture in determining economic behaviour. in short, the reason is that 
in the current model, some agents have access to Contemporaneous 
information about aggregate prices. This knowledge conveys greater 
information about real interest rate movements which generates the 
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above result. This theme is developed in more detail in part rr of 
the thesis. 
Nonetheless, the information structure plays a prominent role 
in the case of supply shocks for which the conflict of optimal 
policies is no longer unambiguous. In particular, it is a simple 
matter to show that 
2-2-2-2- 
ap (m, e2 >< ap (r, e 2 
), ay (m, e2 >< ay (r, e21 (3.3.53) 
rf YI< ý-' the usual conflict obtains. By contrast yl . ý-' implies 
a reversal of optimal policies. This is explained by the fact that 
the effect of having contemporaneous price information becomes more 
important as yI and P increase in value. Thus, observing a fall in 
prices following a positive supply perturbation is equivalent to 
observing a greater reduction in real interest rates than observing 
just the fall in nominal interest rates. Prices are stabilized owing 
to the demand increase. It is easily verified, however, that 
ar t! '3462t >, 0 according 
to whether, ylj3, Z 1 
(2) 
. Thus, interest rates 
may actually tncrease following a positive supply shock and this will 
qualify the stabilizing powers of amoney supply peg. This is 
obvious ly more likely as both Y., and 0 increase in value. The 
observed greater incipient fall in real interest rates raises aggre- 
gate demand and prices to the extent that the nominal interest rate 
increases. Pegging interest rates, however, prevents this and causes 
a greater stimulus to demand. The expenditure stimulus may be suf- 
ficient to stabilize prices at the cost of destabilizing output. The 
above results and the conditions in equation (3.3.53) are consistent 
(3) 
with Turnovsky (1980) Unfortunately, this author offered no 
explanation for the ambiguity of the conflict. 
The optimal value for (0 in a combination policy is derived as 
in section 3.3(A). Thus, for the solutions (3.3.49) - (3.3.50), 
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-1 and recall the definition of 
Zt. Then define to = 11(Ab) 
[-2 ; 2] 
at0u. 
-13 
[ß72(, 
b + y2 )(1 + CXYIL)j2 
a(b 
2jo 1 
+ Y2 +y_ (1 + co-1); 
2 
I)Cý2 31 
(3.3.54) 
[ýOýud 
0 
and 
it c 
j2(. 
- ý-l)-2 0 yl 
a2 
-2 -2 -2 H3a3-H 1'71 '1' 
H 2a2 
14 
where M, = 
H2 
ý-2, y 2(1+ cry, 
)(aa 2+ (1-a)) 
(yi - 13 -1 )((l-a )(ý-lY2 + YI) - acx(y2 + 1) ) 
+ 0; 6-1 )( aa + (, _a)) 
1MIT2 + )-2 H Y2 r1 aa a2 
(3.3.55) 
(3.3.56) 
As would be expected, 4) C 
(e 
I) and (OC(453) are 
identical to (Yel) 
and (0 (e 3 respectively. For supply shocks, 
by contrast, (OC(452) 
-. 1 -1 - ((I-a)o aa) C(l-a)(j3 y+y acx(y + 1)] so that a 2 2. 
coun-ter-cyclical monetary response is optimal regardless of whether 
a-0 or a-1. This is peculiar given that the particular optimal 
pure policies depend critically on yI and A. The explanation is that 
for a-I the counter-cyclical policy is not feasible under any 
cirm tances whilst for a-0 it is feasible only under certain 
cirrcýstances. For the former case, substitution of (b 
* (e ) with C2 
a=1 into equation (3.3.47) yields a zero root which violates the 
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unique solution. For the latter, repeating the same substitution 
71 
with a-0 reveals that O< (Ayl): <2creates a similar problem (this is 
analogous to the condition derived in section 3.3(A)). Thus, 
provided j3y, < 'a, the counter-cyclical policy is indeed optimal for 
price stabilization. This supports the analysis above and the reason 
is as follows. Recall that Or t1ad 2t* 
0 according to whether y,. A 9; 1. 
If 71 J3 <1a money supply peg is superior to an interest rate peg. 
By permitting the money supply to tncrease in response to a fa&l, in 
interest rates (following a positive supply shock), the additional 
further fall in interest rates stimulates aggregate demand further 
and stabilizes prices. This policy can become destabilizing as Y, 
and 0 increase in value for then ar t/ae 2t 1.0 and a counter-cyclical 
monetary response will exacerbate the initial price fall. 
3.3(D) The Control Problem in the Fischer Model 
Equations (3.2.1d) (3.2.2d), (3.2.3d) and (3.2.4) - (3.2.5) yield 
0- (j3b + C)p + (13 - i2c)p 
eee 
t tlt-l zcpt, t-2 - opt+l, t-I +ut 
(3.3.57) 
where b, c and u are again defined as previously. Positing the t 
solution 
OD 
pt "E qj iu t-i 
(3.3. SS) 
1-0 
the identities are 
%p 0- -(Ob 
+ c)-1 (3.3.59) 
0- (j3(1+b) + lzc)ýP 1-m2 (3.3.60) 
4; 1- (I + b)%Pj_,, (3.3.61) 
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so that *i-02) and %P 0 from (3.3.60). The solution for 
prices is 
Pt - %ut (3.3.62) 
and noting that p_ pe %P u %P u in (3.2.2d), the t t, t-2 0t+ 
*lut-1 
0t 
solution for output is 
yt qlout + e2t (3.3.63) 
comparative statics are of the usual sign and obtained by 
substituting q; 0 
from (3.3.59) in place of A0 in equation (3.3.7). 
Equations (3.3.62) (3.3.63) yield 
a2'. 
22 (3.3.64) 
p 110au 
2- 22 -2 ay - %Po-cru- +a2+ 2%poau2 (3.3.65) 
and table 3.3(D) summarizes the results of the control exercises. 
Clearlyý, 'these are identical to those for the Sargent-Wallace model 
with a=1 and tberefore require no furtber comment. It is equally 
unnecessary to compute the optimal value for io. 
3.3(E) 7he Control"Pioblem in the Calvo Model 
Using the solution procedure in appendix B the system described 
by equations ý3.2. le), (3.2.2e), ' (3.2.3e), (3.2.4)-(3.2.5)'is reduced 
as follows: eliminate the non-dynamic relationships by first 
dsI 
eliminating m-m-m and r in-the usual way and substitute for 
yd from equation'(3.2.1e) and for Yr'- eI (cr-p) from equations 
(3.2.2e) and (3.2.3e). The resulting third-order differential 
equation system is written in state-space form as 
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le .-, . -xc . -Aß(b +9 1) Äßei 
dp 
e0p 
dt + 
20-u 
(3.3.66) 
, 
dq A- 121 
where dul = [du 1 
du 2T 
du, m X( e1- ßbe 3 
)dt - X(de 1- Abde 3) 
 du 2 'm 
a1e2 dt - E) 1 
de 
2 
and b and c retain their previous definitions. The characteristic 
-I 
equation of (3.3.66) is 
T3+ ACT 
2+ 
x0e 
20T- 
Ai3bG 
2a0 
(3.3.67) 
1212 
For this'model y and p'are predetermined and-q is non-predetermined. 
A unique non-explosive solution obtains, therefore, if -rlv -r2 <0 and 
(4)ý 
r3). 0, say Examination of the test functions of the character- 
istic equation'(see appendix D) shows that'saddlepoint stability 
obtains provided there iS'one sign change in the sequence, 
Aj3bG 
2a 
'I, ' xc' '\j3G 
2 
G- +12, G (3.3.68) 12 Ac 
12 
2 
or -Obele 2 0. 
(An equality, can be appended to the inequality 
because'a zero'value for the relevant test function merely indicates 
a zero root and this"'occurs under an 
b0 (see chapter 2, "section 2.4). 
elgenvalues with"ne-gative real part: 
0. Hence, 'saddlepoint stability obb 
and w. 
interest rate peg ((b - w, 
There are'two remaining 
f(T)(i) -, T(T 
2+ AT + A002 i92) 
&ins necessarily for both 0. o 
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Equation (3.3.69) below gives the stable trajectory of the 
systems 
-mY y- mp- p 21 21 
-0 1e2 
Ac +r3 
y 
-e AA(b +0 1)m 21 
MP- 21 
+ 
Thus, 
XAG y iw2l 
91 
aq 
. -MY ). 0 
aq 
. -M 
pZ0 
21 21 
ay ap 
(3.3.69) 
(3.3.70) 
(3.3.71) 
(3.3.72) 
aqlay 3,0 necessarily because of the assumption that contract prices 
depend positively on excess demand. By contrast, aqlap <0 is 
possible despite a similar functional relationship. To see why this 
should be so substitute for 
Y from equation (3.3.70) into equation N21 
(3.3.71) and suppose an interest rate peg (b -r3-0; c- 1). Then 
up- (; ) Z0 and &Vap(F) !%0 according to whether Pe GZ1. A positive 21 12 
price perturbation induces an expected rate of dtsfmfLatton and future 
contractions in aggregate demand. The contraction increases with 
J3. The expectation of this implies negative pressure on the contract 
price which increases with 92. Moreover, if contract prices 
actually do fall, expected disinflation continues via the inflation 
mechanism (3.2.3e) which is more likely as a1 increases. In 
contrast, relatively low values for these parameters give the usual 
response, aq/ap(r) 3.0. 
To ex2unine the control problem, the system is reduced further to 
just two dynandc relationships in terms of y, p and the disturbances. 
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Substituting equation'(3.3.69) into (3.3.66), 
dy' 'S 11 
S 12' 
dt + du 1 (3.3.73) 
, 
dp. SS 
:I 
21 2 2. 'p 
where S -x(C + 09 
Z 
2 21 
-Aj3(b +G+0 mp- 12 11 21 
y 
21 einl2l 
s --9 (I+ mp- 22 1 21 
22 
ay and ap are now computed from equation (3.3.67) using the method 
described in appendix E. Hence, note that 
0s+ 
sl: 
o 
+r0 (3.3.74) 
a2aa20 y yp 
1: 
0 22 
(3.3.75) 
py p 2. 
where', as usual, a yp 
a py 
is the asymptotic covariance of y and p 
2 
and ah is the asymptotic variance of duh (h - 1,2). S is the 2x2 
dynamic matrix in equation (3.3.73). The matrix system in equation 
(3.3.74) defines a set of three independent simultaneous equations 
in a2, a2 and a These are given by yp yp 
'2S 21 0 
0 2S 
22 
s 
21 
s 
22 
ý2 2' 2S 
12 ay -a, 
2S a2 -a 
2 
21 p2 
(S 
21 
+s 
22 a ypi 
0 
(3.3.76) 
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so that applying Cramer's Rule, 
(S ss (S +s ))a 
2_s22 
a2 
12 21 22 11 22 1 12a2 
(3.3.77) 
y 2K 
4 
(S ss (S +s ))a 
2_s22 
a2 
12 21 21 11 22 2 2. a. (3.3.78) 
p 2K 4 
where K4 = (Sn +s 22)(Sll 
s 
22 -s 12 
s 
21)' 
In addition, it is useful here to simplify the expression for K 4 
Two useful properties are S -7* + APG my- and 0 mp- r 22 31 21 1 21 31 
APO my- . Then it is fairly straightforward to show that 1 21 
2 
K4 CAc-r 3 
(AC +73+ xPe 102 (Ac + b) ] in which case IK4 (r) 
K4 (M) 
Turning first to expenditure shocks, 
a2 (d 
(S ss (S 4- S) )A 
2-2 
12 21 22 11 22 ly, 
(3.3.79) 
2K 
4 
s2x 
2-2 
cr 
2( 
e)__ 
21 
- 
ly, 
U4 
(3.3.80) 
From the definition of mY in equation (3.3.70), ImY (_ y- 21 21 r)l . 
Im 
21(m) 1 
so that S 21 
(r) ), S 21(m) . 
Thus, the ni rator and denominator in equa- 
tion (3.3.80) increases and decreases respectively as io increases. rt 
2-2-2 follows that aP (r, e 1ap 
(m, e Now consider ay (d in equation 
(3.3.79). Then substituting for S ij (i, j - 1,2) and rearranging 
gives 
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AO(b + XOG y )e 
2 
2 (e 
3 l'il IG2 
Y JL 2K 4 
(, \C +T3 
(-r (Xc +r+ XPO 29) 312, 
IX 
232 
2K 
411 
(3.3.81) 
It is clear from the definition Of K4 that the second term in (s) is 
almost certain to increase with ý0. The effect of 40 on the first term 
in (-) is a little more difficult to discern since both b and -r 3 
decline with 4b whilst Imy- I increases with *. Nonetheless, the 21 
denominator unambiguously falls (absolutely) as 4) rises which sug- 
gests strongly thatthe whole 
2 
a (m, e These results are 
though the intuition is sligI 
2- term in (-) increases. Then a (r, e 
supportive of the previous findings, 
htly different here. A positive 
expenditure shock raises contract prices and, for a money supply peg, 
interest rates. The former implies subsequent price inflation. The 
rise in interest rates dampens output and, via the effect on contract 
prices, dampens aggregate price movements which otherwise tend to 
stimulate demand through real interest rates. An accommodative 
monetary policy, however, negates the stabilizing interest rate 
fluctuations and induces a further jump in the contract price because 
of the implied higher expected demand. 
Supply shocks in the model are incorporated in the inflation 
mechanism (3.2.2e). - From equations (3.3.77) - (3.3.78), 
2 2-4. 
a2 (e 
s 
12 
G1a2 
(3.3.82) 
y2 2K 
4 
2-2 
l(S s- s- (S 4- s MO cr 2 (e ) 12 21 11 11 22 12 (3.3.83) 
p2U4 
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As before, we may re--write equations (3.3.82) - (3.3.83) az 
cr (e y2 
2222 2-2 A j3 ( (b + 7* 3 
)(Ac + -r 3)+ xpe 10 2) el a2 (3.3.84) 
2K 
4 
(, \C +T 
3) 
2 
\ß(b +- ßo 20) 
cr 
2 (E ). _I, 
73 - '\ßelmy21)92102 
+ 
Ä(C(AC + 73 )-12 
E) 
2-2 
p2 2K 
4 
(Äc +r 
3) 
2K 
41ZZ. 
(3.3.85) 
2-2- in which case the most plausible outcome is ay (r'd 2ay 
(M, d 2) and 
2-2- 
ap (r, e2ap (m, e2). The reason is as follows. An initial positive 
perturbation to prices implies an expected rate of disinflation. The 
disinflation is sluggish because of the upward tendency of contract 
prices. Output effects will primarily follow the initial increase in 
the interest rate under a money supply peg. Expected lower demand 
tends to depress the contract price and stabilize prices. Output 
is stabilized by virtue of the lower interest rates. By contrast, 
accommodating monetary changes neutralizes these effects and the 
disturbance tends to be distributed over a longer period of time. 
Implications of monetary volatility are captured in 
22 2-2 
a2 (d 
(S 
22 
s 
21 -s 22 
(S 
11 
+s 
22 
))A 13 ba3 
(3.3.86) 
y3 2K 
4 
s2A2 J3 
2b2-2 
2 21 03 
cr P( 453 
)- (3.3.87) 
2j< 4 
2-2- 
so that the usual result obtains, namely 0-ay (r, e 3)cay 
(m, e 3) and 
2-2- 0a (r, e <a (m, e P 
'3 
p3 
A derivation of an optimal value for (0, whilst possibly yielding 
greater insight, is obviously impossible for this system given its 
dynamic configuzation 
183 
3.3(F) The Control Problem in the open Economy Model 
The system described by equations (3.2.1f), (3.2.2f), (3.2.3f), 
(3.2.4) (3.2.6) is reduced to a fourth-order dimension as follows: 
dsd 
m mm m, r and y are eliminated as before, as is Yr - ey from 
equations (3.2.2f); recall the process for v in equation (3.2.10) and 
include this in the state vector. Then 
dy 
dp e 
dv 0 
de e. n, 
_A , (ß 1b+ 
ß2) 
0 
0 
n 
0 AO 
2' Y, 
00pd dull 
t+2 
-P 0v du 
n2 ej 
(3.3.88) 
where n -1 1 1)1 712 
n2 "1 T)3 
du I" [du du du ] 
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du . du 4 
du, X(el - ßbe3)dt - A(de, - ßlbcle. ) 
du 
2 Ge 2 
dt - Ode 2 
du 
3ý pe 4dt m, pde4 
du 
4" 
be 
3 
dt - bde 3 
v 
and where b and c are defined as, usual. The characteristic equation 
of (3.3.88) is- - 
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q(T) - (p + T) (T 
3_(n2- 
A(c - J3 1 
G))T 
- A[J3 2 
(by 
1-nI)+n2 
(c - 010) - e(j3, b + 13 2)]r 
- Aebp 2+ 13 1n 2)) -0 
(3.3.89) 
so that -p, the autoregressive coefficient for the disturbance v, is 
one of the stable eigenvalues, TI say. Since y and p are predeter- 
mined and e is non-predetermined, saddlepoint stability then 
requires that T2, -r 3<0 and T4 ý' 
0' say. Examination of the (-) 
term in equation (3.3.89) is sufficient to investigate this. Hence, 
computing the test functions of (3.3.89) (see appendix D), the 
saddlepoint property is satisfied if there is one and only one sign 
change in the sequence. 
1, -(n 2- A(C - J3 3.9))# 
02 (byl n, ) +n 2(C 13 le) 
G(13, b + J3 2)] 
- 1"ý)bo 2+ 13, n 2) 
(3.3.90) 
it is of some interest to examine this condition in some detail 
here. In particular, an additional implication of the present 
analysis is that it is not the degree of capital mobility per so 
which matters for stability, but rather the relative magnitudes of 
current account para ters. Moreover, these are crucial in deter- 
mining the impact effect of price level movements on the exchange 
rate which may exhibit perverse responses. As far as we know, these 
issues have hitherto gone unnoticed. 
Consider, then, the second test function, -(n 2 
A(c 13 1 0)) and 
note that c j3 190 is a necessary condition for stability (this 
Aeb(ß 2+ß1n 2) 
n2- A(C -ß1 0) 
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is proved below). Then as the degree of capital mobility increases 
( n, ,o aD, n2 --' 
0) -(n 2- 
x(c -01 e)) > 0, and the saddlepoint 
condition reduces to just \Ob(j32 + 131n 2) *. % 0 (where 
it is noted 
again that, an interest rate peg, cb -(n, b-0, implies a zero root). 
Thus, a high degree of capital mobility is certainly conducive to a 
well-defined solution. As ill .90 (n 2 3,0), 
however, 
-(n - \(c, - j3 9)) <0 is more likely and it is necessary to examine 21 
the behaviour of the third test function. it is cleax that as n2 
increases, this test function also becomes negative, implying that 
the saddlepoint condition reduces to that above, Aeb(p 2+ 13 1n2) 'N 0. 
Note, however, that n., -0 also raises njL which operates, against: 
stability. This is the first indication that it is not the degree of 
capital mobility per so which is important. 
To elaborate further, suppose an interest rate peg. The zero 
root is witnessed in the expression (-) in equation (3.3.89)t 
(p+T), r[, r -(n 2-Ä( 
1-ßi 9»i-X(n 2( 1-ß 1 0)-ß 2(n1 +0») - 0. Then 
saddlepoint stability requires no change in the sequence 
1, A(i -ß1 9», - ßl? ) - ß2. (n2. + 0». 
Perfect capital mobility implies n, mn2ý0 so that provided 
1- 13 1e), 0, 
the condition is satisfied. Since c ), 1, this verifies 
the earlier proposition that c- j3 1G3,0. For 
the case of imperfect 
capital mobility it is seen that, whilst. higher values for n2 tend 
to violate'stability, this is not true for increasing values of nif 
Thus, it is observed again that the absolute degree of capital 
mobility is not the important factor; rather, it is the relative 
magnitudes 
. 
of the 
I 
trade balance parameters, r)2 and rl 3' which axe 
reflected in n and n respectively. Moreover, the way in which 12 
the different para ters influence stability appears to changee when 
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b ;d0 (flexible interest rates) high n2 and low n1 are conducive to 
stability; when b-0 (fixed interest rates) the reverse is true. 
These results are of so interest. Some intuition about them is 
obtained below. 
The stable trajectory is 
-MY y- MP p- MV v 21 21 21 
(3.3.92) 
Y42 (3.3.93) 
A 43 2 
b-nx( J31b + J32 )Yn, - by + (A(c j3 0) + 7, )Y 
MP- 
2- 72- 1114 M-21 
21 
(3.3.94) 
v1 
M21 "p+ 
T4 
so that 
(3,3.95) 
ae -y ae ae 'e 0; -mP- e 0; c0 (3.3.96) -'ii - 21 -m 21 
ey C7P av 
ae/ay'2t 0 depending on the degree of capital mobility and the policy 
regime. Thus, perfect capital mobility (n 2ý 0) implies ae/ay <0 
because of the induced interest rate movements following output fluc- 
tuations. obviously, ae/ay(r) -0 under perfect capital mobility. 
By contrast, n2 ;d0 implies -ae/ay(r) ). 0 owing to the output-induced 
movements in the trade balance. 
Similar arguments apply to the sign of aelap. There are, 
however, some rather more interesting cases which relate back to 
the discussion of stability. Suppose an interest rate peg (b - o, 
cr= 0) and recall the definition of my in equation (3.3.93). 4 21 
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Then it is seen that ae/ap(r) ?j0 according to whether 
nI-0 -1 (1 - j32e)n * 0. The normal case is ae/ip(r) 3.0 because oE 2 
fluctuations in real competitiveness. A necessary condition for this 
is I-010>0 which is recalled to be a necessary condition for 
stability. Alternatively, a relatively high (low) nI (n 2) 
implies 
ae/ap(r) <0 and, from the previous discussion, this is conducive to 
stability. An increase in prices, therefore, may actually cause an 
exchange rate apprectatton even under imperfect capital mobility and 
fixed interest rates. The reason is as follows. An initial price 
increase induces an expected rate of disinflation which raises real 
interest rates and implies a subsequent output contraction. This 
effect increases with 01. The expectation of lower income propagates 
an expected exchange rate appreciation which increases with n1 (71 2)' 
This is translated into a current appreciation. in terms of 
stability, this is beneficial because of the dampening force on 
prices. 
Further insight is obtained by relaxing interest rate control. 
Then mp- is given by (3.3.94) again. The noteworthy feature in the 21 
negative sign on by 1, 
implying a tendency for the exchange rate to 
deprectate following a price increase as interest rates become 
endogenous. The reason follows from above: expectation of lower I 
demand induces the expectation of lower interest rates and a current 
exchange rate depreciation. rn terms of stability, it is recalled 
that under flexible interest rates, relatively high n1 may hinder 
stability; under such circumstances, the depreciation Is exacer- 
bated. Thus, for perfect capital mobility, mp- - 9-1(-by: L + 21 
(A(c - j319) +r 4) -r4/'\j32) which shows 
that the tendency for 
aelap <0 is partly offset owing to the expectation effects vi& 
-by 10 
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The foregoing digression is useful for the insights it yields 
into the control problem. Thus, following appendix E, substitute 
equation (3.3.92) into (3.3.88) and obtain 
dy 1 
12 
dp 0 
dvi 0 
1 
13 y 
p dt + du 
-Pl vi 
where 1 22 - -(, \(c - J3219 'r4 -n 2) 
P 122 ý -X(J32b + J32(2 +m 22)) 
'123 = -'\'02m2v, 
Efence cr 
2 
and a2 are given implicitly by yp 
T 1: 
0L+ 
LI: 
0+1: 
2 
a 
y 
E0 
py 
a vy 
cr 
yp 
2 
cr 
p 
cr VP 
aa2 YV 
apvj 0 
a20 v 
0 
2 
0 
(3.3.97) 
(3*3*98) 
1 
0 
0 
2 
31 
(3.3.99) 
where a YV -a VY 
and a PV, M Cr VP 
are the appropriate covariances and 
cr2 is the asymptotic variance of du (h - 1,2,3). L is the 3x3 hn 
dynamic matrix in equation (3.3.97). The system (3.3.98) describes 
six independent- simultaneous equations which are solved such that 
-K a2K e7la 2+ 12 e7l a2 
a251 
12 52 13 3 
(3.3.100) 
y 21 11 K5 
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K ea 
2+ (1 
2 
e-1 -1 )K a2+12Gp 
-1 2 
251 11 12 52 13 11 3 
p 21 
11 
1 
12 K5 
where K. is (1 11 - P)PO-JL 
For the case of aggregate demand shocks therefore, 
2-2 
2 
y 21 
0X 232 2 
ap( 45 
21 11 
1 
12 
(3.3.101) 
(3.3.102) 
(3.3.103) 
Clearly, ' 11 11 
(r)l 11 11 (m)l; regardless'of the degree of capital 
(6) 2- 
mobility (since (o', - co implies c-1, r4 ý 0) Hence, ay (r, e 
2- 
ay (M, e regardless of the degree of capital mobility also. The 
reason is, of course, that endogenising interest rates endows this 
variable with a'stabilizing role which is compounded by exchange 
rate movements. The implications for a2 (e are rather more difficult P 
to discern owing to the ambiguous effect of 40 on 1 120 
Nonetheless, 
2-2- 
one would expect a (r, e a (m, e )ýalso since prices depend solely PP 
on-income. This'means either that 11 
. 12 
(r)l < 11 12(m)l , reinforcing 
all 11 
llft, or that if all 12 
I/a4i 1,0, this is less than all 11 1/040 
(7) p 0. For perfect capital mobility (n3. =n2ý 0), M 21 
is given by 
(3.3.88) as wp- -a e-'(-by + Mc - O'e) +T so that assuming 21 11 4)r4/AO2) 
p- the normal case"(mp- o, aelap <'O), mP (m-) ), m (r) -0 and 11 ' (r)l 21 21 21 12 
11 
12 
(m)l. ' For imperfect capital mobility matters are slightly more 
complicated though the above argument applies. 
Supply shocks yield the following: 
-2 
2 (e 12 
Oaý, 
I 
y2 211, 
(3.3.104) 
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12 e7l 
2-2 
11 12 
)G a2 
p 21 11 
1 
12 
(3.3.105) 
2-2- 
Thus, whether ay (r, e 2ay 
(M'd 
2) 
depends on the relative rates, 
all 12 
11ft and all 11 
Ilao. consider, first, perfect capital mobility. 
Then recalling the definition of mP- it is likely that all 1/00 t0 21 12 
2-2- is greater than all 11 
Ilao <0 and ay (r, e 2ay 
(M'd 
2 
). The reason 
is that, for a money supply peg, the ensuing variation in interest 
rates, the exchange rate and expected inflation following a price 
perturbation reinforce each other causing output fluctuations. An 
accommodative monetary policy negates the first two of these effects. 
Such a policy, however, is unlikely to be optimal for price stabili- 
22 -2 zation. Rewriting (3.3.205) as a p(d 2 11 
9/1 12 -0 
/1 
11 )a 2 
and using the above discussion, the term in parentheses tends to 
increase with 40 and a2 (i, ea2(;, e ). The reason follows fron p2p2 
that given for the case of output stabilization. In that, pegging 
the interest rate negates much of the spillover effects onto aggre- 
gate demand. In term of price volatility, such effects are 
stabilizing, offsetting the initial price shock, by virtue of the 
inflation mechansism. Thus, there is the usual conflict of optimal 
policies. 
Relaxing the assumption of perfect capital mobility complicates 
2- 
matters. It is certainly possible, however, that ay (r'd 2 
2- 
a (m, e ) in this case which implies a reversal in optimal policies. y2 
Intuitively, this can be seen by considering a positive price shock, 
Under an interest rate peg the exchange rate depreciates inducing an 
expansion in output. By contrast, fixing the money stock permits 
a stabilizing role for the upward movement in interest rates both 
directly, by the rise in real interest rates, and indirectly, by 
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dampening the exchange rate, depreciation. Moreover, and in contrast 
to the perfect capital mobility case, the fixed money stock policy 
is also likely to be optimal for price stabilization; there is no 
conflict of optimal policies. 
The implications of monetary volatility are unambiguous: thus, - 
2432b232 
a2 (e 
13 
(3.3.106) 
Y 21 
11 
2j3Yý2 
GA 213 
p(e 3) m- 
(3.3.107) 
21 11 
1 
12 
2-2- 
and pegging interest rates (b - 0) implies ay (r'd 3ap 
(r, 43) 'o 0' 
The open economy is subject to a fourth tyPe of'stochastic shock, 
namely a foreign or external disturbance which incorporates random 
shifts in trade and capital flows. For this, 
2 -1 2-2 
a2 (e ) 
li? p 174 
(3.3.108) 
Y J& 21 
11 K5 
2 -1 _ l)p2-2 2 (e 13 
G 
lip a4 (3.3,109) 
21 11 
1 
12 K5 
Clearly, from equation (3.3.95), mvv 21(r) :' m2l(m) so that 11 13 
13(m)" Under perfect capital mobility, recalling 
the previous 
discussion about I and it is also likely that JK (r)l < 21 &. 5 
22 In addition, rewriting IK 5 
(m)j. Hence, ay (r, d 4) )' ay(m. 04 
. 
(3.3.109) as a2 (e : j212 P(1/1 K -, - P/1 1K); 
2 
shows that 
p4 13 12 5 11 12 54 
a2 (r, e >a2 (m, e The optimal policy is therefore a money supply p4p4 
peg. considering a positive foreign shock which causes an exchange 
rage appreciation, there is a contractionary effect on-demand and 
prices. Permitting a fall in interest rates offset this by reducing 
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real interest rates and dampening the appreciation. Less than 
perfectly mobile capital is unlikely to qualify these results. 
in conclusion, it is noted that the foregoing has been predicated 
on the assumption that the normal cases hold. Perverse responses 
that were recorded earlier may, of course, alter some of the results. 
it is not our intention to pursue these further but merely note their 
implication. 
3.4 Sunmuiry and Concluding Remarks 
Table 3.4(A) provides a conspectus of the results derived in 
section 3.3. It constitutes the payoff matrix for the monetary 
instruments problem. 
-Casual 
inspection reveals a striking consistency in certain 
cases. In terms of model uncertainty, this means that it may not be 
all that important and ab uno disco omnes. At the same time, 
however, the payoff matrix illustrates vividly the possible and 
critical model dependency of the optimal policy. 
Hodel robust policy rules are most apparent for expenditure and 
money demand shocks. with the exception of only one, the optimal 
policy is invariant with respect to divergent model structures. For 
the former disturbance this takes the form of a money stock peg; 
for the latter typeof shock, an interest rate peg is Optimal. These 
are explained generally by the endogenous movements in interest rates 
when the money supply is fixed and which are stabilizing in the face 
of demand shocks but destabilizing under monetary volatility. The 
exception is for the Lucas-Rapping model in which aggregate supply 
is determined partly by real interest rates and real money balances. 
These additional dimensions provide the reason for the ambiguity of 
optimal policy. A special case whereby the standard results re- 
obtain, however, is when these effects are absent. Though this is 
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Disturbance Expenditure Supply External 
Demand 
Model iteria C. r3. 
2 
Sargent- a p 
WaIlace 
2 
a m r 
y 
Lucas- a2 p 
; 
ýt-r 
Rapping 
2 
a m/r r r y 
2 
a m m/r r 
Turnovsky P 
2 
a'Y m m/r r 
2 
p Fischer 
2 
a 
y 
m 
2 7 a p m Calvo 
2 
ay m r 
2 
Open ý a p m m r m 
Economy 
a2 
y 
i-n 
Table 3.4(A) :, Payoff matrix for alternative optimal 
instruments 
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a limiting case, it is worth noting that it is the most popular and 
extensively used version of the Lucas-Rapping framework. If any 
importance is attributed to this fact, the robustness of optimal 
policies is complete. 
The major problem of defining a model robust policy occurs for 
the case of supply shocks. The particular optimal policy under such 
circum tances depends in general on the structural parameters of the 
model, including those defining the policy maker's preferences. This 
is of some importance since it is probably precisely these types of 
disturbances which have become the predominant source of stochastic 
behaviour since the early 19709. In view of this, any conclusion 
regarding the optimal choice of monetary policy must be tentative. 
Even in this single analysis of only two alternative policy regimes 
the need for testing robustness of policies is blatantly clear. 
At the most general and important level, the major contribution 
of the chapter is its rigour and its comprehensive assessment of the 
monetary instruments problem. This reflects the earlier remarks 
about the drawback of existing literature. A proper evaluation of 
the issue must be conducted against the background of model uncert- 
ainty; the absence of this is the essential flaw in that literature. 
The singular characteristics of supply side disturbances were hinted 
at in early studies but a full appreciation of them can only be 
gained from the current chapter. These aspects, which are particular 
to supply shocks, have not hitherto been fully recognised. in 
addition, the deployment of the policy problem to richer dynamic 
models has been a useful exstension, yielding insights otherwise 
overlooked. The role of forward-looking behaviour becomes far from 
trivial in these models. 
in concluding the chapter, however, it is useful to note socne 
features of the analysis that might be considered objectionable. 
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The first (and probably most obvious) objection that might be 
raised concerns the description of policy behaviour. Recalling 
equations (3.2.5), this assi sa contemporoneous relationship 
between the money stock and the interest rate. it is questionable 
the extent to which this mimics the true manner in which actual 
policy instruments are adjusted (see, for example, McCallum and 
Whittaker (1979) in connection with fiscal policy). Rather, delays 
in receiving, processing, and interpreting information may prompt 
consideration of a Lagged feedback rule. Under such circumstances 
certain of our results may cease to be true especially for the 
discrete time models. This is because these models exhibit zero 
hysteresis. Thus, since all disturbances are assumed to be purely 
transitory, any lagged feedback rule will imply corrective action 
which is out of phase with the current perturbation (see, for 
example, Phillips (1957) for an early exposition). The propagation 
mechanism which converts random shocks into persistent deviations 
from equilibrium is precisely the policy rule so that the optimal 
policy is to avoid feedback(e). This point is well-taken though it 
has been purposely ignored given that the purpose of the chapter was 
to concentrate solely on one particular class of policy rule. 
Two further objections that may be noted relate to the shock 
structure. First, agents have been endowed with the knowlege that 
all stochastic disturbances are independently Gaussian distributed. 
Second, inference problems pertaining to the source of stochastic 
variation have been eschewed. With regard to the latter, chapter 6 
shows some misleading implications of this abstraction. 
in toto, the content of the chapter has suggested some clear 
implications for the evaluation of the monetary instruments problem. 
As far as we know, the chapter is the first to make operational the 
methodology that emphasizes the need to search for model robust 
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policies. we, believe it to be an important contribution to the 
monetary instrument debate. Yet the particular preoccupation is 
entirely general. -our analysis should be followed up by similar 
policy evaluations for different problems. The methodology is 
attractive and constitutes a fruitful area for further research. it 
could be made even more attractive if, in addition to the search for 
model-robust policies, one introduced uncertainties about the source 
of stochastic fluctuation. 
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Notes to Chapter Three 
This chapter is a much extended version of Blackburn (1984a). 
See Blackburn (1985c). 
(1) See Benavie (1983), pp. 157-160, with a3 'm al a4 'n 0; V, =a 
Y2 -a 2* 
(2) Substitute the solutions (3.3.43) (3.3.44) into the expression 
dM 
for rt obtained by equating mt - mt mt and rearrange terms. 
(3) See Turnovsky (1980a), p. 49, equations (24) - (25)1 with 
0- Id 2 
1; V, ma1. 
(4) In fact,. 7- 3o 
is also admissible since this is a consequence of 
an interest rate peg which still yields a well-defined solution 
(see chapter 2, section 2.4). This is shown below. 
(5) The reason for specifying the autoregressive process for v is 
now clear: equation (3-3.92) has no white noise error terms. 
In this respect, the continuous time version of the solution 
loses information relative to the discrete time case (see 
appendix 8). Since'we wish to examine external disturbances 
it is tberefore necessary to avoid defining these an purely 
white noise terms. 
(6) It is noted that 3..,, <0 is necessary for a2 (d Y 
1< 0-is necessary for a2 (d 0. 22 p 
(8) The reader is invited to verify this by substituting for the 
policy in equations (3.2.5), the rule m t+I 'm Or t, 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ALTERNATIVE FMANCIAL POLICY RULES IN AN OPEN 
ECONOMY UNDER DIVERGENT EXPECTATIONS* 
4.1 Introduction 
A well-known drawback of the early treatments of monetary and 
fiscal policy is their failure to appreciate the interrelationships 
between these policies. The standard approach amounted to perfor- 
ming independent comparative static exercises with respect to changes 
in monetary and fiscal instruments in a simple rS-LH system which 
could be extended to incorporate price flexibility and international 
trade. The early papers by Ott and Ott (1965) and Christ (1967, 
1968) (see also Meyer (1975)) highlighted the fallacy of this 
approach by pointing out the financing requirements associated with 
changes in the government's fiscal stance. Failure of the earlier 
analyses to incorporate these render their treatment of fiscal policy 
in general, and the crowding out issue in particular, inadequate. 
First, the effect of changes in government expenditure generally 
depends on the method of financing this expenditure. Second, the 
government budget constraint imposes restrictions on the number of 
degrees of freedom available to the authorities exogenously choosing 
values for monetary and fiscal instruments; with n instruments, there 
are only n-l degrees of freedom because at least one instrument must 
be determined residually. A related additional (and probably the 
most important) implication of the government budget constraint 
continues to receive much attention and is the main focus of this 
chapter. This is as follows. 
The government budget constraint simply requires that the total 
a unt of govemmeent expenditure for all purposes be equal to the 
total a unt of finance available to the government from all sources. 
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Government expenditure includes items such as direct government 
purchases of goods and services, debt interest payments and trans- 
fers. Sources of finance include taxes on income, taxes on debt 
interest, sales of government debt and monetary issue. The f inan- 
cing requirement endows the system with intrinsic dynamics arising 
from changes in asset stocks associated with a budget imbalance. 
These changes in asset stocks held by the private sector will induce 
second round effects which may offset or reinforce the initial 
impact of the budget imbalance. The steady state of the system is 
then characterized by stock-flow equilibrium(l). In the classic 
article by Blinder and Solow (1976) LSPe also Blinder arcl Solow (1974); 
Tobin. and Buiter (1976)) the dynamic adjustment of a modified IS-LH 
system following a shift in the budget deficit away from equilibrium 
was shown to be critically dependent upon the financial policy 
adopted by the authorities. Most important is the probability of 
instability associated with a policy of issuing or retiring govern- 
ment debt to accommodate budget imbalances. This can be interpreted 
more provocatively by stating that if the system is stable, deficit 
financing by bonds is more expansionary than deficit financing by 
money. These results arise because of the appreciation of debt 
interest payments as an expense item in the government's accounts. 
Financing a deficit by issuing bonds forces up interest rates such 
that output expands by less than if the deficit is financed by money 
creation. This means that the induced tax receipts are lower under 
the former policy. Moreover, debt issue causes a larger volume of 
outstanding debt and greater interest payments. The outcome is an 
ever widening budget gap and the system explodes. Note that a simi- 
lar instability occurs in the absence of interest payments in the 
government budget via the wealth effects operating in the goods (a 
stabilizing effect) and money markets (a destabilizing effect). in 
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any event, the critical stability condition requires a high wealth 
effect in the goods market relative to the wealth effect in the money 
market in order to generate a sufficient increase in ouput to close 
the budget gap. 
The potential destabilizing properties of a bond financing 
policy has proved to be fairly robust to alternative model specifi- 
cations. Flexible price models have been analysed by Christ (1978, 
1979), Cohen and Leeuw (1980), Turnovsky (1980b) and Smith (1982), 
and extensions to the open economy have been performed by Scarth 
(1975, '1977) and Turnovsky (1976b). Further issues relating to the 
government budget constraint (and bond-financed deficit instability 
in'particular) are discussed"in Currie (1976a, b, 1977,1980a, b, c, 
1982,1985b), and Scarth (1982). It is not our intention to review 
this literature bere'as this has occupied the attention of other 
authors. (see, for example, Carlsonýand Spencer (1975); Buiter (1977)1 
Currie (1978,, 1981); the edited volume by Cook and'Jack3on (1979)). 
We-should, however, make some comment on where we believe the exis- 
ting literature is lacking since this is the motivation for our 
analysis-that follows. 
First, all of the literature cited above concentrates on small 
models which are analytically-tractable. Though we welcome these 
as useful devices for important preliminary investigations, we 
believe that further research should be directed towards investig-: 
ating somewhat larger systems with richer dynamic structures. This 
would obviously mean abandonment of analytical techniques and the use 
of nil rical computer simulations. Clearly, the results obtained 
will then be dependent upon the particular values chosen for the 
para ters but a sensitivity analysis could test the robustness of 
the results across ranges of para ter values. The recent contrib- 
utions by Nguyen and Turnovsky (1979,1983), Turnovsky and Nguyen 
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(1980) and Camilleri, Nguyen and Campbell (1984) are steps- forward 
in this direction and the results continue to imply the undesira- 
bility of bond financing. Second,. there is still relatively little 
work on open economy models. Third, and likewise, relatively little 
attention has been given to the incorporation of rational expect- 
ations (exceptions to this are Turnovsky'and Nguyen (1980), 
Camilleri, Nguyen and Campbell (1984) and Scarth (1980), though the 
latter continues to adopt an analytical approach), ' One iumsediate 
implication of introducing rational expectations is that the concen- 
tration on g&obaD stability in evaluating the stability of a system 
is inappropriate; rather,, forward-looking behaviour stresses 
saddLepotnt stability in determining a unique non-explosive 
solution. 
This chapter is motivated by the above considerations. Specifi- 
cally, we wish to analyse the stability of a fairly general opený 
economy macroeconomic model which permits both perfect and imperfect 
capital mobility'and which is able to incorporate either adaptive or 
rational expectations or both. In these ways, our contribution to 
the existing literature can be considered as two-foldi first,, we 
examine the issue of bond-financed deficit instability in an open 
economy with a variety of sources of dynamic behaviour which mean 
the use of computer simulation techniques; -second we inquire into the 
importance for this issue of different expectations mechanism. At 
the moment, the literature has nothing to say about whether the 
probability of instability is likely to depend on the assumption 
one chooses to make about the way in which expectations are formed. 
In addition, we also examine the model's dynamic properties by 
subjecting it, to exogenous perturbations and tracing through the 
trajectories, for certain variables. 
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Section 4.2 sets out the model in its original non-linear form. 
This was developed by Whittaker and Wren-Lewis (1983) and is 
designed to encompass earlier, more specialised, models rather than 
to innovate. This chapter essentially extends the work in Whittaker 
and Wren-Lewis (1983) and Blackburn and Currie (1984), where the 
latter is itself an extension of the former. Whereas Nguyen and 
Turnovsky (1983) deal with a closed economy model with capital 
accumulation, and Camilleri, Nguyen and Campbell (1904) analyse an 
open economy with a fixed capital stock, Whittaker and Wren-Lewis 
(1983) allow for capital accumulation in an open economy framowork. 
Expectations are formed extrapolatively, however, and the work 
reported in Blackburn and Currie (1984) focusses on the implications 
of rational expectations in the foreign exchange market. This 
chapter is the culmination of this research, combining both Whittaker 
and Wren-Lewis (1983) and Blackburn and Currie (1984), together with 
adding an additional dimension, namely rational expectations in the 
goods market. Thus, the model incorporates either global adaptive 
expectations, adaptive and rational expectations, or global rational 
expectations. A linearised version of the model is used for computer 
simulations. Section 4.3 presents a numerical analysis of stability 
using a range of plausible parameter values. Section 4.4 contains 
some simulations of permanent exogenous perturbations based on 
particular parameter sets. A summary and conclusion are contained in 
section 4.5. 
4.2 The Model and the Simulation Framework 
Whittaker and Wren-Lewis (1983) develop a fairly general macro- 
economic model for addressing the implications of alternative 
financial policies. It builds upon an open economy IS-LM system 
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permitting both perfect and imperfect capital mobility with a supply 
function for output and an expectations augmented Phillips curve 
generating inflation. Asset accumulation and the government budget 
constraint provide a rich source of dynamics and the analysis centres 
on a rule describing the method of financing budget imbalances. The 
model is closed by assumptions about expectations formation. The 
complete system comprises a set of thirteen static and dynamic non- 
linear s imultaneous equations. These can be partitioned into two 
blocks: the first block contains equations (4.2.1) - (4.2.11); the 
second block consists of equations (4.2.12) - (4.2.13) and is the 
innovation of our analysis. We write the system as followsi 
c+i4; k +9+t ýp v0 
J31(i - r, )y + 132(('l-T2 )rb +hfrf- hr) 
-a3 ((m +b- h)ir +hf fff )- J3 4 
(r - Tr) 
J3 5w+ 13 6e 
ai). (4.2.2) 
i-x1 (- x2 (r - ir) - k) Ai), 0 (j - 1,2) (4.2.3) 
t- cr I wd +a2g-a3y-a4ea1 -v 
0 (1-1,... 4) (4.2.4) 
fff t (r -p)h + (r p )h 'rs 0 (4.2.5) 
a (r 
f 
ý- r+ iT 
+ n2 w- 71 3w+n4e 
0 (4.2.6) 
Y. 1y + Y2 w-y3r ys 
0 Cs-1,2,3) (4.2.7) 
p 
(4.2.8) 
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y+ (1 - 'r2 )rb - P(m + b) +9 
0< l(J-1,2) (4.2.9) 
v is kLk 
m +b +a +k 
(p IT) 
G2 (Y-V) + IT 
el(q - p) 
-e q el(q - p) - ()2(y 
p 
-e (f e)/e 
8(e 
A%0 (4.2.20) 
(4.2.11) 
913,0 (J-1,2) (4.2.12A) 
013, (J-1,2) (4.2.12R) 
8 3- 0 (4.2.13A) 
C 
. 
e-e (4.2.13R) 
where y real output (aggregate demand) 
c real consumption 
k capital stock 
g real government expenditure 
t real trade balance 
r domestic nominal rate of interest 
b real value of interest bearing government debt 
ahf-h net foreign assets 
h domestic financial assets held by overseas sector 
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f h. overseas financial assets held by domestic sector 
Tr M expected domestic rate of inflation 
m real money stock 
ff 
f 
expected overseas rate of inflation 
w real domestic private sector wealth 
e= real exchange rate 
wd - world trade 
p- domestic-rate of inflation 
rf = overseas nominal rate of interest 
pf- overseas rate of inflation 
rs - nominal value of overseas reserves (deflated by the 
output price deflator) 
f 
real overseas wealth 
f- real exchange rate expected next period 
vm real output supply 
p authorities 'inflation target' 
q rate of contract price inflation. 
In addition, for any variable, x, dx/dt and the real exchange 
rate, e, is measured such that a rise in e is a real appreciation. 
As mentioned in section 4.1, the model is intended to be fairly 
conventional and our main innovations are the introduction of 
international trade and capital transactions together with the incor- 
poration of divergent expectations mechanisms. The model also 
reflects some features of the small analytical systems employed in 
the rest of the thesis. 
Equation (4.2.1) is the national income identity which gives 
real aggregate demand as the sum of real consumption, real invest- 
ment, real, government spending and the real trade balance. 
Equation (4.2.2) is the consumption function which relates real 
consumption to real disposable income, the inflation tax, real 
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(2) 
interest rates, real wealth and the terms of trade . Disposable 
income comprises post-tax earned income and net unearned income. 
The latter consists of post-tax interest income derived from govern- 
ment debt holdings, less the interest on the volume of government 
debt held by overseas residents, and the interest income obtained 
from holdings of overseas assets. The model is sufficiently general 
to allow for differences in the above tax rates, or T, ;dr 2* 
Similarly, the model permits divergent marginal propensities to 
consume out of post-tax labour income, P, , net interest income, P 2' 
and the inflation tax, A3. 
Equation (4.2.3) describes capital accumulation or investment. 
rt captures the partial adjustment hypothesis with the desired 
capital stock depending inversely on the real rate of interest and 
depreciation incorporated into equation (4.2.1) by the term q'k. 
Equation (4.2.4) gives the real trade balance which depends 
on world trade, real government expenditure, real domestic output 
and a measure of competitivensss given by the real exchange rate. 
The structure of the equation is such as to allow for different 
propensities to import out of domestic demand and domestic output. 
It is also noted that a4>0 implies that the Haxshall-Lerner cond- 
itions for a depreciation to improve the trade balance are satisfied. 
The balance of payments identity is summaxized in equation 
(4.2.5) and comprises the trade balance from equation (4.2.4p), 
real net foreign asset accumulation, and changes in the authorities, 
foreign reserve holdings. The second of these is described more 
fully below. The important feature of this equation, following 
Scarth (1975), is the explicit account of interest payments on both 
domestic assets held overseas (denominated in domestic currency 
terms) and foreign assets held by domestic residents (denominated 
in 'world currency' terms), together with changes in the real value 
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of debt due to domestic and world inflation; hence the terms in 
(r - p)h and (r 
f-pf )h f. changes in the real value of the latter 
group of assets due to fluctuations in the real exchange rate are 
ignored for simplicity, as are taxes on these interest payments. 
Equation (4.2.6) represents the net foreign asset demand func- 
tion, the arguments of which are the real interest differential 
(corrected for expected real exchange rate variations), real domestic 
wealth, real foreign wealth and the real exchange rate. This 
equation is motivated by considering the following functions 
describing domestic demand for overseas assets and foreign demand 
for domestic assets: 
rv-v_ 
ýe )+ n2 w+ 71 14 e nll'1114 3' 
(4.2.14) 
-7121 (r -r+ ff - fff - 
ý, )3w- n24 e 712VT124'ý 
(4.2.15) 
Then the definition a-hf-h gives equation (4.2.6) with 
11 1 An nil +n 21 and n4 m 'n. 4 
+ T'24* Perfect capital mobility is not 
assumed but may be approximated by attaching a high value to the 
parameter nI. Thus, the model has some features in common with 
portfolio balance models of open economies and the current account is 
permitted a role in exchange rate determination (see, for example, 
Dornbusch (1975); Dornbusch and Krugman (1976); Dornbusch and Fischer 
(1980); Allen and Kenen (1980); Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983); the 
series of papers in the 1976 edition of the Scandanavian Journal of 
Economics). 
Equation (4.2.7) is a standard money demand function with the 
demand for real balances depending on real output, real wealth and 
the nominal rate of interest. 
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The linchpin of the analysis that follows centres on equations 
(4.2.8) - (4.2.9). Equation (4.2.8) specifies a general financing 
rule for the government for which two extreme cases can be identified 
(the terminology follows Smith (1982)). The first is when 0-0 and 
represents a regime of bond financing in which the rate of growth of 
the nominal money supply is fixed at p*. This policy rule is termed 
monetartst. The second regime occurs when 0-I and the authorities 
pursue a policy of issuing or retiring money as the budget constraint 
dictates with the growth rate of interest bearing government debt now 
constrained to be p*. For obvious reasons, this rule is termed 
bondtst. It may be noted that in either regime, the equilibrium rate 
of inflation is p* so that p* may be regarded as the authorities' 
inflation target. 
Equation (4.2.9) is the familiar budget constraint written in 
real terms and completes the description of government behaviour. 
Government bonds are assumed to be of the variable interest type 
rather than fixed interest perpetuities. We also assume the fiscal 
instrument to be government expenditure. We have defined government 
expenditure as expenditure on goods and services. Christ (1979) 
and Cohen and Leeuw (1980) have recently shown that the probability 
of instability associated with a monetarist financial policy may be 
reduced if government expenditure is defined to also include debt 
interest payments. other definitions of government spending also 
exist, but wee feel it would prejudge the issue of instability that 
this model is designed to explore by departing from the traditional 
definition of the fiscal instrument at this initial stage. ' There 
might be some interest in exploring other possibilities in future 
research. 
output is allowed to fluctuate in the long-run as well as the 
short-run via the production function in equation (4.2.10) which 
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relates output supply to the stock of capital. It may also be noted 
here that the model adopts the conventional view in the literature in 
the sense of regarding output as being purely demand determined (that 
is, actual output is always constrained to equal aggregate demand and 
not. output supply). In these respects, therefore, the model loses 
some of its generality: firstly, by eschewing any explicit and 
important role for the labour market; and secondly, by permitting the 
principle of voluntary exchange to be operative on only the sellers, 
side of the market. Relaxation of these restrictions is another 
potentially interesting area for further research. 
Equation (4.2.11) defines the identity for real domestic private 
sector wealth from which one may derive the demand for bonds as the 
residual asset demand function. 
Equations (4.2.1) - (4.2.11) above represent the main structure 
of the model that will be used throughout our analysis. To this we 
append some further relationships describing the inflation mechanism 
and expectations formation. These constitute the main innovations 
of, our analysis'and the particular form of the relationships are 
determined by the assumptions about expectations formation. This 
second block of the model consists of equations (4.2.12) - (4*2.13). 
Each of these equations are partitioned according to the assumption 
about expectations. Thus, the suffix A denotes adaptive expectations 
and the, suffix, R denotes rational expectations. Equation (4.2.12A) 
describes the inflation process in terms of an expectations augmented 
Phillips curve with expectations being formed adaptively. Similarly, 
equation (4.2.13A) assumes adaptive expectations-in the foreign 
exchange market. Replacing the adaptive expectations assumption by 
rational expectations is equivalent to invoking perfect foresight in 
e this deterministic model so that ;. e and Tr - P. The former is 
suitable and equation (4.2.13R) applies; but the latter would make 
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supply and demand always equal were we to retain the augmented 
Phillips curve. Not only is this implausible, but it would also tend 
to render our stability analysis rather trivial. Hence, to incorpor- 
ate rational expectations into the goods maxket, we use equation 
(4.2.12R) which is a variant of the Calvo (1981,1982,1983) model 
used in chapter 3 and described in chapter 2 (section 2.3). This 
combines rational expectations with sluggish price adjustment due to 
long-term contracts. The version adopted in equation (4.2.12R) is 
slightly different from the usual formulation because we assume that 
the sluggishness applies to the rate of change, rather than the 
level, of prices. We adopt this specification in order to aid 
comparison with the adaptive expectations case. Then actual infla- 
tion adjusts sluggishly towards contract inflation which, in turn, in 
given as a forward-looking discounted moving average of future 
demand and inflation. 
This completes the description of the model. rts core is given 
by the main block comprising equations (4.2.1) - (4.2.11) and three 
alternative versions of the system can be distinguished according to 
which of the equations in (4.2.12) - (4.2.13) are chosen to comple- 
ment the main block. The first version assumes global adaptive 
exectations and is termed model A. The relevant equations are 
(4.2.1) - (4.2.11), (4.2.12A) and (4.2.13A) and is the original 
specification analysed in Whittaker and Wren-Lewis (1983). The 
second variant assi s adaptive expectations in the goods market 
and rational expectations in the foreign exchange market. ThiS J13 
termed model A/R and is the subject of investigation in Blackburn 
and Currie (1984). This type of divergent expectations has been 
considered by Turnovsky (1980b) in a similar analysis and by Peel and 
Metcalfe (1979) in a slightly different context. Though it is admit- 
tedly rather arbitrary, it might serve as a first approximation to 
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the case in which asset markets adjust more quickly than goods 
markets and is in the spirit of the popular Dornbusch (1976) and 
Buiter and Miller (1981) models of exchange rate dynamics (see also 
Canzoneri and Underwood (1982); Obstfeld and Rogoff (1984)) Wickens 
(1984)). The relevant equations for the A/R model are (4.2,1) - 
(4.2.11), (4.2.12A) and (4.2.13R). The third system is model R and 
assumes global rational expectations. The equations describing this 
model are (4.2.1) - (4.2.11), (4.2.12R) and (4.2.13R). 
our analysis that follows is based on a linear approximation 
of the model around its long-run equilibrium which amounts to 
linearizing equations (4.2.2), (4.2.5), (4.2.8) - (4.2.9) and 
(4.2.13A)). 
-,, 
We also eliminate 
i from equation (4.2.1) using equation 
(4.2.3) and substitute hf-a+h in equations (4.2.2) and (4.2.5). 
Then denoting by x the long-run equilibrium value of a variable x, a 
Taylor's series expansion gives the linearized version of the system 
for computer simulations which we write in full as followst 
A1A2r+AIA2. +x1 )k g 
I)y 
+ [02 (S( 1-T 
2) - 
ý) 
- 04 
(4.2.1)' 
(ß r( 1-r2)- ß3 ir)b + (ß 2 
(r - r) +ß3(; -; 
f 
+ (13 
23 
)r a3 iTm j3 3 
(m +b- h) - 13 4 
)IT 
3 
(a h)ir 
f+A2 
(a + K)r 
f+w+6 
1A2 
(4.2.2)' 
(4.2.3)' 
t, -- a1 wd +a2g-a3y-a 4e (4.2.4)1 
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f (r p-r+p Rr + Rp + (a + ý)r 
(a + E)p 
f+ (r 
f-pf 
)a -0 (4.2.5), 
ffef 
Tj r r) 1r+ 71 1 IT 11 1 Tr - 71 1e+ rl 2w 71 3w+ 71 4e 
(4.2.6)1 
y1y+ Y2 w-y3r (4.2.7), 
(P)l - ((l Cm -+ (I - 
4ýp P)b + ((Ob - (1 - O)m)p (4.2. S)' 
gy+ 3' 72 )Sr +2 ý)b - 
i; n 
(m + b)p (4.2.9)1 
Ak 
w- m+b + a+k 
elp - elir 
pG 2y e2v + Ir 
el q-e lp 
,q elq - elp e2y + e2v 
Ir p 
e e 
8e, - af 
e e 
(4.2.10)9 
(4.2.1.1)' 
(4*2.12A)l 
(4a2.12R)' 
(4.2.13A)' 
(4,, 2.13R)' 
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The solution of the system is performed via computer simulation 
using an earlier version of the PRISH rational expectations package 
described in Al-Nowa-ihi, Levine and Fontanelle (1985). We distin- 
guish between those variables determined by static relationships and 
those, variables determined by dynamic relationships. The system is 
then constructed on the computer in the form 
u 
D2 + Mys (4.2.16) 
u 
51 Ys + S2 0 (4.2.17) 
where u= vector of exogenous variables 
'Vd -- vector of endogenous variables 
determined by dynamic 
-relationships 
ys - vector of endogenous variables determined by static 
relationships 
and 0 is, the null, vector with DI, D2, D3, Sl, and S2, matrices of 
structural parameters. In. addition, and as usual, we partition the 
Y vector such that X. CT, 
TjT 
where z is a vector of predeter- d' -d a 2E - 
mined variables and x is a vector of non-predetermined variables. 
Equation (4.2.16) simina izes. the dynamic relationships of the model 
and, equation (4.2.17) summa izes the static relationships. These, 
together with the vectors of variables and the matrices of para- 
rieters, will generally depend on the. choice of the three models 
described above, We may note, however, that equation (4.2,16) 
always includes equations (4.2.3)1, (4.2.5)1 and (4.2.8)1 - (4.2o9)1 
which means that, z, always,. includes the variables k, a, m and b, 
Similarly,, equation, (4.2.17) always contains equations (4.2.1)1 - 
(4.2.2)', (4.2.4)1, (4.2.7)1' and (4.2.10)' - (4.2.11)1 so that ys 
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always contains the variables y, c, t, r, v and w. rn addition the 
vector of exogenous variables, u, is the same ax1 vector for all 
ffffT three models and is given by !I- Cp ghvr wd pwI. We have 
assumed that the exogenous variables follow identical and independent 
autoregressive processes and have included them in the dynamic state 
vector C. U 
TYTT 
. d] . 
The autoregressive process is summarized by 
il -- Pu 
where P is an 8xa diagonal matrix with elements 
p(i, i) - (i, j - lfetofe) (4.2.19) 
ip 
>, 0, ij 
Thus, p>0 implies that perturbations to exogenous variables are 
temporary with the degree of autocorrelation falling as p increases. 
when p-0, exogenous shocks are permanent. 
The complete vectors of variables for each model are presented in 
table 4.2(A). The non-zero elements of the matrices, together with 
the orders of these matrices, are given in tables 4.2(B) - 4.2(p). 
The differences between the models in terms of these elements are 
indicated by an asterix. Our intention to make the models Comparable 
with each other means that many of these differences occur merely 
because of the different orders of the matrices. Particular points 
(3) to note in deriving these matrices are as follows 
For model A, we eliminate 4e from equation (4.2.6)1 using 
equation (4.2.13A)I. We also introduce an extraneous variable x0, 
which is a fictitious jump variable evolving according to k0"X 
This variable plays absolutely no role in determining the behaviour 
of the system and serves the sole purpose of making the model 
compat. ible with the computer software. For nbodel A/R, we drop 
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Mode 1 
A A/R R 
Vectoi 
k 
k k 
a 
a a 
a 
Z a p 
in 
m 
b 
bJ bI 
f 
q 
x0 e 
y 
c y 
c 
r c 
r 
p r 
Y-S p 
v 
v 
w w 
w 
t, t 
t 
e 
Table 4.2(A) i Definitions of vectors under divergent model Specifications. 
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\ 
Hodel 
Elemenotde' 
A (15 x 15) A/R (14 x 14) R (15 x 15) 
(1,1) 1 1 1 
(2,2) 
(3,3) 
(4,4) 
(6,6) 
(7,7) 
(9,9) 
(10,10) 
(12,12) 
(12,13) 
(13,12) 
(13,13) 1 1 
(14,14) 1 1 
(15,15)* 1 n/a 1 
Table 4.2(B) : Non-zero elements in 01 matrix under divergent model 
specifications. 
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Model 
El\enmient: 
del 10 Mo 
A (15 X 15) A/R (14 X 14) R (15 x 15) 
-P -P -P 
(2,2) -P -P -P 
(3,3) -P -P 
(4,4) -P -P -P 
(5,5) -P -P- -P 
(6,6), -P -P -P 
(7,7) -P -P -P 
-P -P -P 
(9,11) A1A2 A1A2 A1A2 
-r-p 
(10,5) 
(10,7) 
(10,10) r -P r -p x -P 
(10,11)* 0 0 ri 
(11,11) -ei -GI -91 
(11,14) 0 0 0 
0 0 
(12,12) 
. (12,13) -10(f) -P) -, O(. Tp -P) 
(13,2) 
0 0 
(13,12) -f) -P 
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2)«i-ii 2) 
i--ýP 
2 
(14,4) 0 0 
(14,5) 0 Til 0 
(14,8) 0 -TI3 0 
(14,10) 0 -1 0 
(14,14) 114 01 
(15,4) 0 n/a -111 
(15,5) 0 n/a 
0 n/a -, ri3 
0 n/a 
0 n/a 
n/a 
Table 4.2(C) : Non-zero elements in 02 matrix under divergent model 
specifications. 
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\ 
Model 
Elemento 
A (15 X 8) A/R (14 x 7) R (15 x 6) 
(9,3) -A1A2 -X1A2 -A1A2 
(10,3) -R -R -R 
(10,4)* 0 
(10.6) 0 0 
(10,7) 1 n/a 
(11,4) e1 e1 0 
(12,4) 7 OTD. -( j-, t)ja 0 
(13,1) 
(13,3) 2 
(1--r 
2) 
b- 1-r 
2 
)b 
(13,4)* -; -b 0 
(14,1) 0 0 -0 2 
(14,3) 0 -ni 0 
(14,4) 0 0 e2 
(14,6) 0 T12 0 
(14, S) 8 n/a n/a 
(15,3) 0 n/a 
0 n/a 
2 
Table 4.2(D) -. Mon-zero elements in D3 matrix under divergent model 
specifications. 
Model 
Element 
(1,3) 
(1,6) 
(1,7) 
(2,1) 
(2,2) 
(2,3) 
(2, S) 
(2.6) 
(2.8) 
(3.1) 
(3.3) 
(3, S) 
(3,6) 
(4,1) 
(4,4) 
(4, S) 
(5, S) 
(6,1) 
(6,6) 
(7,1) 
(7,7) 
(8 x 8) 
A1A2 
-0 1 
(1-7,1 ) 
'347-)32( b( 1--r 2 
)-h) 
0 
-0 5 
_J36 
-Yi 
Y3 
0 
-Y2 
-0 2 
2 
0 
1 
cr 
1 
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A/R (7 X 7) 
12 
0 
-ß 1( 1--r 1) 
ß4-ß2 (b(1--r 2 )-h) 
0 
n/a 
-Yl 
y3 
0 
-Y2 
-9 2 
1 
2 
0 
1 
a 
1 
R (6 x 6) 
A1A2 
n/a 
4 -0 2 
(b( 1-7* 
2 
)-b) 
-J3 5 
0 
n/a 
-Yi 
Y3 
-Y 
2 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
a3 
1 
n/a 
n/a 
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(7, S) a4 n/a n/a 
(8,3) n/a n/a 
(8,6) r12 n/a n/a 
(8, S) T)i + 'n4 n/a n/a 
Table 4.2(E) : Non-zero elements in Sl matrix under divergent model 
specifications 
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Hodel 
t. Elemen 
\ 
A (8 x 15) A/R (7 x 14) R (6 X 15) 
(1,2) 
(1,9) 
(1,11) A1x2 AIA2 -A IA2 
(2,3) f- -j3 2 
(Y -r)-O 3 
(W-rT ( ii-w f) no 2 
(Yfýy)-o 
3 -J3 
Tf-- -f 
2 
(x -x)-J3 3 (yr-u 
(2,4) j3 3( 
X+h) 
3 
(X+h) A3 (X+h) 
(2, S) -J3 2( 
X+h ) -j3 2 
(X+h) -0 2 
(X+h) 
(2,10) -(J3 2 -0 3 
)if -(j3 2-133 
)if -(j3 2-J33 )i 
f 
(2,11) 03 (E+b-h)-j3 
4 03 
(ffi+b-h)-P 
4 
(2,12) 03 -Tr j3 3 
'ff Jo 3R 
(2,13) J3 3 
if-J3 
2 
Y(I-T 
2) J3 3 
; i-)3 
2 
T( I-T 
2) J3 3 lr-A 2 
Y( 1--r 2) 
(2,14) 0 -P 6 0 
(2.15) 0 n/a -, 3 6 
(4.9) 0 0 -A 
(4,11) -1 -1 0 
(5,9) -A 
(5,10) 0 0 -1 
(5.12) 0 0 -1 
(5,13) 0 0 -1 
(6,2) 0 0 -a 
(6,6) 0 0 --Cr 1 
(6,9) 0 
(6,10) 0 
(6,12) 0 
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(6.13) -1 -1 0 
(6,15) 0 n/a a 4 
(7,2) -a 2 -a 2 n/a 
(7,6) -a 1 -a 1 n/a 
(7,14) 0 a4 n/a 
(8,4) -T)i n/a n/a 
(8, S) n/a n/a 
-T'3 n/a n/a 
(8,10) -1 n/a n/a 
(8,11) n/a n/a 
(8,14) n/a n/a 
Table 4.2(F) : Non-zero elements in matrix S2 under divergent model 
specifications. 
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equation (4.2.13A)ý and replace the equation for 6e with the rational 
e expectations assumptions in equation (4.2.13R)', 6-6. These 
modifications also apply to model R. In addition, for this model, we 
substitute equation (4.2.12R)l for equation (4.2.12A)l and impose the 
rational expectations assumption for prices so that v-p throughout 
the model. All three systems are now in the required form for 
simulation. 
4.3 Stability under Alternative Financial Policy Rules 
In this section, we perform an analysis of stability of the 
model described in section 4.2 with the view to examining the 
possibility of instability associated with a monetarist financing 
rule and the implications for. this of alternative expectations 
assumptions. Given the dynamic configuration of the model, a full 
algebraic analysis of stability is impossible. In Whittaker and 
Wren-Lewis (1983) and Whittaker, Wren-Lewis, Blackburn and Currie 
(1985), 'however, some manipulations permitted a preliminary algebraic 
investigation by concentrating on the necessary determinant condition 
for convergence. This indicated that a monetarist and bondist policy 
rule cannot both be stable at the same time so that one will neces- 
sarily be destabilizing. In fact, the necessary condition for a 
monetarist policy to be stable appears very stringent. We do not 
repeat the algebraic analysis in any detail here since our main 
concern is with eliciting the numerical results. it is useful, 
however, to ccawwnt briefly on certain properties of the analytical 
results as these provide some insight into the numerical investig- 
ation. 
The main conclusion that emerges from the algebraic analysis is 
that stability is more likely undeic a monetarist policy if post-tax 
real interest rates are negative. This makes intuitive sense because 
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the critical destabilizing feature of this policy is that, with real 
interest rates positive, bond issue will raise the outstanding debt. 
A negative real interest rate will operate as a stabilizing force by 
reducing the real burden of interest payments. This is to say that 
if inflation rises faster than nominal interest rates (so that real 
interest rates fall), there is a greater likelihood that the stabili- 
zing inflation tax on wealth will outweigh the destabilizing interest 
payments (see, for example, Nguyen and Turnovsky (1979); Turnovsky 
and Nguyen (1980)). Stability will be enhanced here as the degree 
of capital mobility rises (operating through the influence of wealth 
and the terms of trade on consumption) and as the interest sensitivity 
of consumption increases (operating via the real interest rate). Two 
final points worth mentioning about the algebraic analysis are as 
follows. First, the stability condition is independent of all the 
adjustment parameters in the model and is also independent of whether 
expectations are formed adaptively or rationally. The latter 
property is rather misleading since, as we demonstrate in the 
numerical simulations below, there are circumstances under which the 
stability of the model is non-invariant witb respect to alternative 
expectations assumptions. Secondly, bowever, the numerical analysis 
strongly suggests that the interest payments on government debt 
will remain the dominant factor and that a monetarist policy will 
remain destabilizing. 
We now turn to the central concern of this cbapter, namely a 
ni rical analysis of model stability using computer simulation 
techniques. This begins by defining a contra& parameter set for 
each model. Since the results will be dependent upon this set, it 
is necessary to test their sensitivity by varying the parameter 
values. Thus, we also define plausible ranges for some of the more 
uncerta. in or important parameters. we then attempt to mark out the 
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stable parameter space by setting one parameter at a time to its 
value at either end of this range, while keeping all other parameters 
at their central values. Finally, we use these results as a guide to 
further experimentation involving varying more than one parameter 
from its central value simultaneously. 
The choice of paxameter sets are termed Low, centraL and htgh. 
These are chosen by Whittaker and Wren-Lewis (1983) with the central 
parameter set based on a version of the Treasury model. Equilibrium 
values of variables are based approximately on UK data for 1980. 
An important exception is the equilibrium value chosen for interest 
rates which, by being the same as the equilibrium value for inflation 
rates, implies a significantly negative post-tax real interest rate. 
The reason for choosing this value is that the algebraic analysis of 
stability discussed above implied that monetarist stability is 
unlikely to be compatable with positive real interest rates. Thus# 
there seemed little point in examining this area of the parameter 
space in much detail. All parameter values and equilibrium values 
are summarized in Tables 4.3(A) and 4.3(B) respectively. 
our stability analysis proceeds by computing the eigenvalues of 
the dynamic system. We may ignore the eight roots associated with 
the exogenous variables in u as these aLre not associated with the 
intrinsic dynamics of the system (hence the appearance of zero roots 
for permanent shocks, p-0, may be ignored). The stability of the 
model then focusses an the remaining dynamic relationships for the 
endogenous variables. In rational expectations models, the conver- 
gence properties are defined in terms of saddlepoint stability (see 
appendix B for further discussion). This requires that there be as 
many stable eigenvalues (eigenvalues with negative real part) as 
there are predetermined variables, and as many unstable eigenvalues 
(eigenvalues with positive real part) as there are non-predetermined 
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Para ter Equation High Central Low 
(4.2.1) - 0.080 - 
J3 1 
(4.2.2) - 0.800 - 
2 
(4.2.2) - 0.600 - 
3 
(4.2.2) - 0.600 - 
J3 4 
(4.2.2) 20.000 0.000 0.000 
5 
(4.2.2) 0.150 0.080 0.000 
6 
(4.2.2) - 15.000 - 
1 
(4.2.3) 0.500 0.300 0.200 
2 
(4.2.3) 50.000 15.000 5.000 
(4.2.4) - 30.000 - 1 
a (4.2.4) 0.200 2 
a (4.2.4) - 0.400 - 3 
a (4.2.4) 100.000 28.000 5.000 4 
ni (4.2.6) 500.000 20.000 10.000 
n2 (4.2.6) - 0.000 - 
n3 (4.2.6) 0.000 
n4 (4.2.6) - 0.000 - 
Yi (4.2.7) 0.075 0.039 0.02 
Y2 (4.2.7) 0.018 0.009 0.000 
Y3 (4.2.7) 20.000 6.500 3.000 
(4.2.8)' - 0/1 - 
(4.2.10) - 0.066 - 
01 (4.2.12) 20.000 3.000 0.500 
G2 (4.2.12) 0.020 0.005 0.002 
8 (4.2.13) 0.900 0.600 0.300 
Table 4.3(A) : Parameter values for high, central and low parameter sets. 
T 
Variable Equilibrium 
100.0 
25.0 
0.4 
72 0.6 
S 38.5 
m 6.5 
K 300,0 
a 0.0 
iT ;ar; r 0.1 
e; wd 1.0 
R 30.0 
II 
F 
Table 4.3(B) Equilibrium values of variables. 
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variables. in model A, there are six dynamicrelationships descri- 
bing the evolution of, predetermined variables plus an extraneous 
dynamic relationship associated with the fictitious jump variable, 
x. Hence, saddlepoint., stability obtains if there are six stable 0 
roots and one unstable root (the latter will, obviously be unity). 
The results reported for, this model ignore the unstable root. Model 
A/R contains five dynamic equations for predetermined variables and 
one dynamic equation for a free variable which, in this case, is the 
excbange, rate, e. Then saddlepoint stability requires five stable 
roots and one unstable root., Finally, model R also has five rela- 
tionships describing. the evolution of predetermined variables but 
there are now two jump variables;, the contract price, q, and the 
exchange rate, e. In this case, a unique convergent solution 
requires, five stable'and twounstable eigenvalues. 
II 
It 
Table 4.3(C) reports the results of the stability analysis for 
each parameter set, under each financial policy, either monetarist 
(io-ý) or bondist (40-1). These results are derived frcxa the eigen- 
values. of the systems which are recorded in tables 4.3(D) - 4.3(J). 
, 
For the central parameter set, the models are all. unstable under 
a monetarist policy. In fact, in each case, they contain one too 
I 
many unstable roots. Under a bondist policy, however, the models 
are all stable. section 4.4 examines the dynamic properties of the 
models under thecentral parameter set in more detail. 
For the cases when a single. parameter is varied from the central 
set, the notable result is the general instability of bond financing. I 
This is. true despite our deliberate inclusion of a negative post-tax 
real interest rate which is beneficial to the possibility of monet- 
arist stability (we could not find any plausible parameter set that 
is stable under a policy when post-tax real interest rates are 
positive). There are, however, some interesting and important 
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exceptions to this general proposition. A very high value for the 
interest elasticity of consumption, 0 4' ensures stability in all 
three cases. Systematic investigation revealed the critical value 
in models A and A/R to be j3 4 tc 14, whilst in model R this is p4 
This suggests that for 04< 14, models A and A/R suffer from 
instability because of the adaptive inflation expectations formation 
in the goods market. Note that 13 4> 14 is the only variant for which 
model A/R is stable under a monetarist rule. Models A/R and R are 
stable under bond financing if the degree of capital mobility, nl,? is 
increased sufficiently. It therefore appears that near-perfect cap- 
Ital mobility combined with rational expectations in the foreign 
exchange market increases the chances of monetarist stability. 
There Is also a noticeable tendency for model R to offer greater 
probability of monetarist stability if the competitivness effect on 
the trade balance, a 4' 
is relative low. This supports the above 
result for variations in 04: in particular, it strongly suggests 
that in the other models, it is the adaptive determination of 
inflation expectations which presents an additional obstacle to 
monetarist stability. Finally, the results of simultaneous varia- 
tions of some parameters support the above findings for independent 
changes in the degree of capital mobility; a relatively high value 
for ! n, coupled with rational exchange rate expectations makes the 
system stable under bond financing. 
Nonetheless, despite these differences, the broad conclusion 
remains that making the money stock exogenous is likely to generate 
problems of instability which are generally reduced if there is a 
move towards money financing. This conclusion is consistent with 
the consensus in the literature on the government budget constraint 
and suggests that, in most cases, it is not the result of assump- 
tions about expectations, but rather concerns the interaction 
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Policy Monetarist Sondist (-t-i) 
Model 
A A/R R A A/R R 
Param. set 
Central u u u S S S 
High U U u S S S 
41 
LOW u u S u u u 
High U U u S S S 
A Jj LOW u u Ey S S S 
Efigh u u u S S S 
A2j 
LOW u u u S S S 
High U S S u u u 
n 11 LOW u u u S S S 
High u n/a n/a S n/a n/a 
8I 
LOW u n/a n/a S n/a n/a 
High U u u S S S I 
LOW u u u S S S 
High u u u S S S 
Y2 
j 
LOW u u u S S S 
Y3 
LOW u u u S S S 
High u u U S S S 
LOW u u u S S S 
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u u 
2 
ww u u u s s s 
A4 High s s s u u u 
High u u u s S, s I 
LOW u u u u u u 
x High 
A 10cm 
5 
71, High 
u s s u u u 
'a. 5 Low 
X2 High 
r1l High 
I 
u s s u u 
j3 5 
LOW 
Table 4.3(C) t Stability under alternative Parameter values and divergent 
model specifications. 
U- Unstable S- Stable 
233 
Monetarist Bondist (0-1) 
-0.387 * 0.9021 -3.842 
-0.35S * 0.1841 -0.291 * 0.47Si 
'0.114 
-0.244 * 0.1481 
-0.16S -0.177 
Table 4.3(D)(i) : Eigenvalues for model A; central parameter set. 
Monetarist (0-0) Bondist (0-1) 
1.103 -3.353 
-0.466 t 0.4021 1.104 
-0.608 -0.662 
0.125 -0.209 t 0.1651 
-0.165 -0.177 
Table 4.3(D)(ii) : Eigenvalues for model A/R; central parameter set. 
Honetarist Bondist (4wl) 
-0.755 ;t0.46621 -3.317 
-0.455 0.930' 
0.143 0.648 
0.672 -0.592 t 0.1911 
-0.159 -0.334 
0.962 -0.120 
Table 4.3(D)(iii) s Eigenvalues for model R; central parameter set. 
Table 4.3(D) : Eigenvalues for divergent model specifications; central 
parameter set. 
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Policy Monetarist (4ýý) Bondist 
Set 
High LOW High LOW 
Parain. 
cr 
AI 
A2 
ni 
6 
-0.765: tl. 469i 
0.243 
-0.515 
-0.368 
-0.108 
-0.362tO. 908i 
-0.459tO. 234i 
-0.169 
0.111 
-0.298tO. 877i 
-0.38OtO. 351i 
-0.151 
0.061 
0.12ltO. 610i 
-0.290tO. 136i 
-0.167 
-0.031 
-0.375*1.0351 
-0.378*0.2121 
0.116 
-0.165 
-0.63610.4171 
0.225*0.5071 
-0.281 
-0.051 
-0.400: tO. 904i 
-0.306tO. 122i 
0.118 
-0.156 
-0.409tO. 909i 
-0.351*0.1001 
0.135 
-0.175 
-0.90410.8431 
-0.369tO. 210i 
0.136 
0.165 
-0.418*0.7581 
-0.31210.0961 
0.111 
-0.164 
-6.505 
-0.12liO. 640i 
-0.470 
-0.382 
-0.162 
-3.942 
-0.298tO. 403i 
-0.325tO. 232i 
-0.179 
-4.136 
-0.423tO. 470i 
-0.110tO. 177i 
-0.173 
-3.540 
0.251 
-0.265tO. 102i 
-0.177 
-0.097 
ý-3.765 
-0.35liO. 607i 
-0.234tO. 155i 
-0.177 
-2.463 
-0.52810.5791 
0.235 
-0.150 
-0.28S 
-3.795 
-0.275tO. 496i 
-0.215tO. 092i 
-0.173 
-3.752 
-0.253*0.5031 
-0.282tO. OS7i 
-0.180 
-4.283 
-0.600*0.52li 
-0.234tO. 145i 
-0.177 
-3.917 
-0.207*0.3151 
-0.28OtO. O94i 
-0.177 
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Y, 
Y2 
V3 
01 
a 
j3 
-0.34OtO. 854i 
-0.355tO. 186i 
0.114 
-0.165 
-0.404tO. 890i 
--0.352tO. l84i 
-0.165 
0.117 
-0.373tO. 8O9i 
-0.330tO. 168i 
-0.165 
0.061 
0.022t2.157i 
-0.437tO. 153i 
0.123 
-0.158 
-0.45611.640i 
-0.42610.1601 
0.122 
-0.158 
-0.359. tO. 88li 
-0.385kO. 237i 
-0.256 
0.134 
-0.417tO. 931i 
-0.355tO. 183i 
0.114 
-0.165 
-0.370*0.9151 
-0.358*0.184i 
-0.165 
0.112 
-0.407*0.0101 
-0.371*0.1951 
-0.165 
0.155 
-0.58810.5791 
-0.14liO. 096i 
0.092 
-0.268 
-0.445. tO. 670i 
-0.25610.171i 
0.103 
-0.184 
-0.40910.9301 
-0.361. tO. 140i 
0.046tO. O66i 
-3.340 
-0.287tO. 482i 
-0.245tO. 147i 
-0.177 
-3.875 
-0.288tO. 470i 
-0.245tO. 150i 
-0.177 
-1.344 
-0.396tO. 461i 
-0.23ltO. 13li 
-0.183 
-4.168 
-0.293tO.. 471i 
-0.244tO. 149i 
-0.177 
-3.810 
-0.295*0.4791 
-0.243tO. 146i 
-0.178 
-6.915 
-0.269tO. 484i 
-0.248tO. l5li 
-0.176 
-2.699 -4.000 
-0.275il. 195i -0.42910.4401 
-0.730 -0.266 
-0.319 -0.033tO. O78i 
-O. L21 
-3.848 -3.81 
-0.391*0.4731 -0.26010.8341 
-0.0740.1211 -0.560 
-0.258 -0.344 
-0.123 
-3.826 
-0.35810.3681 
-0.17310.322i 
-0.279 
-3.161 
-0.27110.542i 
-0.320tO. 103i 
0.038 
Table 4.3(E) : Eigenvalues for model A) high and low para ter sets. 
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Policy 
7Combination 
Monetarist (4ý--O) Sondist 
-0.330to. 903i -4.151 
A2 High -0.357to. 309i -0.377tO. 498i 
j3 5 LOW 0.006tO. 079i -0.222fO. 169i. 
0.060 
0.09610.6111 -3.557 
ij I High -0.305*0.1131 '0.230 
J3 5 
LOW -0.016*0.027i -0.302tO. 082i, 
-0.037tO. 040J 
0.08510.6811 -3.924 
A2 High' 
-0.239to. 681i 0.249 
T) I 
High 
-0.019tO. 029i -0.255LO. 132i 
j3 5 
LOW 
-0.04410.0431 
Table 4.3(F) : Eigenvalues for model A; Simultaneous parameter vaLriations. 
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Policy 
Se i, 
Parramý. 
a4 
AI 
A 
Y, 
72 
Monetarist ((O-ý) 
High 
2.058 
-0.947*0.9121 
-0.353 
0.252 
-0.108 
-1.104 
-0.827 
-0.431*0.5231 
-0.169 
0.120 
1.109 
-0.864 
-0.261*0.5831 
-0.152 
0.063 
-0.223*0.6471 
0.463 
-0.258 
-0.171 
-0.035 
1.097 
-0.437*0.4171 
-0.590 
0.125 
-0.165 
1.101 
-0.460tO. 381i 
-0.629 
0.127 
-0.165 
LOW 
-1.078 
0.082tO. 616i 
0.642 
-0.291 
-0.052 
1.102 
-0.55610.3601 
-0.360 
0.129 
-0.156 
1.101, 
-0.602tO. 390i 
-0.383 
0.149 
-0.175 
1.545 
-1.174 
-0.413*0.2961 
0.143 
-0.165 
1.106 
-0.481*0.3901 
-0.621 
0.124 
-0.165 
1.105 
-0.470tO. 422i 
-0.591 
0.122 
-0.165 
Sondist (40-1) 
High LOW 
-4.221 
2.154, 
-0.245*0.57li 
-0.356 
-0.162 
-3.478 
1.105 
-0.810 
-0.216*0.2111 
-0.178 
-3.712 
1.110 
-0.841 
-0.104*0.1621 
-0.173 
-3.275 
0.187*0.2431 
-0.17S 
-0.141 
-0.290 
-3.067 
1.102 
-0.671 
-0.211*0.2651 
-0.177. 
-3.369 
1.104 
-0.657 
-0.209*0.1681 
-0.176 
-2.874 
-1.171 
0.559 
0.285 
-0.294 
-3.295 
1.103 
-0.572 
-0.212tO. 113i 
-0.173 
-3.242 
1.102 
-0.281*0.1421 
-0.527 
-0.180 
-3.441 
1.528 
1 -0.975 
-0.221*0.1531 
-0.177 
-3.52 
1.105 
-0.658 
-0.209tO. 166i 
-0.177 
-3.338 
1.105 
-0.668 
-0.210*0.1631 
-0.178 
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Y3 
eI 
9 
ß5 
1.123 
-0.748 
-0.37giO. 269i 
-0.166 
0.063 
-0.781*1.630i 
1.152 
-0.428 
-0.158 
0.137 
-0.802*1.1001 
1.199 
-0.438 
-0.159 
0.135 
1.099 
-0.763 
-0.386*0.4581 
0.147 
-0.258 
1.073 
-0.509tO. S74i 
-0.541 
0.181 
-0.165 
1.085 
-1.057 
-0.140*0.1001 
-0.266 
0.097 
1.066 
-0.895 
-0.249*0.2141 
-0.183 
0.111 
1.108 
-0.575*0.4221 
-0.455 
0.049*0.0681 
-1.468 
1.116 
-0.592 
-0.20710.1421 
-0.182 
-2.670 
-0.985tO. 849i 
1.190 
-0.319 
-0.120 
-3.384 
1.236 
-0.644tO. 548i 
-0.339 
-0.122 
-3.342 
1.100 
-0.752 
-0.15ltO. 254i 
-0.280 
-6.272 
1.099 
-0.677 
-0.21ltO. 17li 
-0.176 
-3.426 
1.076 
-0.772 
-0.033to. 076i 
-0.263 
-3.348 
1.059 
-0.742 
-0.254 
-0.072tO. llSi 
-3.365 
1.110 
-0.527 
-0.34ltO. 175i 
0.037 
Table 4.3(G) : Eigenvalues for model A/R; high and low parameter sets. 
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Policy 
Combination 
Monetarist (40-0) Sondist'(qt-1) 
1.114 -3.674 
-0.811 0.187*0.2111 
x Hi, h 
2 
-0.299*0.5531, -0.279 
5 
LOW 
0.005*0.08oi -0.098 
-0.068 
-0.257*0.6451' -3.287 
-n 2 High 0.447 0.15610.2191 
05 LOW -0.292 -0.097 
-0.019*0.0281 -0.064 
-0.191*0.727i -3.674 
A High 
2 0.421 0.187*0.2111 
n2 High -0.279 -0.279 
05 Low -0.023*0.0311- -0.098 
-0.068 
Table 4.3(H) : Eigenvalues for model A/R; simultaneous parameter variations. 
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Policy 
Set 
P am. 
cr 
AI 
A 
Til 
vI 
monetarist (4: >ý) 
High 
-1.183*0.8181 
1.856 
-0.346 
0.336 
0.711 
-0.107 
-0.696*0.5401 
-0.766 
0.136 
0.679 
-0.161 
0.967 
-0.575tO. 601i 
-0.801 
0.987 
0.705 
-0.148 
0.066 
-0.493tO. 631i 
0.564*0.169 
-0.288 
-0.035 
-0.168 
LOW 
-0.754tO. 311i 
-0.843 
-0.150 
0.296 
-0.643 
0.112 
-0.793tO. 448i 
0.150 
0.667 
-0.152ý 
-0.288 
0.959 
-0.815tO. 460i 
0.181 
0.657 
-0.346 
0.954 
-0.165 
-3.243 
0.701 
-0.043*0.2461 
-0.265*0.0321 
-0.219 
-0.720*0.4721 
0.142 
-0.159 
0.669 
-0.456 
0.955 
-0.776*0.4561 
-0.455 
0.143 
0.674 
-0.159 
0.960 
Bondist (ot-1) 
High 
-4.193 
2.077 
0.760 
-0.555tO. 540i 
-0.320 
-0.159 
-3.444 
0.934 
0.610 
-0.780 
-0.458tO. 247i 
-0.120 
-3.687 
1.013 
0.460 
-0.812 
-0.328tO. l6li 
-0.120 
1.397 
-1.020 
-0.777 
-0.587 
0.171 
0.627 
-0.158 
LOW 
-0.543 
1.018 
-0.110tO. 026i 
0.140 
0.232 
-0.148 
-3.2SS 
0.909 
0.679 
,, -0.612tO. 
238i 
-0.200 
-0.120 
-3.206 
0.860 
0.750 
-0.61liO. 259i 
-0.309 
-0.120 
-3.401 
1.320 
0.669 
-0.936 
-0,573 
-0.336 
-0.121 
-3.037 
0.929 
0.647 
-0.600*0.19oi 
-0.333 
-0.120 
-3.481 
0.930 
0.649 
-0.588*0.19li 
-0.335 
-0.120 
241 
Y2 
Y3 
01 
a 
135 
-0.763tO. 447i 
-0.452 
0.145 
0.672 
-0.157 
0.960 
-0.744tO. 337i 
0.954 
0.657 
-0.428 
-0.155 
0.068 
-1.144*1.0961 
1.18M. 2791 
-0.421 
0.140 
-0.158 
-1.015*0.908 
1.062tO. 267i 
-0.424 
0.140 
-0.158 
-0.690*0.4471 
-0.593 
-0.253 
0.169 
0.928 
0.718 
-0.74810.477i 
-0.458 
0.140 
0.673 
-0.160 
0.964 
-0.769tO. 589i 
-0.469 
0.213 
0.695 
-0.160 
0.977 
-0.955 
1.026 
-0.327tO. 168i 
0.217 
0.183 
-0.165 
1.014 
-0.800 
-0.478*0.194 
0.406 
0.148 
-0.160 
-0.798*0.4911 
0.994 
-0.399 
0.623 
0.052tO. O76i 
-3.334 
0.929 
0.648 
-0.587tO. 193i 
-0.120 
-0.336 
0.935 
0.63S 
-1.456 
-0.578tO. 116i 
-0.309 
-0.117 
-3.142 
1.120tO. 364i 
-1.025tO. 5O8i 
-0.311 
-0.116 
-3.230 
1.004tO. 314i 
-0.863tO. 451i 
-0.313 
-0.116 
-3.306 
0.879 
0.721 
-0.687 
-0.388tO. 144i 
-0.273 
-3.300 
0.930 
0.648 
-0.597tO. 189i 
-0.333 
-0.119 
-6.126 
0.928 
0.646 
-0.599tO. 204i 
-0.339 
-0.120 
-3.340 
1.011 
-0.758 
0.277 
-0.231 
-0.173tO. O53i 
-3.334 
0.995 
0.408 
-0.718 
-0.30ltO. 097i 
-0.128 
-3.330 
0.971 
0.566 
-0.6lSiO. 266i 
-0.323 
0.041 
Table 4.3(l) : Eigenvalues for model R; high and low parameter sets. 
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Policy 
-ý'Iinationicy 
Honetarist (4ýý) Bondist (4t-1) 
-0.612*0.5861 -3.698 
-0.730 1.032 
x2 High l 
1.014 0.378 
J35 LOW 
0.666 -0.743 
0.002*0.08li -0.387*0.1401 
0.075 
-0.52610.6311 -3.255 
0.544 & 0.2721 0.668 
n2 High 
-0.292 -0.670*0.2031 
5 
LOW 
-O. O2OtO. O28i -0.064 
-0.259*0.0091 
-0.506*0.7361 -3.654 
A2 High' 
0.534*0.1241 0.587 
-n2 High 
-0.279 -0.060*0.2521 
435 Low 
1 
-0.023*0.0291 -0.067 
-0.237: tO. 016 
Table 4.3(J) - Eigenvalues for model R; simultaneous parameter variations. 
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,, 
Model 
A A/R R 
0.90 s s s 
0.80 s s s 
0.70 s s s 
0.60 s s s 
0.50 s s s 
0.40 s s s 
0.30 s s s 
0.20 s s s 
0.15 s s s 
0.10 u u u 
Table 4.3(K) : Stability, under policy para ter variations and divergent 
mdelýspecifications. 
U- Unstable IS- Stable. 
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Hodel 
(b 
0.90 
0.80 
0.70 
0.60 
0.50 
A/R IR 
-3.470 -3.048 -3.015 
-0.303tO. 472i 1.104 0.931 
-0.240*0.1421 -0.664 0.649 
-0.178 -0.20910.1571 -0.597*0.179 
-0.178 -0.327 
-0.118 
-3.092 -2.741 -2.713 
-0.317*0.4701 1.104 0.933 
-0.23510.1341 -0.666 0.650 
-0.180 -0.209tO. 147i -0.612tO. 143 
-0.180 -0.306 
-0.114 
-2.707 -2.433 -2.408 
-0.33610.4671 2.104 0.933 
-0.231*0.1221 -0.669 0.650 
-0.183 -0.209tO. 133i -0.612tO. 143 
-0.183 -0.306 
-0.114 
-2.310 -2.122 -2.100 
-0.361*0.4651 1.104 0.934- 
-0.224*0.102i -0.674 0.651 
-0.189 -0.207tO. llli -0.625*0.110 
-0.189 -0.291 
-0.110 
-1.890 -1.806 -1.782 
-0.39610.4631 2.104 0.936 
-0.204*0.0661 -0.681 0.653 
-0.221 -0.195tO. O72i -0.104 
-0.219 -0.271 
-0.647*0.0091 
0.40 
'0.30 
ý 0.20 
0.15 
0.1 
-1.419 
-0.456tO. 463i 
-0.160tO. 048i 
-0.306 
-0.59010.5131 
-0.769 
-0.394 
-0.129*0.0151 
-0.60ltO. 725i 
-0.423t: 0.15li 
-0.157 
-0.040 
-0.555. tO. 795i 
-0.39610.2681 
-0.160 
-0.004 
-0.502*0.8451 
-0.37810.176i' 
-0.162 
0.033 
245 
-1.479 
1.104 
-0.696 
-0.306 
'-0156tO. O47i 
1.104 
-1.109 
-0.745 
-0.382 
-0.133 
-0.121 
'1.103 
-0.756*0.2221 
-0.477 
-0.15 a" 
-0.039 
1.103 
-0.669±0.290i 
-0.532 
-0.163 
-0.004 
1.103 
-0.59110.3421 
-0.573, 
-0.163 
0.033 
0.939 
0.654 
-1.428 
-0.545 
-0.246 
-0.093 
-0.840 
0.942 
0.657 
-1.02710.2391 
-0.509 
-0.218 
-0.74 
-0.925tO. 386i 
0.946 
0.660 
-0.486 
-0.350 
-0.190 
-0.877*0.4221 
0.949 
0.662 
-0.476 
-0.004 
-0.179 
-0.83210.4451 
0.952 
0.66S 
-0.468 
-0.170 
Table 4.3(L) Eigenvalues for divergent model specifications; policy 
parameter variations. 
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of asset stocks and flows in the system. Mixed financial rules may 
also be stable. We therefore examined the influence of the 
financing parameter, 0, on stability in the region 04041. A 
selection of the results are reported in table 4.3(K), for which the 
eigenvalues are recorded in table 4.3M, for the central parameter. 
They show that a small shift of (0 away from zero makes the system 
stable: thus, stability obtains for (V >, 0.15 (our search was 
originally in steps of 0.05 so that the precise value of (V at which 
the system becomes stable cannot be identified, but it clearly lies 
in the region 0.1 <040.15). Interestingly, this is true for all 
models. Nevertheless, although the system is stable for 40 >, 0.15, 
a low value of (0 > 0.15 may still be undesirable. This is motivated 
by inspection of the eigenvlues which reveals that values of (0 in 
excess of, but close to 0.15, have an eigenvalue very close to zero. 
This will give rise to very slow convergence of the system and, when 
subject to shocks, the system will display a high degree of vola- 
tility. The next section, which examines the stochastic properties 
of the models, does not test the above prediction though we have no 
reason to believe that it would not be verified. It would be a 
simple matter for future research to investigate this. 
4.4 Some Dynamic Properties of the Model 
Section 4.3 indicated that model stability will be crucial in 
influencing the authorities' choice of financial policy rule. 
Stability is also, of course, a precondition for any meaningful 
discussion of the long-run properties of the model. In this section 
we convey the flavour of the stochastic properties of the system by 
subjecting it to two permanent disturbances: a unit permanent 
increase in the authorities' inflation target, p and a unit 
permanent increase in government expenditure, g. As for the 
stability analysis in section 4.3, a preliminary algebraic treatment 
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of the long-run multipliers can be found in Whittaker and Wren-Lewis 
(1983) and Whittaker, Wren-Lewis, Blackburn and Currie (1985). This 
showed that the long-run multipliers are independent of both the 
adjustment parameters in the model and the expectations assumption. 
Needless to say, these assumptions will influence the dynamic path 
from one steady state to another and it is this adjustment that we 
wish to concentrate on here using computer simulations for a bondist 
policy and the central parameter set. 
The financial policy (whether monetarist or bondist) determines 
the equilibrium rate of inflation which we have termed the author- 
ities' inflation target, p Figures 4.4(A) - 4.4(C) show the 
trajectories for output, inflation and the exchange rate following 
a unit increase in p This is accomplished by a change in the 
nominal bond stock for given fiscal para ters so that both nominal 
and real interest rates rise. Higher real interest rates depresses 
demand. This initial fall is then reversed, partly because higher 
interest rates generate a larger budget deficit and increased 
interest income. Increased demand then moves inflation towards its 
long-run equilibrium level with a depreciating exchange rate. As 
inflation moves towards this level, real wealth is eroded which, 
coupled with the inflation tax, depresses demand towards its long 
run equilibrium which is-below the original steady state value. 
Figures 4.4(A) - 4.4(C) also illustrate the dynamic behaviour 
of output, inflation and the exchange rate for a money-financed 
permanent unit increase in government expenditure. Inflation 
increases and the real value of the bond stock falls so that both 
nominal and real interest rates are reduced. Lower domestic 
interest rates stimulates investment and consumption and induces a 
capital outflow. The budget moves, into surplus because of higher 
tax receipts and lower debt interest payments and the increase in 
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20.0 
10.0 
00.0 
-10.0 
-20.0 
Figure-4.4(A)(i) sýIncome trajectories for divergent model specifications; 
permanent'unit increase in p 
1.50 
1.00 
0-5C 
0.00 
-0.50 
Figure 4.4(A)(ii) : Income trajectories for divergent model specificationss 
permanent unit increase in g. 
Figure 4.4(A) : Income trajectories for divergent model specifications 
under alternative permanent shocks. 
-1 model A; --- model A/R; - model R 
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1.00 
0.50 
0.00 
-0-50 
specifications; permanent unit increase in p 
0.06 
0.04- 
0.02 
O. oc 
specifications; permanent unit increase in g. 
Figure 4.4(B) : Inflation trajectories for diVergent model specifications 
under alternative permanent shocks. 
model A; -- model A/R; - model R 
Figure 4.4(8)(i) : Inflation trajectories for divergent model 
Figrure 4.4(B)(ii) I. Inflation trajectories for divergent model 
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0-0 
-1.0( 
-2.0( 
-3.0( 
-4.0( 
-5. oc 
specifications; permanent unit increase in p 
0.15 
0.10 
0.05 
0.00 
-0-05 
specifications; permanent unit increase in g. 
Figure 4.4(C) : Exchange rate trajectories for divergent model 
specifications under alternative permanent shocks. 
- model A; -- model A/R; - model R 
Figure 4.4(C)(i) : Exchange rate trajectories for divergent model 
Figure'4.4(C)(ii) : Exchange rate trajectories for divergent model 
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demand encourages an exchange rate depreciation which improves the 
trade balance such that the effect on the balance of payments arising 
from the capital outflow is neutralized. over time, the effect of 
government expenditure is crowded out. The main reason for this is 
the decline in real wealth resulting from the budget surplus and 
higher inflation. Inflation continues to rise due to excess demand 
(and, in models A and A/R, due to the reinforcing effect of adaptive 
inflation expectations). Then the continual fall in real interest 
rates raises output supply above aggregate demand such that the 
inflationary pressure begins to ease. The fall in demand improves 
the trade balance and the exchange rate appreciates further. In 
the longýrun, output is above its initial equilibrium level and so 
there is only partial crowding out. ' 
Finally, it is worth noting some additional features of the 
above dynamics which are common to all models. in each case, the 
broad characteristics of the adjustment paths are strikingly similar. 
in addition, -the initial exchange rate jumps in models A/R and R are 
relatively small (see, for example, Turnovsky and Nguyen (1980) for a 
similar observation). Nonetheless, it appears that the adjustment 
path in model R tends to be smoother and approaches equilibrium more 
rapidly. Thus, the introduction of rational expectations seems to 
(4) 
smooth the process of adjustment and speeds it up 
4.5 Summary and ConcludingRemarks 
We have analysed the stability of a fairly general open 
economy model, incorporating both adaptive and rational expectationso 
under two stylised financial policy rules3 a monetarist policy which 
fixes the rate of growth of nominal money; and a bondist policy which 
fixes the nominal rate of growth of government debt. The analysis 
suggests that as long as post-tax real interest rates are positive, 
the bondist rule is much more likely to be stable than the 
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monetarist rule. In this respect, we have confirmed'the proposition 
familiar from the existing: -literature on the government budget 
constraint that a fixed monetary rule is likely to be destabilizing. 
rf, however, post-tax real interest rates are negative, ' we found 
certain cases in which the expectations assumption and the open 
economy aspects of our model increased the possibility of monetarist 
stability. in particular, a model with rational expectations in 
the foreign exchange ma ket and perfect capital mobility'could be 
stable under this policy rule. rn addition, rational'expectations 
in the goods market also tends to aid monetarist stability as the 
interest sensitivity of consumption and the''competitiveness effect 
on the trade balance fall. These suggest that it is the adaptive 
inflation expectations formation which presents an additional 
obstacle to bond financing stability. In spite of these interesting 
and important exceptions, a policy which involves pure bond 
financing of budget imbalances is generally unstable. 
The long-run multipliers of the model are independent of the 
expectations assumptions but these assumptions will influence'the 
dynamic response of the system to exogenous shocks. our illustrative 
simulations for permanent changes in the authorities' inflation target 
and government expenditure indicated the broad similarity of dynamic 
adjustment under alternative expectations formation. Nonetheless, 
the approach to long-run equilibrium was far from monotonic and the 
paths were smoother if expectations were rational. 
The analysis reported in this chapter could be extended in a 
number of directions. 'First, and most obvious, a wider spectrum of 
stochastic perturbations could be handled easily. These would take 
the form of different permanent shocks together with temporary 
disturbances. Second, am noted in section 4.2, some authors have 
obtained stability under a monetarist rule for analytical models 
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if, government expenditure is appropriately defined (see, for example, 
Christ (1979); Cohen and Leeuw (1980)). We have no suggestions to 
make about the relative merits of alternative definitions of govern- 
ment spending, 
-, 
though there might be some interest in examining the 
implications of these different approaches using the framework set 
out in this chapter. Third, the model could be broadened in one 
important direction, namely the introduction of a more detailed 
description of supply behaviour. We suspect that our general conclu- 
sions will more-or-less remain intact, though the dynamic adjustment 
of the system may be altered. A particularly interesting approach 
would be to follow Artis and Currie (1981) who specify cost mark-up 
pressures including import prices and the exchange rate. This would 
increase the importance of the open economy aspects of the model. 
Fourth, and in a slightly different vein, we intended to perform 
optimal control exercises on the model but the software was unfortu- 
nately unavailable. Similarly, we would also have welcomed the 
opportunity of examining some of the issues discussed in part Ir 
of the thesis on the information structure conditioning rational 
expectations in this"system. above', the software was unavailable. 
Given the fair degree of generality of the model and, in particulare 
the dynamic configuration resulting from asset accumulation and the 
government budget constiiint, we believe that investigation into 
these matters would be of some interest. we hope to pursue this 
research shortly. 'Finally, as far as we know, the issues discussed 
in this chapter have not been analysed in the context of inter- 
dependent economies and we suggest this as another possibility for 
further reseach. 
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Notes to Chapter 4 
*This chapter is based on Whittaker, Wren-Lewis, Blackburn and Currie 
(1985) which is an extension of the research in Whittaker and Wren- 
Lewis (1983) and Blackburn and Currie (1984). The second of these 
papers provided the motivation for the other two. 
(1) See, for example, Friedman (1978) for an analysis stressing 
portfolio behaviour. 
(2) We assi that government bonds are net wealth. There is a 
well-known debate on the validity of this assumption and the 
reader is referred to Barro (1974), HcCallum (1978c), Currie 
(1979) and Tobin (1980b). our inclusion of bonds in net wealth 
is consistent with the majority of the budget constraint 
literature and is rather more plausible than their exclusion. 
The requirement that bonds be part of net wealth is not neces- 
ýsary for their appearance in the money demand function in 
equation (4.2.7) because of portfolio considerations (see 
Currie (1979)). 
(3)- Different forms of the simulation framework in equations 
(4ý2.16)1- (4.2.17) were used in earlier papers because of the 
different software. The particular configuration of the vectors 
and matrices can be found in Whittaker and Wren-Lewis (1983) and 
Blackburn and Currie (1984). 
(4) Blundell-Wignall and Hasson. (1984) have observed a similar 
tendency in a slightly different context. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
ON THE EXTRACTION OF AUXILIARY INFORHATION IN 
RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS MODELS 
5.1 'Introduction 
By definition, the rational expectation hypothesis forces 
consideration of the'amount and nature of information available to 
forecasting'agents. This must be so; for in order to construct a 
rational expectation of some variable, x, it is-necessary to make 
explicit the information structure conditioning that expectation. 
Hence, 
e E(x I n) 
where E(, *) is the mathematical conditional expectations operator, 
requires some notion of what is actually meant by the information 
set, n. Unfortunately, the particular information structure is 
rarely. explicated in sufficient detail. Neither also are the implic- 
ations of the information structure for the results of an analysis 
suitably reveaLled. To be sure, the reader may have noticed in part 
r of the thesis the limited remarks about the factors conditioning 
expectations. At the same time, it is probably the case that many 
would have been unconcerned about this. After all, it is a familiar 
feature of much of the literature and one with which the reader is 
no doubt acquainted. one should not, however, infer from this the 
triviality of specifying the precise information structure in an 
economy. On the contrary, the lack of detail regarding this is a 
poor reflection of the literature and it is an unfortunate habit 
which economists have become accustomed to. 
Though the formal definition of rational expectations has some 
inerit, many would argue that it begs rather more questions than any 
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that it answers. Blind patriotism to the hypothesis is to eschew 
the very real problem of how agents actually learn the true process 
determining the laws of motion of the system (given that such 
exists). This is an issue which certain authors have taken as 
indication of the implausibility and inapplicability of rational 
expectations. Particular views on this can be found in Cyert and 
De Groot (1974), Taylor (1975), Shiller (1978), Friedman (1979a), 
Helm (1983), the symposium in the 1982 edition of the Journal of 
Economic Theory and the edited volume by Frydman and Phelps (1983). 
our own view on the. matter is one of caution. We believe that 
problems of existence of and convergence to rational expectations 
equilibria with endogenous learning is an important area which has 
largely been neglected. Some of the strong conclusions reached so 
far may be qualified when the process of learning is integrated into 
the analytical framework. Nonetheless, it is possible that this 
research will open up a Pandora's box which makes practically any- 
thing possible. As a consequence, progress is likely to be exciting 
but slow and the conclusions must be judged with some caution. At 
the moment,, the simplest way of modelling intelligent economic 
behaviour is to invoke the rational expectations assumption. Until. 
such time emerges when we are more certain about some of the above 
issues, we must appreciate our original premise (maintained through- 
out the thesis) that rational expectations is still the only 
sensible assumption, at least in terms of policy evaluation. 
There is, however, another interesting, and more directly 
realisable, line of inquiry. Thisis to examine, the nature of the 
information structure in a rational expectations equilibrium itself. 
As noted above, analyses conducted on this assumption often neglect 
explicit consideration of the information structure. This is an 
important drawback for it obscures the potentially crucial role of 
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information in determining the dynamic response of the system. 
The chapter is concerned with clarifying some of the issues involved. 
The linchpin of this (and subsequent chapters) is the existence of 
(only) partial ignorance. Let us be more specific. 
in models embodying rational expectations, one may define the 
information structure in tem, of a number of characteristics. 
Information sets may be homogeneous or heterogeneous (differen- 
tiated); they may be complete, incomplete or null. A popular 
assumption is homogeneous and full information sets. By this is 
meant that agents are endowed with complete information about aLL 
variables in the system at a&D times and that this is true for aLD 
agents. There is no lack of information and no individual or group 
has an informational advantage. Though a useful assumption in some 
cases, its obvious implausibility renders it redundant as a 
reflection of actual situations. Similarly, the opposite extreme of 
homogeneous and null information sets is an equal falsehood. 
Intermediate between these polax cases is the assumption of 
incomplete information sets which may be homogeneous or differen- 
tiated. it would not be implausible-to argue that these are probably 
the closest approximations to the actual environment in which 
agents find themselves. Thus, agents are likely to have access to 
contemporaneous information about only a subset of the set of 
economic variables. Note, however, that this does not necessarily 
(and is unlikely to) imply zero information about currently unobserv- 
able variables. To be sure, by observing contemporaneous movements 
in some variables, informed inferences can be made about the beha- 
viour of the unknown quantities. That this is so endows certain 
variables with the role of conveyers of information - what we shall 
term tnformatton vartabLes. Agents can exploit the information 
content of these variables. In the engineering literature, this type 
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of statistical inference problem is known as signal-extraction (that 
is, the extraction of auxiliary information from observed signals). 
The general characterisation of the signal-extraction problem 
takes the form of the Kalman filter (see, for example, Meditch 
(1969); Aastroem, (1970); Chow (1975,1981)). Put simply, this 
provides a set of updating equations for sequentially revising the 
estimates of unobservable variables on the basis of innovations in 
news. By way of an introduction, the essence of the Kalman filter 
can be conveyed by considering the following general dynamic systemi 
yt - Atyt_l + I! t (5.1.2) 
st= ctyt + yt 
where y= vector of state variables 
s= vector of observable variables 
vectors of stochastic disturbances. 
A and C are time-varying matrices and u and v are assu d to be 
independently and Gaussian distributed with variance-covariance 
matrices, Lu and r. 
v 
respectively. Equation (5.1.2) is the state 
equation describing the laws of motion of the system. Equation 
(5.1.3) is the measurement equation. The information set is 
at 40 
i. 2t-j, Lt-i, Eli >, (s. 1.4) 
where r is a vector of time-varying structural parameters and 1: 
summarizes the variance-covariance properties of stochastic 
disturbances. The Kalman filter begins with the linear regression 
2ee=a(1-ae 
t, t - 
Y-t, 
t-l ttt t_l 
(5.1.5) 
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where a is a time-varying matrix of regression coefficients and, for 
any variable, 
e-0,1). Equation (5.1-5) 3, ýt't-j " 'Ostint-J) (j 
shows that expectations about unobservable variables are updated 
according to unanticipated changes in information. Now, if we let 
E(yt _ 
e, 
t-i)(, t _e then 
the Kalman filter may tIt-i Xt - 
Xt t_i)T, 
be summarized in the set of equations (5.1.6) - (5.1.10): 
eW (i -Ac)e+ Atat -Yt, ttt 
Y-t, t-I 
eAe 
-Y-t, t-l t: -Y-t -. I, t -. I 
iy cT (C ry cT+ e)-l t tlt-l tt tlt-l t 
Ate- ATu t, t-1 t-l, t-2 i+ 
r=ry (I -cT (C I: 
ycT+I: vcI: y 
tlt t, t-1 tt tlt-l tt tlt-l 
where r is the identity matrix. Equations (5.1.6) - (5.1.10) are the 
set of updating equations and their derivation is fairly straight- 
forward. Nonetheless, they are rather complicated for analytical 
purposes and the Kalman filter can be simplified greatly by assuming 
that full information eventually becomes available. For the types of 
problems that we will be addressing this is not an implausible 
assumption. 
It is important to note that the filtering process is not merely 
an elaborate mathematical device with little substantive appeal. It 
is, in fact, endemic to rational expectations models which are 
characterised by partial information. Abstracting from it is to 
violate the funda ntal tenet which states that sophisticated agents 
will not waste useful information. That it has been largely neglected 
in the literature is a non-trivial criticism. 
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Appreciation of the statistical inference problem has important 
implications for policy evaluation. Under such circumstances, 
control rules have scope to influence the system in two ways. The 
first is the standard mechanism, common to all control rules, whereby 
control alters the dynamic response of the system. The second 
occurs by virtue of the ability of control laws to alter the inform- 
ation content of variables. This can be considered as an extension 
of the Lucas (1976) critique on Policy evaluation. Not only is the 
economtc structure non-invariant with respect to changes in policy, 
which arises via the feedback through expectations, but neither 
also is the tnformatton structure from which these expectations are 
derived. In addition, the implementation of optimal policies takes 
on an additional complicated dimension since the controller may wish 
to formulate policy in terms of observable variables. 
-A further twist occurs when partial information is combined with 
the assumption of heterogeneous information. Consider the following 
scenario. A circularity inherent in the inference problem is that 
the observed signals are influenced by actions conditioned on 
inferences drawn from the signals. The importance of this is fully 
realized only when there exists differential informationj for now, 
observed signals reflect the different perceptions of different 
agents. As Lucas (1975) notes, this makes the signals themselves 
an object of speculation. Agents must appreciate that information 
about unobservable variables is contaminated. They must form 
expectations about other's expectations. The latter will be 
performing exactly the same computations. Then agents must form 
expectations about'others' expectations of their expectations and so 
on and so forth. This is an interesting problem and is likely to 
arise whenever there exists some idiosyncratic information. It 
motivates the idea of an informational ga . 
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rn summary, we hope that we have made clear the potentially 
critical importance of the information structure. The above issues 
will be returned to at greater length throughout this and subsequent 
chapters. The current chapter is concerned with the following. 
Section 5.2 reviews critically some recent contributions to the 
field of signal-extraction. Section 5.3 is motivated by the need to 
clarify some issues which we feel have not been given adequate 
attention. Its'main purpose is to provide a rigorous investigation 
into the information contents of the exchange rate and interest 
rates in a simple dynamic model. section 5.4 concludes. 
5.2 -A Critique of Some Rational Expectations Models with 
Partial Information 
The role of the information structure in determining the 
behaviour of the economy was demonstrated succinctly in the early 
pioneering work on rational expectations of Lucas (1972b, 1975), 
Sargent (1973), Sargent and Wallace (1975,1976) and Barro (1976). 
For the most part, subsequent investigations have exploited the 
simplistic elegance of these studies with the view to reinforcing, 
generalizing and extending the insights thereof. The essence of this 
research may be silmma ized by considering the following type of 
statistical inference problem: if decisions are based on perceived 
relative price changes, agents must attempt to distinguish between 
LocaL and aggregate shocks. The seminal papers by Lucas (1972b, 
1975) envisaged the following well-known scenario. 
A single commodity is transacted in various markets indexed by 
b (h These markets are spatially separated. At any 
time an individual agent finds himself in a particular market at 
random and can only trade in one market at each time. Thereafter, 
agents are again randomly distributed across markets. Information 
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circulates continuously and instantaneously within a market but is 
disseminated across locational boundaries sluggishly. Producers in 
a particular location observe their own local price but not the 
prices in other markets, information about which accrues with a one 
period lag. supply decisions are based on perceived relative price 
changes: suppliers in each location must infer the extent to which 
an observed movement in their local price reflects a change in rela- 
tive prices. This scheme should be familiar. in order to acquaint 
the reader with the mechanics of the inference problem and some of 
the issues, 
-to 
be discussed later, a useful illustrative device is a 
stripped-down version of this framework. This is contained in 
equations (5.2.1), ý- (5.2.3) (similar structures can be found in King 
(1981); Boschen and Grossman (1983)): 
ys (h) a(p (h) - 
eh 
t, Pt, t (h -a0 (5.2.1) 
ydmp (h) + ttt 
P't-l 
(5.2.2) 
(5.2.3) 
where y3 (h) - natural logarithm of the supply of the commodity in 
market h (h 
yd (h) - natural logarithm of the demand for the commodity in 
ma ket h (h - 1,..., H) 
P(h) - natural logarithm of the price of the commodity 
in marke th (h - 1,..., H) 
p = natural logarithm of the aggregate price level 
mm natural logarithm of the nominal stock of money 
e(h), v - stochastic disturbances (h 
and all variables are measured as deviations from equilibrium. 
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Equations (5.2.1) - (5.2.3) should require little discussion. 
Equation (5.2.1) is the local supply function. The term 
p eh (h is the expectation of the economy-wide price t1t 
level, p, formed by participants in location h (h 
eh pt, t- E(pt In t (h)) 
(h - 2,..., H) where E(-) is the mathematical 
conditional expectations operator and n(h) is the information set in 
market h (h Equation (5.2.2) is a simple quantity 
theory of local demand. We shall discuss later the appearance of the 
aggregate money stock, mt, in this relationship rather than the local 
money stock, mt (h) (h Equation (5.2.3) specifies an 
exogenous non--cyclical autoregressive process for aggregate money. 
Stochastic disturbances are denoted by e(h) (h - 1,..., H) and V. The 
former is a local (m&rket-specific) demand shock and the latter is a 
global (economy-wide) demand shock which is permanent if p-1. Each 
disturbance is independently and Gaussian distributed with asymptotic 
variance of e(h) (h -1.... H) and v equal to a2 and a2 respectively. eV 
Imposing'the equilibrium condition ys (h) -yd (h) -y (h) ttt 
(h - 1,..., H) and substituting for mt from equation (5.2.3) yields 
(h) (1 + eh + (h» (h t, t+ Pnt-i tt 
(5.2.4) 
Now consider the information structure. At the most general and 
rigorous level, the current information set in each location is 
F (h) - Cp (h), yt(b), M (b), p mt 
_j, 
pt-) (b), yt n) ttt t-J, Yt-i 0 _j 
(b 
m t-i 
(b), r, 1) (h - (5.2.5) 
where r is a vector of all structural parameters and r. summarizes the 
variance-covariance structure of stochastic disturbances. Equation 
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(5.2.5) states that contemporaneous infornuition is available about 
all local variables whilst information about aggregate variables 
accrues with a one period lag. Lucas (1972b, 1975) and Barro, 
(1976) define the signal-extraction problem as involving the 
estimation of unobservable aggregate variables on the basis of local 
price movements. Thus, equation (5.2.4) constitutes the observation 
or measurement vector (in this case a scalar). rt shows that 
observation of pt (h) (h conveys information about both 
local and global shocks. The reader might question the abstraction 
of local output, yt (h) (h -1.... 8) as an information variable. The 
reason is that both pt (h) and yt (h) (h move simultaneously 
and reflect the same information. Similarly, local money signals 
mt (h) (h seem also to be unexploited. This is rather 
more interesting. Note, first, that the inclusion of aggregate 
money in equation (5.2.2) is because of the assumption that mt (h) 
(h is always the same fraction of mt (see, for example, 
Barro (1976)). Then if this is so, observation of mt Ch) 
(h - 1,..., H) would surely amount to an accurate observation of vt, 
Lucas (2972b, 1975) avoids this by supposing that the proportionality 
between mt (h) (h - 1,..., H) and mt is sufficiently uncertain as to 
make mt (h) (h an unreliable estimate of mt movements 
(1). 
This is a crucial assumption for, as Barro (1976) notes, without it 
the principal source of imperfect information disappears. We prove 
this formally below. For the moment, we follow convention and regard 
the available useful contemporaneous information to amount to an 
observation solely of local prices. 
We shall term the information set in equation (5.2.5) the 
tntttaZ, tnformattonaL endowment. This is to be distinguished from 
the overall information available which comprises both this endowment 
and any auxiliary information extracted therefrom. The distinction 
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is not trivial. An important possibility which seems to have been 
overlooked in the literature is the'perverse outcome where an 
increase in the informational endowment reduces the accuracy of some 
forecasts (that is, makes some auxiliary information more unreliable). 
Section 5.3 illustrates this. 
We solve the system by applying the method of undetermined 
coefficients in appendix C to a trial solution (see, for example, 
Lucas (1972b, 1973,1975); McCallum (1983); Minford and Peel 
(1983b)). Thus, equation (5.2.4) inspires consideration of the 
following solutions for local and economy-wide prices: 
Pt (h) - goet(h) + ; 111"t + "L2t-. 1 (h (5.2.6) 
pt m )Alv t+A2m t-1 - 
(5.2.7) 
where IA i (i, - 0,1,2) are coefficients to be determined and we have 
used the fact that et (h) (h - 1,..., H) disappears on aggregating. 
Then equation (5.2.7) implies 
eh eh + t, t1 t't 2m t-1 (h - (5.2.9) 
so that substituting equations (5.2.6) and (5.2.8) into equation 
(5.2.4) gives 
(I + a)(A et(h) + ji., vt + ;Lm)- a(A v 
eh + AL M 02 t-I 1 t, t 2 t-1) 
+ pmt-1 
vt+dt (5.2.9) 
It Is now necessary to compute the expectation v 
eh (h t, t 
This is found by solving the signal-extraction problem alluded to 
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earlier. specifically, given the linear dependence of the local 
price signal on the stochastic shocks in equation (5.2.4), the 
optimal filtered estimates of V and e- (h) (h ..., H) follow as t' t 
. eh . 2' 
""v tlt , 11 22 
I- eh (h) -dtýt t, t 
(5.2.10) 
or 
eh ,. (bv(v' +e t, ttt 
(h - 1,..., ff) (5.2.11) 
eh -, ýlE 
6 t't (h) 4) 
(v tet 
where ýOv .a2 (cr 
2+a2 
)-l 
vve 
22 2 -1 (a a + a ) ., ,, v e 
(b - ... H) (5.2.12) 
The expressions in, equations (5.2.11) - (5.2.12) have some intuitive 
appeal. ý Suppose-that monetary noise dominates. Then a2 implies V 
d eh 
.0 .'e tIt 
(h) - 0, (h Conversely, ýif money is relatively 
2V eh 
stable, aV0 and 4) .V t't - 0. Similar properties apply to 
2 
variations in ae. Substituting equation (5.2.11) into equation 
(5.2.9) and equating coefficients now reveals the following 
identities: 
-, 
2 
a 
a2++ a)a 
2 
A2 10 p (5.2.14) 
where we have used Now denote by the suerscript F the 
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solution of the system under the filtering problem. Then substituting 
equations (5.2.13) - (5.2.14) into equations (5.2.6) - 5.2.7) gives 
the solutions for local and global prices under partial contempor- 
aneous information. The solution for output follows by substituting 
P (h) _ 
eh A(e (h) +v-v 
eh ) (b - 1,..., H) into equation t Pt, t ttt, t 
(5.2.1). The resulting expressions are summarized in table 5.2(A). 
Table 5.2(A) also contains the solution of the model under full 
contemporaneous information in which case there is no filtering 
a eh problem; hence the superscript NF. Then e t, t 
(h) -et (h) and 
V 
eh 
v (h - 1,..., H) and the informational endowment is t, t t 
n 
Nr (b) - (p (b), yt_, (b), mt_, (b), pt_,, t t-j Yt-i , 't-J, 
r', rIik 
As shown, when agents are endowed with complete information, the 
familiar neutrality result obtainsi both local and global prices 
incur the full impact of an aggregate demand shock whilst both local 
and global output remain invariant. By contrast, this is no longer 
true when information is restricted. In this case, agents are 
unable to decompose the local price signal into relative and 
aggregate perturbations. There is a change in perceived relative 
prices and output deviates from equilibrium. As a consequence, local 
and global prices change by less than their full information counter- 
parts. in a similar vein, local output under responds to local 
shocks as agents misinfer an aggregate disturbance. Then local 
prices are stabilized by less than under full information. A further 
property of the solutions is the observation of Lucas (1973) that the 
slope coefficient in the supply schedule is a function of the 
stochastic properties of the exogenous variables. In particular, as 
2 -d monetary volatility increases, aV4w and 040. This is to say 
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that greater monetary volatility reduces the impact of unanticipated 
monetary shocks on output because agents interpret (correctly) the 
(2) 
occurrence of these shocks 
Further insight into the importance of the information structure 
can be gained by recalling our earlier remarks concerning the possi- 
bility that local money might convey information about aggregate 
money. Suppose, for example, that mt (h) (h - 1,..., H) is related 
to mt by mt (h) - G(h)m t with 
0 q)(h) <I (h m known to 
agents. Then we may write the observation vector as 
t 
(h) 0 Pt (h), 
. 
mt(h) G(h), Mt 
(b - 1,..., Ff) (5.2.16) 
Denote by C the 2x2 right hand side matrix in equation (5.2.16) and 
partition this such that C- Ecl C21. Equation (5.2.16) may be 
re-written as 
tc 
(I + cx)-l ap 
eh + Dpm + Dv 1 t, t t-I t 
t 
(h). 
c1 (1 + a)-' dt (h) (h - 1,..., H) (5.2.17) 
where D-CI (I + a) -1 G(h) +C 2* 
As before, observation of pt (h) and mt (h) (h conveys 
information about both vt and et (h) (h- 2,..., H). In this case, 
however, this : Lnformation is absolute. To see this, note that 
equation (5.2.17) gives the optimal filtered estimates as 
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eh 2DT 
t't 
mv 4(DV t+ 
(1 + a)-1 c1 IE t (h» 
e 
eh (h) cr 
2cT (1 + cx) -1 
. 
t't 
.E1 (h (5.2.18) 
where 4ý = (Da2 DT+ (I +a )-2 Ca2CT )-l. vIC! I 
It is now fairly straightforward to show that v 
eh 
-v and t, t t 
eh- (h) -e (h) (b. The reason is that local money now t, t t 
conveys accurate information about aggregate money. This enables the 
extraction of perfect information about local shocks from local price 
signals. This is notýa new observation (see, - for example, Barro 
(1976)). We hope, however, to, have illustrated explicitly the 
crucial influence of the information structure. In terms of the 
implications of the equilibrium models it is critical that agents 
have little faith in the information value of local money signals. 
King (1981) and Boschen and Grossman (1983) steer an intermediate 
course between the above two scenarios. They assume the availability 
of some preliminary aggregate monetary estimate; ; it, say, where 
I; t mt+V it and vI 
is a measurement error assumed to be white 
nolse with asymptotic-variance a2 The essential implications of 
Vl* 
partial information noted above are unchanged. Limiting cases of 
interest are when a2-0 and a2 -# (a. In the former there is v, v, 
accurate contemporaneous aggregate monetary information. For our 
(3) 
model this would imply full information .' In the latter, the 
monetary-signal is sufficiently noisy as to induce agents to 
ignore it.,, The solution then collapses to the case in which only 
local price-signals are exploited. 
A further type of generalization is performed by Cukierman 
(1979). Here, it is assumed that agents are not restricted to 
just local price information but may sample prices in other markets. 
Moreover, the number of prices observed is a choice variable. The 
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rather obvious conclusion is that forecast errors are a decreasing 
function of the number o prices observed. rn the limit, when agents 
have access to information about all prices, the solution reduces to 
the full information case though agents may choose not to gather 
full information if this involves a cost. 
An important extension by Barro, (1980) is the inclusion of 
on economy-wide capital market. In the model of equations'(5.2.1) - 
(5.2.3) this might be accomplished by regarding equation (5.2.2) as 
a money demand function which depends on an economy-wide interest 
rate. Then an aggregate demand schedule may be posited to close 
the model. Barro, (1980) follows his earlier paper (Barro (1976)) 
and assumes local commodity supply and demand to be determined by 
the anticipated real rate of interest plus a wealth variable which 
a unts to a forecast error of contemporaneous aggregate money 
movements. Supply (demand) is positively (negatively) related to 
(4, S) 
the former and negatively (positively) related to the latter 
7be key aspect of this extension is that agents have access to an 
additional information variable, namely the economy-wide nominal 
interest rate which summarizes aggregate conditions. Information is 
(6) 
still imperfect provided there is more than one global shock 
Again, the familiar results obtains neutrality emerges under 
conditions of perfect information; under imperfect information 
output over-responds to global shocks and under-responds to local 
shocks. The precise effect of stochastic perturbations depend, in 
general, on the structural parameters of the model and the reader is 
referred to Barro (1980) for further discussion. Our main comment on 
the analysis is favourable in the sense that it appreciates the pos- 
sibility of a global price (that is, the interest rate) acting as an 
information variable. It is not implausible to argue that the most 
obvious candidates for information variables are indeed asset prices. 
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Information about these is likely to be available almost instant- 
aneously and continuously, more so than is information about other 
aggregate variable such as aggregate prices and output. It is 
precisely this idea which has been encompassed in recent contrib- 
utions to the literature. For the most part, these have borrowed the 
equilibrium frameworks of the earlier studies and applied them to an 
open economy setting. They may be summarized briefly as follows. 
Saidi (1982) examines an equilibrium model of interdependent 
economies in the spirit of the monetary theory of the balance of 
payments (see, for example, Hahn (1959); Mussa (1974); Whitman 
(1975); Hacche and TOwnend (1981); Krueger (1983); the edited volume 
by Frenkel and Johnson (1976)). The markets previously indexed by 
b (b now represent identically structured economies 
operating under a fixed exchange rate regime. The formal structure 
is similar to Barro (1976,1980). The set of information variables 
for each economy comprises economy-specific prices and the world 
interest rate (determined by international capital mc>bility). We 
should note here that the exchange rate is also contemporaneously 
observable. The fixed exchange rate assumption, however, deprives 
this variable of any useful information. This is in stark contrast 
to the case in which the exchange rate is permitted to float and 
illustrates vividly how control may influence the information 
structure. Certain subsequent research has been concerned to 
examine the implications of this. Saidi (1982) obtains results 
under full information which are consistent with the monetary 
theory. World monetary perturbations are neutral with respect 
to real variables whilst economy-specific shocks induce relative 
price changes and output fluctuations. When information is 
restricted the familiar modifications to these results obtain. 
In this respect the monetary theory of the balance of payments 
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is a special case which is realised only under conditions of full 
information. otherwise, the response of the system is determined 
by agents' misperceptions and the reduced form coefficients are 
functions of the variances of exogenous variables. 
Duck (1984) considers a two country model with both fixed and 
flexible exchange rates. Each country is characterized by the 
equilibrium physically separated markets paradigm. Demanders are 
located randomly in markets and international trade takes place 
when the citizens of one country find them3elves in the markets 
of the other country. Under fixed exchange rates the balance of 
payments is given by the relative demands for each nation's 
comiodity. This determines the exchange rate when permitted to 
float. Initial information is summarized in local prices and the 
global exchange rate and there are no interest bearing assets to 
act as additional information variables. In addition, as noted 
above, the exchange rate ceases to convey useful information when it 
it fixed. An implication of the analysis is that stabilizing 
monetary volatility is insufficient to negate output movements under 
fixed exchange rates but is sufficient when exchange rates are 
flexible. The reason is that, in the former regime, agents have 
access to only local price signals which are insufficient to infer 
the precise values of local shocks and foreign monetary distrubances. 
By contrast, observing exchange rate movements conveys full informa- 
tion about the latter. A similar but more rigorous analysis which 
allows capital mobility can be found in Lawrence (1984). 
Let us now digress a little on some matters of importance. 
The role of asset prices as information variables is intuitively 
appealing. In this respect, there is an important pecularity in 
the simple aggregative and widely employed model of Sargent and 
Wallace (1975) (see also Sargent (1973)). A stylized version of 
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this (but which retains the peculiarity) was given in chapter 3 
(section 3.2, equations (3.2.1a), (3.2.2a), (3.2.3a), (3.2.4) 
- (3.2.5)). The information set conditioning expectations is 
lagged and comprises only lagged values of variables. Implicitly, 
however, the current nominal interest rate is assumed to be 
contemporaneously observable. Yet the value of this as a conveyer 
of information is not exploited. As we argued in section 5.1, ', this 
appears to be inconsistent with the rational expectations, assumption. 
Moreover, this criticism is not trivial. Minford and Peel (1983a) 
have recently demonstrated some apparently perverse results when 
the information content of the interest rate is taken account of. 
In particular, a positive aggregate demand shock may reduce output 
if aggregate supply is sufficiently volatile. Then the observed 
rise in the interest rate is misinterpreted as a negattva. supply 
shock. Expected prices rise more than actual prices'and output 
contracts. We also obtain this result in chapter 6 (section 6.3). 
Even here, however, agents are neglecting some information 
for they still have local price observations. This might be 
important in the case of money demand shocks. An exogenous 
increased desire for liquidity raises interest rates and depresses 
prices. Demand and supply perturbations have the same qualitative 
effecist positive (negative) demand (supply) shocks tend to raise 
both prices and interest rates. This suggests that observation of 
both local prices and the global interest rate will convey full 
information about money demand shocks. We do not attempt to prove 
this intuition here but merely point it out as an interesting 
observation. 
Nonetheless, it is possible to justify abstracting from local 
price signals. Suppose that local prices are subject to a wide 
variety of both local and global shocks. The interest rate 
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reflects only the latter. Then the contamination of local price 
signals may be sufficient to induce agents to ignore them. That 
is, local prices are so noisy that agents regard them to have 
(7) 
negligible information value . Agents merely take these prices 
as given and concentrate their efforts on extracting information 
from observable global variables. This is not implausible and may 
apply generally to the low information content of local variables. 
The argument gains force if one is primarily concerned with discer- 
ning the nature of aggregate shocks. 
it is possible that the abstraction of local price signals is 
important in order to avoid some severe complications in the 
inference problem. Hore generally, we should be wary of prtvate, 
or equivalently dtfferenttaL, information which may raise some 
issues of substance and which effect is to poison the simplicity 
of the analyses considered hitherto. Our argument can be illustrated 
most easily as follows. Let us augment the model in equations 
(5.2.1) - (5.2.3) with a local demand relationship. In addition, 
let equation (5.2.2) be aggregated and let us introduce the nominal 
rate of interest as an argument. Then local commodity demand and 
aggregate portfolio balance equations axe written respectively as 
yd (h) - -ß(r -p 
eh +p (h» +t (h) + 11 t t4-1, ttt 
0 (S. 2.19) 
d 
jw 1,2) mt Pt +y1yt- yý rt Yi>0 (j (5.2.20) 
where r- nominal rate of interest rate 
J(h)'n - stochastic disturbances (b 
Clearly, f(h) (b - 1,.., El) is a local demand shock and n is an 
aggregate demand shock. Now consider the information content of 
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the interest rate. Appropriate substitution and manipulation 
reduces equations (5.2.1), (5.2.3), (5.2.19) - (5.2.20) to 
pt ape, +ap+a mt_l +av+a Yj (5.2.21) 1tt2 t+l, t34t5t 
Y2 
1 (bp t-yev (5.2.22) t I'Pt, t - P't-I t 
where a., ma a(2 + 
-1 
5 Y2 Y201 
a2ýa. 13 
a3a 4p 
-1 a4a 2Y2 
a. 03(1 + Y-1 + a(l + y-ly 0))-l 221 
b (1+y1cx) 
and pe (s - 0, I) is the average price expectation acros's markets. t+Slt 
substituting equation (5.2.21) into equation (5.2.22) gives 
rt = y-l 
[(ba, 
- y,. a)p 
e, 
t 4. ba pe+ (ba 2t2 t+l, t 3 P)mt-l 
(ba 
4- J)v t+ 
ba 
srit] . (5.2.23) 
Equation (5.2.23) constitutes the interest rate signal of the obser- 
T 
vation vector Cp t 
(h) r t] . The first three right hand side terms 
in the expression are ass, =ed to be known and the problem is to 
infer the values of the unknown shocks, vt and nt (and Ct (b)). 
The crucial elements in the expressions are the terms pe t+s, t 
(s - 0, I) which reflect average expectations across markets (or 
market expectations). It is these terms which require further 
comment. 
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, eh If all agents possess identical information then p t+s, t ý 
pe (S - 0,1; h - 1,..., H) and market expectations are indeed t+s, t 
known. This may be a critical assumption and is also ruled out 
in the equilibrium models. In particular, it is important to be 
aware that these models assu not only partial information but 
also differential information. This follows from the fact that, 
in addition to contemporaneous information about the global interest 
rate, each agent posseS3es a piece of private information, namely an 
observation of the local price. Then it is no longer true that 
eh e Pt+s, t '0 Pt+s, t 
(s - 0,1; h From the perspective of any 
individual, therefore, the market price expectation is unknown. 
Agents must form an estimate of this in order to infer the underlying 
shocks. Let us denote by p 
e(h) 
agent h's expectation of the market t+s, t 
expectation (s - 0,1; h-1,..., H). The question is how each agent 
computes this expectation. This leads us to the following scenario 
outlined in section 5.1. ý Note, first, that an expectation of market 
price expectations is equivalent to an expectation of market 
expectations about stochastic disturbances. Then each agent must 
infer the actual values of disturbances and market expectations 
about these. 
The approach to this problem adopted in the aformentioned litera- 
ture is quite simple: since local prices are purely random (and 
since aggregate prices are merely an average of local prices), 
expectations thereof are unbiased estimates of the market price 
expectation. A more sophisticated approach is for each agent to 
recognize that others' expectations differ from his own. The 
approach usually adoprted then, to which we turn below, is to assume 
that market expectations are gtven; that is, each agent forecasts 
market expectations but assi s that he is unable to influence the 
economy-wide estimate. This is really a 'special case of the more 
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general approach to a differential information problem which we now 
describe. Each agent knows that his own inference-based action will 
influence his observations., Individually, these might only influence 
the local signal. Collectively, however, the inference-based actions 
of all agents will alter the global signal as well., This means that 
each agent appreciates that his observations reflect not only the 
underlying shocks to the system but also market expectations - 
thereof (see equation (5.2.23)). The latter comprises expectations 
of other individuals who will similarly recognize this contamination 
of observations. Accordingly they will also form opinions about 
market expectations. This is not the end of the story. Agents now 
know that their observations reflect not only the expectations of 
others, but also other's expectations about their, own expectation. 
They will then form expectations about this latter, expectation and 
so on and so forth. This, is an interesting problem and it motivates 
the notion of an informational game. Agents may take as given the 
expectations of others - a, Nash informational game if you will; 
or they may recognize-their, influence on other's expectations -a 
stackelberg assumption perhaps..,, This may apply equally to those 
models which abstract, from a global information variable. A par- 
ticular agent misinterpreting a relative change in his situation 
will alter, output and this will change the local signal. An agent 
in a different location will be forming expectations about the 
price in others markets.. -Then he must recognize the above effect. 
The former individual will then appreciate this recognition. The 
problem is-the same as before. In fact, Lucas (1975) appreciated 
precisely the point that we are making. He avoided addressing it by 
assuming that different agents' estimates are somehow 'pooled', 
yielding a-common expectation applicable to all agents. The problem 
with this is that it is vacuous without eliciting how this pooling 
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takes place. After all, if agents axe able themselves to pool their 
separate estimates, they are surely capable of divulging their own 
pieces of private information. 
The upshot of our discussion is the potentially crucial 
distinction between the assumption of partial information and the 
dual assumption of partial and heterogeneous information. The full 
implications of this distinction are not always appreciated. Shifting 
from the former to the latter may transform substantialiy't'he nature 
of the signal-extraction problem. We shall have more to say about 
this later. The immediately proceeding discussion centres on those 
studies for which the added complication does not &rise. Specifi- 
cally, in these analyses, contemporaneous information takes the form 
of aggregate signals which are available to all agents. As before, 
we can summarize these analyses fairly briefly as follows. 
Saidi (1980) considers a small open economy in which purchasing 
power parity holds. An intertemporal supply function in the spirit 
of Lucas and Rapping (1969) is introduced iný'the'set OfInformation 
variables comprises exchange rate and price'observations. Note that 
the only stores of value in the model are domestic and foreign money 
so that the role of interest rates as information variables-does not 
exist. The general conclusions are familiar and the analysis adds 
little to what has been said already. Herely note that imperfect 
information renders the insulation properties of flexible exchange 
rates no longer applicable and generates exchange rate overshooting 
or undershooting relative to the full information response. We are 
sceptical about the inclusion of aggregate prices in the set of 
information variables. 
A more attractive analysis is performed by Kimbrough (1983a). It 
is motivated by a fundamental difference between fixed and flexible 
exchange rate regimes alluded to earlier. Unlike the former, the 
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latter makes the information content of the exchange rate nil. This 
might be an important factor when assessing the relative merits of 
the two systems. In fact, it is a similar notion which motivates 
our analysis in chapter 6 on the re-evaluation of the appropriate 
choice of monetary instrument (see chapters 2 and 3) when the 
interest rate performs the role of an information variable. 
Kimbrough (1983a) assi sa simple aggregative model of a small 
open economy characterized by a money demand function (depending 
on the domestic price level") and output) a supply function 
(determined by contemporaneous price forecast errors) and a demand 
relationship (a function of real competitiveness). As in Saidi 
(1980) interest bearing assets are excluded but contemporaneous 
information is available about the exchange rate. Two central 
conclusions are as follows. First, regardless of which type of 
shock occurs, if one type of disturbance predominates, flexible 
exchange rates are at least as good as fixed exchange rates in 
terms of minimizing the expected squared deviation of output around 
its full information level. Second, when domestic monetary shocks 
are accompanied by real shocks, flexible exchange rates are 
unambiguously superior. The reasons for these are as follows. 
Recall from chapters 2 and 3 two implications of the monetary 
instruments literature. First, in the face of monetary disturbances, 
fixing the exchange rate will neutralize these shocks by permitting 
an accommodatory monetary response. Second, in the face of real 
disturbances, some flexibility in exchange rates is preferable. The 
latter continues to be true in Kimbrough (1983a). In addition, 
'however, suppose that monetary shocks predominate. Then this is 
known to agents who correctly perceive no relative price change. 
Output remains invariant just as it does under fixed exchange rates. 
Moreover, if monetary shocks are accompanied by real shocks the 
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usual superior stabilizing properties of flexible exchange rates 
operates. Clearly, these add some qualification to the conclusions 
reached from a standard approach to the issue (which neglects 
consideration of the information content of the exchange rate). 
Nonetheless, as Kimbrough (1983a) notes, it remains to be seen how 
robust the particular conclusions he reaches are when the model 
structure is enriched and a wider spectrum of disturbances 
considered. 
The main drawback of Saidi (1980) and Kimbrough (1983a) is the 
absence of global interest rates (both domestic and foreign). 
Bhandari (1982) incorporates the interest rate's role as a conveyor 
of information together with permitting a preliminary estimate of 
the'money stock as in'King (1981) and'Boschen and Grossman (1983). 
He also assi sa large closed foreign economy in order to trace 
the precise mechanisms whereby foreign shocks'are transmitted to 
the domestic economy. A more fruitful line of inquiry might have 
been to allow for'some symmetry in the interdependence between 
economies. Rather than commenting further on Bhandari (1982) and, 
other similar studies, we wish to point out an important criticism 
of a&T, of'the analyses considered hitherto. 
The foregoing research has a single important characteristic, 
na ly the concentration on purely static models. Any dynamics are 
modelled by an arbitrary selection of the stochastic process 
determining the exogenous variables. ' For this reason, 'we are a 
little sceptical about the generalizability and importance of the 
results derived from these models. When different variables exhibit 
different degrees of'slu4gishness, exogenous shocks will impact 
at different speeds and the full implications of a shock will be 
distributed over time. rt is precisely this which is likely to 
enrichen the information content of vaziables. Consider, for 
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example, the abstraction of interest rates from the set of 
information variables. Kimbrough (1983a) observes that observation 
of foreign nominal interest rates will convey no information about 
domestic perturbations, if the domestic economy is small (that is, 
foreign interest rates are treated as exogenous). This is true 
but neglects the usefulness of foreign interest rate observations 
as signals of foreign shocks. Now, assuming-uncovered interest 
parity, Kimbrough (1983a) also argues that domestic interest rate 
observations will convey no extra information other than that 
which-is already embodied in the exchange rate. Thislis true only 
in so far as stochastic perturbations impact on the interest rate 
and exchange rate simultaneously; but there are plausible circum- 
stances under which this may not be so. All that is. required is 
that there be some sluggishness in the domestic economy. -. Then 
foreign shocks may impact on the exchange rate contemporaneously 
but feed through to interest rates with a lag. This asymmetry in 
speeds of adjustment acts as a further source of information - an 
additional information variable if you like. Horeover, the assump- 
tion of uncovered interest parity makes domestic interest. rates,, 
and the exchange rate move in the same direction. Relaxation of 
this will generally make the information contents of the exchange 
rate, and interest rate differ. Some implications of these ideas 
are, demonstrated in section 5.3. Currie and Levine (1983b) and 
Kinford and Peel (1983a) have considered dynamic models in the spirit 
of the Dornbusch (1976)-sticky price framework. As our, analysis 
shows, their treatment-oCthe information structure is rather 
misleading and obscures matters of some interest. 
As we have noted previously, there is a natural, progression 
from a purely partial information framework to one which combines 
this with the assumption of heterogeneous information. When agents 
283 
are both imperfectly and differentially informed, observed signals 
will reflect a linear combination (for a linear model) of the actual 
disturbances impinging on the system and the different expectations 
of these held by different agents. The existence and continuance of 
differential information is not, however, always justified. Hinford 
and Peel (1983a) express some concern over this. They argue that 
there is likely to develop a market which specializes in information 
if information is important for decisions. In any event, it is 
probably true that differential information will eventually be 
smoothed as the relatively uninformed agents acquire more infor- 
mation. Nonetheless, it is also possible that news is not dissemin- 
ated to all agents instantaneously. An obvious example is the 
distinction between foreign exchange markets and goods or labour 
markets. Another is that agents are likely to be more aware of their 
own circumstances than are other agents and vtce versa. Then an 
i diate consequence of an exogenous perturbation is to drive a 
wedge between the information available to agents operating in 
different ma kets. Investigations into a differential information 
structure are not, therefore, entirely trivial. At a minimum, they 
may yield some insight into the immediate response of the system 
to unforeseen events. 
As mentioned earlier, the full implications of a differential 
information structure are not addressed in the literature. Fore- 
casting others, forecasts is surely appreciated; but this is where 
the-iterations stop. This is exemplified in King and Trehan (1983) 
who illustrate the type of solution technique employed in the 
literature. it is probably the case that the most interesting 
aspect of the problem is where agents perform further iterations. 
Then each individual forecasts others' forecasts about his own 
forecasts and so on and so forth. ' This strikes a direct analogy. 
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with some of the research into the process of learning the 
model(9). Nonetheless, there are some interesting conclusions 
which emerge in the absence of this and which are likely to 
illustrate general points. 
Much of the literature continues the theme of the early equilib- 
rium models on neutrality and the efficacy of stabilization policy. 
With respect to the, latter, chapter 2 (section 2.3) contained a 
summary of the debate. It was mentioned there that, deterministic 
feedback policy is able to influence real variables if there exists 
differential information sets. An informational advantage in favour 
of the controller will obviously give potency to control rules. ý As 
Barro, (1976) notes, however, the desirability of such action must be 
judged against the alternative course in which the controller, 
divulges his extra information. In view of this, subsequent research 
on, differential information assumes the policy maker to be no better, 
informed than the most ignorant private agent. That is,, differential 
information is assumed to exist wtthtn the private sector.. 
Turnovsky (1980) and Weiss (1980,1982) are the popularly cited 
illustrations of the implications of the above scenario., The 
analytical, framework of the former was described in chapter 3 
(section 3.2, equations (3.2.1c), (3.2.2c), (3.2.3c), (3.2.4) 
(3.2.5); see also the discussion in chapter 2, section 2.3). The 
efficacy of stabilization policy is a consequence of the informa-- 
tional advantage of1demanders of goods who, unlike suppliers, have 
access to accurate contemporaneous price information. There are 
two major drawbacks of Turnovsky (1980): 
'first, 
the signal- 
extraction problem is not addressed; second, it is debatable whether 
aggregate prices. are contemporaneously observable. Such criticisms 
do'not apply to Weiss (1980,1982) who envisages the source of 
differential information to be the existence of local information. 
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Systematic stabilization policy is effective in this and other 
differential information models because of the ability to influence 
future expectations of differentially informed agents. A number of 
authors to be mentioned below have associated this with the idea that 
control operates by influencing the information content of globally 
observed variables. This follows-from the fact that these variables 
reflect the expectations of all agents in the system (market 
expectations). The influence of control on these expectations is not 
uniform because of the idiosyncracies in information. 'Altering 
control will alter these (unknown) expectations and change the 
signal, thereby influencing the behaviour of agents contitioned on 
this signal. This has been termed the effectiveness of prospectfve 
feedback policy (the future response of policy to currently unknown 
(10) 
events) Weiss (1980,1982) shows that allocative efficiency 
can be improved by such policy via its ability to improve the inform- 
ation content of variables. In a Lucas (1972b, 1975) and Barro 
(1976) type framework, King (1982) demonstrates the sa point. 
Differential information takes the form of differentially informed 
agents wtthtn a particular market. The global observable variable 
from the perspective of this ma ket is the local price therein. 
Hore plausibly, perhaps, King (1983) adopts the Barra (1980) , 
specification in which the informational asymmetry exists in the 
economy-wide capital market by virtue of market-specific goods price 
observations. It may be noted that, in this respect, the analysis 
by King t1983) is a much improved version of Barra (1980) who 
entirely eschews the problem of inferring ma ket expectations. 
Thus, in a differential information framework with signal- 
extraction, the operation of systematic feedback control is through 
market expectations. It is the prospect of reactions to current 
events which gives scope for effective stabilization policy even 
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in ma ket clearing mc4els because these current events are perceived 
non-uniformly by different agents. It is possible, however, to turn 
this around and suggest that such action could be detrixaental. .. 
Suppose that the first best solution is that which obtains under 
full information(1-1). imperfect and differential information will 
obviously lead to a departure from this. Yet the full effect of 
differential information may be exacerbated by prospective feed- 
back actions which serve to confuse agents further about market 
expectations. Of course, it may not exacerbate problems. In any 
event, however, a superior outcome might be achieved if the con- 
troller avoids feedback on currently unknown circumstances. This 
idea is addressed by Anderson (1983) in the model of Barro (1980) 
modified as follows. Suppliers and demanders of the commodity are 
differentially informed about the conditions on the other side of 
the maxket. Thus, all suppliers are assumed to know the aggregate 
sd supply shock, vt, say, but not the aggregate demand shock, vto say- 
The converse holds for all demanders. At the same time, there is the 
usual ma ket-specific information about local prices, pt (h) 
(h - 1,..., H) which depend on local perturbations. Aggregate shocks 
3s8dd,. ;d follow random wa. Lks; vt In v t-I +; t and vt =v t-I t, where 
;s and ;d are white noise error terms. Then Anderson (1983) writes 
the information sets for local suppliers and local demanders in the 
form, 
3 ;sd. s at (h) Pt (h), to Mto pt-j (h), p t-J, Vt-J fv t-J, Mt-i 0 
r,, i: ij )ý 11 (5.2.24) 
C11(h) P (h), ;d, (h), pvdv8 ttt, 't, Pt-i t-J, t-j, t-j, 't-J, 
r, r. ii :ý 11 (5.2.25) 
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The =Pnetary feedback rule is 
m 4- PIV 
s+ -S +pvd+pvdp, 001,2,3,4). 
t+l , mt t-1 p2vt 3 t-I 4ýt 
(5.2.26) 
7be primary source of differential information about future money is 
the fact that suppliers and demanders are differentially informed 
about aggregate supply and demand shocks. A pure prospective feed- 
back policy occurs when PI = P3 '0 0 and p 2' P4 
0 0. A pure current 
feedback policy is when P2 '0 P4 ý0 and Pl' P3 0 0- Within this 
framework, Anderson (2983) shows that, unlike Weiss (1980,1982), a 
pure prospective feedback policy cannot attain the first best 
solution. By contrast, a pure current feedback policy is able to 
accomplish this. The reason relates to our previous intuition. 
Feedback on currently unknown variables imply different expectations 
of future money and prices between agents. The differential 
information structure is maintained. By contrast, reacting to 
commonly known variables implies uniform expectations across 
agents. In short, this policy removes the primary source of diver- 
gent expectations. In this respect, Anderson (2983) is strictly 
incorrect in his assertion that policy is not operating by improving 
the information content of signals. On the contrary, policy is 
operating in precisely this way. It definitely removes a source of 
confusion by inducing all agents to hold the same expectations. 
Some of the above issues have been extended to an open economy 
frame-ork by Kimbrough (1983b, 1984). Turchasing power parity 
holds in the aggregate but not in localised markets 
(12) 
. An 
economy-wide foreign exchange market provides the setting in which 
differential information manifests. Thus, in Kimbrough (1984) the 
set of information variables comprises local prices (foreign and 
domestic) and the global exchange rate. The motivation for the 
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analysis is as in Kinbrough (1983a), mentioned earlier, namely the 
fact that the exchange rate ceases to convey useful information when 
it is fixed. Monetary policy operates as above by influencing the 
expectations of differentially informed agents. When the exchange 
rate is fixed, however, monetaxy policy is entirely accommodating 
and the mechanism breaks down. What matters is exchange rate 
policy but this is impotent with respect to influencing real 
variables. Moreover, since exchange rate control reduces the 
information available to agents, a floating exchange rate regime is 
deemed, to be superior 
(13) 
. 
Some corments are in order about these results. Note that under 
a flexible rate system, the money stock is predetermined. When 
exchange rates are fixed, the money stock must accoumdate any pres- 
sure on the exchange rate. Then the information conveyed by 
fluctuating exchange rates will be reflected in the money stock when 
exchange rates are fixed. Moreover, it must be assumed, that the 
controller is able to observe aggregate money in order to stabilize 
the exchange rate. Thus, it must also be assi d some, reason for 
the controller not to divulge this information (see, for example, 
Barro (1976)). In addition, it would appear that exchange rate 
policy could gain effectiveness if private agents have observations 
of aggregate money. Then just as monetary policy influences the 
information content of the exchange rate under a floating system, 
exchange rate policy would influence the information content of 
money under the. alternative regime. This is demonstrated in 
Kimbrough (1983b). It does not depend on there being accurate 
monetary information; some preliminary noisy estimate will suffice. 
ffence, ýthe superiority of floating exchange rates hinges critically 
on the-informational assumption one cares-to make. 
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There is another point as well. Kimbrough (1983b, 1984) posits 
two conditions for policy to be effective in equilibrium models: 
first, it alters the information content of a globally observed 
signal; second, it does this by virtue of incomplete and differ- 
ential information. That is, merely incomplete information is not 
enough. To some extent this might be true; but there, is an error 
in the illustration used by Kimbrough (1983b, ' 1984). This involves 
considering the case in which local volatility is zero. Then the 
source of differential information disappears, policy becomes 
ineffective but there is still imperfect information regarding 
aggregate shocks. This example is fundamentally misleading) for 
if local volatility is zero and agents know this, local output, will 
always remain invariant to policy. This follows because there can-"-,, 
be no misperceptions about relative price changes. This is not 
entirely a trivial point. We make it in order to emphasize the 
difficulty inýdiscerning the precise role of the information 
structure which is not always easy to isolate from the normal 
workings of a, rx>del. Even when it is possible, the interpret- -' 
ation may not always be unique. 
To close this section, we wish, to CO=Qnt briefly on four 
remaining issues of some substance. The first relates'to the 
implementation of policy in'the presence of heterogeneous infor- 
mation. King (1982) observes that the formulation of optimal -- 
policy under such circumstances will increase the informational. 
demands of the controller. --In particular, Sargent-and Wallace 
(1975) point out that for control to have its desired effects, the 
controller must be'aware of the precise nature of the differential 
information structure. This is an important issue pertaining to 
practical policy making. ' In standard analytical work, however, it 
cannot be taken too seriously. In any rational expectations 
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model, with or without differeneial information, the policy maker, 
is assumed to possess knowledge of the model's characteristics. 
Introducing differential information is just another characteristic; 
and if the policy maker is assumed able to work out the economic 
structure, he surely has the capacity to figure out the information 
structure. Nonetheless, we believe an explicit treatment of the 
problem in a properly specified framework might be of some-interest. 
it is one way of relaxing the extreme information assumptions one 
often finds in the literature. In a related vein, there is also a 
serious matter of robustness. Even if one admits-the formulation of 
policy on the basis of knowledge about the information structure, 
there is an interesting question concerning how robust particular 
policy rules are with respect to different informational assumptions. 
This is a focus of attention in chapter 3. 
The second point is also concerned with differential. information. 
Kimbrough (1985) has recently shown that the existence of an economy- 
wide, futures market-in the Barro (1980) model will re-establish- 
policy ineffectiveness by virtue of endowing agents with complete 
information about market expectations. More generally, a suffic- 
iently rich menu of economy-wide markets serves to de-contaminate 
observed signals of the expectations of differentially informed 
(14) 
agents it is plausible to argue that the number of such 
markets is, in fact, insufficient. Yet this is inadequate; for if 
the first best solution obtains under full information, there will 
presucla ly exist incentives for agents to establish. -these ma kets. 
This is another possibly interesting area for further research. 
Third, most of the literature has concentrated on analysing 
partial and differential information in equilibrium models with 
the view to realizing their-implications for neutrality and policy 
effectiveness. We believe that these types of analyses should now 
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be abandoned and the implications of signal-extraction examined in a 
wider spectrum of models and for further issues. A recent contrib-- 
ution in this respect is Kimbrough (1983c) who attempts to explain 
exchange rate overshooting and deviations from purchasing power* 
parity in a model where agents in the foreign exchange market have 
superior information to agents in'the goods market. 
The final point we wish to make is that, though the information 
structure appears potentially crucial for determining the behaviour 
of a system, its precise quantitative importance remains to be 
seen. it may well be that a seemingly significant change in the 
information structure yields relatively little change in the 
behaviour of the system. Investigations into the quantitative 
importance of the informational assumptions would require numerical 
simulations and we ask for future research in this direction. 
This concludes the present section. in addition, there is some 
further literature on signal-extraction with special reference to 
monetary control. This is related to the subject matter of chapter 6 
and our comments are contained in that chapter (section 6.1). 
5.3 rnterest Parity, the Deqree of capital mobility and the 
Information Contents of the Exchanqe Rate and the Interest 
Rate : Clarifications and Fxtensions* 
This section explores in detail the role of the exchange rate 
and the interest rate as information variables under conditions of 
perfect and imperfect capital mobility. ' At a more general level, it 
illustrates the importanceof a detailed investigation into the ' 
information structure as a pre-requisite for any analysis. Section 
5.2 recorded some recent work in the field of partial information 
which indicated the potentially critical dependence of the behaviour 
of the economy on the information structure. A common assumption 
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of some of the literature is that the set of currently observable 
variables includes at a minimum all asset prices, in particular the 
exchange rate and interest rates. These are typically related 
through uncovered interest parity. As a consequence, it is often 
assumed that interest rates convey no extra information other than 
that already embodied in the exchange rate. The current section is 
motivated by this view. Formally, it states that the infozmation 
contents of the exchange rate and interest rates are sufficiently 
similar as to make explicit treatment of observation of both 
unnecessary. We show that, despite the intimate relationship 
between these variables (via interest parity), observation of both 
conveys more information than does observation of just the exchange 
rate. At the same time, however, there is the interesting perverse 
possibility that enrichening the information set in this way 
actually reduces the accuracy of forecasts about some shocks. In 
this case, the extra information is misleading. This motivates the 
distinction, mentioned in section 5.2, between the tntttaZ, 
tnformattonal. endoument and the overall information, available. Our 
result implies that increases in the former do not necessarily 
yield more accurate auxilliary information about all stochastic 
disturbances. As far as we know, this has hitherto gone unnoticed. 
we also show the critical dependence of the a unt and nature of 
information conveyed to agents on the degree of capital mobility 
and the nature of the shock structure assumed. Implications are 
drawn for the dynamic behaviour of prices and the exchange rate. 
The commonly held belief about the similarity of the information 
contents of the exchange rate and interest rates is exemplified in 
Kinford and Peel (1983a): 
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tn thts parttcuLar model. no additional information 
on the shock structure is conveyed by the global 
interest rate. This is because the pieces of global 
information are structurally related via Cinterest parity]. 
observation of Cthe exchange rate] implies observation of 
(the interest ratel". (15) 
By contrast, Currie and Levine (1983b) make no reference whatsoever 
regarding their abstraction of the current interest rate from the 
set of information variables. In Kimbrough (1983a, b, 1984), the 
model is entirely static and exogenous shocks impact simultaneously 
on both the exchange rate and interest rates. In addition, as in 
Minford and Peel (1893a) there are no external (foreign) distur- 
bances. Relaxation of these properties have important implications. 
This section demonstrates that in the models employed by Currie 
and Levine (1983b) and Kinford and Peel (1983a), the information 
contents of the exchange rate and the interest rate are identical 
only if the following conditions are satisfied: first, there is 
perfect capital mobility; second, either no external shocks exist or, 
if such shocks do exist, they take the form solely of foreign 
interest rate variations. rn the Kinford and Peel (1983a) model both 
of these conditions are satisfied. Hence, their proposition is true 
though only for these limiting cases. In Currie and rAvine (1983b), 
however, imperfect capital mobility and foreign disturbances are 
explicit. 
The model we use for demonstration is a fixed output discrete 
time variant of the small open economy described in chapter 3 
(section 3.2, equations (3.2.1f), (3.2.2f), (3.2.3f), (3.2.4) - 
(3.2. G)). This is based on Dorbusch (1976) as modified by Shandari 
(1981), Shandari, Driskill and Frenkel (1984), Driskill (1981), 
Frenkel and Rodriguez (1982) and Gazioglou (1984) to incorporate 
imperfect capital mobility. The resulting structure is formally 
identical to Currie and Levine (1983b) and encompasses Hinford and 
Peel (1983b) as a special case: 
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pt - A(et - pt) + elt 0<A1 (5.3.1) 
md+d0 (5.3.2) t Pt - 'Y't 2t 
1rt-ee+e t+l, tt 
where p= natural 
eM natural 
d 
m natural 
r nominal 
+, n2 (et -pt+ Vt -0 1)1 ). 0 (1 - 1,2) 
(5.3.3) 
logarithm of the price level 
logarithm of the nominal exchange rate 
logarithm of the nominal demand for money 
rate of interest 
0-'k n- stochastic disturbances (k - 
As usual, all variables are measured as deviations from long-run 
equilibrium and ee E(e In ) where E(-) is the mathematical t+l't t+l t 
conditional expectations operator and n is the information set. 
Equations (5.3.1) - (5.3.3) should be familiar. Equation (5.3.1) 
is the inflation generating mechanism subject to stochastic pertur- 
bation. The nominal exchange rate, e, is therefore the domestic 
currency price of foreign exchange (a rise in e is a depreciation). 
Equation (5.3.2) is a stochastic money demand function. Equation 
(5.3.3) is the balance of payments equilibrium condition. Recalling 
the discussion in chapter 3 (section 3.2), this is derived from the 
sum of the capital and trade accounts, Xt and Tt respectively, where 
K- il (r ee, +v) (5.3.4) tIt t+Ift + et it 
Tt = il 2 
(e t- pt + v2t) (5.3.5) 
where vi- stochastic disturbances (i - 1,2). 
Thus, -n, ýw approximates perfect capital mobility and v1 and 
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(16) 
are random shocks to capital and trade flows It is important 
to note that vI is not to be interpreted as a foreign interest rate 
disturbance. In what follows we shall be assuming all interest 
rates to be contemporaneously observable. Since foreign interest 
rates are exogenous in this model, v1 would be known with certainty. 
The correct interpretation here is that v2 captures non-systematic 
deviations from interest parity. In this way, under perfect capital 
mobility, the Minford and Peel (2983a) specification (which excludes 
foreign shocks) is considered a limiting case of the current frame- 
work. Finally, we assume that each disturbance is independently and 
Gaussian distributed. 
The model is closed by assuming a fixed money stock so that money 
d. (17) 
ma ket equilibrium implies mt0 in equation (5.3.2) . Then 
equations (5.3.1) - (5.3.3) can be written in state-space form as 
Pt+i pt, u 1, +t (5.3.6) 
eeaaeu2 t+l, t, 1 2, 
where a, -1 n. 
a2+n 
-1 n ma 71, r'2 
I ut =e 
it, 
2 -1 ut mye 2t +e 3t 
e -1 3t '13, 't 
The characteristic equation of (5.3.6) is 
f(r) - -r 
2_ 
(2 +n- X)-r + (I +n-A(. 1 + y-1)) -o (5.3.7) 
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frcxa which 
718T 2 
42 ((2 +n- A) t C(2 +n- A) 
2_ 
4(l +n- A(I +M 
11 
) 
(5.3.8) 
Treating p as predetermined and e as non-predetermined, saddlepoint 
stability requires one stable root and one unstable root; Ir II<I 
and Ir 21>1, say. 
Following appendix D, this condition is satisfied 
if there is one (and only one) sign change in the sequence of test 
functions 
1, 
2(3 +n A) 
2(2 +n- A) Ay-l 
-AY -1 
2(2 +n- X) - Xy-1 
(5.3.9) 
which implies the condition 2(2 +n- A) -Ay-1 ). 0. Note that 
2+n-A>3.. Thus, T2 )- 1 unambiguously and regardless of the 
degree of capital mobility. By contrast, -r IZ0 
depending in 
particular on the magnitude of y. Relatively low values of y imply 
-r I -c 0; 
but the test function condition is more susceptible to 
violation. Hence, noting the requirement for a sufficiently large 
value for y, we make the following assumption. 
ASSUMPTION 5.3.1 : The system in equation (5.3.4) satisfies the 
saddlepoint property and 0<rI<1 and r2 
REKkRK 5.3.1 t The assumption that 0< -r <I rules out cyclical 1 
behaviour. 
PROPOSMON 5.3.1 : The general quasi-solution of the system 
described by equations (5.3.1) - (5.3.3) can be written as 
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-1 le et -M 21pt +'b 1u t-I -a2e 2t a2e 3t -bIu t-Ilt 
+be+be (5.3.10) 2 2t, t 2 3t, t 
1 -1 -1 -1 le Pt+ 1ý Tlpt + \b, ut_l - Aa 2y e2t - Aaý2 d 3t - Ab I ut-i't 
Ab Y-le 
e+ Xb ee+u1 2 2t, t2 3t, t t 
er1 -1 
1 fa72ly-le2t + fa-le t+l lpt - fblut_l -a2a, ut +2 3t 
-1 -1 -1 le -1 e 
2 2t+l -a2e 3t+l + fb 1u t-i, t - fb 2ye 2t, t 
- fb ee, -bu 
le +by -1 de+bee 2 3t, t I t, t+l 2 2t+l, t+l 2 3t+l, t+l 
(5.3.12) 
where ma 21 2) .1 
(-r 
2a 2) 
b, a; 
Ia 
1121 21 
-1 -1 bý a 22- r2 
f Mn 21' + ri 
PROOF See appendix B. Q. E. D. 
The virtue of writing the solutions as in equations (5.3.10) - 
(5.3.12) is that we can immediately identify the differences (and 
implications thereof) in the information contents of the exchange 
rate-and the interest rate.. Intuitively, these differences will be 
realized in the optimal filtered estimates of the disturbances 
ek-. (k 1,2,3). We consider four alternative information structures 
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(informational endowments) conditioning these expectations. These 
are given as follows 
NF 
m 
fet_j,, 
rt_j,, rfm, r, ol (5.3.13) t t-J, Pt-jl t-j 
r. fff 
ant et, rt, rt, et_j,, rt_,,, rt_jf pt_j,, m t-J, 
L, (S. 3.14a) 
p fet, e't_,, rt 
f 11 Ot rt_,, pt_,,, mt_j, r, r ii ),, il (5.3.14b) 
rto rrfet At 
frt, f 
t-j, t-J, t-J, p _J, t_,, 
r, r 
(5.3.14C) 
where rf foreign nominal rate of interest 
and r and, r represent a vector of all structural parameters and the 
variance-covariance characteristics of stochastic disturbances respec- 
tively. Equation (5.3.13) states that, agents have full contempora- 
neous information. about all variables. Equation, (5.3.14a) restricts 
current information on just asset prices. Equations (5.3.14b) - 
(5.3.14c) restrict current information further such that only one type 
of asset price is contemporaneously observable. The superscripts NF 
and P refer respectively to the absence and presence of a filtering 
problem. 
REMARK 5.3.2 The following features of equations (5.3.13) - 
(5.3.14c) are worth noting. First, the information sets are homog- 
eneous. Thus, we avoid the complications introduced by heterogeneous 
information (see section 5.2). Second, the approach taken by 
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previous autbors can be summarized as follows. The popular assump- 
tion is the informational endowment in equation (5.3.14a). Then a 
supposedly simplifying assumption is to ignore observations of rt 
f 
and rt. In what follows, we show this not to be merely a simplific- 
ation. The abstraction leads to the information stucture in equation 
(5.3.14b). This yields results which, even if qualitatively similar 
to, are at least quantitatively different from those derived from 
equation (5.3.14a). 
REMARK 5.3.3 : The information structure in equation (5.3.14a) is 
consistent with the model specification. Actual prices appear in 
equation (5.3.1) because information about current prices is 
available in the next period. Alternatively one may consider a micro 
relationship in which market specific (known) prices respond 
sluggishly to market specific competitiveness. Aggregating yields 
equation (5.3.1). The latter interpretation can be applied to 
equations (5.3.3) and (5.3.4). Similarly, equation (5.3.2) reflects 
aggregated individual money demand functions. The relationship 
between the information structures in equations (5.3.14b) - (5.3.14c) 
and the model specification is more erroneous. We have no intention 
to justify these as each of them are meant to reflect supposedly 
simplifying assumptions. By considering these separately we can 
isolate the information contents of the exchange rate and the 
interest rate. 
PROPOSIMON 5.3.2 : For the three. information structures defined in 
equations (5.3.14), the following expressions are true: 
le 2[ (g2 2-2] 1 -2 -2 
au t-ilt m a(Pul 3+n c7 2u t-1 - na 2e 3t 
+ cr 3e 2t) 
e tý-2 
2,72] 
e in j 
[g2U1 + ncr 
2e 
t+ 
[j2 +n 
a 3t, t a23 t-1 1331 
02t1 
e 
'o-2 
2+ -2) Cr2 -2ul 
) 
e 3t, t ". a3 
[(a 
1a2 e3t +n1e 2t - na 2 t-1 (5.3.15a) 
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le 21 
být-l, t"b (0aa, 
[alutl_l 
+e 3t + 7- 4 2t] 
46 e 0; -132 a ul +d+ Y-1 d " 2t, t b2[1 t-I 3t 2t) 
e -2 -1 e ýa 
[aul + 4! +ye (5.3.15b) " 3t, t b3 t-I 3t 2t) 
u le ým (0a 
2 (Ul 
c t-l, t c1 t-I 
+ 0-2t) 
e 
't-2 
1 
cd 2t, t ca 2[ut-1 
+d 2t] 
(5.3.15c) 
222+ -2) 2-2 -1 a2 
(n 
a1a3+a i73) (5.3.16a) 
b4o 
[a 2a2+a2+ 
Y-2; 
2 -1 (5.3.16b) 
113 21 
a2+ ý2 -1 (5.3.16c) CIO 1 21 
-2 2 where cr k and cr tl are 
the asymptotic variances of ek (k - 1,2,3) and 
uh (h - 1,2) respectively. 
PRow : (See appendix B for futher discussion. ) Denote by A the 
2x2 right hand side dynamic matrix in equation (5.3.6). Partition 
this such that A- [(A 
I)T (A 2)T I T. 
(a) For equations (5.3.25a) and (5.3.16a) denote by A the vector 
of currently observable variables. Then 
r0, 'pt, 
e ti 0 11 .et, 
-1 T. et C be the 2x2 right hand side matrix where ay-t 
IV 
0- 2t 
01 Ie 
in equation (5.3.17). Partition this conformably with A such that 
C- [C I Y. Following appendix 8, equation (5.3.17) can be 
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re-written as 
PA +Ca -1 ee+ FU 
I-Ca -1 u2+ 22 t+l, t t-. 1 22t 
e t-1, 
IT 
t-l' 
e Eýl -1 +G FA +c2 a72le t+l, t+ tl-l - C2 a2 453t 452t 
.e 
t-1. (5.2.18) 
where F-cI-c2a21a,, Gý 
fy'-' 
-a-ly -I]T and we have used the 2 
definitions of u2 and yt. From equation (5.3.18), u 
le 
taa t-l, t' 
ee and ee are given by a 3t, t a 2t, t 
le 
au t-1, t 
e 
ad 3t, t 
e 
.ad 2t, t 
a2FT 
-2 T -1 1 -1 -a 3C2a2 oCPU t-1 -a2c2e 3t + Ge 20 
32GT 
2 
(5.3.29) 
2T -2 -2 T -2 T where -6 - (FajF +a2c2a3c2+ Ga 2G 
)-I. The 2x2 inverted 
matrix, 0, is 
-2 22 -2 -2-2 -l -1 2 -132 a2 (a 1a1+a3+ya 2) -a 2y 
(a 
1 cr 1+y 2) 
-2 a -2 -1 2-11 
(a a2+ Y-132 Y-2 (a 
2+ 32 
. 
a72 11212 
(5.3.20) 
where a 40 
Is defined in equation (5.3.16a). Some tedious algebra then 
gives the expressions for u 
le 
de and is 
e in equations a t-l, t' a 2t, t a 3t, t 
(5.3.25a). 
(b) For equations (5.3.15b) and (5.3.16b), the vector of currently 
observable variables is the scalar 
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pt 
s m e an (0 11 t b t 
which can be written equivalently as 
s= -a -1 aA1+ a-le 
e-a -1 au1-a -1 u2 bt212 t+l, t 21 t-1 2t 
.et. -1, 
(5.3.21) 
pt-1 
-1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -a 2aIA+a2e t+l, ta2aIu t-1 a2yd 2t a2d 3t 
e t-1, 
2 
using the definition of ut. Hence, 
- le 
bu t-1, t 
e 
b 3t, t 
e 
b 2t, t 
2 
17, a 
ý2 
b(o(alu 
I+0+d 
3 t-I 3t 2t 
32 -1 
2 
(5.3.22) 
(5.3.23) 
where b 41 
C, is defined in equation (5.3.16b), which gives the expressions 
le e' -e for- bu t-l, tlf be 2t, t and be 3t, t 
in equations (5.3.15b). 
(c) For equations (5.3.15c) and (5.3.16c), the measurement vector is 
the scalar 
p 
s rt cy 0] v cte 
ti +ct 
t 
where cvtd 2t* 
Equivalently, 
1A1 
pt-11 
+y -lul-i +y -1 
ctet 2t 
(5.3.24) 
(5.3.25) 
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using the definition of cvt. , so 
that 
le 2' 
u t-1, ta1+e 
-2 
ct1 2t 
.ce 2t, 
t,. cr 2, 
(5.3.26) 
with C(O 
defined in equation (5.3.16c). The expressions for cu 
18 
t-l, t 
and ee follow as in equations (5.3.15c). Q. E. D. c 2t, t 
REKARK 5.3.4 : it is obvious from equations (5.3.15) - (5.3.16) that 
the information contents of the exchange rate and the interest rate 
are, in general, differents u 
le 
Au 
le 
)de ;dde b t-l, t c t-l't b 3t, t c 3t, t 
ee ;d 4S 
e Particularly interesting results are stated in the b 2t, t c 2t, t 
following propositions 
PROPOSIMON 5.3.3 : Under conditions of perfect capital mobility, the 
information contents of the exchange rate and the interest rate are 
identical if there are no external shocks. 
PROOF : Consider equations (5.3.15b) - (5.3.15c) and (5.3.16b) - 
-2 m (5.3.16c). Set e 3t ýa30. Also, with n, = w, nm0 and 
-1 le le e a, my. It then follows that bu t-l't '= cu t-l't and bd 2t, t 
deQ. E. D. 2t, t* 
PROPOSMON 5.3.4 : Under conditions of perfect capital mobility, 
observation. of both the current e=hange rate and the current 
interest rate conveys complete information about external shocks. 
PROOF : Consider ee in equations (5.3.15a) and (5.3.16a). Set a 3t, t 
co so that n-0. Then ee0Q. E. D. TI, ýa 3t, t '" 3t* 
PROPOSITION S. 3.5 : Under conditions of imperfect capital mobility, 
ProposItion 5.3.3 ceases to be true. 
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PROOF : Repeat the proof of Proposition 5.3.3 with n1, <w, n ), '0 and 
a, n. Then u 
le 
;du 
le 
and 4! 
e 
;d, 4! 
e 
obviously. b t-l, t c t-I tb 2t, t c 2t, t 
Q. E. D. 
PROPOSITION 5.3.6 : Under conditions of imperfect capital mobility, 
Proposition 5.3.4. ceases to be true. 
PROOF - Repeat the proof of Proposition 5.3.4 with', n 1<w so 
that 
n 3,0. Then eeAd obviously. Q. E. D. 3t, t 3t 
PROPOSMON 5.3.7 : Regardless of the degree of capital mobility, if 
there is only one internal shock and one external shock, observation 
of both the current exchange rate and the current interest rate 
conveys complete information about both disturbances. 
-2 = PROOF : Consider the case in which e 2t =a20. Then from equation 
2e 2e (5.3.25a) and (5.3.26a), uu and ee Alternat- a t-i, t ý t-i a 3t, t'ý 3t* 
Ively, consider the case in which u2a2= t-I .10. 
Then from equations 
(5.3.25a) and (S. 3.16a), ee4! and ee ii =10Q. E. D. a 2t, t 2t a 3t, t 3t* 
The foregoing results have some economic intuition. The fact 
that there exists differences between the information contents of the 
exchange rate and the interest rate is obvious. The current exchange 
rate responds to aLL contemporaneous shocks. By contrast, the 
current interest rate responds only to contemporaneous domeattc 
shocks. It also depends on last period's external shock via the 
sluggish price adjustment; but, by assumption, this is part of 
current information. That the current interest rate conveys no 
. information about contemporaneous external disturbances is readily i 
apparent from equation (5.3.25). This demonstrates the point made 
earlier regarding the implications of intrinsic dynamics. 
Propositions 5.3.3 and 5.3.5 are a little less obvious but still 
fairly straightforward. When capital is perfectly mobile and there 
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are no external disturbances, fluctuations in the exchange rate are 
dictated entirely by internal (domestic) perturbations operating 
through the interest rate. observation of the exchange rate is 
therefore equivalent to observation of the interest rate. This is 
obviously not the case if external shocks exist. When capital is 
less than perfectly mobile, domestic price perturbations can cause 
exchange rate movements independently of any interest, rate variation 
via their effect on competitiveness (and-hence the trade balance). 
rn this way, the information contents of the exchange rate and the 
interest rate differ. 
Consider next Propositions 5.3.4 and 5.3.6. The former arises 
since exchange rate'fluctuations are again motivated exclusively 
by interest'rate movements plus, now, external shocks. Any variation 
in-the exchange rate over and above that implied by interest rate 
changes are necessarily the result of foreign disturbances. By 
contrast, as noted above, imperfect capital mobility permits-domestic 
price shocks to impinge directly on the exchange rate. 
1. Finally, consider Proposition 5.3.7. For perfect capitaI 
mobility, this is a corollary of Proposition 5.3.4 whichImplied that 
agents have information about only a composite domestic shock. 
Decomposition of this was not possible. obviously, however, with 
only one type of domestic shock, the problem of aggregation 
disappears. For imperfect capital mobility, similar reasoning 
applies. A single current internal disturbance causes a contempora- 
neous interest rate response whilst the effect of an external shock 
on the interest rate is realized only after a lag. 
The upshot of the foregoing results is that both the degree of 
capital mobility and the nature of the shock structure have drastic 
implications for the a unt and nature of auxilliary information 
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extracted from observed signals. Previous work has overlooked these 
points. A corollary is the following. 
COROLLARY 5.3.1 : The accuracy of auxilliary information about 
external disturbances is an increasing function of the degree of 
capital mobility. 
Corollary 5.3.1 follows from the fact that imperfect capital 
mobility contaminates the information content of observed signals by 
delivering an additional source of confusion via the direct effect 
of prices on the exchange rate through the trade balance. 
Some implications of our results are illustrated in figures 
5.3(A), 5.3(8) and 5.3(C). These show the dynamic behaviour of the 
exchange rate and prices under a variety of circum tances. Single 
domestic price, money demand and foreign disturbances are considered 
in isolation; u149! io 0. The trajectories are conditioned t-l' 2t' 3t 
by the degree of capital mobility and the assumption about the 
initial informational endowment. For the latter, these assumptions 
are given by equations (5.3.13) - (5.3.14b). The trajectories are 
derived from the complete solutions of the system given as follows. 
PMPOSMON 5.3.8 : For each of the information structures defined in 
equations (5.3.13) - (5.3.14b), the complete solutions of the system 
can be written as 
NF 
t 2ý t- 'r2 7 ý02t 2 
03t 
p 
Nr 
T' pt y -1 77,1 +uI t+l 12 2t - 'k 2 e3t t 
NF NP I 
f-ý - T7 -1 e t+l r1et-m 21 ut+f; Y-1 
;l '52t+l . 
ý21 42t + 214ý3t -2 'ý 
T2e 3t+l (5.3.27) 
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Fp2m 
'r -1 )u 
1 (-T -1 y -1 
aet -M 21 t+ae( 21 a2 t-1 
+2 
;l(m 
21 T2a1 ))e 2t ++ 
; l(m T a2a 21 2 
pFTp2 A(m a -1 -T 
-1 )u 
L+ 
\(-Ir-i y -1 - a t+l 1t+2 21 12t12 
51 - T71al) -1 + 51(m2l - -lal))ot + ul a 
(m2l 
2 
)452t + '\(-T 2 
(5.3.28a) 
eT-a2 f(m a -1 - -1 
1 -1 -1 
,( ep) r2 )ut-, - f(-T2 Y a t+l ata 21 1 
'r -1 -3. -1 -1 a 
51(m 
21 -2a 1))d2t - 
f(-T2 +a0 (M 21 -T2a 1))e3t 
(-M +92m 
la7l' - T-1))ul 
+ (-, r -1 y -1 21 a(22t2 
51 (m - 7: 
-Ill))o T7- T7-lal))e, t+l a 21 2c -2t+l 
+ (- 
21 
+ 
a'91(1221 2 
F2 -1 -1 1 -1 
být -M 21pt + be 
(m2lal - T2 )ut-1 + (--r 2 
51 (m - Ir -1 a ))d + (- T -1 - ý-21a, ))4! 3t b 21 21 2t 2 b; 
l(m2l 
- 
pFp+e2 A(m a7l - lr-i)Ui 7-1 -1 b t+l Itb 21 12 t-I + '\(- 2y 
T 
'a, ) T1a ))e +u1 e-l("121 -2 )42t + 'ý(-'ý21 - 
JI(1221 -21 3t t 
(5.3.28b) 
p2 f(m a -1 -7 -1 )u 
I f(--r-ly-I - být+l rl(bept) - ba 21 12 t-I 2 
e3'( m 21 -T 21411))452t - 
f(--r 
21-b 
;I (m 
21 -721a 1))e3t 
2 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 + (-M 21 +b9 
(m 
21 a1 -- Ir 2 
))Ut + (-Wr 2 
7 a, ) T -r7 a, bel(In2l - 72 )"! 2t+l 
+ (- 
2'1 - b5l(m2l 2 
)63t+l 
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2 Oalý2-2 where 0a2a3 
-1 2-2 e. 
a 40a 1a3 
51 2-2 
a a4tna 1a2 
02 4ýa (Y-232 4. ;2 b123 
-1 2 
b 40aly a1 
;l. a2 b b4tal I 
NF NF NF le 1 
PROOF t For et pt+l and e t+l 
in equations (5.3.27) set uu 
ee 
4e 2. e2 and e3e3 
in equations (5.3.10) - (5.3.12). 
(a) For eF0pF and eF in equations (5.3.28a) substitute into ata t+1 a t+I 
equations (5.3.20) - (5.3.12) the expressions for u 
le 
0e an ee aa2a3 
given in equations (5.3.25a). Collect terms and obtain the coef- 
ficient expressions on each disturbance. in particular, in each 
expression, 
b- Glb + 92ý2 t-1 1a1a 
-a -1 a- elb + 02 b 21a1a2 
d: 
; lb 
+ 
;2b 
2a1a2 
d: -a -1 + 
Vb + ; 2b 32aIa2 (5.3.29) 
1"2 2-2 -2 -2 -132 22 -2 2-2 where a9 aital(n cr 2+ Cr 3a0 a'" 2 
(n a1+a3+ na Ia3 
-2 -2 -1 2 -2 232 2 .1 -1 
a6- (P(a 2(y na, 
+a3+a13 and 
a0, ae and a9 are 
defined 
previously. Now note that 91a 
2a7l ;2. 
Y7-1 - 
; 'a, 
and aa1'aa 
;2+ -1 
aaGa1 
Recalling the definitions of bi (i - 1,2), 
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appropriate substitution in equations (5.3.29) yields the coefficients 
on the disturbances shown in equations (5.3.28a). 
(b) For eFpF and eF in equations (5.3.28b) substitute into btb t+l b t+1 
le e equations (5.3.20) - (5.3.12) the expressions for bý ,ba2 and 
ee given in equations (5.3.15b). Collect terms and obtain the b3 
coefficient expressions on each disturbance. In particular, in each 
expression, 
b- Olb + 92b2 1b1b 
1 -1 
t -a 2aI- Olbl + ba2b2 
2 -a 21Y-1 - bý 
'Ib 
3. +b 
;2b2 
3 -a 21 - b5 
lb, 
+'b52ý2 (5.3.30) 
I. 22 "2 -232 4. -2 2. -2-2 -2 where bab (ýa 1aI; b9= býOY71(y 2a 3)) b5 bCya2+a3 
and b9 
2'. 
b 
;1 
and b; 
l 
are defined previously. Now note that 
be 
1. I-2 al 
1'b ;2. 
Y -1 -b; 
1a 
11 and b 
52 - 
-1 b 
; 'a,. Recalling 
the definitions of bi (i - 1,2), appropriate substitution in equation 
(5. '3.30) yields the coefficients on the disturbances shown in 
equations (5.3.28b). Q. E. D. 
The diagrams constitute a pictorial representation of the 
following propositions. 
PROPOSITION S. 3.9 In the presence of domestic price disturbances, 
observation of both the current exchange rate and the current 
interest rate conveys more information than does observation of just 
the current exchange rate. 
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PROOF : Denote by, e (u the response., of e to u 0. Then t, t-1 t t-l- 
from equations (5.3.27) - (5.3.28b), 
NF 1 
e (u -m2 1 t t-1) 
F12 
e (u 
-) 
-M + (m -1 att1 21 a 21al 
-21) (5.3.32a) 
F (u I -M +b02 (m 21all Ir 
-1) (5.3.32b) 
být t-I 21 2 
F1F122 
(U e (u (m a být t-1 at t-1 21 1 T72 ba 
(m a -1 T -1 WO 
2aa2 (5.3.33) 
21 1211 
2 -2-2). It where P a'ob4)( a3+ ny a2 
is easily verified that 
-1 22 
-v 0. For n., m co (n - 0), MG0. From m2 -r2 2, ' al a 
equations (5.3.31) - (5.3.32b), e 
NP (U I)<0 and eF (u 
I 
t t-1 at t-l 
F (ul ) ). e 
NF (U In addition, from equation (5.3.33), bet t-1 tt1 
F1T I- NF 1FIF1 
bet (U t-l )>aet (U t-1). Hence, et (U t-1 aet 
(u t-1 bet (u t-1). 
22 For Tj w (n > 0), m 21 a, a0,0<0. 
From equations (5.3.31) 
I NF 1FIF1 Np L (5.3.32b), et (U t'i >0 and aet 
(U t-1 ), , et(ut_, ) <et (U t-1 In 
addition, equation (5.3.33') gives beF(ul_ eF (u 
L ). Iience' ttIattI 
NF 1, F 1ý FI 
et (u t-'1) aet 
(U t-1 >bet (u t-1 Since the subsequent dynamics are 
determined by these initial responses, this establishes the 
Proposition. Q. E. D. 
PROPOSMON 5.3., 10. : In the, presence of foreign disturbances, obser- 
vation of botb the current. exchange rate and the current interest rate 
conveys more information than does observation of just the current 
exchange rate if there is either perfect capital mobility or imper- 
fect capital mobility accompanied with relativity low money demand 
volatility. Otherwise, observation of both the current exchange rate 
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and the current interest rate conveys Less information than does 
observation of just the current exchange rate. 
PROOF : Denote by et (d 3t 
) the response of et to 4S 3t > 0. 
Then from 
equations (5.3.27) - (5.3.213b), 
NF 
(d )- -T 
-1 (5.3.34) 
t 3t 2 
eF (4 ) an -T 
-1 + 51(m - Ir 
-1 
a (5.3.35a) at 3t 2a 21 21 
F(e -1 -1 T -1 a, ) (S. 3.3Sb) být 30 m -72 be 
(m2l -2 
FF 
(e m -(M T7'a, )( + 
51) 
být"30 - aet 3t 21 2ba 
-1 22 -1-2 in -(M 21 -T2a1 
N)a 
I 
(a 
1aI+ya 2) 
(5.3.36) 
-1 > it is easily verified that m2l - 'r2 aI': ý 0 ** a. 4 00 For 712 
(n - 0), m 21' a 1' b5l >0 and a'l - 
0' From equations (5.3.34) 
(5.3.35b), e 
Np (e eF (e 0 and 
F (e )<e NP (e t 3t at 3t bet 3t t 3t 
Obviously, e 
NF (e eF (e 
F For rl, < co 
't 
3t at 3t) )' et(03t), 
(n # 0), 
M a,, 
1 
-c 0 and > 0. From equations (5.3.34) - (5.3.35b), 21' b5 
NF FF NF 21 
> Y-1-2 et (0 3t 0 and ae t(e3t), be t(e3t) <et 
(e 3t If Ja 1a1 aij, 
equation (5.3.36) gives eF (d )<eF (e so that e 
NP (d bt 3t at 3t t 3t 
eF (e; eF (e. otherwise, 
FeF (e and eNF (d 30 at 30 >bt 3t bet(03t) at 3t t 3t 
(e ) ). eF (e Since the subsequent dynamics are determined bet 3t at 3t 
by these initial responses, this establishes the Proposition. Q. E. D. 
PROPOSITION 5.3.11 : In the presence of domestic money demand distur- 
bances, observation of both the current exchange rate and the current 
interest rate conveys Less information than does observation of just 
the current exchange rate if there is perfect capital mobility. 
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Otherwise, observation of both the current exchange rate and the 
current interest rate conveys information which is qua&ttattv@&y 
dtfferent from the information conveyed by observation of just the 
current exchange rate. 
PROOF : Denote by et (e 2t 
) the response of et to d 2t ). 0. 
equations (5.3.27) - (5.3.2Sb), 
Np (d 
t 20 -72 
eF (d )- -T 
-1 
y 
-1 
- ;I (m 1- Ir-lal) at 2t 2a22 
Fy -1 - 
;i (m Ir -1 a ]ý't 2t 2b 21 21 
FF -1 
.1. I 
bet 
(d 
2t) -aet 
(d 
2t) - -(m2l -T2a 1) 
(b G-aa 
" -(M -ra )*a (a na - ý2 2211113 
Recall that m -r -1 a 2<* 0 ** a 0. For r1l (n - 0), 2i- 21 
M21* lil a 
; 1, 
b8l > 0. From equations (5.3.37) (5.3.38b), 
mr pp tip 
Then from 
(5.3.37) 
(5.3.38a) 
(5.3.38b) 
(5.3.39) 
et -(e 20 -c 0 and ae t(e2t)" be t(, 62't et' 
(e 2t Equation (5.3.39) 
gives ýe 
FF (e Hence, e 
NP (e eF (e )oeF (e t(452t) ** aet 2t t 2t bt 2t at 2t 
For 71 w (n ). 0), m 21 ,a19<0 and a 
;'0. From equations 
(5.3.37) (5.3.38b), e 
UF (e 0, eF (e >e 
NF (e and t 2t at 2t t 2t 
F Np F NF F 
b et(d 2t et 
(e 
20- 
Hence, 
aet 
(e 
2t et (e 2t >bet (e 2t ). 
Since 
the subsequent dynamics are. determined by these initial responses, 
this establishes the Proposition. Q. E. D. 
The economic intuition underlying the foregoing results is as 
follows. Figure 5.3(A) illustrates the case of a positive domestic 
price shock, uI>0. As shown in the proof of proposition 5.3.9, t-I 
the exchange rate makes an instantaneous discrete apprectatton under 
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perfect capital mobility and an instantaneous discrete deprectatton 
under imperfect capital mobility. in both cases, the effect of 
partial information is to dampen the response. This is because 
agents misinterpret the signals given by the exchange rate and 
the interest rate as reflecting other shocks. For perfect capital 
mobility, this means that the expected future exchange rate is more 
depreciated relative to the full information case. Hence, the 
current exchange rate appreciation is lower than under full inform- 
ation. For imperfect capital mobility, the misinterpretation implies 
an expected future exchange rate which is relatively more apprec- 
iated. Then there is pressure for the current exchange rate to 
appreciate as well. Observation of both the current exchange rate 
and the current interest rate generates dynamic behaviour which is 
closer to the full information solution than that implied by 
observation of just the current exchange rate. The reason is that 
observable contemporaneous movements in the interest rate signal 
(correctly) the definite occurrence of domestic shocks. 
Figure 5.3. (B) illustrates the case of a positive external 
disturbance, e">0. The proof of Proposition 5.3.10 showed that 3t 
the exchange rate appreciates. This is true regardless of the degree 
of capitallmobility, by construction. Moreover, the proof supports 
Propositions 5.3.4 and 5.3.6. For perfect capital mobility, contem- 
poraneous information about, both the exchange rate and the interest 
rate conveys perfect auxilliary information about the external 
disturbance. This is not true when the information content of the 
interest rate is ignored. Under such circumstances, agents infer a 
positive price shock which induces relatively more appreciated future 
exchange rates. This exacerbates the current appreciation. When 
capital is less than perfectly mobile, any restriction of the inform- 
ation set leads to a departure from the full information solution. 
G 
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In particular, the effect of signal-extraction is to compound the 
initial, appreciation. This occurs because agents infer a negattue 
domestic price shock in which case expected future exchange rates 
are relatively more appreciated. Figure 5.3(B)(ii) shows the out- 
come where exchange rate and interest rate observations yield more 
accurate. information than just exchange rate information by itself. 
Nonetheless, Proposition 5.3.10 and its proof identified the 
possibility that the opposite might occur. An interesting condition 
for this is that monetary volatility must be relatively large. The 
explanation is as follows. In response to a current external pertur- 
bation, agents observe no contemporaneous interest rate fluctuation. 
Then the inference of a negative price shock must be accompanied with 
the expectation of a positive money demand disturbance in order to be 
consistent with this observation. If money demand volatility is 
relatively large, ýthen so must be the expectation of the negative 
price movement. From above, this exacerbates the initial exchange 
rate appreciation. , 
Turning, finally, to money demand-disturbances, e 2t 3,0, 
figure 5.3(C) is relevant. The proof of Proposition 5.3.11 showed 
that the exchange rate initially appreciates regardless of the degree 
of capital mobility. When capital is perfectly mobile, the effect of 
partial information is to exacerbate the response. This is because 
of the (mis)inference of a positive price movement (implying rela- 
tively more appreciated future exchange rates). The degree of 
exacerbation is greater when agents observe both asset prices than 
when they rely solely on the information content of the exchange 
rate. As before, then, greater initial information reduces the 
accuracy of forecasts. In this case, however, this peculiarity is 
unambiguously true. This can be explained as follows. If agents 
observe only the exchange rate, they assign probabilities to the 
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occurrence of each type of shock. The additional observation of the 
interest rate signals (correctly) the occurrence of domestic shocks; 
but this signal is actually misleading. Agents are now more inclined 
to perceive positive domestic price shocks. 'Then forward expecta- 
tions serve to deliver the outcome. - For the case of imperfect 
capital mobility we observe a further peculiarityi relative to the 
full information solution, observing both the exchange rate and the 
interest rate implies a, Less appreciated exchange rate whilst obser- 
ving just the exchange rate implies a more-appreciated exchange rate. 
This motivated the statement in Proposition 5.3.11, namely that-the 
two initial information endowments-convey quaLttattveLy dtfferent 
auxiliary information. Thus, observing solely exchange rate 
variations, agents infer a negative price"movement which exacerbates 
the current appreciation. This is, however, 'inconsistent with the 
rise in-the interest rate when this variable is also observed. On 
the contrary, agents are more inclined to infer a postttve price 
movement. -, Hence, the difference. ''I 
In terms of the behaviour, prices, the-above forces the following 
observations. 
COROLLARY 5.3.2 : Under conditions of perfect capital mobility, the 
1, 
volatility of prices is a decreasing function of the initial informa- 
tional endowment in the face of domestic price and external 
disturbances. In the face of domestic money demand disturbances, the 
effect is ambiguous. 
COROLLARY. 5.3.3 : Under conditions of imperfect capital mobility, the 
volatility of prices is an increasing function of the initial 
informational endowment in the face'of domestic price disturbances. 
In the face of domestic money demand and external disturbances, the 
effect is ambiguous. 
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in summary, we have shown some significant differences between 
the information contents of the exchange rate and the interest rate. 
These differences disappear only under special conditions. In 
addition, the amount and nature of auxilliary information is 
critically non-invariant with respect to both the degree of capital 
mobility and the particular shock structure. Most interestingly, 
perhaps, are the following: first, a greater initial informational 
endowment may reduce the accuracy of forecasts about some shocks; 
second, a greater initial informational endowment may change the 
qualitative nature of auxilliary information. This is not to say 
that the overaU, dynamic behaviour of the system moves further from 
the full information solution as the initial informational endowment 
increases. Taken together (that is, in the face of all shocks 
impinging simultaneously), it must be true that increasing the 
information set conveys more accurate information in the sense of 
yielding a solution which is closer to the full information case. 
This could only be proved numerically in our model. Nonetheless, our 
analysis indicates that increases in forecast accuracy may not apply 
to all forecasts but rather may apply to the forecasts of only some 
shocks. As far as we know, these points have hitherto been 
overlooked. 
5.4 Sunmary and Concluding Remarks 
The chapter has been by way of an introduction to the. applic- 
ation of signal-extraction from the engineering sciences to economic 
problems. As for the theory of optimal control discussed in 
chapter 2, there is a fundamental difference between the engineering 
and economic problems; unlike the former, the latter involves the 
use of signal-extraction techniques by participants wtthtn the 
system itself. This has gained in popularity in recent years as 
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various researchers have become more aware of the potentially crucial 
role of the information structure in determining the behaviour of the 
system. Horeover, it is intrinsic to rational expectations models 
and is a criticism of those analyses which abstract from the problem. 
The assumption one chooses to make about the elements in the set of 
information variables is, of course, somewhat arbitrary. Yet a 
fairly unprovocative notion is that this set comprises at a minimum 
all asset prices. If private information is contemporaneously 
available, then there is an important additional dimension to the 
inference problem. More generally, idiosyncracies in the information 
structure contaminate observed signals because these signals now 
reflect the expectations of differentially informed agents. The 
existing literature has made a bold attempt to investigate the 
consequences of this. Nonetheless, we believe that the full implic- 
ations of heterogenous information are yet to be realized. Further 
research would be helpful on this matter. 
Though, in general, the existing literature has much to commend 
it, we hope that our discussion in section 5.2 has highlighted some 
important gaps. Of much concern is the types of models that have 
been employed. With the exception of only a few, these have con- 
tained no intrinsic dynamics. Yet asymmetric speeds of adjustment 
may serve to enrichen the information content of variables. 
Section 5.3 contained a fairly rigorous investigation into the 
information contents of the exchange rate and the interest rate. 
rt was motivated by the view that these are sufficiently similar 
as to require consideration of only one. We showed this view to be 
generally misconceived. We also illustrated the critical dependence 
of the information structure on the degree of capital mobility and 
the nature of the shock structure. I: n addition, two important 
results were that enrichening the initial informational endowment 
321 
might actually redUCS the accuracy of forecasts about some shocks 
and may change the qualitative nature of auxiliary information. Both 
of these suggest that it is not just the amount of initial inform- 
ation that is necessarily important but also the nature of the 
endowment. Though an increase in the endowment can only ultimately 
improve the overaLL accuracy of auxiliary information, the forecast 
accuracy about some shocks might actually fall. 
rt should be stressed that the particular signal-extraction 
problem that we have addressed concerns the extraction of information 
about unobservable events by employing the actual system generating 
these events. This is to be distinguished from the more thorny 
problem of learning the system itself. our views on this matter were 
elicited in section 5.1. We believe it to be a fundamentally 
important issue and offers an exciting challenge for further research 
to which we have unfortunately been unable to make any contribution 
in this thesis. The issues and problems raised in the context of 
our own preoccupation are likely to be helpful to and compounded by 
a framework which analyses the process of learning the system and 
the convergence to an equilibrium. 
rn summary, the chapter has demonstrated the potentially crucial 
interdependence between the system and the informational structure 
within that system. Though different assumptions can have drastic 
implications for the information structure, however, the precise 
importance of different information structuies for determining the 
dynamic behaviour of the system requires nil rical evaluation. We 
suggest that research into this should be taken up. The important 
implications for policy evaluation are as follows. First, the 
informational requirements of the controller are increased substan- 
tially. Not only must he be aware of the mechanics of the system, 
but he must also judge the precise informational characteristic 
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of the system. second, control has an opportunity to influence 
the system by altering the information content of observed signals. 
These issues are addressed in the following chapters. 
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Notes to Cbapter Five 
(1) Alternatively, Barro (1976) suggests that even if agents 
observe variations in local money balances, these may merely 
reflect the transfer of money between locations. 
(2) Note that this is different from the case in which the 
structuraL parameters of the model are functions of the 
stochastic properties of the disturbances. This effect 
arises via agents' utility maximization. 
(3) In King (1981) and Boschen and Grossman (1983) there is still 
a signal-extraction problem because, in addition to local 
demand and aggregate monetary shocks, there is also a velocity 
disturbance which serves as a second economy-wide perturbation. 
(4) This is essentially the Lucas and Rapping (1969) supply 
hypothesis discussed in chapter 2 (section 2.2). 
(5) The real interest rate term is rp 
eh +P (h) where r is t t+l, t t 
the economy-wide nominal interest rate. The (local) expecta- 
eh tion of next period's aggregate price level Pt4.,, t, reflects 
the assumption that agents are randomly located in markets in 
the next period. This requires agents to form estimates of the 
aggregate price level rather than just the price level in the 
market in which they are currently located. 
(6) If not, then observation of local prices and the global 
interest rate will convey full information. Suppose that the 
local price and interest rate signals are pt (h)'i 81V it 
+ 
82V 
2t +83dt 
(h) and rt Ylvlt + y2v2t respectively. With 
either 'YI' 81 -0 or y282ý0, observation of rt conveys 
perfect information about the single aggregate shock and then 
Pt (h) yields perfect knowledge about et (h). With -y,, Si A0 
(i - this is no longer true. In addition, only if 
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yl - y2 -y and 61 " 62 "8 would there be no confusion 
between aggregate and local shocks. The only confusion is 
then between the type of aggregate shock. in general, 
0' yl * Y2 and 81 * 82 so that the composite 
aggregate shock v it +v 2t and 
its decomposition are unknown. 
(7) This is similar to the argument advanced earlier concerning 
the negligible information conveyed by local money about 
aggregate money. 
(8) This is a weighted average of domestic and foreign prices 
corrected for exchange rate movements. 
(9) This is to be distinguished from learning the nature of 
stochastic shocks impinging on the model. in this case, 
agents' inferences are conditioned by their knowledge of 
the model. 
(10) This is distinguished from current feedback policy which is 
a response to known events. 
(11) There is no consensus on this. 
(12) In each market, h (h - 1,..., H), agents choose a foreign 
trading partner. Purchasing power parity gives 
p, (h) -e+pf (h) (h where e is the nominal tttt 
exchange rate and pf (h) is the price of the commodity in 
market b's (b trading partner. The latter is 
stochastic owing-to market-specific shocks. 
(13) In particular, the variance of output around its full inform- 
ation level is lower when exchange rates are flexible than 
when exchange rates are fixed (see also Kimbrough (1983a)). 
This assi s that the full information solution is first best. 
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(14) This is similar to the result of Grossman (1976). Formally, 
if n1 is the number of linear combinations of aggregate 
shocks and average expectations and n2 is the number of 
economy-wide markets in which differentially informed agents 
trade, the observation of the n2 global signals will permit 
decomposition of the composite aggregate shocks and average 
expectations provided n2 )ý nI 
This section draws on the analysis in Blackburn (1984b, 1985a) 
(15) Minford and Peel (1983a), p. 245, n. 4. 
(16) Recall that the flow view of capital movements in equation 
(5.3.4) is likely to be innocuous (see, for example, Bhandari, 
Driskill and Frenkel (1984); GaZioglou (1984)). 
(17) This assumption is innocuous. Any exogenous process for the 
money supply will suffice. Assuming a fixed money supply is 
merely the most convenient. In any specification, the 
important point is that exogenising the money stock leaves 
the interest rate free to respond to ma ket conditions. This 
. permits the interest rate to perform the role of an information 
variable. The implications of controlling the interest rate 
are studied in, chapter 6. 
(18) rn what follows, nI m aD implies e 3t mV it which 
is the 
exogenous shock to capital flows, interpreted as random 
deviations from interest parity. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
MONETARY INSTRUMENTS AND INFORMATION VARIABLES :A RE-EVALUATION 
6.1 Introduction 
An-important implication of recognizing the problem of signal- 
extraction is the ability of control rules to influence the system by 
altering the information content of-observed signals. In chapter 5 
(section 5.2) we saw how this might operate in the presence of 
heterogeneous information. Then contemporaneously observed variables 
will reflect the expectations of differentially informed agents which 
may be manipulated by choice of control parameters. Nonetheless, 
differential information is not necessary for control to work in this 
way. Provided agents exploit the information content of observed 
variables, control has the potential to alter behaviour by influen- 
cing this information. In this chapter, we investigate a particular 
application of this idea to the issues discussed in chapters 2 and 3. 
Those chapters examined the optimal choice of monetary instrument 
(money stock or interest rate) in a variety of different models and 
in the face of a range of alternative sources of stochastic 
fluctuation. In some cases we assumed full contemporaneous informa- 
tion whilst in others the information set was restricted. These made 
our analysis directly comparable to the existing literature. There 
is, however, an important criticism that can be made of the orthodox 
approach. Not only is the full information assumption unrealistic, 
but equally the precise modelling of imperfect information is inap- 
propriate. To be specific, it entails an overty restricted informa- 
tion structure. That this is so is to merely be aware of the 
abstraction of the important role of some variables as conveyers of 
auxiliary information, in particular, the exchange rate and interest 
rates. Given this, there is a potentially serious gap; for if 
327 
control is administered over the interest rate such aJ3 to make 
this variable currently exogenous, it is deprived of any useful 
information. 
This chapter is concerned to re-evaluate the monetary instrument 
problem in the light of these criticisms of the orthodox analysis. 
By way of a preamble to our analysis, it is useful to be acquainted 
with some further literature on signal-extraction whicb was not 
mentioned in chapter 5 because it is more relevant for the present 
concern. 
A number of studies address the optimal filtering problem with 
reference to the conduct of monetary policy. Thus, Kareken, Muench 
and Wallace (1973), Friedman (1975,1977) and LeRoy and Waud (1977) 
show how contemporaneous observations of some monetary aggregate 
yield useful information about the state of the economy which can be 
exploited by the controller to revise monetary policy (see also 
LeRoy and Lindsey (1978)). A similar investigation can be found in 
Kitchell (1982). on a less rigorous note, Friedman (1979b) identi- 
fies the types of information used in formulating monetary policy 
which might be useful to the private sector. The approach taken in 
this chapter differs from these studies and of more relevance are 
the papers by Dotsey and King (1983) and Canzoneri, Henderson and 
Rogoff (1983). In both, a Sargent and Wallace (1975) model is 
employed and the set of information variables comprises the global 
nominal interest rate(l). The authors show that a contemporaneous 
feedback rule involving the money stock and the interest rate is 
impotent with respect to influencing the distribution of output 
(this is identified by Canzoneri, Henderson and Rogoff (1983) in a 
particular case; a similar result is obtained by Siegel (1982) in a 
related context). The result is essentially a generalization of the 
policy ineffectiveness proposition to the case of currently dated 
-1 
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information sets. in short, no-one has an informational advantage 
and the controller is feeding back onto a variable which is part of 
the private sector's information set. A second result of Dotsey and 
Kinq (1983) is that an interest rate peg can never be superior to a 
policy which permits some interest rate variation because the former 
necessarily deprives agents of information. Though superficially 
appealing, it is important to note that the validity of the conclu- 
sion hinges on the assumption that the appropriate loss function 
penalizes deviations around the full information solution. Though 
this is likely to be appropriate in some circumstances, there is no 
consensus about the general validity of this criteria. Canzoneri, 
Henderson and Rogoff (1983) consider alternative information struct- 
ures which differ according to which group (investors, suppliers or 
the authorities) exploit the information content of the interest 
rate. When suppliers do not use this information, the contemporaneous 
feedback policy becomes effectivej essentially, the authorities have 
an informational advantage. The problem with this analysis is that 
there is no reason why any group should not exploit the information 
content of the interest rate. The assumptions that the authors make 
are quite arbitrary. After all, the interest rate is globally 
observed and it is rather meaningless to suppose that some agents 
will not use the observation in formulating their predictions. 
In the analysis that follows we consider two aggregative 
models that we have previously employed in the thesis. We abstract 
from private information (and hence differential information) by 
regarding the set of information variables to comprise solely economy- 
wide asset prices. In particular, in both models the interest rate 
is treated as an information variable. The usefulness of this is 
neutralized when it is pegged. This is the assumption made in Dotsey 
and King (1983) and Cartzoneri, Henderson and Rogoff (1983). These 
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authors fail to point out, however, that the auxiliary information 
embodied in the interest rate when this variable is free to respond 
to market conditions will be reflected in the accommodating money 
stock movements when it is fixed. In addition, it must also be 
assumed that the controller has contemporaneous information on both 
the interest rate and the money stock. in view of these, there is an 
implicit assumption that, for some reason or another, the controller 
does not divulge contemporaneous money supply accommodations. The 
virtue of the assumption is'that it enables consideration of the 
plausible case in which exogenising the interest rate does indeed 
deprive agents of information. Nonetheless, we feel it necessary to 
elicit these points here as they are rarely revealed in the 
literature. 
- Some other'preliminary remarks are as follows. We compute the 
solution of the systems under the standard assumption which 
abstracts from the filtering problem and for the case in which there 
is a role*for some variables as information variables. The criteria 
we assu is the minimization of the expected squared gap between 
actual values and long-run equilibrium values of variables(2). It is 
also worth'recalling our comments in chapter 2 (section 2.4) concern- 
ing the feasibility of an interest rate peg. In particular, this 
policy may cease to be viable if it generates indeterminacy. As our 
analysis in'that chapter showed, however, this is unlikely. A pure 
interest rate peg is entirely consistent with a well-defined 
solution provided -the controller announces a particular control rule 
which involves feedback on forward expectations. Moreover, and very 
conveniently, this general rule is observationally equivalent to the 
simple contemporaneous feedback rule between the money stock and the 
interest rate. Without loss of generality, therefore, we may 
restrict attention to just the latter. Determinacy under an interest 
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rate peg is necessary-for the present analysis. The information 
content, of the interest rate is nil only under this policy. Any 
a unt of interest rate variation, however small, would render our 
analysis inoperative., Note, however, that we may be assuming an 
informational advantage in favour of the controller with this type of 
rule. Recall that the policy rule which admits a unique solution 
underý. an interest rate peg can be implemented in either the above 
form (a feedback on private sector expectations) or in the form of a 
feedback on'ýcurrent variables and current stochastic disturbances. 
Thus, for the latter, whilst the private sector will be assumed to 
have, incomplete price information, the policy maker must be able to 
observe current prices and shocks(3). Finally, we are concerned with 
examining the change in the relative superiority of one policy over 
another as one moves from the non-filtering to the filtering 
solutions. Thus, though a particular policy may remain optimal, its 
relative superiority is likely to change. Other considerations, 
such as the practical difficulty in actually controlling a particular 
policy variable, may then incline one to regard the other more or less 
favourbly. 
The remainder of the chapter is as follows. Section 6.2 con- 
siders an open economy. The set of information variables comprises 
the exchange rate and the interest rate. Exogenising the latter 
still enables extraction of some auxiliary information via the 
former. Some unambiguous conclusions emerge. Section 6.3 examines a 
closed economy model in which the set of information variables now 
comprises only the interest rate. Then control over this variable 
will deprive agents of any contemporaneous information. In this case, 
the results are more sensitive to the relative magnitudes of the 
structural para ters of the model. Concluding remarks are contained 
in section 6.4. 
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6.2 An open Economy model 
The relevant system has been described in chapter 5 (section 
5.3, equations (5.3.1)-(5.3.3)). To this we append the control rule 
given in chapter 3 (section 3.2, equation (3.2.5)) specifying a 
contemporaneous relationshipýbetween the money stock and the interest 
rate., Recapitulating, the formal structure is defined by equations 
(6.2.1) - (6.2.4) below: 
Pt+1 -, pt is A(e t- Pt) + Olt 0, <Ac1 (6.2.1) 
d 
mt ýp0 (6.2.2) t yrt + 43t 
e T11 (rt-e t+lIt +et)+n2 (e t- Pt) t .0 
Tli ,o 0(1-1,2) (6.2.3) 
s 
mt srt 0 (6.2.4) 
where P natural logarithm of the price level 
em natural logarithm of the nominal exchange rate 
mdý natural logarithm of the nominal demand for money 
r" nominal rate of interest 
M. 3 jw natural logarithm of the nominal supply of money 
"5k v -1 stochastic disturbances (k-1,3). 
As usual, all variables are measured as deviations from long-run 
equilibrium and ee is defined by ee E(e In ) with E(, ) t+l't t+l't. t+l t 
the mathematical conditional expectations operator and n the 
information set. 
Equation (6.2.1) is the inflation mechanism where the nominal 
exchange rate, e, is the domestic currency price of foreign exchange 
(a rise in e is a depreciation). Thus, prices respond sluggishly 
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to changes in real competitiveness. The disturbance e1 is an 
expenditure (or price) shock. Equation (6.2.2) describes a standard 
money demand function depending on prices and interest rates, and 
subject to a stochastic perturbation, e 3* The 
balance of payments 
equilibrium condition is summarized in equation (6.2.3) where the 
disturbance v comprises random shocks to capital and trade flows, 
VI and v2 respectivelyi v-qIVI+ TV2, As in chapter 5 (section 
5.3), vI is interpreted as random deviations from interest parity. 
rt is also recalled that ij, =w approximates perfect capital 
mobility. As usual, all stochastic shocks are assumed to be indepen- 
dently distributed white noise processes. Finally, equation (6.2.4) 
specifies the control rule. Thereader is reminded of the two polar 
cases 0-0 and 4)ý. The former is a money stock peg and the latter 
an interest rate peg. 
As stated in the introduction, we compute two solutions of the 
system. In the first, agents face no filtering problem. This is the 
standard approach to analysing this type of model and amounts to the 
assumption of full contemporaneous information about all variables. 
in the second, the information set is restricted and agents are 
forced to infer the behaviour of the unobservable variables. rn both 
cases, the controller is assu d to be concerned with minimizing the 
expected squared deviation of the price level around its long-run 
equilibrium level. The loss function is therefore just 
E(J) - laa 
2 
p 
(6.2.5) 
where a2 is the asymptotic variance of prices. p 
In order to derive the two solutions we follow appendix B and 
reduce the sytem to minimal dimension. Thus, eliminating 
dsM 
mt MMtmt and rt from equations (6.2.1) - (6.2.4) the 
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state-space representation is 
+1 t 
e et 4-2, tl a., 
u 
1, 
t 1 
+ 2 
a2 et. u t. 
(6.2.6) 
where a2 b-n 
a 2+n 2 
n 'n. T12 
-l b - (to + Y) 
ut c 
it 
u2 t 
+e 3t 4t 
e 4t ill Vt. 
The characteristic equation of (6.2.6) is 
x 
f(T) -T2_ (2+n-, \)T + (I + n-, \(I+b)) -0 
implying 
r1. Ir 2m 
la«2 +n-Ä) * [(2+n A) 
2- 
4(1+n-X(I+b») 
la 
). 
(6.2.7) 
(6.2.8) 
obviously p is predetermined and e is non-predetermined. Hence, 
IT 
11<I and 
IT 
211, say, 
for saddlepoint stability. Equivalently, 
there must be one end only sign change in the sequence, 
2(3+n-, \) -Ab 
2(2+n-, \)-, \b 2(2+n-X)-, \b 
(6.2.9) 
or [2(2+n-X)-. kb]-'Xb )ý 0. 
The case of a money supply peg was examined in chapter S 
(section 5.3). For this we recall the following (set t=o, b=y-'). 
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Since 2+n-, k > 0, -r, (m) 1 unambiguously and regardless of the degree 
of capital mobility. In addition, relatively low values for V imply 
-r (m) t 0, but violate the test function condition. Thus, assume a 
sufficiently high value for y in which case 0<TI (m) < 1. For an 
interest rate peg (it-w, b-0), equation (6.2.7) reduces to f(r)(i) - 
(l--r)(l+n-A--r) - 0. Hence, there is a unit root (as indicated by the 
zero value for the relevant test function condition). Recalling the 
discussion in chapter 2 (section 2.4), ' we ignore this (treat it as 
unstable; T2 (r) 1). Then -r, (r) - I+n-, \. Provided n<x, the 
system possesses a unique convergent solution. In this respect, the 
requirement of a well-defined solution under an'interest rate peg 
imposes a lower limit on the degree of capital mobility. Under both 
policies, the fact that we assume 0< -r I<I always precludes 
cyclical behaviour. 
Appendix'B gives the solutions for the exchange rate and prices 
as 
emp+du a-be a-1 4! -du 
le 
t 21 t1t12 3t 2 4t 1 t-l, t 
+_d2bf! e+dee (6.2.10) 3t, t 2 4t, t 
p rlpt + Ad u1+u1- Aa-lb-o Aa-le t+l 1 t-1 t2 3t 2 4t 
Ad u 
le 
+ Xd be e+ Xd ee (6.2.11) 1 t-l, t 2 3t, t 2 4t, t 
e t+l r1et- fd 1u t-1 -a2aIut+ 
&-21be3t + &21454t 
a2 
lkms 
3t+l -a 
-1 d+ fd u 
le 
- fd be 
e 
2 4t+l 1 t-i't 2 3t, t 
fd ee-du 
le 
+d be e+de 2 4t, t 1 tlt+l 2 3t+l, t+l 2 4t+l, t+l 
(6.2.12) 
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71 
2-a 2 (6.2.13) M21 
A- 
where d., m 21 
da -1 
22 
-1 a2aI 
-1 -r2 
ým 21 'r. . 
6.2(A) Model Solution with No Filtering 
The popular approach to examining this type of system is to 
a. asume full contemporaneous information about all variables (and 
hence all disturbances). The current information set is then simply 
NP f 
at = (e t-j, rt_j ,r t-j, Pt-j Im t-j , 
r, o) (6.2.14) 
f 
where r. foreign nominal rate of interest 
with Z' a vector of all structural parameters and ra description 
of the variance-covariance structure of stochastic disturbances. 
(The superscript NF refers to the absence of a filtering problem. ) 
le 1e 
The complete solution then obtains by setting u, u, e3 wd3 
e 
and e4. d4 in equations (6.2.10) - (6.2.12)s 
NF p 71-lbe Ir -1 d t 21 t2 3t 2 4t 
(6.2.15) 
NF 
Pt+l lpt - 
"ý21b'63t -A, 7* 21d4t + ut 
(6.2.16) 
e 
NF 
jo re 
NF 
-mu1+ fi 
'be 
f-r 1 
t+l 1t 21 t2 3t 
+ 2; e4t - T721be3t+l 
T -1 d (6.2.17) 2 4t+l 
As usual, equation (6.2.15) gives the jump variable, e, as a 
linear combination of the predetermined variable, p, and the 
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2 
composite disturbance u be 3+04. Thus 
ae NP ae 
NF 
ap 
m 21 
ad t 3t 
NP 
Ot 
ad 
4t 
(6.2.18) 
The responses in equation (6.2.18) are familiar from previous 
analyses (see chapter 3, section 3.3(F); chapter 5, section 5.3). 
Since -4 0 in equation (6.2.13), ae 
NF IaP 19 0 depending on the m2, tt 
degree of capital mobility and the policy regime. For perfect 
capital mobility (n - 0) and a money supply peg (b - y-1), 
NF 
M 21 
(m) >0 and ae t lapt 
(m) <0 because of the induced interest 
rate variations following price movements. This is obviously 
neutralized if interest rates are fixed (b - m2l (r) - 0). For the 
case of imperfect capital mobility it is possible that m 21 
(M) <0 
NF 
so that ae t 
lapt (m) > 0. This is due to price induced fluctuations 
in competitiveness operating on the trade balance. Clearly, 
NF 
3e t 
/apt (r) >0 for imperfect capital mobility. Perturbations to 
money demand have the usual effect which is completely negated when 
interest rates are pegged. Finally, foreign disturbances have the 
indicated effects by construction. 
To complete the description of the full information (no 
filtering) case, we note the asYmPtotic variance of prices from 
equation (6.2.1§) as 
-2 2 2-2 21 2-2 NF a+A (-, r-lb) a, +A( -7*- )a 
a212324 (6.2.19) p 
T2 3. 
-1 
2b 
-2 where ak is the asymptotic variance of ek (k - 1,3,4). The reason 
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for writing cr 
2 in the form of equation (6.2.19) will become clear in p 
what follows. 
6.2(B) Model Solution with Filtering 
The more realistic informational assumption posits some partial 
ignorance. in particular, from the discussion in section 6.1, we 
assume 
ff 
fet, rt, rt, et_,, rt_j, rt_j, pt_j, mt_j, 
. 
E, EIJ :ý 1) (6.2.20) 
Thus, contemporaneous information about only the exchange rate and 
interest rates is available with information about the money stock 
and prices accruing after a lag. Recall that this is entirely 
consistent with the specification of the model in which the actual 
money stock and actual prices appear in the behavioural equations 
(see chapter 5, section 5.3). 
The important property of this type of information structure is 
its non-invariance with respect to alternative control regimes. To 
be specific, though the tntttaL endowment of information remains the 
sa , the amount and nature of auxtLtary tnformatton are unlikely to 
remain unaltered as the controller's Policy stance shifts. This is 
so because of the effect of control on the information contents of 
currently observable variables. In addition, chapter S (section S. 3) 
demonstrated the critical dependence of the nature of auxiliary 
information on the degree of capital mobility. These properties are 
returned to below. 
(As a slight digression of some interest, we a-re forced to 
consider each policy independently. This is so because of the 
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following. Suppose that a general solution (with no restrictions 
on 40) is computed. Suppose also another solution with 40 - (o 
imposed at the outset. Then imposing io -w in the former yields 
expressions which are not the same as those in the latter. This 
is because the expressions for the optimal filtered estimates of 
the disturbances are actually tdenttcaL in each case. This is 
peculiar since for (0 - w, the interest rate conveys no information. 
Clearly, the results obtained for the second procedure (imposing 
(0 - aD at the outset) are correct. The contradiction arises because 
of the discontinuity as one moves from the 4$ -w case to the 0-w 
case; with 40 close to, but not equal to infinity, r still fluctuates t 
and therefore provides useful information. The discontinuity at 
40 - w, however, is when rt is fixed absolutely and is therefore 
redundant as an information variable. This feature applies also to 
the model of section 6.3. The interested reader is referred to 
appendix 8 for the formal demonstration. ) 
Consider, then, a money supply peg. The vector of currently 
T 
observable variables is gt(m) - [rt et] . This is related to the 
state vector in equation (6.2.6) as 
0 r -1 
o3 
t ty 
at(TA) In . In + Et (6.2.21) 
'-l T 
where Cy cs 3t 0] 
and we have uýed b for 4) - 0. Denote by A and C the 2x2 
right hand side matrices in equations (6.2.6) and (6.2.21) respect- 
ively. Partition these conformably such that A ý- [('A 
I)T (A 2)TjT and 
Cw Cc I C2]* Appendix 
B shows that equation (6.2.21) can be 
re-written as 
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gt(in-) - FAl 
pt-11 
+c -le e+,, t+ Ful 2a2 t t-I 
e t-I 
-1 2- -2a2ut (M) + yt 
FA 1 
pt 1 -lee4.1, 
t + Ful 
I- 
I+ 
Yý2 t t-1 
t-1 
-ca -1 d+ Ge 22 4t 3t 
where FC2-C 2aý21a, 
(ý) 
G ry-I -a -1 y -2 1T 2 
and the notation emphasises the dependence of terms on (ý - 
(6.2.22) 
The reader will recognise this information structure as being 
identical to that in chapter 5 (section 5.3). Equation (6.2.22) 
shows that observation of both the current exchange rate and the 
current interest rate conveys information about all shocks impinging 
on the system. We recall two results obtained from chapter 5 
(section 5.3): first, under perfect capital mobility, the external 
shock is known with certainty (Proposition 5.3.4); second, this is no 
longer true for imperfect capital mobility (Proposition 5.3.6). 
obviously, we need not repeat all of the steps involved in solving 
this system. The reader is, however, reminded of the salient 
features. We choose to do this partly because of the slightly 
different notation used here and partly for direct comparison with 
the interest rate peg case. (It will also avoid the necessity for 
continually referring back tochapter 5 (section 5.3)). The optimal 
estima es of the disturbances can be Computed from equation (6.2.22) 
as 
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le -2 u t-l, t(m) ajF 
e-m -2 cTa -1 
4t, t(m) -aý 22 
e- -2GT e (M) a 3t, t3 
II(Fu I-a -1 cd+ Ge ) (6.2.23) t-I 22 4t 3t 
(Eý-2FT + a72 where Ua2 32 
T -2 aT) -1 1 C2 ýC2 + C"73 
12.32 2 
and recalling that u t-l d it-1 so that a11, where ah is the 
asymptotic variance of uh (b - 1,2). The procedure summarised in 
chapter 5 (section 5.3) then yields 
u 
le 
ff(ii)g2« 02+n202 )u 
1 
na 
2e+ 
cr2 (6.2.24) t-l, t(M) 143 t-1 3 ft 4e 3t 
e2 -2 1 g2, e + (j2 
2j2), 
a e 3t, t(m) lr(m)cr 3( a4u t-1 
+n1 
4t 4+n1 3t 
(6.2.25) 
ee- F( m )g2« cr 
2 
-f- a2 )e + na 
2e 
na 
2u1 (6.2.26) 
4t, t(M) -413 4t 1 3t -1 t-1 
-2 2ý2 + -2) + 32a2)-l. where ir(m) - (a 3 
(n 
1 cr4 14 
Substituting equations (6.2.24) - (6.2.26) into equations 
(6.2.10) - (6.2.12) gives 
et(; -n) m 21(m)pt 
+ &(M)U 
t-I 
+ A(M)d 
3t 
+ A(M)o 
4t 
(6.2.27) 
Pt+l(m) - rl(m)pt + \&(M)U t-I + AA(M), d 3t 
+ AA(M)d 
4t +ut 
(6.2.28) 
FF 
et+. I(m) - -r, 
(i-n)e t 
(M) - f(m)&(m)u t-1 - f(M)A(M)d 3t - f(M)A(M)d 4t 
*-I 
+A (M)u 
t+ 
ý6; 
)d 
3t4-1 
+ 3(; )e 
4t4-1 
(6.2.29) 
where the following definitions are noteds 
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2 dl(m) -e(; )d I 
(m) +e (m)d 2(m) 
-1 -1 - 
;I(; ) + ; 2( a2y(; )d I m-)d 2(Fa) 
-1 (; ) 4.52( a2+ ; 
'(in-)d 
I 
; )d 
2(i; 
) 
-1 1 -)d 2- '--a 
2, a, 
(;; ) (; n I 
(;; ) +0 (m)d 
2(m) 
91(-) = jr(-)-2 
2-2 +ý32) ; 92(;; ) -2 (n iT(in-)a (; )32 a m 472 173 4234 
(6.2.30) 
T(-)-2ý2 
; 2(-) 
. IT(; )( -132 
232 
+ 32) + n-2ý2) ' '. 1 4my3 
(n 
14'. 1 4 
;I- 232 ; 2(;; -2 4.32) 4.3232 (M) - iT(; n)na n) w IT(;; )(32( y7"n 133414 
(6.2.31) 
91(; ) . .1_ 02(; )a, 
-I(; ), ; 2(;; ) w -1 
1- 
Now recall that Y0 (m)a (m) 
and 52 ( m) + 51(m-)a 1 
(m). Appropriate substitution into equations 
(6.2.27) (6.2.29) finally reveals 
eFm+92 (in-)h (; )u 
I- +C --r-1 ; -1 - 
;i(; )h t 21(; )Pt It12 (M)y 2(;; )3"13t 
+ E-T-I(; ) + 51(m-)b (m-)]4! (6.2.32) 22 4t 
F2--1 -1 - -1 ýl - Pt+l (m) -rI (M)p t+ Ae 
(M)hl(m)ut-l + '\C-'r2 (M)y -a (M)h 2(m)]e 3t 
2 
(M) + 51(; n)h 2 
(M)ld 
4t 
+ut (6.2.33) 
FF- f(m)e 2 (m)h (; )u 1 e t+l (m) -r1 (m)e t(m) 1 t-1 
f(m)[-, r 2 
(; -a)y7l - 
; "'(Fa)h 
2 
(-M) d 3t 
f( -r2 
To c 
(m)b (M)le + C-M (m) +02 (M)h m)]u 
1 
2 4t 21 t 
m 
-1 -1 - ;ý; 7 2 (M)h 2 (m)]d 3t+l 
C-7 
2+ 
; '(m)h 
2 
(M)]d 
4t+l (6.2.34) 
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where hWMa -1 -7 -1 1 21 12 
T 
-1 
a 21 21 
Equations (6.2.32) - (6.2.34) are the partial informational analogues 
to equations (6.2.15) - (6.2.17) for a money supply peg. Thus, the 
asymptotic variance of prices for the former is given from equation 
(6.2.33) as 
2-- 2-2 2 -1 22 
2F 
M) 
CI+ Ae (m)h 1(m) 
Ia1+ [-72 (; )y7l - 
; l(i)h 
2(ii)] 
&3 
p( 
Fa 
T2 
C--r-l(m) + 81(; i)h (; )32 a2 224 (6.2.35) 
2 
- When the controller fixes the interest rate, this variable is 
deprived'of any'useful information. Setting 40 - co so that b- rt = 0, 
the vector of observable variables is just the scalar at (r) -etI 
t 
ptl st(r) -e co 1] 
e 
(6.2.36) 
An equivalent expression is derived in appendix B as 
s (r aa (i)Al + i-2lee+,, t - a7"a, (;; )ul a-*ld t21 
rett-11 
t2 t-l' -2 4t 
(6.2.37) 
where the notation now emphasizes the dependence of terms on 4) - W. 
Note that, unlike equation (6.2.22), equation (6.2.37) shows that 
there is no auxiliary information about money demand shocks. 
The expectation of these is therefore zero. Note also a further 
interesting feature. Under conditions of perfect capital mobility, 
e 
a, (r) - 0, a2-I and st(r) - et4.1,, t - '64t i external shocks are 
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known with certainty but no information is conveyed about internal 
disturbances. These properties are explained as follows. 
The absence of information about money demand shocks is the 
immediate consequence of an interest rate peg which completely 
nullifies these shocks. Similarly, for perfect capital mobility, 
domestic price shocks have no effects either. The exchange rate 
fluctuates only because of foreign disturbances. When capital 
is less mobile, domestic price shocks can impinge on the exchange 
rate directly via the trade balance. This served to deliver an 
additional source of confusion under a money stock peg. For an 
interest rate peg, however, it tends to alleviate the problem in 
the sense that information about prices is now forthcoming. None- 
theless, since price shocks are still not completely known, neither 
are foreign perturbations. In this respect, therefore, imperfect 
capital mobility complicates the inference problem by contaminating 
information about external shocks. Comparing the two policy regimes, 
this establishes the critical influence of control on the information 
structure. 
on the basis of equation (6.2.37), we have 
le '-2 
t-1, t11a 
2(i)32 
+ 32 )-l (a (; )ul_ +e 
-2 
1141t1 4t 
a 4t, t4 
(6.2.38) 
or 
le (-)32 - 3. u t-ilt (r) - v(r)a 1r1 (al(r)u t-1 +d 4t (6.2.39) 
e- IT(i)32 -I e 4t, t (r) -4 (a, (r)ut_l +d 4t (6.2.40) 
2- -2 -2 -1 where ir(r) - (al(r)a 2+a 4) 
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(Clearly, the above discussion on the consequences of perfect 
capital mobility is verified in equations (6.2.39) - (6.2.40) by 
setting a 0: u 
le (; i) - 0, ee"d t-I't 4t, t 4t*) 
The solution now proceeds in the usual way. Substitute 
equations (6.2.39) - (6.2.40) into equations (6.2.10) - (6.2.12) for 
(b - cD (b - 0) and obtain 
eF(; ) m (; )p + &(; )u 
1- 
+ z(; )e (6.2.41) 
t 21 tt1 ft 
F 
Pt+l (r) - TjPt + ÄA(r)ut_I + >ý3( r )e4t + ut (6.2.42) 
F-F---1 
t+l (r) - -r Iet 
(r) f(r)A(r)u 
t-I - f(r). &(r)e 4t 
+A (r)u t+ A(r)e 4t+l (6.2.43) 
with 
12 (i)dl(-r) +0 (-r)d 
2(p) 
a2 r)d 1 
(r) + ; 2( r)d 2 
(r) 
a -1 a (r) -01 (r)d (r) + 52 (i)d (i) (6.2.44) 212 
2(-)32 2 
(-)32 0 (r) ir(r)a 1r10(; ) - iT(-r)a 1r4 
;I--2 52 -2 ( r) - iT(r)a i(i)(r, 
(r) - iT(r)a 4 
(6.2.4S) 
12 
and Noting that G (r) -1-a (ý)a7,1(i) 
simple manipulation in equations (6.2.41) - (6.2.43)'then yields 
F2 
M (r)p +0 (ý)h (r)u (r)]o t 21 t1 t-l+ C-'r2 2 4t 
(6.2.46) 
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F21 
'r (r)p + AG (r)h (r)ut_i+ AC-T-, (ý) - 5, (r)h (r)]e t+l 1t122 4t 
(6.2.47) 
t 
FF--2--I 
e t+l(r) -T1 
(r)e t (r) - f(r)G (r)h 1 
(r)u t-1 
- f(r)[-T 2 
(r) - 
; '(-r)h 
2 
(-r)le 
4t 
E-m 21 (r) +G2 (i)h I 
(ý)]utl 
-1 
C--r2 (r) - 
51(r)h 
2 
(r)h 
2 
(r)]e 
4t 
(6.2.48) 
with h1 and h2 defined as before and appropriately conditioned by 
Equations (6.2.46) - (6.2.48) are the partial information 
analogues to equations (6.2.15) - (6.2.17) for an interest rate peg. 
The most interesting. feature about both of these is that for perfect 
12 
capital mobility (al(r) -m 21 
(r) -h2 (r) -G00, 
a- f(r) = r2 1), they are tdenttcaL even though the latter 2 
is derived on the assumption of full information. Thus, perfect 
capital mobility and an interest rate, peg makes the solution. of the 
system under partial information, observattonaD equtvatent to that 
obtained under full information.. The reason is as follows. When 
interest rates are pegged, there is no auxilliary information about 
internal disturbancesi but this policy means that such shocks have 
no implications for the. exchange rate anyway, the behaviour of which 
is dictated solely by foreign shocks. - information about these is 
therefore absolute. In short, the absence of information about 
domestic shocks is innocuous. 
To complete the description of the interest rate peg solution, it 
remains merely to note the asYMPtotic price variance obtained from 
equation (6.2.47)t 
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2 2-2 gl -- -2 [l + ÄG (; )h (-r)] cr 1+ 
[- _l(ý) (r)h (r»cr 
2P -1 
r72 24 
cr (r) m 
1- -r r 
(6.2.49) 
Clearly, from equations (6.2.32) - (6.2.34) and (6.2.46) - 
(6.2.48), the effect of the partial information structure will, in 
general, be to modify the dynamic response of the system to exogenous 
shocks. The details of this are explicated below. 
6.2(C) The Relative Merits of Monetary and Interest Rate Control 
we now evaluate-the relative merits of alternative control in the 
light of the inference problem discussed above. In particular, we 
will be concerned with examining the change in the relative 
superiority of alternative policies as the information structure 
shifts. Tables 6.2(A) and 6.2(B) illustrate. The precise determin- 
ation of the inequalities is given below. 
The first points to note are the standard results for the no 
filtering (full information) solution (see chapter 2, section 2.2; 
chapter 3, sections 3.3 - 3.4 for further discussion). Hence, 
2NF - 2NF 2NF - 2NF 2NF aP (M, d aPaP (m, d 3ap(;,. e 30 and 111p 
(; "e 4 
2-NF - ap (r, 4s 4 
). These can be obtained by applying the implicit function 
tbeorem to the polynomial in equation (6.2.7) to obtain arilft 
(i - 1,2). - 
--- ________ (i-12). (6.2.50) 
It is easily verified that a-r, /04) ). 0 and ar2la'o <0 or T1(; ) < 
(4) 
1(r) and -r 2 
(m) > 7*2(r) The intuition is familiar. Under a 
money supply peg, a price shock causes interest rate fluctuations. 
For perfect capital mobility, the induced exchange rate variation 
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No filtering Filtering 
Disturbance 
2NF - a (m) 
2F 
a p 
1 2 
22 El + AG (m)h 1(m)] -2 Expenditure 3 5 
L 2 
T 
2- 
T I(M) 
K A2 
1-7-1 (; )Y-112_ 
22 
1 (; )32 A2 [-. r, 
1 
oney _ , 22 a 5 demand 
2 - 3 
-T 1(m) T I(rn) 
212 
A 17T2 2 
\2[-T7 32 ;, 
I(m -)h 
2 
(; ) 
-2 External 
2 
a4 
Table 6.2(A) : JU3ymptotic price variances under divergent information 
structures, money supply peg. 
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No filtering Filtering 
Disturbance 
2NF - a (r) 
2F 
a p p 
-2 
22 Cl + AG (r)hl(r)3 -2 Expenditure a aI 
IT (r) 
Money 0 0 demand 
2 -1(i) 12 E -r 
2- 51(ý)h 32 E (ý) 
External 
22 2 -2 2 a 4 
Table 6.2(B) : Asymptotic price variances under divergent information 
structures, interest rate peg. 
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is stabilizing. For imperfect capital mobility, the effect of the 
price shock may induce destabilizing movements in the exchange rate. 
Permitting interest rates to vary will offset these. Fixing interest 
rates obviously neutralizes any monetary shocks. Foreign distur- 
bances imply exchange rate fluctuations which feed into prices and 
interest rates. The optimal policy is therefore explained as for 
the case of domestic price shocks. 
Of more interest are the implications of restricting the 
informtion set., 
consider, first, a money supply peg summarized in table 6.2(A) 
(see chapter 5, section 5.3, for further discussion). Then for 
expenditure shocks, the effect of the inference problem may be to 
increase or decrease the volatility of prices. It is easily 
verified that bI (m) >0 unambiguously. Thus, for perfect capital 
2- 2UF 
mobility (71, = w, n- 0), a1 (m), 0 (m) 3,0 and ap (m'd -C 
2F - Cr p 
(m, el). By contrast, imperfectý capital mobility (n < co, n 3,0 
2 2T"O 2F 
implies aI(; ), 
-G 
0 so that cr pm1ap(;, e 1 
These are 
explained as follows. From equations (6.2.15) and (6.2.32), 
F NF 
ae t aet 02(- m)b, (m) 
aelt-I 
NF 
where ae t 
1,345 it-l(m) "'- M21 
(m) >< 0. For perfect capital mobilitY* 
m 21 
(m) >o so that the effect of the inference problem is to dampen 
the exchange rate appreciation. This occurs because agents misinfer 
the occurrence of other shocksý Expected future prices are lower 
than actual, and expected future exchange rates are less appreciated 
than actual. The current exchange rate therefore appreciates by less 
than under full information. 
rn terms of price volatility, the initial price perturbation is 
offset by less under partial information. For imperfect capital 
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mobility, m21(m) -c 0 and the effect of imperfect information is to 
dampen the exchange rate depreciation. The reason is as abovei 
current and future prices are underestimated inducing the expectation 
of a relatively more appreciated (or less depreciated) exchange rate. 
The incipient current depreciation is therefore partly offset. rn 
this case, then, the less depreciated exchange rate means a greater 
stabilizing force. on prices. 
Turning to money demand shocks, note that 
;16; ) %0 unambiguously 
but h2 (m) Z0 according to whether a, (m) 0. Hence, for perfect 
2NF 2F 
capital mobility (a, (m) 0), ape3ap (in-, e3 whilst for 
2NF - 2F - imperfect capital mobility (a I (m) -C 0), ap (m'e3) ap (m'03 The 
intuition is obtained again from equations (6.2.15) and (6.2.32)t 
ae 
F 
ae 
NF 
tt 
(M) 
ad 
3t 
ad 
3t 
NP 
with ae t /ad 3t(m) 
51(; )h 
2(; ) 
-1 - -1 
-T2 (M)y c 
1 
(6.2.52) 
When capital is perfectly 
mobile, therefore, the exchange rate appreciaton is exacerbated. 
Increased interest rates and an exchange rate appreciation signal 
(incorrectly) positive domestic price movements. Future expectations 
of relatively high prices and relatively more appreciated exchange 
rates then induce a further current appreciation over and above the 
full information response. It follows that prices are then destabil- 
ized by partial information. By contrast, imperfect capital mobility 
dampens the initial appreciation. The observed appreciation might be 
due to negative price shocks; but these are inconsistent with the 
observed rise in domestic interest rates. The latter imply the 
inference of postttve price movements. Under imperfect capital 
mobility, this forces the expectation of relatively more depreciated 
exchange rates in the future, which is translated into a relatively 
lower current appreciation. This has the effect of stabilizing 
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subsequent price movements relative to the full information case. 
Consider, finally, external shocks. in this case we have 
0 for perfect capital mobility (n - 0) and 0, h2 (m) <0 for 
2NF - imperfect capital mobility. Hence, in the former case a (m, 4 p4 
2F - 2NF - 2F - a (m, e ), whilst in the latter, cr (m, da (m, o ). Note again p4p4p4 
froin equations (6.2.15) and (6.2.32) that 
aept ae NF t -1 (M) 
_ 
(m) +0 (m)h 
2(m) 
(6.2.53) 
ae 
4t 
ac 
4t 
NF -1 - with ae t /Cle 4t(m) 2 
(m) < 0. Perfect capital mobility implies 
an identical exchange rate appreciation under each information 
structure because agents have complete information about the external 
shock (see chapter 5, section 5.3, Proposition 5.3.4). This is no 
longer true when capital is imperfectly mobile, in which case the 
exchange rate appreciation is exacerbated. This is, of course, due 
to the misinterpretation of negative domestic price shocks, inviting 
the expectation of a relatively more appreciated future exchange 
rate. obviously, then, price volatility is increased under partial 
information. 
Table 6.2(B) contains the results for interest rate control. As 
we have seen, perfect capital mobility makes the informational 
assumption innocuous. This is realised in table 6-2(B) by noting 
2- 
that a1 (r) h2 (r) -G (r) - 51(-r) -0 for perfect capital mobility. 
2NF 2F - Thus, ap (r, ek) -ap (r, ek) (X - 1,3,4). This is not generally 
the case for imperfect capital mobility. The exception where it does 
continue to be true is in the case of money demand shocks, for which 
2NF - 2F -)-o as usual. For expenditure and external cr p 
(r, e 3a 
(r, e 3 
disturbances, however, the informational assumption makes a 
difference. 
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For the former (expenditure shocks), note that hI (r) %0 
umambiguously. In addition, with imperfect capital mobility 
2- 2NF - 2F - (a, (r) < 0), 9 (r) < 0. Hence cy p 
(r'd 
1 . 1# Crp 
(r, 4! The reason 
is obtained from equations (6.2.15) and (6.2.46) whereby 
F NF 
Oe t aet 2 (r) +G (i)h I (-r) (6.2.54) 
ae It-I ae 2t-l 
NF 
with ae t 
lad 
it-I 
(r) m 21 
(r) ), 0. The effect of the inference 
problem is therefore to dampen the exchange rate depreciation. The 
reason should be familiar. The incipient depreciation is mistaken as 
symptotic of other shocks. Expected current and future prices are 
lower than actual and agents expect a relatively less depreciated 
future exchange rate. The current exchange rate reflects these 
expectations. With a less depreciated exchange rate, price volatility 
under partial information is obviously less than under full informa- 
tion. 
Consider, finally, foreign disturbances. Then h2 (r), 0 
for imperfect capital mobility: clearly, a 
2NF (i'e a 
2F (; 'd p4p4 
From equations (6.2.15) and (6.2.46) 
F NF 
ae t- aet 
, 
(r) _ 
(r) - ; 
1(-r)h 
2 
(r) (6.2.55) 
ad 4t 
ad 4t 
NF -1 - 
with ae lae (r) --r (r) -c 0. Hence partial information t 4t 2 
compnounds'the exchange rate appreciation: agents infer negative 
price shocks and the current exchange rate embodies the induced 
forward expectations. Prices then suffer greater volatility than 
in the full information case. 
Increased clarity of the above results can, perhaps, be obtained 
from a diagrammatic representation. Figures 6.2(A), 6.2(B) and 
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Figure 6.2(A)(i) : Exchange rate and price level trajectories, 
money supply peg, 
e r 
Figure 6.2(A)(ii) : Exchange rate and price level trajectories, 
interest rate peg 
Figure 6.2(A) : Exchange rate and price level trajectories 
under divergent information structures and 
control, e 1-ti ' 
NF (p NF ( 
.. e(d1 )) p (a 1 
), T), W OD 
NF (ep UF (e ), 
-- e (e 1 ); p (d 1), ni < cc 
e p 
Figure 6.2(B)(i) i Exchange rate and price level trajectories, ý 
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Figure 6.2(B)(ii) : Exchange rate and Price level trajectories, 
interest rate peg 
Figure 6.2(B) : Exchange rate and price level trajectories, 
under divergent information structures and 
control, e 3t ). 0. 
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e P 
Figure 6.2(C)(i) i Exchange rate and price level trajectories, 
money supply peg, 
p 
Figure 6.2(C)(ii) : Exchange rate and price level trajectories, 
interest rate pecl 
Figure 6.2(C) : Exchange rate and price level trajectories 
under divergent information structures and 
control, e 4t > 0. 
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6.2(C) illustrate the dynamic behaviour of prices for positive 
expenditure, wney demand and external shocks, e it-I 1 4S 3t' 6 4t > 0. 
Different assumptions about the information structure and degree of 
capital-mobility are superimposed in alternative diagrams specifying 
(5) 
the control regime. The dynamics support the algebraic analysis 
Together, they suggest the following conclusions. 
Under conditions of perfect capital mobility and a money supply 
peg the effect of the inference problem is to unambiguously raise the 
volatility of prices. An exception is the case of external shocks 
for which there is no departure from the non-inference solution, By 
contrast, partial information has no effect whatsoever when interest 
rates are fixed. Under imperfect capital mobility, the inference 
problem has the same qualitative effects for both control regimes in 
the face of expenditure and external shocks. For the former, price 
volatility is reduced; for the latter, price volatility is increased. 
In the presence of money demand shocks, partial information has no 
effect when interest rates are pegged and reduces the price variance 
under a money stock peg. Collectively, these results suggest that, 
in terms of the relative merits of monetary and interest rate con- 
trol, there may be a net gain to the latter. More provocatively it 
may pay the controller to deprive agents of information. 
6.3 A Closed Economy Model 
A notable feature of the open economy model in section 6.2 is 
that the set of information variables comprises two elements, the 
e=hange rate and the interest rate. Thus, pegging the latter still 
permitted the disemination of some auxilliary information via the 
former. In the closed economy model in this section we retain the 
assumption that the set of currently observable variables includes 
solely asset prices. For this model, however, the only asset price 
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is the interest, rate. interest rate control, therefore, now deprives 
agents of any auxilliary informtion. It is of some interest to 
examine the implications of this. In addition, we shall realise the 
extent to which the results of section 6.2 may be qualified. 
A useful and popular expositional framework is the Sargent and 
Wallace (1975) model. This was described in chapter 3 (section 3.2, 
equations (3.2.1a), (3.2.2a), (3.2.3a), (3.2.4)-(3.2.5)). We write 
this as 
dee 
yt t- Pt+l It+ 
Pt 
,t)+4 it 
J3 0 
a(Pt -e+ 46 CK 0 yt pt 
,t 2t 
d 
mt Pt +y lyt - Y2 rt +d 3t y0 (J-1,2) 
8 mt (or 0 t 
where yd natural logarithm of real aggregate demand. 
r nominal rate of interest 
P- natural logarithm of the price level 
(6.3.1) 
(6.3.2) 
(6.3.3) ý 
(6.3.4) 
S 
y natural logarithm of real aggregate supply 
d 
m natural logarithm of the nominal demand for money 
s m natural logarithm of the nominal supply of money 
ek - stochastic disturbances 
As usual all variables are measured as deviations from long run 
equilibrium and p t+ilt - 
E(p t+i 
III 
t) (1-0,1), where E( -) -is the 
mathematical conditional expectations operator and n is the 
information set. 
Equation (6.3.1) is the aggregate demand schedule relating 
aggregate expenditure (negatively) to the real rate of interest 
49 1 
is a random expenditure shock. Equation (6.3.2) is the supply 
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schedule whereby supply depends on perceived relative prices and 
stochastic perturbatione e2. Equation (6.3.3) is a money demand 
function depending on, prices, output and interest rates, and 
subject to randomýfluctuation, e3. All shocks are independent white 
-2 
noise error terms with asymptotic variances cr k (k - 1,2,3). Equation 
(6.3.4) is the monetary control rule with 4wý and 4ýý representing 
money supply and interest rate pegs respectively. 
, 1, 
Within this framework, we distinguish three cases according to 
the assumption about the current information set, nt, These 
amount to the assumptions of full, partial and 'zero' contemporaneous 
information. The latter is the standard formulation of the model 
where the current information set includes only lagged values of 
variables (see chapter 3, section 3.2, equations (3.2.1a), (3.2.2a), (3-2.3a), 
(3.2.4) - (3.2.5)). Despite its popularity, this involves a 
peculiarity because implicit is the assumption that the current 
interest rate is currently observable; yet its value as an inform- 
ation variable is totally ignored. The solution is as if agents 
have no contemporaneous information. Both this and the full 
information'specification abstract from'the filtering problem. We 
return to these issues in more detail. For all informational 
assumptions, the objective'function of the controller is 
E(J) = lz(aa 
2+ 
-a)a 
2 
yp 
04a41 (6.3.5) 
where a2 and a2 are the asymptotic variances of output and prices yp 
res, --ctively, and a-0 and a-1 are noted as the polar cases. 
Note, first, that for all informational assumptions, equations 
(6.3.1) (6.3.4) can be reduced to 
kp + np e+u p t+l, tt'tt 
(6.3.6) 
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where k -, b +, (xq 
n- cxq 
q- "+ by 
bý 4' Y2)-l 
-1 ut M 46 it + qe 2t + 
be 
3t* 
Treating p as non-predetermined, there is a unique convergent 
solution provided that there is one eigenvalue wbicb lies outside 
the unit circle Irl > 1, say. Taking expectations at time t through 
equation (6.3.6), 
pem (k + n) 
e+ue 
t+l, t pt "tt, t 
(6.3.7) 
Hence, r-k+n1+b )6 1. For a money supply peg (4p - 0), 
b y-l and T(; ) 1. For an interest rate peg oD), b-0 and 
T(r) - 1. Ignoring the unit root, therefore, the system possesses 
a well-defined non-explosive solution irrespective of the policy 
regime. 
Appendix B gives the solution for prices as 
pt =- k7lqe - i-lbe - Sý-l de it 2t 3t ' it, t 
sqe + abte 2t, t 3t, t (6.3.8) 
waare s 
and using the definition of u t' 
In addition, appendix 13 shbW3 that 
e=- k-l (u ue) so that substitution into equation Pt- pt 
"t t-t"t 
(6.3.2) yields the solution for output as 
yt an ak-lý-le + 
i-lbe - OOC'be - c&71ý-16' it 2t 3t it, t 
+ ak7lqe' + dClbe (6.3.9) 2t, t 3t, t 
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In what follows, the complete solutions for prices and output 
are obtained by deriving the expressions for the expectations terms, 
e (k - 1,2,3). Three solutions emerge according to the partic- ekt, t 
ular assumption we choose to make about the information set 
conditioning these expectations. The three alternative information 
structures are listed below in order of decreastng initial 
informational endowment. 
6.3(A) Model Solution with No Filtering : Full Contemporaneous 
Information 
The relevant information set is 
t-j , 
E, r- 1j>, 0) (6.3.10) in (r t-j, Yt-i# m 
where r is a vector of all structural parameters and L summarizes 
the variance-covariance structure of stochastic disturbances. Hence, 
information about all variables is instantaneously available. It 
follows that the solution of the system is to set e in ekt, t ý ýkt 
equations (6.3.8) - (6.3.9)t 
p 
NP 
T-I A-1 0- -r -1 qe - -r -1 be (6.3.11) at it 2t 3t 
NF 
ayt 452t 
(6.3.12) 
using the definitions of s and k. The usual impact responses follows 
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a( 
Nr 
at 71 -1ý-l ), 0 
aelt 
a( PNF at- T-lq <0 
ae 2t 
NF a(apt 
Am - 
lb 
<0 
ad 3t 
a( NF 
ayt 0 
adit 
a( NF ayt 
ae2t 
a(ayt 
0 
ad 3t 
(6.3.13) 
The consideration of the full information case may seem rather 
trivial. After all, output is entirely orthogonal to the system and 
(probably for precisely this, reason) this informational assumption 
has received very little attention in the literature. The reason 
for including this case here is that it serves as a useful benchmark 
against which the other two cases can be judged. In pafticular, 
though both of the latter depart from the full information assump- 
tion, only the immediately proceding structure is strictly correct. 
The remaining specification (which is the most popular version of the 
model) has some peculiarities. These render it inappropriate as a 
true reflection of the implications of a partial information 
,, 
framework. 
Frcxa equations (6.3.11) - (6.3.12) we have 
a 
2NF 
'. (T-1ý-1)232 + (_ T-lq )2a2 + (_ T-1b)232 ap123 
2brF -2 cr " crz 
6.3(B) Model Solution with Filtering 
(6.3.14) 
(6.3.15) 
We retain the popular assumption that asset prices are the most 
obvious candidates for informational variables. Information about 
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prices, output and money is assumed to accrue with a lag. Hence, 
nF an (rt, r 'p m (6.3.16) t t-J, t-J, yt-j- t-J, L, I: lj I, I). 
Note again that this information structure is entirely consistent 
with the model specification. Equations (6.3.1) - (6.3.3) reflect 
aggregated micro relationships. Individual demand for goods depends 
on the global (observable) interest rate and individually expected 
rate of inflation: aggregating yields equation (6.3.1) where 
Pe (i - 0, I) is the average expectation of the aggregate price t+i, t 
level. Individual supply depends on local (observable) prices and 
individually expected aggregate prices: aggregating yields 
equation (6.3.2) where, as before, Pe is the average expectation of t't 
the aggregate price level. Individual money demand depends on 
observable prices, observable individual income and the observable 
interest rate: aggregating gives equation (6.3.3). 
Having access to contemporaneous information about the interest 
rate endows agents with potential auxiliary information about the 
unobservable variables. To be specific, the vector of currently 
observable variables is the scalar st =rt which is related to 
prices by 
3= rt wbp - ay bp 
e+v (6.3.17) 
tt1 tlt t 
where w-1+ ay 
7tý ylbo2t + bo3t* 
Appendix B shows that equation (6-3.17) can be re-written as 
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,, j-1 e- b(a)rOC' + ayl)pe + wbk-'ý-le t Pt+i, t tlt it 
- ubk7lqe 2t - wb 
2 k7le 
3t + vt 
. j-1 
e b(wnk-1 + ay )PO + Pt+i, t -It, t it 
+ b(y - uk-lq)e 2t + 
b(I - OCib)e 3t (6.3.18) 
using the definition of vt. Equation (6.3.18) shows that obser- 
vation of the current interest rate conveys information about all 
shocks impinging on the system except for when the interest rate is 
pegged. in the latter case, agents have no auxiliary information 
whatsoever. (It is useful to note again the necessity for considering 
money stock peg and interest rate peg policies independently. As in 
section 6.2, imposing co in the final expressions for e ekt, t 
(k - 1,2,3) makes no difference. This is true despite the fact that 
an interest rate peg delivers zero auxiliary information. The reader 
is again referred to appendix B for the formal proof. ) 
Under monetary control, recalling the definitions of w, b, k, n 
and q and setting 40 - 0, equation (6.3.28) becomes 
-: Lk-l(in-) e -1 - -1 e wy p-yk"- ))P 2 t+l, t22 
(m)(" + J3 t1t 
WY2 it -2 2t 
- -2 - -2 ay 2 
"k Wla 453t (6.3.19) 
where the notation emphasizes the dependence of terms on (0 - 
Thus, from equation (6.3.19), the optimal filtered estimates of the 
disturbances are given by 
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e 
it, t(m) 
e- 
2t, t(m) 
e- e (M) 3t, t 
or 
-2 a1w 
-2 232 + 32 2-2 -1 + ad --a 2 
(w 
12+aa 3) (welt 2t 30 
-2 a3a (6.3.20) 
d 4, cZ2(we e+ ae lt, t(m) -I lt - 2t 3t 
,, 
e 
-ýa-2(4)e d+ ad 2t, t(m) -2 lt - 2t 3t 
%Kj2( cüe 46 3t, t 
(im) -3 it -e 2t + ad 3t) 
2-2 -2 2-2 -1 where 4; - (w a1+a2+ cc a 3) 
(6.3.21) 
(6.3.22) 
(6,3.23) 
The solution of the system under a money supply peg now follows 
by substituting equations (6.3.21) - (6.3.23) into equations 
(6.3.8) - (6.3.9) for 40 - 
F- -1 - -1 pt(m) k-'(; )q(-m)e 2t -k (m)y 24 3t 
-1 --); 2 _ -1 -2 + C(d - s(m)%P(ý &ýa 1+ q(in 2 Y2 acr3 
)(we 
it 2t 30 
ak 
"(M-)13-'I-e + y- k (m)e - cdc- t it 2 2t m Y2 '03t 
(6.3.24) 
-I - -1 -2 )32 _ V-1 -2 - ak Cm)%P(j3 wcy, + q(in- 22 aa 3 
)(we 
it -d 2t 
+ ad 3d 
(6.3.25) 
Equations (6.3.24) - (6.3.25) can be expressed in a more convenient 
form. Collecting terms in kt 
(k - 1,2,3), 
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P, (M) m m)(]e + C4-l(; )q(Fa) + s(Fa 
F--, 
( )ý-, - S( - it )C]d2t 
ý-k -1 ý M)y 
1 
2- 13(m) 
1463t (6.3.26) 
yr (M) + c4Cl(; )7jd t it 72 2t 
(6.3.27) 2 3t 
-1 -2 where a+ q(in )32 '2 ýa 3) 12 
4, (Cl -2 -)-2 -1 -2 Wa + q(m a2 Y2 aa3) 
4, a(Clý-2 a+ q(Ta )32 a 12 Y2 3 
('ý-2 2 Using the definitions of w and q(m), substitute waI+a2+ 
, Va( -2 -2 . 4z2 
2-2 232 
71a2 aa3 ) into t, 72. :L %P(w aI+a3) into 7, and 
40a2-2 232 + -2 a3w1 47 2) into C. Som manipulation then reveals the 
following solutions for prices and output 
F- -1 - -1 -1 -2 2)jdlt Pt (M) - [T (m)A +7 (m)At4i(y Ia2- cý-a 3 
- -)Jjýpcwy 2+ cý-2)1, e 
l(m 
or a + 1- 71 (m)q(m) +T113 2t 
-r -1 (M)Y2 
1+2+a2 )ld (6.3.28) 
12 3t 
F(; ) .- a'«. -2 y YI cr _ (X j2)elt + a, 4ý( (dy g2 + cz ý2)je t. 23113 2t 
-2 + j2 (6.3.29) WKY 12 
)e 
3t 
where g- a(13 4- 
-1 Y2 Y. 1) - 
JL' 
Clearly, the impact effect of exogenous shocks are different from 
those under full information (see equations (6.3.11) - (6.3.13)). 
Rather than deliberate upon these here, we return to them in 
connection with the control exercise. For the latter, we note the 
asymptotic variances of prices and output from equations (6.3.28) - 
(6.3.29)t 
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ZF - -1 - -1 -1 - -2 -2 2-2 ap (m) [T (M)J3 + 'r (m)4*( y lcr2 - (la3)1 cyl 
;2 -2 2-2 -1(M + [T"-'(M)q(; n) +T )A%P(Wy 11- aa 3 
)l cr2 
-1(; -14. r-l(; ), 44, ((a-a2 4. ý2)3232 (6.3.30) n)Y2 223 
2F - -2 -2 2-2 -2 -2 2-2 ay (M) a*(-y Ia2- aa 3)j a. 1 
+ [I - a%P(wy I a, 
+ aa 3 
)] a2 
2+ ý2 2-2 + C- crp(wa 12 
)l a3 (6.3.31) 
This completes the description of the filtering solution for a 
money supply peg. Under an interest rate peg, matters are substan- 
tially simplified. As we have seen, such a policy prevents the 
dissemination of'any auxiliary information. Hence, e 4kt, t -0 
(k - 1,2,3) and equations (6.3.8) - (6.3.9) reduce to 
pF (- -1 - -1 -1 -)q(; )e r) -k (r)P 0-k (r (6.3.32) t it 2t 
yF CLk-"(r-)j3-, 
le 
(6.3.33) t it 
imposing it - co (b - 0). From equation (6.3.32) - (6.3.33), therefore, 
2F - -1 - -1 2ý2 + (- k7l - )2ý2 ", (r) - (k (r)J3 (i)q(r) (6.3.34) p2 
a2F(-) . (ok-l(-)ý-1)2 
2 
yrra10 
(6.3.35) 
6.3(C) Model Solution with No Filtering s *Zero' Contemporaneous 
rnfoization 
rmplicit in analyses based on the orthodox version of the model 
is the assumption of equation (6.3.16). There is, however, an 
important difference between the, two cases. This was mentioned in 
chapter 5 (section 5.2). The problem with the popular specification 
is that it involves an inconsistency. To be specific, it assjj s an 
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oveny restricted information set: whilst the current interest rate 
is implicitly assumed to be currently observable, the value of this 
as a conveyor of auxiliary information is ignored. To see this, 
recall that in the popular version expectations are actually 
conditoned on Lagged information (see chapter 3, section 3.2, 
equations (3.2.1a), (3.2.2a), (3.2.3a), (3.2.4) - (3.2.5)). In 
terms of the current framework, this amounts to assuming a current 
information set of the form, 
nNF m (r Mt bt t-j, pt-j, yt-if -jo 
(6.3.36) 
Thus, the role of the interest rate as an information variable is 
entirely ignored. 
The solution to this system follows by merely setting !eM qkt, t 0 
(k - 1,2,3) in equations (6.3.8) - (6.3.9) 
NP 
.k -1 0-1 d- k-lqe - k-lbe (6.3.37) bpt it 2t 3t 
NP -3'be (*-I be byt ak it +k 2t - 3t* 
(6.3.38) 
Hence, 
2NF 
. (k-lý-1)2-2 
-1 )2cr2 + (_3ý-lb)2-2 
bap a1+ ký q2a3 (6.3.39) 
2NF 
. (Cck-lji-1)232 + (k-lb)232 + clb)2-2 ba12-, C& a3 
(6.3.40) 
The most notable feature of equations (6.3.37) (6.3.40) is that 
they are identical to equations (6.3.32) - (6.3.3S) for the case of 
an interest rate peg (41 - w, b- 0). The reason is, of course, that 
by fixing the interest rate, agents are deprived of any auxiliary 
information. Equations (6.3.37) - (6.3.40) are predicated on the 
absence of auxiliary information regardless of the policy regime. 
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6.3(D) The Relative Merits of Monetary rnterest Rate Control 
As in section 6.2 we are prima ily concerned with the effect of 
the informational assumption on the relative superiority of money 
stock and interest rate control. Tables 6.3(A) and 6.3(a) give the 
asymptotic variances of prices and output under each of the three 
informational structures and each of the two policy regimes for 
single isolated shocks. It is noted that q(ý) and 
-1. k(r) - aO In addition, it should also be noted that the inequal- 
ities in the table are not necessarily in sequence. This will become 
clear below and is emphasized by the parentheses. 
We begin by comparing monetary and interest rate peg policies 
for the two solutions without filtering. Chapter 3 (section 3.3(A)) 
demonstrated the following results for the orthodox version of the 
model: pegging the money stock is optimal for both price and output 
stabilization in the face of expenditure shocks and is optimal for 
price stabilization in the face of supply shocksl by contrast, 
interest rate control is superior for both price and output stabili- 
zation under monetary shocks and is optimal for output stabilization 
under supply shocks. The intuition is recalled as follows. Aggregate 
demand disturbances cause variations in prices which induce output 
fluctuations. Fixing the money stock permits endogenous movements in 
the interest rate which dampen the demand shock and hence stabilize 
prices and output. This is obviously absent when the interest rate 
is fixed. Money demand shocks are completely neutralized by an 
2NF - 2RF - accommodative monetary policy so that bap (r, e 3ba (r, e 3) 0' 
For aggregate supply disturbances, the initial price movement is 
exacerbated if interest rates are fixed; at the same time, these 
unanticipated price fluctuations are stabilizing in terms of output 
variation. 
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No Filtering Filtering No Filtering 
(a) (b) 
2NF - a (m) 
2F - (M) a 
2NF 
ý7 Disturbance a p p b p 
ý-l 2 2 
ý2 -2 2 ý-1+A%P(yl 
2 -aa 3)' -2 
r -1 2 -2 0 Expenditure 3 a1 01) aI 
'r(M). k(; ). 
2 2 
32 -2 '2 -q(m)+). Lqi(wy 11 +aa 3) -2 
2 
-2 Supply z; 2( a2a2 
Mney -Y 
-l' 2 
2 2 
-l+A, 4, (4ýa2+a2)'2 -l' 2 -Y2 12 -2 -Y2 -2 
demand 
3 r3 a3-a3 
T(; ) . k(; ). 
Table 6.3(A)(i) : Asymptotic price variances under divergent 
information structures, money supply peg. 
No Filtering Filtering No Filtering 
(a) (b) 
b c Di t 
2NF - (m) 
aa 
2F (; ) a 
2UF - (m) ba ur an e s y y y 
Expenditure 0 -2 -2 
232 C-cO(y a -aa ] -2 
CO a ,. . 2 I I 
Supply -2 a ; 
24 
wy a32)j2; 
2 Y2 -2 (7 2 1132 2 
Money 0 C -c*(wa 
2 
+a 
2)j232 "aY2 -2 a damand 223 3 
k(; ) 
Table 6.3(A)(ii) ; AsymPtotiC oUtPUt variances under divergent 
information structures, money supply peg. 
Table 6.3(A) : Asymptotic price and output variances under divergent 
Information structures, money supply peg. 
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No Filtering Filtering No Filtering 
(a) (b) 
2NF 
a 
2F 
a (-r) 
2NF - (r) a Disturbance a p p b p 
Expenditure (ý-l 
2-2 
a (ci-1)2-2 -1 
2-2 
%a a a I 1 
Supply a -1 
2-2 
a (-a a 2 2 2 
Money 0 0 0 
Demand 
Table 6.3(B)(i) t Asymptotic price variances under divergent 
information structures, interest rate peg. 
No Filtering Filtering No Filtering 
(a) (b) 
2NF - a (r) 
2F - a (r) 
2NF - ey (r) Disturbance a Y Y 
Expenditure 0I -2 CaI -2 aI 
supply -2 a2 00 
Money 
Demand 
0 00 
Table 6.3(B)(ii) : Asymptotic output variances under divergent 
information structures, interest rate peg. 
Table 6.3(8) : Asymptotic price and Output va-riances under divergent 
information structures, interest rate peg. 
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For the full information case certain of these results are 
qualified.. -. Output is orthogonal to the system and the transmission 
mechanism is slightly different. Clearly, then, the control problem 
for output is redundant. In terms of price stabilization criteria the 
above conclusions continue to hold with the exception of the case of 
supply shocks. A positive demand shock raises prices. This is 
observed and is equivalent to an increase in the real interest rate. 
This is enhanced by fixing the money stock and permitting a rise in 
the nominal interest rate. The demand shock is therefore dampened. 
Money demand shocks continue to be nullified under an interest rate 
peg. The optimal policy for supply perturbations is ambiguous. The 
precise condition for a policy to be optimal is 
2NF - 2NF - ý-l ap (m, 45 2 >< aap 
(r, e2 VI 5; (6.3.41) 
which is identical to the condition derived in chapter 3 (section 
3.3(c), equation (3.3.53)) for a slightly different model. The 
common feature of both that model and the current framework, 
however, is the existence of contemporaneous price information (at 
least for demanders of goods). The normal case is when 
2NP - 2KF - 
aCrp 
(M'e2) < aap 
(r, e 2a positive supply shock induces negative 
price movements which consequences for the real interest rate are 
enhanced by permitting interest rates to fall. The expenditure 
stimulus then stabilizes prices. Nonetheless, it is possible for 
interest rates to tncrease following the supply shock. As in 
chapter 3 (section 3.3(C)), ar Vae 2t 50 according to whether 
Y1 -a 
-1 < 0. Hence, the observed fall in real interest rates 
(which is greater than in the Orthodox model in which there is zero 
contemporaneous price informtion) induces an expenditure stimulus 
which increases with j3. As y1 increases this may be sufficient for 
the nominal interest rate to exhibit a net upward movement. This 
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would qualify the stabilizing properties of a money supply peg. An 
accommodative monetary policy, however, prevents this and inducea a 
further increase in aggregate demand, thereby reducing price 
2NF - 2NF - fluctuations. Hence, 
aap M'e 2 J% aapr, e 2 
on a final note, we may compare the full information and orthodox 
solutions. For expenditure shocks we have that 
2NF - 2NF - 
a cr p 
(m, d 1) Z býap (m"61) *. * ;LZ0 
(6.3.42) 
2NF - 2NF - 
aap 
(r, d1 býa p 
(r, 4s, ) *w* j3 !%a (6.3.43) 
2KF - From the definition of g, aap 
(M, d 
a increases and 0 falls which implies 
For the former, a high value for (x in 
2NF - 
bgp (M, 41) is more 
likely am 
2NF - 2UF - that 
a cr p 
(r, e 1) 3' bap 
(r, e I 
the orthodox model means a 
large supply response to the unanticipated price movement. This 
has the effect of stabilizing prices relative to the full information 
case. As j3 increases, however, the stabilizing effect of the 
observed variation in real interest rates in the full information 
case may outweigh the stabilizing properties of supply fluctuations 
in the orthodox model. Similar arguments apply to the relative 
magnitudes of a 
2NF (;, e and 
2NF (;, e ap Iýlp 
For supply shocks, 
2MP - 2NF - 
aap 
(m, e 2) b ý'p 
( M"Y *0* 4 ;ý0 (6.3.44) 
2NF - 2NF a(r, e) ?k bep 
( r, < (6.3.45) 
ap2 '52 
ß> ýx 
so that relatively high values for a imply a 
2NF (;;, e 
2NF (;, e ap2 býp 2 
2NF - 2NF - and aap 
(r, e 2) "bap 
(r, e 2 
), whilst relatively high values for j3 
imply the converse. The reason is similar to that given above for 
expenditure shocks. For the formr, the initial price perturbation 
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is partly offset in the orthodox model by virtue of the induced supply 
response. This increases with a. in the full information framework, 
observable fluctuations in real interest rates axe also stabilizing. 
2NF - This increases with 0. Analogous arguments apply to 
a Cr p 
(r'd 
2) and 
2NF - 
b; ap 
(r, e2 
Finally, money demand shocks yield similar results, 
2NF - 2NF - ap (m, e 3) z býp 
(Im'e3) *m* 4 ý4 0 (6.3o46) 
2NF - 2NF - whilst a cr p 
(r, e3)- ba p 
(r, '63) ý 0* 
Thus far, the analysis suggests that for a particular policy 
regime the effect of the information structure is ambiguous in terms 
of the volatility of prices. More Precisely, restricting the 
information set may increase or decrease the variance of prices 
depending on the relative magnitudes of structural parameters of the 
model. rn addition, for the case of output volatility we have the 
2NF - 2NF - 2NF - unambiguous results: aay 
(M'd 0<bay (M'd 
aay 
(M, d 2 
2NF - 2NF - 2NF - 2NF - 
bay (M, e 2 
); 
aay 
(M, e 30 -C bay (M, d 3 
); 
aay(r, 
e10< 
2NF - 2NF - 2NF - 2NF 
bay ( r, 4s 1 
); 
aay 
(r, e2) ,ýbay (r, e 2) - 0; aay 
(ý, 0 3) m 
2NF - 
, ýay (r, e3) -0. 
of rather more interest is the case in which agents attempt to 
exploit the information content of the interest rate. When interest 
rate control is administered, such an attempt is futile since the 
information value of this variable is zero. As we have seen, the 
solution reduces to the conventional version of the model and the 
foregoing discussion for the case of an interest rate peg applies. 
When the money stock is fixed, however, the interest rate is free to 
respond to current market conditions. 
Thus, consider aggregate demand shocks. Then we may postulate 
2KF - 2F - -2 -2 
aap 
(M, 4! 1)§ap (m'd I) according to whether A(V Ia2- aa 3) ;t0. 
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2NF - 2F - obviously, 
aay 
(M, 46 10 4( ay (m, d, 
) but note a peculiarity. From 
equation (6.3.29), 
F (; ) yt 
ý2 
ae- 12 it 
(6.3.47) 
so that output may actually faL& following a positive demand shock. 
This was originally noted by Minford and Peel (1983a) and occurs for 
the following reason. If supply noise dominates, ;2 is relatively 2 
large. The observed rise in interest rates signals (incorrectly) 
a negattve supply disturbance. Expected prices are higher (than 
actual prices) and output falls. By contrast, if monetary volatility 
is relatively, high, ;2 is large and the normal positive output 3 
response is observed: agents misinterpret a positive money demand 
shock, expected prices are lower and output increases. Thus, 
consider the behaviour of prices. From equation (6,3.29) 
F a( 
NP 2) 
ap 
apt (7. )+ 
;, %P(YJLý2 ca tn23 (6,3.49) 
ad it 
ad it T(M) 
where a( 
NP )Iae 0 from equation (6.3.21). 
apt it 
-2 Suppose a2 is relatively large. Suppose also ji 3ý 0, which occurs for 
high values of a and low values of P. Then the price increase in 
greater under partial information than under full information and 
2NF - 2F - 
aap 
(M'd 1) 4aP (M'd The reason is that, as we have seen, output 
contracts in the former came, imparting an upward bias to prices. 
rn addition, cr 
2NF (; M, d ba 
2NF (;, 4s ), from above so that a 
2F (;,, i appp 
2W. - lNr - 
aap- 
(M'd bap (M'd. 1). This may be qualif ied as cx falls and 
13 increases. Under such circumstances, the destabilizing effect of 
the output contraction in the partial information model is dampened. 
Moreover, the expectation of higher prices compounds the rise in real 
interest rates and is greater than in the full information case. Both 
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2KF - 2F of these tend to stabilize prices so that ep (m, d., )). aP Fr(xn 
above, a 
2NF (;, e 
2NF (; i, e ). Hence, a 
2F (;,. d 
2NF (7n, e apI býp Ip acp 
2NF 
Now consider the case in which ;2 is relatively large. Suppose 3 
also that Ab0. Then from equation (6.3.48), the price increase is 
greater under full information than under partial information. The 
reason is that output increases (see equation (6.3.47)) in this case. 
This stabilizes the initial price rise so that aa 
2KF (; '-d I) 30 
2F - 2NF - 2NF - ap (M'd In addition, aap 
(m'd 
1) 10 bap 
(M'd so that 
2F - 2NF - ap (M'd bap (m'O 1 
). As before, these results are likely to be 
reversed as a falls and 13 rises. Under such circumstances, the 
stabilizing output response in the partial information case is 
dampened. Coupled with the lower real rate of interest relative to 
the full information case (because expected prices are lower) this 
2KF 2F 2NP - implies 
aap(; 'd ap(;, e 
From above, 
aap 
(M'd 
2NF - 2F 2NF - 
bap 
(M'd and therefore ap (M'd 1bap 
(M'd 
The above results for expenditure shocks demonstrate an important 
point raised in chapter 5 (section 5.3)o access to more tnttta& 
information does not necessarily imply more accurate a=t&tary infor- 
mation. To be sure, we have seen that price volatility may be 
greater under full information than in the case where agents do not 
exploit the information content of the interest rate; yet when agents 
do exploit this, price volatility may actually be greater than the 
full information case. Similar conclusions &rise elsewhere for 
demand shocks and for other disturbances. 
X, et us now examine the position for supply disturbances. Clearly, 
2NF - 2F - 
aap 
(M, d 2ap 
(M, d 2) according to whether A50. The price and 
output responses under partial information are given by equations 
(6.3.28) - (6.3.29) as 
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NF -2) aprt a( pt ; L, 41( wy ;2+ ci a a123 on) + (6.3.49) 
ad 2t ad 2t 
ayFt a( y 
Nr 
at -2 ;2 a%p( (OYI cr I+a 3) (6.3.50) ad 2t ad 2t 
NF 
with a(, pt )la-e q(; )ý-l(; ) <0 and a( 
tF)lad (7n) -1 from 
ý2t(; 
) 
ayt 2t. 
equations (6.3.11) - (6.3.12). Clearly, then, the output response 
under partial information is less than under full information and 
2NF(- 
a m'd a2F (m, e ). The reason is, of course, that the induced ay2y2 
unanticipated price fall following a positive supply shock dampens 
this shock. Now suppose that gý0 (a high, A low). Then 
2NF - 2F - (m, e 2ap 
(m, q! 2 
). This occurs because of the dampened supply 
movement under partial information which stabilizes the downward 
pressure on prices. In addition, we have seen that aa 
2NF (;,. d 2 p 
2NF - 2F 2NF ;' 
b Cr p 
(m, e 2) so 
that ap (M'd 2 ba 42)* For A<0 
(Cc low# 
2NF - 2P - 13 high aap 
(m'd 2ap (m'-O 2 ): as a falls, the stabilizing effect 
of unanticipated price movements is reduced; as a rises, the observed 
greater fall in real interest rates under full information induces 
stabilizing demand movements. Since cr 
2NF (M'd ) -C 
2NF (;,, e ) in this 
ap2 ep 2 
2F - 2NF case, ap (m, .0 2) ;ý kýýp 
(M"02)' 
consider, finally, money demand disturbances. Clearly, 
2NF - 2F - 
a Cr p 
(M, d 3ap (M, d 2) according to whether A50. Price and out- 
put responses are given by equations (6.3.28) - (6.3.29) as 
app 
Nr -2 40ý-2) 
ta( apt pý, ((ýa 1a2 
-Cm) in - 
(Tn) + 
ad 3t ad 3t 
0 YF, 
+ 2ý cr (6.3.52) 
ae 
3t 
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Ur -1 -1 NP where a( apt 
)1ae 2t (Ta) y2 -r (m) <0 and a(ayt )/a452t(m) 0 from 
2NF - 2F equations (6.3.12) - 6.3.12). Thus, a cr y 
(M'd 304ay (m, e 3) 
obviously because of the unanticipated price movement. If ;L3.0 
2NF - 2F - (a high, a low) then 
aap 
(M'd 
3ap (m'd 3 
). The reason is 
familiar. The initial price fall is offset by the output contraction 
2NF - which is absent under full information. Since a (m'd 3 
2NF - 2F - 2NF - 
ba p 
(m, e3 then ap (m, d 3) 
;ý bý7p (M'e3)' If A40 (a low, j3 high), 
2NF - 2P - 
aap 
(m, e 3ap 
(m, e 3) 
is more likelys the stabilizing effects of 
unanticipated price fluctuations are dampened and the observed lower 
real interest rates under full information induces stabilzing demand 
2NF - 2NF responds. In addition, a cr p 
(M'd 
3) -C b: crp 
( M'03) from above so that 
2F - 2NF - a (m, e ) <> bap (m, e p33 
in conclusion, the results for the closed economy are rather more 
ambiguous than the results obtained for the open economy model in 
section 6.2. Whether or not the existence of a filtering problem 
increases or decreases price and output volatility is critically 
dependent on the structural parameters of the model. Nonetheless, 
the salient point remains, namely that the information assumption is 
(at least potentially) far from innocuous and the relative super- 
iority of monetary over interest rate control is non-invariant with 
respect to the information structure. As in the open economy model, 
there is still the possibility that it may pay to deprive agents of 
information. 
6.4 Summary and Concluding-Remarks 
The chapter has been concerned to re-assess the optimal choice 
of monetary instrument under alternative assumptions about the 
information structure. Standard approaches to the issue (as in 
chapters 2 and 3) eschew the important role of some variables as 
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conveyers of information. This means that the effect of control on 
the information content of these variables is neglected. 
we have considered two simple models. Section 6.2. contained 
an open-economy model in which the set of information variables 
under partial contemporaneous information comprised the exchange 
rate and the interest rate. Some fairly unambiguous conclusions 
emerged which indicated that, for all the shocks taken together, 
the relative superiority of a money stock peg over an interest rate 
peg is reduced wh en the assumption of full contemporaneous information 
is'relaxed and agents extract auxiliary information from currently 
observed asset prices. This is interesting because an interest rate 
peg makes the set of useful information variables contain only the 
exchange rate. In section 6.3 a closed economy model was analysed. 
unlike the open economy model, exogenising the interest rate here 
deprived agents of any contemporaneous information. The results were 
more sensitive to the structural parameters than in the open economy 
framework. The general point remained, however, namely the poten- 
tially critical influence of the information structure on the 
relative superiority of one policy over another. An implication of 
both analyses is that it may pay to deprive agents of information by 
pegging the interest rate. 
We believe that the content of the chapter should be extended to 
other issues. Then a clearer understanding of the relative merits of 
alternative policies would be forthcoming. certain policies deemed 
to be favourable under one information structure may lose some of 
their attractiveness under an alternative assumption. Moreover, 
depriving agents of some initial information by controlling infor- 
mation variables should not be ruled out. As our own analysis 
indicates, this may prove to be a useful way of reducing the ampli- 
tude of stochastic fluctuations. A prtort, nothing more can be said 
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on this matter. Further research is necessary in order to yield 
greater insights into these issues. In particular, it should be 
noted that, though our results certainly show that the relative merits 
of different policies are likely to change according to the informa- 
tional assumption, they have little or nothing to say about the 
quantitative magnitude of this change. As mentioned in chapter 5, 
a general drawback of the literature on signal-extraction is that 
the precise quantitative importance of alternative informational 
assumptions is unknown. Attempting to measure the potential 
importance would seem to be particularly relevant for policy 
evaluation and we suggest this as an area for future research. 
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Notes to Chapter 6 
TbIji Chapter car be found in Blackburn (1965cl). 
(1) In Dotsey amcl King (1963) there is also local price informatio-n. 
(2) This is, of course, to incur criticism from those who regard 
the appropriate welfare criteria to be the minimization of 
deviations from the full information solution. As mentioned 
above, however, there is no general agreement on this. In the 
model of section 6.3 (an equilibrium model), the full informa- 
tion criteria is most persuasive. Nevertheless, we seek to 
compare the analysis in this section with the orthodox approach 
and the latter takes deviations from long-run equilibrium as 
the minimand. Thus, for the sake of comparison, we adopt the 
the latter criteria. 
(3) We have not investigated whether or not the results of our 
policy rule of chapter 2 (section 2.4) are qualified with 
respect to different information structures. ' 
In fact, r 2(m) T2 (r) is I 
obvious: since r2(r) 
-r 2 
(m) >1 is necessary for stability. 
(5) In"constructing the diagram , it is noted that Ori/an ), 0 
(i 1,2) by applying the implicit function theorem to the 
'polynomial in equation (6.2.7)t a-r, /cln Caf(r i)/arij 
Caf(-r 
I 
)/an] (i - 1,2). 
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CHAPTER 7 
REFLECTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
, The thesis has been concerned to examine--and extend some recent 
developments in macroeconomic theory and the theory of macroeconomic 
policy. - For the most part, these developments reflect the integ- 
ration of the rational expectations hypothesis into economic analysis 
and the consequences thereof. 'We have not attempted a, rigorous ' 
defence of this hypothesis. Though the formal definition of rational 
expectations is subject to some important criticisms (to which we 
are sympathetic and to which we shall return below), we have adopted 
the assumption throughout the thesis on the grounds that it is a 
fallacy to consider any existing alternative. Nowhere'is this more 
persuasive than in the problem oUeconomic policy evaluation. The 
Lucas (1976) critique is, one example of this. Another is that 
economic policy should not be-designed on the assumption that agents 
can be continually fooled. Yet another is that agents will use or 
attempt-to forecast policy in-formulating their expectations and 
plans'. -Surely, rational expectations is to impart'an extreme form of 
intelligence to the system; but it'is the-only existing assumption 
which captures sophisticated expectations formation in a simple way 
and we believe this to be sufficient justification-for adopting the 
hypotbesis 
The thesis has been consciously written with two parts in mind. 
Part'rýcontained chapters-1 - 4. A-notable feature of these chapters 
was the minimal reference to the information structure conditioning 
expectations. ý 'In certain instances, however, we hinted at the 
potentially important role of information in determining the outcome 
of events. Part 11 consisted of chapters 5-6 and was intended to 
address explicitly the informational assumptions in rational 
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expectations models. rt now remains for us to summarize the content 
of each of these chapters, to collect our thoughts on these and to 
suggest areas where we believe important research to lie in the 
future. The reader is also referred to the concluding sections of 
each chapter. 
Chapter I was motivated by a recent rapidly growing research 
progra on general problems of macroeconomic, policy design in the 
presence of forward-looking behaviour. This has been pioneered by 
Buiter (1980a, 1981a, b, 1983,1984a), Miller and Salmon (1983,1984a, 
b, c), Currie and Levine (1983a,, 1984a, b, c, 1985) and Levine and 
Currie (1983,1984). our purpose was to provide a comprehensive 
appraisal of the research, to clarify matters and to make the area 
accessible-to a wider audience. The chapter introduced the technique 
of dynamic optimal controlýand showed that the standard optimal 
control problem yields optimal policies which satisfy the prtnctpLe 
of opttma&tty or, equivalently, are ttme conststent. This strikes a 
direct analogy with the problems faced in the physical sciences. We 
then discussed the seminal contribution by Kydland and Prescott 
(1977) which illustrated vividly a reason why one-might feel less 
enthusiastic about applying techniques from the physical sciences to 
social phenomena. The major insight was the appreciation of the 
economic policy problem, as a ga between intelligent players. 
Various game-theoretic concepts were introduced, and the distinction 
between the notions of Nash and StackeLberg behaviour elicited. Open 
Loop-and cLosed Loop concepts could be appended to these to refine 
the strategic structure of the game further. We argued that a game 
between the privateýsector and the government is most plausibly 
described by the Stackelberg assumption whereby the government acts 
as-the dominant player. The consequence of this was seen to be the 
distinction between the ex ants optimal policy and the ex post 
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optimal policy, or,, equivalently, to be the ttme tnconststency of the 
original optimal plan. This makes the original plan lose its 
attractiveness because its optimality property. hinges on it carrying 
credibility; but this is unlikely to be accommodated, because of 
private sector foresight in anticipating the incentive for, the 
controller to renege on his announcement. We illustrated how the 
time inconsistency property had been established in standard game-, 
theoretic analyses, without formal modelling of rational expecta- 
tions, where players are engaged in a Stackelberg game (see, for 
example, Simaan and Cruz (1973); Cruz (1975);, Kydland (1975,1977)). 
Nonetheless, we-also emphasized that these analyses implicitly rely 
on sophisticated forward-looking behaviour akin, to rational 
expectations. 
Given the time inconsistency of the ex ants optimal policy, we 
re-defined the policy problem as seeking the best policy within the 
subset of credible (and hence time consistent) policies. Precommtt- 
ment makes the ex ants optimal policy fall within this set but we 
questioned its feasibility since there always remains an incentive 
to cheat. In addition, we commented, on the erroneous association of 
the time inconsistency issuewith the debate on rules versus 
discretion. A strategy of perfect cheattng, which is time consis- 
tent, was identified with the actual. implementation of the full 
optimal policy which requires continual deception. This was deemed 
to be too implausible to merit serious consideration. The asymmetry 
inherent, in the Stackelberg ga can be avoided by invoking the Nash 
assumption which yields a time consistent solution. The original 
contributions were by Buiter (1983), Cohen and Michel (1984) and 
Currie and Levine (198S) and we identified other approaches with 
these., We discussed various concepts of Nash equilibria, in 
particular subgame perfectton, and noted that the search for time 
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consistency is often-a search for perfect equilibria. rn either 
case, the, solution has a backward-recursive structure which effect- 
ively eschews the non-causalities in the system. 
The Nash assumption alters the strategic structure of the game 
but we saw how it can be motivated by considering the consequences 
of reneging and the loss -of reputatton. Following this we suggested 
that the preoccupation with Nash equilibria and dynamic programming 
techniques overlooked the main issue at stake. Control rules 
resulting from these analyses are inferior to the ex ante optimal 
policy and the most pressing-Sroblem is precisely how to enforce the 
latter. We applauded the recent work by Barro and Gordon (1983) and 
sackus and Driffill (1984a, b, 1985) which address the policy problem 
in the context of-repeated games or a supergame. Then the inferi- 
ority of the Nash solution provides the mechanism by which the 
ex ante optimal policy might be enforced. Uncertainty about rivals 
preferences will enrich the game as players engage in a learning 
process. For us, this type of framework is the correct background 
against which the time inconsistency issue should be addressed. We 
pointed out, however, what seems to us to be a major drawback, namely 
I 
the apparent difficulty in generalizing the analysis. Moroever, ' we 
also stressed that, though the reputation framework seems to be a 
useful descriptive device in some circumstances, it is devoid of any 
quantitative content. We urge research to be directed towards these 
matters if the reputation approach is to sustain and enhance the 
respect which we believe it deserves. An investigation into the 
stochastic control problem by Currie and Levine (1985) was seen to 
yield'results akin to the reputation models and this might prove to 
be a convenient way of examining reputation issues, given its 
relative superiority over the reputation models in terms of its 
tractibility. 
1 
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A discussion on the conirý; fpri)blem'in sto6hastic systems also 
argued that much of the literature overlooks certain issues of 
substance which arise precisely because of the presence of stochastic 
behaviour. A feedback (or innovation-contingent) policy adds a 
further interesting dimension to the policy problem since there is a 
potential confusion between the optimal response to exogenous 
perturbations and the time inconsistency property of the optimal 
policy. Canzoneri (1984) is a paper in mind here. A prtori, the net 
outcome is difficult to ascertain. We suggest that this area is 
relatively terra tncogntta and should be explored in more detail. 
we also recorded some comments on the question of cooperation and 
questioned the validity of analysing this since it would appear to 
assume collusion between players which is always ruled out, other- 
wise the non-cooperative game might degenerate into Stackelberg war- 
fare. In addition, though cooperation between countries might be 
plausible and has occupied much attention, we also pointed out that 
suitable penalty strategies for enforcing cooperation between 
countries may be unavailable given the different sizes of nations. 
Some rather more substantive issues that we addressed are as 
follows. We noted that the literature takes as a fact that time 
inconsistency actually constitutes a problem. We argued that if the 
controller is truly able to acconviodate private sector preferences, 
it is difficult to envisage any problem associated with time incon- 
sistency. Rather, for there to be a problem, at least some players 
must percieve of the possibility that they will be made worse off 
should the controller renege on his announced strategy. We believe 
that there are sufficient reasons to believe this to be the case, 
most notably because of divergent preferences between the controller 
and the private sector or heterogeneity in the private sector, or a 
divergence between private and social interests. We then suggested 
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that a more realistic approach incorporating heterogenous players is 
likely to complicate the problem significantly. The threat effect of 
a lost reputation may be undermined and, indeed, may not merit 
serious consideration. because it would rely on collusive behaviour. 
Further-research into these matters would be helpful. our final , 
remarks focussed on the informational assumptions in the literature. 
we, pointed out that, for the most part, the analyses deal with full 
information dynamic games. Though useful for illustrating, general 
themes, we believe that greater uncertainty should now be incorpor- 
ated., This might take the form of uncertainty about players, 
payoffs, players' strategies and the general stochastic properties 
of the system. There would then be an interesting filtering problem 
in identifying the intentions and current behaviour of rivals. 
our overall thoughts on the time inconsistency literature were 
guarded and remain so. We do not, subscribe to the view expressed 
by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Prescott (1977) that control 
theory (or optimal economic policy formulation in general for that 
matter) is redundant, when the problem takes on the features of a 
dynamic game. It, is certainly true that rational expectations 
modifies substantially the approach to economic policy design but it 
does not render. it futile. There is a clear need for collaboration 
on empirical evaluations of the issues involved. A sustained 
research progamme involving close cooperation between academics 
should go some way towards making the area less abstract and appear 
, more directly relevant to the aficianados of the policy making 
process. 
chapter 2 was, by way of, a prelude to chapter 3. It took up some 
issues raised in chapter 1 relating to economic policy evaluation and 
the design of control rules. rirst, Chow (1976a, b), Johansen (1979) 
and Currie (1985a, b) have stressed the need to incorporate model 
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uncertainty into problems of economic policy evaluation by testing 
the performance of alternative control rules across different models. 
This would yield a payoff matrix conveying information about the 
possibility of mode&-robust policies. Second, there may be advan- 
tages in adopting simple control rules which must be offset by the 
fact that these rules do not satisfy the prtnctpLe of certatnty 
equtvaLence and will therefore depend on the stochastic properties 
of the system. Poole (1970) illustrated the latter when examining 
the optimal choice of monetary instrument. This particular issue 
continues to generate a lively debate and chapter 2 contained a 
brief review of the literature. our conclusion was that the 
existing analyses shed little light on the possibility of model- 
robust policies because of the similarity of the models employed. 
To correct for this, we proposed an analytical framework comprising 
six different models. Following this, we turned to an issue raised 
by Sargent and Wallace (1975) concerning the possibility of non- 
uniqueness associated with a policy of controlling the interest 
rate and offered a resolution of this problem. This involved the 
announcement of a policy rule with feedback on private sector 
forward price expectations and we showed how this rule could be 
implemented in ter-: of a feedback on actual current prices and 
stochastic disturbances, provided that direct observation of these 
is possible. The important property of both rules was shown to be 
that they are observationally equivalent to the usual contemporaneous 
feedback rule between the interest rate and the money stock. Thus, 
the general rule serves solely to pin down the long-run equilibrIuM 
and does not affect the dynamic response of the system. We 
suspect that there exists a wide class of policy rules with similar 
characteristics to ours and it would be interesting to pursue 
investigation into this matter. 
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Chapter 3 formalized the analytical framework discussed in 
chapter 2 and performed a systematic investigation into the optimal 
choice of monetary instrument across divergent model structures. A 
payoff matrix was constructed and the particular implications for 
model-robust policies can be found in chapter 3. Reflecting on 
some more general issues raised by our analysis, we would emphasize 
the following. First, we continue to urge further research in a 
similar spirit to ours, examining different types of control rules 
and different models. Second, in the case of simple rules which do 
not satisfy the principle of optimality, this should be combined with 
a sensitivity analysis across a wide spectrum of stochastic distur- 
bances. we also suggest that a particularly interesting and relevant 
line of enquiry would be to employ stripped-down versions of the 
existing large econometric models currently used in forecastihg 
and policy simulations. 
Chapter 4 addressed a popular and extensive literature on the 
implications of the government budget constraint for the coordination 
of fiscal and monetary policy. The originalpioneers of this were 
Ott and Ott (1965) and Christ (1967,1968). We recalled a major 
implication, pointed out by Blinder and Solow (1973), to be the 
potential instability of a financial policy which involves the 
financing of budget imbalances by issuing or retiring government 
debt; what we, termed a monetarist financial policy rule. We listed 
a number of papers dealing with this issue and which indicated the 
robustness of monetarist instability with respect to different 
models. we also suggested some gaps in the literature, most notably 
the concentration on small analytical models and the relatively 
little research into open economy models and the consequences of 
alternative expectations assumptions. To investigate these 
matters, we used a fairly general model developed by Whittaker and 
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Wren-Lewis (1983) incorporating asset accumulation, the government 
budget constraint and international trade and capital flows, together 
with exchange rate and price expectations which might be determined 
either adaptively or rationally. This required abandoning analytical 
techniques in favour of computer simulations using a recently 
developed rational expectations software package at Queen Mary 
College. The issue of bond-financed deficit instability was subject 
to a fairly rigorous investigation with emphasis on a sensitivity 
analysis with respect to parameter variations. our results indicated 
strongly the tendency for monetarist instability which was broadly 
independent of the expectations assumption and rather occurred via 
the usual stock-flow interactions in the system. Nonetheless, 
provided post-tax real interest rates are negative, our results also 
indicated how rational expectations might improve the chances of 
monetarist stability and how adaptive price expectations might 
present an additional obstacle to this. Finally, we reported some 
simulations of the model under exogenous shocks. The broad charac- 
teristics of the adjustment paths from one steady state to another 
were seen to be similar for different expectations assumptions, 
though these paths were far from monotonic. In addition, rational 
expectations appeared to smooth and speed up'the adjustment of the 
system. 
6ur overall conclusions suggested some areas for future research 
on this model. In particular, the model is sufficiently manageable 
to permit modifications to its basic structure so that a number of 
extensions could be made. An interesting extension would be to 
incorporate a wage-price-exchange rate nexus in the spirit of Artis 
and currie (1981) (see also Artis (1991)). optimal control tech- 
niques could also be applied as could problems of signal-extraction. 
The latter would be especially interesting as current research on 
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this (to be discussed below) is restricted to small analytical 
models. we hope to pursue these matters at a later date when the 
computer software becomes available. 
Chapter 5 marked the beginning of Part 11 of the thesis on some 
issues relating to the information structure in rational expectations 
models. Our focus of attention was on stgnaL-extractton. This was 
defined as the extraction of auxiliary information, about currently 
unobservable variables from contemporaneous observations of some 
other variables which we termed tnformatton vartabLes. _ 
We, argued 
that this problem is endemic, to rational expectations models which 
assume that'agents exploit all currently available information.. 
The general approach to this problem takes the form of the Kalman 
filter which, we noted, is often simplified by making the assumption 
that information eventually becomes available. after a, lag. We 
pointed out that signal-extraction endows control rules with the 
potential to influence the system in two ways: the first is the 
standard mechanism whereby control alters the, dynamic response of 
the system;, the second. occurs-by virtue of the possibility for 
control rules to influence the tnformatton content of contemporaneous 
signals. In this respect, this is similar to the Lucas (1976) 
critique: -, not only 
is the economtc structure non-invariant with 
respect to policy rules, but, neither also is the tnformatton struc- 
ture. A critical review of some rational expectations models with 
par-tial information which address the filtering problem was given. 
This began with-a simple exposition of the early work by Lucas 
(1972b, 1975) and Barro (1976) in the context of equilibrium models 
and served to, familiarise the reader with the signal-extraction tech- 
nique. We saw that, for the most part, subsequent literature has 
continued to employ the equilibrium framework, or variants thereof, 
and we suggested that future research should be directed towards 
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examining rather different models. Tbroughout our discussion we 
continued to emphasize the potentially crucial role of the inform- 
ational assumptions in determining the behaviour of the system and 
highlighted some drawbacks of certain analyses. We also saw how 
partial information is often associated with dtfferenttaL tnfor7natton 
and suggested how the problem of filtering auxiliary information 
might take on additional aspects of some interest and complexity. 
That this is so is because of the circularity inherent in the 
filtering exercise; actions based on inferences will influence the 
observations upon which these inferences are conditioned. With 
heterogeneous information, observed signals will reflect the expecta- 
tions of differentially informed agents in addition to the underlying 
stochastic shocks. Then agents might be forced to make inferences 
about other agents' inferences who will be making similar inferences 
and so on and so forth. This tricky problem has the seeds of what we 
called an tnformattona& game and we believe that research into this 
might be quite interesting. We have already begun investigation 
ourselves though the preliminary nature of this prevents its 
inclusion in the thesis. Needless to say, we hope to continue our 
exploration in the future and we would welcome contributions from 
other sources. 
certain of our criticisms of the existing literature motivated an 
investigation into the information contents of the exchange rate and 
interest rates. rn particular,, we noted that most of the analyses 
employing open economy models assumed a static structure and 
uncovered interest parity. This meant that the, information contents 
of the exchange rate and the interest rate were identical so that one 
needed to consider the extraction of information from observation of 
only one, usually the exchange rate. We wished to test the validity 
of this in a dynamic model which permitted both perfect and imperfect 
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capital mobility and which introduced a potentially unobservable 
foreign disturbance. We showed that, in general, the information 
contents of the e=hange rate and the interest rate are different so 
that observing both variables conveys different information than does 
observing just one. We also showed that the amount and nature of 
auxiliary information is critically dependent upon the degree of 
capital mobility and the nature of the shock structure assumed. Part 
of the reason for these results focussed on the dynamic configuration 
of the model and suggested that dynamic adjustment might act as an 
additional source of information. Following this, we drew implic- 
ations for the dynamic response of the exchange rate and prices under 
alternative information structures. in some cases we discovered the 
perverse outcome that a greater tntttaL tnformattona& endowment may 
actually reduce the accuracy of forecasts about a particular distur- 
bance being considered. rn toto, however, more information must 
improve the expectational accuracy in which case observation of both 
the current exchange rate and the current interest rate conveys more 
information tha does observation of just the current exchange rate. 
Though the existing literature, and our own analysis, indicated the 
role of information in determining the behaviour of the system, there 
has been no quantitative evaluation of the importance of this. We 
stress that future research should be directed towards this aspect of 
the problem so that the precise significance (or lack thereof, 
pcrhaps) of the informational azsumptions can be assessed. 
Chapter 6 continued the theme of signal-extraction with partic- 
ular emphasis on policy evaluation. We wished to examine the 
potential for control rules to influence the system by altering the 
information content of observed signals. An obvious analysis which 
immediately suggested itself was the issue of the optimal choice of 
monetary instrument which occupied chapters 2 and 3. A potentially 
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useful information variable here is the interest rate which ceases to 
perform this role when exogenised by the policy maker. our-purpose 
was to re-evaluate the monetary instruments problem when the 
potential information content of the interest rate is exploited. We 
showed that depriving agents of useful information by controlling the 
interest rate may actually improve performance by reducing output and 
price volatility. For an open economy model, 'theýrelative superiority 
of a money stock peg unambiguously declined when we incorporated the 
statistical inference problem. For a closed economy model, the 
results were more sensitive to the structural parameter values. 'ýWe 
encourage further research along similar linesýto ours and, as above, 
hope for, some investigations into the quantitative importance of the 
issues. 
To conclude our thoughts-on, information, we emphasize the fol- 
lowing areas of interest., 
First, an important extension to the existing literature would be 
to examine the signal-extraction, problem in larger"models than those 
considered hitherto. Numerical simulations would indicate the 
precise importance of the information structure in determining, the 
dynamic behaviour of-the system and there might be some interesting 
modifications, to the adjustment paths when the solution of a system 
involves information extraction. We mentioned above that we'hope to 
pursue-this-research using the model of chapter 4 which, though 
fairly general-and encompassing a rich source of dynamics; is 
a nable to the extensions suggested here. 
ý-, Second, we noted that the actual implementation of control rules 
is likely to-take on additionl dimensions when the system is charac- 
terized by partial information. There may, for example, be arguments 
which favour restricting control rules to involve feedback on only 
the information variables in the system; and with heterogenous 
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information, there is then the question of which particular informa- 
tion variables to feedback on. whatever the virtues of alternative 
specifications and whether or not anything general can be stated (we 
suspect not), remains to be seen. 
Thirdly, we pointed out that the type of signal-extraction 
problem which occupied most of our attention was predicated on the 
standard assumption that the true structure of the system is known 
with certainty. That is, imperfect information was analysed in a 
rational expectations equilibrium and knowledge of the. system's 
structure conditioned the optimal filtered estimates of the currently 
unobservable variables. This had the attraction of revealing 
immediately the salient points. that we wished. to make. Nonetheless, 
the most fundamental issue remains the formal definition of rational 
expectations. We suggest that a most important area for future 
research is to address the problem of policy evalution in a framework 
which models the process of learning and the convergence (or lack 
thereof) to a rational expectations equilibrium. The optimal_pol- 
icies derived (if possible) are likely to be different from the 
standard rules and the strong conclusions of conventional rational 
expectations models are likely to be qualified. Rational expecta- 
tions can be, seen here as an end-point on the horizon to which agents 
are aspiring; but the practical policy, problem will involve consider- 
ation of the transition period in which agents are learning about the 
system. The beast which is likely to be unleashed, on. considering 
these issues might be difficultto ta but we encourage attempts to 
do so. 
To summar: Lze_this chapter, it is useful to list our main prop- 
osals-for further research as follows 
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(a) Time inconsistency: 
(i) Coordinated investigation into the quantitative importance 
of time inconsistency and related issues. 
(ii) Further analysis, including generalizations, of reputation 
models and investigations into the quantitative importance thereof. 
(iii) Relaxation of the informational aBsumptions. 
(iv) rurther analysis of stochastic systems. 
(b) other issues in policy evaluation and designs 
(i) Further investigations seeking model-robust policies and 
the combination of these with a sensitivity analysis for simple rules 
with respect to different stochastic shocks. 
(ii) Further investigations into policy rules & la Blackburn and 
Currie (1985). 
(iii) Further analysis of policy influence on the information 
content of information variables and investigations into the quantit- 
ative importance thereof. 
(iv) Analysis of the implementation of control rules under 
partial and differential information. 
(v) Analysis of policy evaluation and design in the presence of 
learning. 
other issues in information: 
Investigations into the quantitative importance of 
informational assumptions. 
(ii) Application of signal-extraction to larger models. 
(iii) Analysis of. heterogeneous information and the possibility 
of an informational ga . 
(iv) Further investigations into problems of learning and 
convergence to rational expectations equilibria, especially for the 
purpose of policy evaluation. 
397 
The foregoing pages have contained discussions and formal 
analyses of a variety of issues. Some of these are probably more 
controversial than others but we hope to have captured the interest 
of the reader in all of them. We also hope that at least some of 
the above suggestions for future research will be pursued shortly. 
on the above note, we conclude the thesis. 
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APPENDIX A 
WAJULTONIAN DYNAMICS AND THE 
MAXIMUM (MINIMUM) PRrNcrPLE FOR 
DYNAMIC OPTIMAL CONTROL 
The appendix sketches the'solution of the'dynamic optiinal control 
problem using the maximum (minimum) principle, as expounded rigor- 
ou'sly in Pontryagin, Boltyanski, 
, Gankrelridze -and Mishchenko (1962) 
for continuous time processes. ' Further discussion of this, including 
the discrete time version, can be found in Katz'ý1-962)`, Intrilligator 
(1971), Chow (1975), Lawden (1975)'and Kamien and Schwarz (1981). 
The second of these is especially recommended. rn addition to the 
foregoing, some useful introductions to optimal control theory 
include Meditch (1969), Aastroem (1970), and Chow (1981). 
A. 1 General Solution 
The continuous time formulation of the optimal control problem 
begins by measuring time continuously over the interval t04tStI. 
Then consider the dynamic system 
BY-M, y(t)) 
or 
(A. 1.1) 
Yn (t); w i(t),...., wm(t)) (J'-l,..., n) 
(A. 1.2) 
where y- nxl vector of state variables 
W, - wxI vector of control variables 
and j(t) is the timae derivative of X, k(t) - SIX(t)/dt. The equations 
of motion given by the nth order differential equation system in 
.j IRV 
equations (A. 1.1) - (A. 1.2) are autonomous. Extensions to non- 
autonomous systems is a trivial exercise. 
rt is assumed that the mx1 control vector, w(t), includes only 
admissable controls which are piecewise continuous functions, 
encapsulating the possibility that controls may jump discontinuously 
across the control region. In addition, it is assumed that the 
functions f. (*) (j 1,..., n) are continuously differentiable. 3 
Clearly, the nxl state vector, y(t), is a point in the n-dimensional 
Euclidean space, : n, so that the n-dimensional state trajectory, 
t 
(y(t))t # is a path of points in En and is a continuous vector-valued 
0 
function of time., Similarly, the mxI control vector, w(t), is a 
. point 
in the Euclidean m-spaceplep so that the m-dimensional control 
trajectory, (! f(t)) 
1, is a path of points in e and is a piecewise t 
0 
continuous vector-valued function of time. 
Now define a performance measure as the objective functional, J, 
evaluated over the horizon t; t4t 0 
'cj(. 
y(t), H(t))dt 
0 
1.3 ) 
g(y-(t), m(t)) - g(y l(t)" * *'Yn(t); wl(t)'* * *'wm 
M) (A. 1.4) 
where the function is assumed to be continuously differentiable. 
This function captures the influence of the state and control trajeC- 
tories within the relevant time interval on J. it has been called the 
interusediate function. rt is sometimes the case that a final func- 
tion, ; (. v(t, )), is appended to equation (Ail. 3) to capture the 
influence on 'J of the terminal state. This extension is a trivial 
exercise. The interpretation of j is that it is a measure of system 
error plus 
control effort. The dependence of J on y(t) represents the 
loss associated with deviating from some target; the dependence of J 
on W(t) captures the intensity of control input. 
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The dynamic optimal control problem is now defined as 
max. (or min. ) J 
! j(t) 
1 
g(. y(t), H(t))dt 
0 
(A. 15 ) 
subject to i(t) - f(y(t), y(t)) 
X(t 0)- yo given 
where y(t )- yo given provides n boundaxy conditions. The Lagrange .0 
functional., L, is therefore 
J+11 RMIBY-M, ]±M) - j(t)3dt 
t 0 
1 
3! (t)) + I-LMIBY. M, ! t(t)) - 
t 
0 
am 
i(g(y(t), 3t(t)) + y(t)f(y(t), y(t)) + A(t)y(t))dt 
t 
0 
- [I-, L(t )Y(t P-(t Wt )l I. 00 
where E- Ixn vector of costate variables 
and -R(t)j(t)has been integrated. The new variables that have been 
introduced are costate (multiplier, auxiliary, adjoint or dual) 
variables in the Ixn vector 8(t). These can be regarded as the 
dynamic analogues to Lagrange multipliers. in addition, note that 
since each (j - 1,..., n) corresponds to a differential equation 
each g. (j - 1,..., n) will vary continuously over time. Obviously, 
the ixn costate vector, a(t), is a point in En and the n-dimensional 
t 
costate trajectory, (R(t))t is a path of points in En, being a 
0 
continuous vector-valued function of time. 
The maximum (or minimum) principle now proceeds by defining the 
Hamiltonian functional, H, where 
AOU JL 
Er - 9(1(t), jf(t» + a(t)I(X(t), MM) 
so that equation (A. 1.6) becomes 
1 (H + A(t). y(t))dt - [a )- ag t l(t I)Y. 
(ti 
O)Y. 
(tO) 
(A. i.. 7) 
(A. 1.8) 
t ti 
Thus, consider an arbitrary variation in (a(t)) t" to (a(t) + '64ý(t))t 
00 
Then equation (A. 1.6) gives 
t 
AL t 
j(t)ldt. (A. 1.9) 
For a stationary point, AL -0 so that i(t). Moreover, from 
equation (A. 1.7), 
oa 
m 
aa(t) 
1.10) 
t1t 
Now consider an arbitrary variation-in (E(t))t to (lt(t) + Alt(t)) t 
t10t10 
and the associated change in (. y(t)) t to (Y(t) + &Y-(t))t . Equation 
00 
(A.. 1.8) gives 
aEl au 
, &L AW(t) +-+ AX(t) 
I dt - 1&(t I)AX(ti). t 
latt(t) lay(t) 
0 
(A. 1.11) 
For -a stationary point, LL 0 so that alll6t(t) w 0, alway: (t) - AM 
mid jL(t 2 
). - 0. Moreover, -from equation (A. 1.7), 
ag( *)T af( - + g- (t) - (A. 1.12 
aig t aly( t 
aEF ag( +pT (t) aff( (A. 1.13 
ay(t) ay(t) ay(t) 
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The foregoing bas sketcbed, the maximum (minimum) principle. The 
necessary conditions for an optimum are summarized below: 
aff 4m 
ajyt) 
1.14) 
aa m ag(, ) +4L TM af(-) =0 
aH agC*') 
+ATM 
ef(*)- 
-A(t) (A. 'l. 16 
ay(t) ax: (t) az(t) 
k(t I) -'0. 
1.17) 
Equations (A. 1-14) - (A. 1.16) are the canonical equations and 
describe 2n differential equations. There are n boundary conditions 
determined from initial time-#' y(t 
0)- 
yo,, and n transversality 
conditions determined from terminal time, g(t 0, given in 
equat. iion (A. 1.17). When'the system is non-causal, the boundary and 
transversality conditions need to be modified as stated in the main 
text. 
A. 2, Particular Solution Ii System 1.2 
The particular, analogue to equation (A. 1.1) is eq ation (1.2.1) u 
with f(y(t), tt(t)) - Ay(t) + EIH(t). The particular analogue to 
equation (A. 1.3) is equation (1.2.2) with g(y(t), ! t(t)) 
TT (y (t)Qy(t) + tE (t)Fý%! (t)). The solution of the optimal control 
problem proceeds as described in detail in the main text. and 
summarized for the general. case in section A. 1. 
4.03 
APPENDIX B 
SADDLEporNT SOLUMON TECHNrQUE FOR 
RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS MODELS 
The appendix describes the solution procedure for rational, 
expectations models as developed by Dixit (1980) for continuous time 
systems and by Blanchard and Kahn (1980) for discrete time systems. 
Further discussion,, including generalizations and extensions, can be 
found in Blanchard (1982), Buiter (1982,1984a, b) and Currie and 
Levine (1982)., The signal extraction technique in the case of partial 
information follows Currie and Levine (1982) and Pearlman, Currie and 
Levine (1983). 
B. 1. General solution ri (Full-rnformation)-Continuous Time 
Time is measured continuously with initial time, to, given. 
Then consider the dynamic system 
dy(t) - AX(t) + du(t) (8.1.1) 
where, y- nxI vector of endogenous variables 
du - nxl vector of stochastic disturbances 
and all variables are measured as deviations from long-run equilib- 
rium. in'-addition, A is an nxn timew4nvariaht matrix of coefficients. 
The rýki state'vector, yI dfýturbance vect or, qu(t), are : (t), and the nxi 
Partitioned confoxmably such that 
z(t) AZ(t) du (t) 
i(t) - 
(t) ! IX-, ( t) 
ýLum - 
du 2 
where z-nI xl vector of predetermined variables 
x-n2 xi vector of non-predetermined variables 
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2 
. 
§ul, du . n3. xl, n2 xi vectors of stochastic disturbances 
and n., +n2-n. 
Note that the nxl disturbance vector is given by du(t) - edt where 
edt is an nx1 vector of stochastic disturbances with independent 
increments so that d (t) is white noise. Any autoregressive disturb- 2A 
ances are therefore incorporated by suitable enlargement of the state 
vector (or, more precisely, suitable enlargement of the vector of 
predetermined variables). Clearly, the n-dimensional column state 
n 
vector, y(t), is a point in the Euclidean n-space, E 
Let n be the information set such that 
n(t) - (Y. M, r, Eli 4 (8.1.3) 
where r is a vector of structural parameters and r summarizes the 
variance-covariance structure of stochastic disturbances. Then gx 
e (t) 
is given by 
! jx'(t) - E'(t+dt, t) - M(t) 
e 2E (t+dt, t) - E(x(t+dt)fn(t)) 
where E(-) is the mathematical conditional expectations operator. The 
information set in equation (B. 1.3) assumes full contemporaneous 
information. The assumption of discrete lags in information availa- 
bility is meaningless in the continuous time system where information 
becomes available continuously. 
The solution technique now proceeds by defining 
_q(t) 
- Hy(t) ; X(t) - 
ýq(t) 
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where _q - nxl vector of 
canonical variables 
and X is an nxn matrix of left eigenvectors of A with lk-1 (so that 
ý is the matrix of right eigenvectors). As before, _q(t) 
is partit- 
ioned such that 
qIM 
_q(t) -21, ýý 
12 
where _q , _q " 
nxl, n 2xl vectors of canonical variables. 
Using a well-known canonical transform, therefore, 
NA an AM AN - 
;M- (B. 1.8) 
where A is the nxn diagonal matrix of eigenvalues of A. The nxn 
matrices A, M, 
ý 
and A are all partitioned conformably withy(t) and 
q(t) so that 
All A 121 
; 14 . 
mll 
A2, A 22 M21 
11 
; 
12' 
21 
ý22, 
H 121; 
Al 01 
H22 0A2 
(81.9) 
where M. 11o 
MI, and A, are nl x n, matrices; A12f M12 and M12 
are nxrl2 matrices; A 210 
M21 and M2 
.1 
are n 2xn, matrices; and 
A 22' 
M22 , M22 and A2 are n2 xn 2 matrices. Then 
dq e(t) - Ndy 
e (t) 
= IMAX(t)dt 
AMy(t)dt 
Ag(t)dt (B. 1.10) 
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using the fact that du 
e (t) - q. Focussing on the last n2 rows of 
equation (B. I. 10), 
d. 2e(t) mA 2-q 
2 (t)dt (B. 1.11 ) 
so that replacing t by r+ dr and taking expectations at time t, 
% ! 
lq 2e ( -r+dr, t)MA2q 
2e (T+dT, t), r4t. (8 " 1. " 12) 
Blanchard and Kahn (2980) show that for the system to have a 
unique convergent rational expectations solution, it must possess 
the saddlepoint property. This requires that there be n,. stable 
eigenvalues of A (n, eigenvalues with negative real part) and n2 
unstable eigenvalues of A (n 2 eigenvalues with positive real part). 
it is assumed that this condition is satisfied in which case the 
only non-explosive solution to equation (B. 1.22) is q 
2e (T+dr, t) -0 
(T >, t). Then for T-t, and letting dt + 0, q2 (t) -0 and the 
def inition of _q(t) gives 
A 
2( 
m 
217K(t) 
+m 
22, '! ý(") 
or 
-'H2. A(t) 2E(t) - -g22 
Equation (B. I. 14) defines the stable trajectory of the system. it 
gives the level of the non-predetermined (jump, free or forward- 
looking) variables as a linear combination of the predetermined 
(backward-looking) variables. The complete solution of the system 
now follows by substituting equation (B. I. 14) into equation (B. I. 1) 
A-07 
to obtain 
dz(t) - qz(t) +'Clul(t) 
where G-A.,, -, A, m Mll AIm ll* 2M22 ýl 
Hence, equations (B. I. 14) - (B. I. 15) give 
e 
G(t-to )z(to) 
+ 
It 
eG(t-r) dul(-r), 
t 
0 
t-tO)I-l 
eAl( m z(t + 
ft "dul(r) 
11 0t0 
(8.1.16) 
t 
-I e 
G(t-to) 
Z(t e 
G(t T)dul(7*) 
M(t) - -H22M21 0) - 
M22H21 
ft 
0 
eAýl(t-tO)ý-' 
te 
Al( t-r)ý-'Iju 1 
21 11 S(to) 4,21 11 
(-r) 
t 
0 
(B "1 17) 
with K( t0z0 given. 
8.2 general Soluti on I ir i (pull and Partial rnformation) D screte Time 
Time is measured discretely with initial time, t, given- Then 
0 
consider the dynamic system 
-'t +: L Ayt + 
B4, t + Y-t (B. 2.1) 
Cy t+ 
e DA, t + yt (B. 2.2) 
where X= nxl vector of endogenous variables 
S pxl vector of observation variables 
a, nxi, pxl vectors of stochastic disturbances 
40 F3 
and all variables are measured as deviations from long-run equil- 
ibrium. in addition, A and B are nxn time-invariant matrices of 
coefficients and C and D are pxn time-invariant matrices of 
coefficients. The nxl state vector, Y-t , and the nxl disturbance 
vector, u, are partitioned conformably such that ý-- t 
e 1, At 
e 
At, t It4-1 Pt 
Y-t Y-t' te Y-t+1 e 
Mt 
2 
(B. 2.3 
wbere zn 1xi vector of predetermined variables 
x-n2 xi vector of non-predetermined variables 
11 
3.11 2- 
nxl, n 2xl vectors of stochastic 
disturbances 
and nI+n2n. 
Equation (B. 2.1) is entirely general for the class of models with 
a single information set. In paxticular, any dynamic system with a 
finite number of lags can be reduced to a first order difference 
equation by suitable redefinition of variables and appropriate 
enlargement of the state vector. Hence, autoregressive processes 
for stochastic disturbances are incorporated in the state vector (or, 
more precisely, in the vector of predetermined variables) so that u 
Is purely white noise. Clearly, the n-dimensional column vector, 
n. is a point in the Euclidean n-space, E 
Equation (B. 2.2) defines the measurement equation with the 
currently observable variables given in the pxl observation vector, 
s, which is a point in the Euclidean p-space, Ep. The iniormatlon 
set, n, is defined as 
at m Qt, . 
2t-i, Y-t-j' E, 1: 1j4 1) (B. 2.4) 
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where r is a vector of structural parameters and E summarizes the 
variance-covariance structure of stochastic disturbances. Then 
eee Et+,, t, 2Et, t and t, t are given by 
e, E(3t+l I nt (B. 2.5) 3t+l, t 
e E(3Et I rit (B. 2.6) 2Et, t-" 
e 
.; t, t 
E(gtillt) (B. 2.7) 
where E(-) is the mathematical conditional expectations operator. 
Thus, contemporaneous information is available about only a subset 
of variables. rnformation about other variables accrues with a one 
period lag. Note, however, that equation (B. 2.4) includes as a 
special case the possibility that some of the z and x are directly 
observable. The two polar cases are when all of the z and, x are 
components of s (full information), and when none of the z and x are 
included in s. 
The solution proceeds by defining 
_qt - 
Myt yt - Hqt (B. 2.8) 
where q- nxi vector of canonical variables 
and M is an nxn matrix of left eigenvectors of A+B with 14-1 (so 
that is the matrix of right eigenvectors). In addition, 
_qt 
is 
partitioned as for yt such that 
. I' 
qt 
_qt 2 
(B. 2.9) 
. 
qtl 
where 
_q 
1, 
-a 
2-n 
xi, n xl vectors of canonical variables. 
3.2 
410 
Then a well-known canonical transform states that 
H(A+B) - AH (A+B)ý - HA (B. 2.1O) 
where A is the nxn diagonal matrix of eigenvalues of A+B. The nxn 
matrices A+B, M, 
ý 
and A are partioned, conformably with yt and 
qt so that 
(A+B) 
11 
(A+B) 
12 m 11 
M12 
A+B M an 
(A+B) 
21 
(A+B, ) 
22 H21 H221 
0m 
-1 - 
11 
; 
12' 
A2 
21 
ý22 
(8.2.11) 
where (A+B) 11' 
Mll' 
11 and 
A1 are n1 xn I matrices; 
(A+B) 
12" 
H 
12 ' 
and 12 are n1 xn 2 matricesi 
(A+B) 
21' 
M 
21 and 
ý21 
are n2 xn 1 matrices; 
and (A+B) 22 ,M 22 ,H 22 and 
A2 are n2 xn 2 matrices. 
Then 
ee 
_qt: 4.: L ,t- 
myý4.: L, t 
M(A+B e 
Im ANY. Nu -c 't ýý_t ,t 
Acl e+ Mu e ýlt, t 
(B. 2.12) 
with 2tet 
2e )TIT since le Focusing on the last Rt, t Mt, t 2- 
n2 rows of equation (B. 2.12), 
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2e 2e 2e 
_qt+l 't 
= A2-qt, t+m 2211t, t (8.2.13) 
so that replacing t by t+j (j ý 1) and taking expectations at time t, 
2e 2e 
_qt+. I+j, t =A 
A+J, tf 
j"I (B. 2.14) 
using the fact that 
2e 
! Lt+j, tý0 (j 
Blanchard and Kahn (1980) show that for the system to have a 
unique non-explosive rational expectations solution, it must possess 
the saddlepoint property. This requires that there be nI stable 
eigenvalues of A+B (n I eigenvalues which lie inside the unit circle) 
and n2 unstable eigenvalues of of A+B (n 2 elgen-values Outside 
the unit 
circle). It is assumed that this condition is satisfied in which 
case the only non-explosive solution to equation (B. 2.14) is 
is 2e 
_qt+j"t -0 
(j >, 1). Then for j-1, the definition of _qt 
gives 
A (M e+me)+m 2e (B. 2.15) 2 21ý-t, t 20t, t 222t, t 
or 
e W-1 A -1 2e (B. 2.16) 25t, t- -W2-2lK2. lke,, t 22 2 M2A, t' 
In addition, equation (B. 2.1) yields 
eI le (B. 2.17) It - it, t" Mt-i - . 
4-. 1, t- 
e 
-A -' 
1AeA-. 1 2 2e (B. 2.18) Kt, t 22 21(Et - Et ,t 22(! 
at - ! at, t) 
so that substituting equations (B. 2.16) - (8.2.17) into equation 
gives 
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im bi - -A71A 
14 -1 M A71A le -'IM21 22 21)Rt-I 22 21- 
-2 
22 21k 
+( 
22 2 2I)lk-. 1, t 
_A-1 
2 
4- (A -1 -1 -1 
2e 
(B. 2.19) 222t 22-M22A2 
M22)2t, 
t' 
Equation (B. 2.19) is now substituted into equation (8.2.1) to obtain 
" Gz +AM -1 -1 A1 -A -1 M -A 
-1 A le - lt+i ý--t 12( 22M21-A22 21)"t-I 12(M22 2 22 21)2t-l, t 
-A A -1 u2+ (A A -1 m 
2e I (B. 2.20) 12 2V--t A12 22 22 2 22)2t, t + 2t 
where G-A -A Ai 
-1 -IM21 'm 
kl 
IHII 11 12422 11 
B. 2(A) Full Information 
The full information solution proceeds by noting that 9 includes 
all of the z and x. Then all stochastic disturbances are known with 
le 1 2e 2 
certainty. imposing 34-l't , 't-l and Mt't - Rt in equations 
(B. 2.29) - (B. 2.20), therefore, 
-M-1 m M-1 -1 
2 
22 21k - 22A2 M22"t 
(B, 2.21) 
GýZ= -1 -1 21 (B. 2.22) lt+l t- lkl2H22A2 H29t + Mt 
Equation (B. 2.21) is the stable trajectory, giving the level of the 
non-predetermined (jump, free or forward-looking) variables as a 
linear combination of the predetermined (backward-looking) variables 
and stochastic disturbances. 
B. 2(B) Partial Information 
The partial information solution arises when s does not include 
all of the z and x. Then to solve the system requires the use of 
siqnal-extraction. The extraction of auxiliary information about 
stochastic disturbances Proceeds as follows. 
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First, partition the pxn C matrix in equation (B. 2.2) conformably 
with Xt such that C - [Cl C2] with CI and C2 having orders pxn., and 
pxn 2 respectively. Then 
Cz+Ce I-; -- t 235t 
+ Dyý, t+ 2t (B. 2.23) 
Similarly, partition the nxn B matrix in equation (B. 2.1) such that 
B- C(BI)T (B 2)T3T with B1 and B2 having orders nI xn and n2 xn 
respectively. The last n2 rows of equation (B. 2.1) can be written as 
A-2 (ez2e2 22 ýt+l, t -A 2V--t -B yt, t-Ilt)o 
(B. 2.24) 
Finally, partition the nxn A matrix as above so that 
A- [(A 
1)T(A 2)T3T 
where A' and A2 have orders n1 xn and n2 xn 
respectiveiy. The first n, rows of equation (B. 2.1) are 
IIe , Y-t-I +, Y-t-i, t-i 
(B. 2.25) 
Substituting equations (B. 2.24) - (B. 2.25) into equation (B. 2.23) 
gives 
C (A 
1 
yt 
1eI)+e 
3. 
, _1 
+ B. Yt_i, t-I + Mt-I Dyý't 
C (A -1 e -A -2 AA -2 B2e -A -1 
2+y 
.t 2 22Kt+l, t 22 21k 22 Y-t, t 222t) 
cA -1 A2., )A 
I 
Yt-l +c -C A -1 
1e 
I-C2 22 
( 
.12 22A21)13 
Y-t-l, t-I 
-1 B2)e+CA -1 e (C -C A-1 
I 4' (D-C2A22 Y-t, t 2 22Lrt+l, t +12 22A21)Ht-I 
C -1 
2 
2A2A + 2t (B. 2.26 ) 
The only terms in equation (B. 2.26) which are currently unknown 
axe u .1u2 and v It is assumed that these are independently t-: L, t -t 
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distributed; if they are not, then the composite disturbances can 
be rearranged such that the resulting expression is a linear 
combination of independently distributed stochastic disturbances. 
12 Given the linear dependence of at on 2t_,, yt and yt, the optimal 
filtered estimates of these disturbances are given by 
le PT 2t-JL, tI 
2e T2 
34, t 2H "ON-1 - 'Lui + Y-t) 
e 
. 
it, t r-v 
where FC -C A -1 A 22 22 21 
HC -1 2A22 
4 (FE i', + Hr. LIT + r., -1 12 
(B. 2.27) 
and r 1' 1: 2 and r-v are the n1 xn1, n2 xn 2 and pxp asymptotic variance- 
12 
covariance matrices of u, 11 and v respectively. The orders of 
F, H and 0 are pxn,, pxn 2 and pxp respectively. 
The solution of the system under partial information now follows 
by substituting equation (B. 2.27) into equations (8.2.19)'- (B. 2.20): '' 
,2 
;2A )gt -IM21"t + (k2 -A71 2 
1M21 
2; 2 21 
-1 T 1- 
-H 
2 -1 2 A rif 3Et; )-A 22M21-A22 21)1: lF 4ý( t-1 ýlt 4' 222t 
-1 -1 -1 T2 AHrH 22- 22A2 H22) 213 Mý + it) 
A (M -1 -1 1 Et+l - O: Et + 12 22M2l-A22A21)11t-I 
-1 HI T4ý(F, 2tl _21+v 2 21 
12 
-A3.2(bC2 -A722A21 )1: 117 _1 
Hu 
-ý--t -t 
A12A; A 
-A (A 
-1 
-M 
-1 -1 mM H70( 2 Yt) +I 12 22 2i 
A2 
22 2 
rlyý-1-112t + 2t 
(B. 2.28) 
(8.2.29) 
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or 
Hz+[- -A A -A22A21)1: 11F* 
Tor 
3t PC22 2V--t 
1 ;2 W2-21H21 ;2 
21-(H22H21 
I I 
Am 
22-M22 2 22 2 
c-A7- 1+ (k2-lM2l-A72'IA FT4 A7 W -1 A7H 
j 
oll, 
2 
22 22 21)1: 2- I+( 21- 22 21 22)1: 2 Rt 
14 M -A 
-1 APT 41 + (A -1 -M 
-1 A -2 MHT O]v 
2-12 21 22 21 1 22 22 2 22 2 "-t 
(B. 2.30) 
Gz +A[ -1 M -A-IA -1 M -A -1 A )E3. F 
T 
OF ; --t 12 
M22 21 22 21-(ý22 21 22 21 
T1 m 1A21M22 )J: 2H OF]j! t (A72-21- 
-22 
_1 
+ Mt 
-1 -1 -1 T -1 -1 -1 T2 A 
12 
[-A 
22 
+ (M 
22M21 -A 22 
A 
21 
)r, 
1F 
OH + (A 
22 -M 22 
A2m 
22)r'2 
H OHj2t 
ICIM -A7 
IAF Tit A7 H -1 -1 
T A: 12ý( 2 
-1 
2 21 22 21) .1+( 22- 22A2 
M22)1: 2R '0'2t* 
(B. 2.31) 
Equations (B. 2.28) and (B. 2.30) define the stable trajectory of the 
system, giving the level of the non-predetermined (jump, free or 
forward-looking) variables as a linear combination of the predeter- 
mined (backward-looking) variables and stochastic disturbances. 
B. 3 Particular Solution I: System 3.3(E) 
The particular analogue to equation (B. 1.10) is equation (3.3.60) 
with A the 3x3 dynamic matrix, z- Cy P]T and x-q. Normalising 
so that M22 "1' the definitions in equation (B. 1.9) give the partic- 
22 
ular analogue th M as M Im 11 with M CMY mP 1. Then the 21 21 21 21 
particular analogue to equation (B. 1.14) is equation (3.3.63). The 
expressions for mY and mp- in equations (3.3.64) - (3.3.65) follow 21 22 
fr r! 
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Ac+, r 3) -, \ß(b+O 1 Aße 1 
p Im 
21 m 21 01 +r 3) e1 
1e2 -e 1 i-Ir 3. 
(B. 3.1) 
The particular analogue to equation (B. 1.15) is equation (3.3.67) 
which is derived by substituting equation (3.3.63) into equation 
(3.3.60). Thus, 
dy' Y, 
dt 
dp P. 
( my mpf 1 dt + du 
1 
21 21 
. 
la, 
. 
which gives equation (3.3.67). 
(B. 3.2) 
BA Particular Solution 11: System 3.3(F) 
The particular analogue to equation (B. 1.1) is equation (3.3.82) 
with A the 4X4 dynamic matrix, z- Cy p v] 
T 
and x-e. Normal- 
ising so that M22 the definitions in equation (B. I. 9) give the 
particular analogue to M2 as M2. CM 1 1] with M 'W [my mp_ mv 2 21 21 21 21 
Then the particular analogue to equation (B. I. 14) is equation 
(3.3.86). The expressions for W_ , mp- and mv in equations 21 21 21 
(3.3.87) - (3.3.89) follow from 
'-(, \(c-j3 
le)+. r4) -A(131 
b+132 0 AO 
2 
Ypve -T 400 
Em2l m 21 M213 an 0 
00 -(P+T 4) 0 
byl7n, b-n 21 n2-'r4, 
(B. 1*61) 
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The particular analogue to equation (B. I. 15) is equation (3.3.91) 
which is derived by substituting equation (3.3.86) into equation 
(3.3.82). Thus, 
dy . -A(C-o I Cý) -A(, G 1 
b+32) 0 Y, 
dp e00p dt 
. dvj o0 -P. V. 
. Aß 
2' , Y' 
ym p_ v1p dt + du 1, (B. 4.2) m il 21 m21 
0. 
-v. 
which gives equation (3.3.91). 
B. 5 Particular Solution III i System 5.3 
The particular analogue to equation (B. 2.1) is equation (5.3.6) 
with A the 2x2 dynamic matrix, z-p and x-e. Normalising so 
that M22 "1' '1* the definitions in equation (B. 2.11) give the particular 
analogue to M2 as 
W 
'. Cm 21 1]. Then the particular analogues to 
equations (B. 2.19) - (B. 2.20) are equations (5.3.10) - (5.3.11). To 
obtain equation (5.3.12), rewrite equations (5.3.10) - (5.3.11) as 
(2-, r 2-, r 
1 
-a-' 
-1 
., 
L)et+, = -m2l( IL)pt+l 
+ lb., (I-TL)ut 
2y 
(1-T. 
IL 
)e 
2t+l 
- a-I (1--rL -b 
le -"(3. e 
2 
)63t+l 
1( 1--rL)ut, t+l +b2y --T I L)d 2t+l, t+l 
b (1-7 L )e e 
21 3t+l, t+l 
( 1--r L)p \b u1 \a -1 y -1 ts u 
le 
1 t+l 1 t-1 2 2t 2 '63t-'\bl t-1, t 
Äb y-'(5 
e+ Ab ee+u1 (B. 5.2 ) 2 2t, t2 3t, t t 
where L is the lag operator. Then'substituting equation (B. S. 2) into 
418 , 
equation'(B. 5.1) gives equation (5.3. '12). The expression forý m2, 
follows as' 
ým 
21 
0. (8.5.3) 
a1a 2-7 21 
The full information analogue to equation (B. 2.4) is equation 
(5.3.13). The partial information analogues to equation (B. 2.4) are 
equations (5.3.14a) - (5.3.14c). For the information set in 
equation (5.3.14a), the particular analogue to equation (B. 2.2) is 
equation (5.3.17) with C the 2x2 right hand side matrix. Equation 
(5.3.19) is the particular analogue to equation (B. 2.27) and is 
obtained by proceeding as in section B. 2(B) to obtain equation 
(B. 2.26) which has the particular analogue in equation (5.3.18). The 
algebra which gives equations (5.3.15a) follows by noting from 
equation (5.3.19), 
, le 2T1' -1 
au t-1, tm cr 1F o(put_l-a 2c2c! 3t +r14! 2t) 
e -2 T1 -1 4s 2t, t cr 2G O(Fut_, -a 2c24 3t 
+Cvd 20 
e 
-72 
T -1 1 -1 
49 3t, ta3c2a2 40(Fu t-1 -a 2C2 3t 
4Ce 2t 
Then 
2T2 -2 -1 2 -1 -2 -2+ý-ln-2) ý-2a7l -2, 
1F0 a'oy 
a2)a 1[y a2 
(a3 or 22 na 2 
(B. S. 4) 
(B. 5.5) 
(B. 5.6) 
(B. S. 7) 
-2 T -2 -2 -1-2 -la72(32 -2 -2a7lncr2 a2G0 a(py 
a2)a 2CY 23 -a 1 ncr I -Y 21 
(B. S. 8) 
-2 T -1 2 -2 -132 -1 -2 2 -1-2 -2a7l( Cr2 -2 -a 3c2a2 
4ý a23 Cy a2 (a 1aI 
+y a 2) y21 
+a 
2)] 
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substituting equations (B. 5.7) - (B. 5.9) into equations (B. 5.4) - 
(B. 5.6) gives equations (5.3.15a). 
For the information set in equation (5.3.14b), the particular 
analogue to equation (B. 2.2) is equation (5.3.21). Equation (5.3.23) 
is the particular analogue to equation (B. 2.27) and is obtain by 
proceeding as in section B. 2(B) to obtain equation (B. 2.26) which 
has the particular analogue in equation (5.3.22). 
For the information set in equation (5.3.14c), the particular 
analogue to equation (B. 2.2) is equation (5.3.24). Equation 
(5.3.26) is the particular analogue to equation (B. 2.27) and is 
obtained by proceeding as in section B. 2(B) to obtain equation 
(B. 2.26) which has the particular analogue in equation (5.3.25). 
The particular full information solution which is the analogue 
to equations (B. 2.21) - (B. 2.22) are equations (5.3.279). The 
particular partial information solutions for the information sets 
in equations (5.3.14a) - (5.3.14b) which are the analogues to 
equations (B. 2.28) - (B. 2.31) are equations (5.3.28a) - (5-3.28b). 
B. 6 Particular Solution rV t System 6.2 
The particular analogue to equation (B. 2.1) iB equation (6.2.6) 
with A the 2x2 dynamic matrix, z-p and x-q. Normalising so that 
H 
22 - 
1, the definitions in equation (B. 2.11) give the particular 
analogue to M2 as M2 - [m2jL 13. Then the particular analogues to 
equations (B. 2.19) - (B. 2.20) are equations (6.2.10) - (6.2.11). To 
obtain equation (6.2.12), rewrite equations (6.2.10) - (6.2.11) as 
-m2, (I-T., L)pt+3. + d3. (I--rL)ul -a2"b(I-7, L tI 
)43t+l 
L-d, (I--rL)u le + d2b(l--rL I 
)454t+l 
t, t+l 
), e3t+l, 
t+, 
Ir d( I-T )e e 
21 4t+l, t+l 
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11 Idlut_l +t- xa: -lim 2 3t Aiý d. t - Ad ulej 1t i't 
Ad2be e+ Ad ee 3t, t 2 4t, t 
(8.6.2) 
where L is the lag operator. Then substituting equation (8,6.2) into 
equation (B. 6.1) gives equation (6.2.12). 
follows f 
cm 
21 
l' 2m0. 
ia1a 
2-'r21 
The expression for m2l 
(B, 6.3) 
The full information analogue to equation (B. 2.4) is equation 
(6.2.14). The partial information analogue to equation (B. 2.4) is 
equation (6.2.20). For a money supply peg, the particular analogue 
to equation (B. 2.2) is equation (6.2.21) and the steps sumnarized 
in section B. 5 apply. For an interest rate peg, the particular 
analogue to equation (B. 2.2) is equation (6.2.36) with C the lx2 
right hand side vector. Equation (6.2.38) is the particular 
analogue to equation (B. 2.27) and is obtained by proceeding as in 
section B. 2(B) to obtain equation (B. 2.26) which has the particular 
analogue in equation (6.2.37). 
We noted in the main text that it is not possible to retrieve 
the interest rate peg case from a general expression which imposed 
no initial restriction on the value of -0 (and hence b). The formal 
proof of this is easy. In fact, all one needs to do is to replace 
Y in the money supply Peg case with b. Then b appears only in the 
2 -2 -2 -2 term ba2. just as ya2 cancelled out for the money supply peg 
case, so b 
2a72 
also cancels out here. The optimal estimates of the 2 
disturbances are still given by equations (6.2.24) - (6.2.25) and 
imposing 0-w (b - 0) makes no difference. 
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The particular full information solution which is the analogue 
to equations (B. 2.21) - (B. 2.22) are equations (6.2.15) - (6,2.16). 
The particular partial information solutions for the money supply 
peg and interest rate peg cases which are the analogues to equations 
(B. 2.28) - (B. 2.31) are equations (6.2.32) - (6.2.33) and (6.2.46) - 
(6.2.47). 
B. 7 Particular Solution V: System 6.3 
The particular analogue to equation (B. 2.1) is the scalar equation 
(6.3.6) with A and B the scalar paramaters k and n respectively, and 
x-p. Since z-1-9, the particular analogue to equation 
-4-3. 
(B. 2.29) is just equation (6.3.8). 
The full Information analogue to equation (B. 2.4) is equation 
(6.3.20). The partial information analogues to equation (B. 2.4) are 
equations (6.3.16) and (6.3.36). For the information set in 
equation (6.3.16) and a money supply peg, the particular analogue to 
equation (B. 2.2) is equation (6.3.17) with C and D the scalar parama- 
ters wb and --ayib respectively. Equation (6.3.20) is the particular 
analogue to equation (B. 2.27) and is obtained by proceeding as in 
section B. 2(B) to obtain equation (B. 2.26) which has the particular 
analogue in equation (6.2.37). 
in the main text we noted that it is not possible to retrieve the 
interest rate peg case from a general expression which imposed no 
initial restriction on the value of 0 (and hence b). To prove this 
is to simply replace y in the money supply peg case with b. Then 
just as y -2 cancelled out in the former, so does b2 here. In fact, 
this can be seen directly from the general expression in equation 
(6.3.18). The optimal estimates of the disturbances are still given 
by equations (6.3.21) - (6.3.23) and imposing o-w (b - 0) makes 
no difference. 
412. 
The particular full information solution which is the analogue to 
equation (B. 2.21) is equation (6.3.11). The paxticular partial 
information solution for the money supply peg and interest rate peg 
cases which are the analogues to equations (B. 2.28) and (S. 2.30) are 
equations (6.3.28) and (6.3.32). 
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APPENDIX C 
EMETERMINED COEFFICIENTS SOLUTION TECHNIQUE 
FOR RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS MODELS 
The appendix summarizes the solution procedure for discrete time 
rational expectations models as developed by Muth (1961). Further 
discussion, including extensions and generalizations, can be found in 
Taylor (1977,1984), Aoki and Canzoneri (1979), Peel (1981), Hinford 
and Peel (1983b) and Whiteman (1983). 
C. 1 General Solution 
Time is measured discretely with initial time, t0, given. Then 
consider the dynamic system 
+ 
r, 
E1Ae+ Bu 
kr0 
AA-k 
r-r 40 rA+r, 
t+r-a ý--t 
S-s 
0 >o 
where nxl vector of endogenous variables 
mxl vector of stochastic disturbances 
and all variables are measured as deviations from long-run equilib- 
rium. In addition, Ak (k - 0, I) and A rs 
(r -r0 1ý O'... 'r I 
s-s 0"... Ps I) are nxn 
time-invariant matrices of coefficients and 
B is an nxm time-invariant matrix of coefficients. Finally, 0 is the 
nxl null vector. 
Equation (C. 1.1) is entirely general. In particular, any dynamic 
system with a finite number of lags can be reduced to a first-order 
difference equation by suitable redefinition of variables and 
appropriate enlargement of the state vector. Hence, autoregressive 
processes for stochastic disturbances are incorporated into the state 
vector so that u is purely white noise. Clearly, the n-dimensional 
column state vector, y., Is a point In the Euclidean n-sPaCe- 
, 424 
Horeover, the absence of restrictions on expectations terms permits 
systems in which expectations differ according to both the date of 
viewpoint and the date of formation. 
The information set is defined as 
nt+r-s ý (yt: +r_j, E, Elj iý s; r-r01.6.0,..., rl; s -s), o,,,,, s ) 
(C. 1.2) 
where r is a vector of structural parameters and r summarizes the 
variance-covariance structure of stochastic disturbances. Then 
e 
is given by Y-t+r, t+r-s 
E( ), r-r !j0,.,,, ri 9ý so Y-t+r, t+r-s Y-t+rlnt+r-s 0 
(C. 1.3) 
where E(-) is the mathematical conditional expectations operator. 
The solution proceeds by positing a solution 
(10 
1: 0u k-0, I 
-vt -k '" i-O 
i-; --t-k-i 
so that 
r-r$0,..., r ;a-a> ooo. so Y-t4. r, t4-r-s -ý 
Ol!! 
t4-r-i' 
ims 
(C. 1.5) 
where 0 (i 4 0) are nxm time-invariant matrices of coefficients to 
be determined. Substituting equations (C. 1.4) - (C. 1.5) into 
equation (C. 1.1), 
w 00 
AE0u+ By 
k 
1: 
0 
Ak( 
i 
1: 
0 
440t-k-i) + 
r-r 0 
00 rs i-s V--t+r-i ý--t 
S-s > 0 
( C. 16 ) 
425 
Then the coefficients on each 2t+i (j 4 0) are equated. The assump- 
tion that the system possesses a unique convergent rational expecta- 
tions solution imposes restrictions on the 01 (1 4 0) coefficients 
such that each 01 (1 >, 0) coefficients such that each 40 1 (1 Jý 0) is 
uniquely determined. Then the solution for yt follows from equation 
(C. 1.4. ). 
C. 2 Particular Solution ri System_3.3(A) 
The particular analogue to equation (C. 1.1) is equation (3.3.1) 
such that k-0, and rs - 01,12. 
A 01 - 
(13-ac)' A. 
2 - -0 and B-1. 
in addition, A0- (Ab + cc), 
Setting -6 - jA in equations 
(C. 1.5), equation (3.3.2) obtains and the particular 
analogue to equation (C. 1.6) is 
cc cc 00 
0- (MA-ac) 1: ;Li ut_i + (j3--ac) LAi ut_i-13 rA1u t-i+l 
+ut 
1-0 1-1 i=2 
(C. 2.1) 
from which the identities (3.3.3) - (3.3.4) follow. 
C. 3 Particular Solution Il i System 3.3(B) 
The particular analogue to equation (C. 1.1) is equation (3.3.29) 
such that k-0 and rs - 01,12. In addition, A0- ((a 1 +a 4 
)(I+fqy 1 
)+ 
. Eq) , AO: L - 
(a, (I+fgy, )+i3) ' A12 ý -((cYx2+a, )('l+fgyl)+'3) and B-1, 
Setting 0-8 in equations (C. 1.4) - (C. 1.5), equation (3.3.20) 
obtains with the particular analogue to equation (C. 1.6) being 
m (0 
f9 ) r_ 81v (a 
3 (i+fgy 1 
)4-0) E81v t-i 10 iml 
m 
- «a 1a2 
+a 3)('+fqyl) + ß) F. aiv t-i+l + vt (C. 3.1 iM2 
from which the identities (3.3.21) - (3.3.22) follow. 
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C. 4 Particular Solution rrr i System 3.3(C) 
Equation (3.3.38) is the particular analogue to equation 
with k-0 and rs - 01,11. Also, A0- (P(I+b) + ac), AO --ac, 
A,., - -13 and B-1. Setting 0 in equations (C. 1.4) (C. 1.5), 
equation (3.3.39) is obtained and the particular analogue to equation 
is 
Co 00 (» 
(ß(l+b) + ac) r- Ziu t-i -aE ti u t-i -ßEtiu t-i+l +ut i-o iml iml 
and the identities (3.3.40) - (3.3.41) follow. 
C. 5 Particular Solution rV i System 3.3(D) 
The pax-ticular analogue to equation (C. 1.1) is equation (3.3.51) 
such that k-0 and rs = 01,02,12. In addition, AO - (pb+c), 
A01 = (j3_12C)' A02 - -Iic, A 12 - -j3 and 
B- . 1. With ow* 
in equations 
(C. 1.5), equation (3.3.52) obtains and the particular 
analogue to equation (C. 1.6) is 
Co Co Co 
(ßb+c) r. %kiut-i + (ß-lac) Z Wi u t-i - 
lec r. %k iu t-i i-o 1-2 
%p iu t-i+l +ut (C. 5.1) 1-2 
from which the identities (3.3.53) - (3-3.55) follow. 
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APPENDIX D 
STABILM AND SADDLEPOWT STABrL]: TY ANALYSrS 
BY MEANS OF TEST FUNCTIONS 
The appendix sets out the procedure developed by Routh (1905) and 
Frazer, Duncan and Collar (1938) for determining the conditions for 
the dynamic stability of a system by determining the number of 
unstable roots. For continuous time systems, this is equivalent to 
calculating the number of eigenvalues with positive real part; the 
discrete time analogue is the number of eigenvalues which lie outside 
the unit circle. The scheme proceeds by computing the test functions 
of the characteristic equation of the system. 
D. 1 General Solution Ii Continuous Time 
Consider the nth-order polynomial 
n-i 
m C, 0 Tn+a1 Ir 
n-1 +.. 464+ a n-1 r+an an 
0 cxo > 
(D. 1.1) 
where a (i-O,..., n) are time-invariant coefficients. Then define 
the test determinants, Di (i-O'... 'n), associated with this polynomial 
such that 
Do -it ao * D., D2 - 
cc I 'o 
Ia3a 
21 
a00 
D 13 cx cl a ;. 0... 63 2 1 3 
a cl a 3 4 5 
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01 -ý 
a3 
a 21-1 
a00.0060 
cl 
2a1C, 0 00 40660 00 
a 21-2* 6.4.. et ... 0040 
)00.000; 
n 
a3 
2n-1 
a 0. * ......... 0.. * 0 0 6009998666*900*0 
a a IX 0000000 * **6060 2 1 O 0 00 
a a a a 111 4 3 2 1 0 
a *0 2n-2 
(D. 1.2) 
In addition, define also the test functions, FI (i-O,..., n), asso- 
ciated with the polynomial in equation (D. 1.1) such that 
-2 F0-D0; F:, =DI; P2=D: L D2 
P3 1= D -1 D ;. $* ... ;F D-1 Dr" D-1 D (D, 1.3) 23 1-3. n n-I n 
Then Routh (1905) and Frazer, Duncan and Collar (1938) show that the 
number of eigenvalues with positive real part equals the number of 
sign changes in the sequence of test functions, F, (1-0 ...... n). 
D. 2 General Solution 11 1 Discrete Time 
Consider the nth-order polynomial 
n n-i 
i-o 
ýa0 -r 
n+a1 Ir 
n-1 +.... + a n-1 r+ (x nm0 
(D. 2.1) 
where aj (1-0 ...... n) are 
time-invariant COefficients. To examine 
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the stability of discrete time systems, equation (D. 2.1) must be 
suitably transformed. Thus, let 
(D. 2.2) 
T+ 
Then g(jL) is the nth-order polynomial 
g(A) 
- ;L 
-n n n-i 1: .i( i+; L 
1-0 
jm Ca(, +, L)n +a 1( i+; L), 
l (l-, u) +.... 
n-1 
( +ýL )(_, )n-1 +an(, _, L)n3 . 0. (D. 2.3 
Clearly, the mapping r -* I. L maps the unit circle to the negative real 
plane. Hence, the unstable discrete roots of f(r) correspond to the 
unstable continuous roots of g(g). It is assumed that gol, thereby 
excluding the possibility of a pole (discontinuity of g(IA)) at A-1. 
The roots of g(ju) are the roots of the expression in [#I in 
equation (D. 2.3). Then 
n n-i g(A) E a, (l+A) ('-A) 
a( 1+)A )n+a 1(1+g) 
n-1 ('-A) n-1 + (, _, )n 
n 
1: . n-2. 
1-0 
, iA 
"80An+8 1A 
n-I +.... + 8 
n-I A+8n-0 (D. 2.4) 
ni 
and equation (0.2.4) is llere, 80 =ir0 (-l) a 3. and 
Sn 
0 
an' 
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re-written as 
n n-i 
iE0AiA 
= 00 
n+ J3 1A 
n-1 +. .. .+ 13 n-1 A+ 
J3 
n -0 
J30 ý 
(D. 2.5) 
Now define the test determinants, Di (i-O'..., n), associated with 
the polynomial in equation (D. 2.5) such that 
Do w J30 D., - 13, D0 2 
'13 3' 21 
I J3.1 J30 01 
D3 J33 02 13 1 
05 13 4 J3 3 
ID. 
D= 
n 
ß1,, ßo 0 
..... 04.000.4.0 
0 
ß3 ß2 ýß 1 
00 ... 400 0 
ß 21-1 
ß21-2 » ........ 4 ... $. **.. 0 
ß, ßo 0 ............. 
ß3 ß2 ß10..... 
ß ß ß ß ß 4 3 2 1 
ß2n-1 ß2n-2 *****» .... 
(0.2.6) 
In addition, define also the test functions, Pi (i-O#**. *n), v asso- 
ciated with the polynomial in equation (D. 2.5) such that 
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-1 D PO I' DO 1 3El m DI 1 IP2 w D71 2 
D-ID ; ...... Fi mDDF D-1 D. (D. 2.7) 231n n-I n 
Routh (2905) and Frazer, Duncan and Collar (1938) now show that the 
number of eigenvalues which lie outside the unit circle equals the 
number of sign changes in the sequence of test functions, Fi 
(i, .. . n). 
D. 3 Particular Solution I : _System 
2.4(B) 
The particular analogue to equation (D. 2.3. ) is equation (2.4.29) 
with ao - 1; (xl "- -(2-*1'*+8 2)1 a2 ý(8 2-"2-"1) so 
that: i-0,1,2 and 
n-2. Then the particular analogue to equation (D. 2.4) gives 
80 = (ao-al+a2); 8.1 - 2(a 0 -a 2 
); 82 ý (a 0+'al+a2 
). Dividing through 
by 80 gives the particular analogue to equation (D. 2.5) with J3 0=J; 
J31 w (aO'. al+(x2 )-"2( aO"a2)1 '02 '0 (ao-al 4.02)-I(cl O+al4'a2 
). The full 
expressions for 3, and j3 2 are respectively 
2( 2-A 1+4b A001 +0 2 
(1-., 0 3)) 
2m 
-x(, o 1 44b 2 
(1+(o 
3) 
(D. 3.2 
2(2-X)(14-0 lyl) - 
A(01+'b2( 1-03 
and the particular test determinants in equation (D. 2.6) are 
D0D, - ß, C)2 ý ßlß2 
The particular test functions in equation (D. 2.7) are therefore 
F0-1; F, m jai ;F2mß2 (D. 3.4) 
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which gives the saddlepath stability condition in equation (2.4.30) 
with 01 and j3 2 
defined as in equations (D. 3.1) - (D. 3.2). 
DA Particular Solution 11 : System 3.3(E) 
The particular analogue to equation (D. 1.1) is equation (3.3.61) 
20; 
CX3 M -, \PbG 
20 
so that i-0,1,2,3 with ao a. w AC; ýx2 = APGI 212 
and n-3. Then the particular test determinants in equation (D. 1.2) 
are 
D0-1; D, m (X 1; D2ýa1 cx 2-a 0a3 3 
D3 ý CC3 ('21cX2 -a 0413) 
(D. 4.1) 
The particular test functions in equation (D. I. 3) are therefore 
-1 ro -I; P., - a. F2=a2- CS, izoa 3 F3 ý a. 
(D. 4.2) 
which gives the saddlepath stability condition in equation (3.3.62). 
D. 5 Particular Solution III i-System 3.3(F) 
The particular analogue to equation (D. 1.1) is equation (3.3.83) 
with Cc =1; al = -( n -' G)); a" -XEJ32 (by -nI) +n 02\( C-J31 212( C-010 
e(13, b + J32 a3m -AGb(O 2+n2 13 1) so that 
i-0,1,2,3 and n-3. 
Then the particular test determinants in equation (D. I. 2) are 
D0-1; 0, im (X 1; D2 'm a1a2-a0a3jD3m a3 ('31'a2 - (X A)* 
(D. 51. ) 
The particular test functions in, equation (D. I. 3) are therefore 
-1 Fo -II-a., F2ýa2-a, aoa3 F3 wa3 (D. 5.2) 
which gives the saddlepath stability condition in equation (3.3.84). 
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D. 6 Particular Solution ry i System 5.3 
The particular analogue to equation (D. 2.1) is equation (5.3.7) 
with ao - 1; a., - -(2+n-, \); a2ý(, I+n-, \(I+y-')) so that i-0,2,2 and 
n-2. Then the particular analogue to equation (D. 2.4) gives 
80- (a 0 -a I +a 2 ); 82- 2(a 0 --a 2 ); 82 '0 (a0 +a +a2 ). Dividing through 
by 80 gives the particular analogue to equation (D. 2.5) with 
J30 " 1; Ol m (a6-a, +a2 )-12(a o-a2); j3 2m 
(aO7al4'IX2)-l( a 6+cl, 4'4x2 
The full expressions for 01 and j3 2 are respectively 
ßl . 
2(A(I+y-1)-n) (D. 6.1) 
-1 2(2+n-X)-Äy 
02m (D. 6.2) 
and the particular test determinants in equation (D. 2.6) are 
D0-1; D, m01; D2ý J3 1 J3 26 
(D. 6.3 ) 
The particular test functions in equation (D. 2.7) are therefore 
F0-1; F, an ß1; F2mß2 (D. 6.4) 
which gives the saddlepath stability condition in equation (5.3.9) 
with 01 and 02 defined as in equations (D. 6.1) - 
D. 7 Particular Solution V: System 6.2 
The particular analogue to equation (D. 2.2) is equation (6.2.7) 
with a0=1; a, = -(2+n-, \); a2 - (I+n-X(I+b)) so that i-0,1,2 and 
n-2. Then the particular analogue to equation (D. 2.4) gives 
80 = ((10-. al+a2); 8.1 - 2(ao--a2); 82 (1 O+al +a 2)- Dividing through 
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by a0 gives the particular analogue to equation (D. 2. s) with 
J3 0"1; j3I = 
((X 
Cr"cxl+a2 
)-12( ad-'Y; J32 = (ad'a, +Y-l ((X 0 4-a 1 
+a 2)* 
The full expressions for 01 and 13 2 are respectively 
ß, m 
2(, \(14-b)-n) (D. 7.1) 
2(2+n-Ä)-Äb 
13 211m 
-Ab (D. 7.2) 
2(2+n-, \)-Xb 
and the particular test determinants in equation (D. 2.6) are 
D0D2 J3 1A2 
(D. 7,3) 
The paxticular test functions in equation (D. 2.7) are therefore 
,F0m1, jF, mß1; F2 ffl' ß2 
(D. 7,4) 
which gives the saddlepath stability condition in equation (6.2.9) 
with j3 1 and, 
O 
2 
defined as in equations (D. 7.1) - (D,. 7.2)* ., 
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APPENDrX E 
ASYMP7WrC VARrANCE--COVARIANCE MATRIX FOR 
LINEAR SrNULTANEOUS STOCHASTIC DIFFERENTIAL 
EQUATION SYSTEKS 
The appendix gives the procedure for deriving the asymptotic 
variance-covariance matrix of the state vector in a system of linear 
stochastic differential equations as developed by Chow (1979). 
E. 3. General Solution 
Consider the stochastic differential equation system 
dy(t) - Ay(t)dt + ! Lu(t) (E. 1.1) 
where X- nxl vector of predetermined variables 
du - nxl vector of stochastic disturbances 
and A is an nxn time-invariant matrix of coefficients. Note that 
consists solely of predetermined variables. In rational 
expectations models where the initial state vector includes non- 
predetermined variables, this must be reduced to a final state 
vector comprising only predetermined variables. Appendix B gives 
the procedure for this. In addition, note that the nxi distur- 
bance vector is given by du(t) - edt where edt is an nxi vector of 
stochastic disturbances with independent increments so that du(t) is 
white noise. Any autoregreiksive disturbances are therefore incorpor- 
ated by suitable expansion of the state vector. Clearly, the 
n-dimension column state vector, y(t), is a point in the n-dimensional 
Euclidean space, E 
n. 
Now define 
i 
as the nxn variance-covariance matrix of the nxi 
state vector, and Edt as the nxn variance-covariance matrix of 
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the nxi disturbance vector, du(t). Also, recall the definition of 
!! X( t) as 
dv(t) - yr(t+dt) - y(t). 
Then 
EX(t)y(t) 
(t+dt)x i(t+dt) - Ey 
'r(t+dt) 
(E. 1.2) 
(E. 1.3) 
1.4) 
where E(*) is the expectations operator. it therefore follows that 
di - 
i(t+dt) 
- 
i(t) 
Ey(t+dt). y 
T (t+dt) - Ey(t). y 
T (t) 
T 
EIX(t) + dx(t)][X(t) + dx(t)] 
7 
T(t) +d t)ýjj t) im Ey(t -(t)y- 
E2Y. ( )12Z(t) + Eýd 
4.4u(t) 
T+ E[AX(t)dt + ! lu(t)]y Ey(t)[Ay : (t)dt 
T 
4- ECAy(t)dt + S! X(t)][Ay(t)dt + S! u(t)] 
TT 
Since y(t) and ! Lu(t) are independent, Ey(t)ju (t) w EýLu(t)y 0 
so that equation (E. 1.5) becomes 
d; . t) 
TT EAY(t) T( T (t)A dt + 
_(t)! 
ftu (t)dt Ey. ( Y t)dt + Edu 
" r(t)ATdt + lki(t)dt + r(t)dt. (E. 1,6) 
Then, dividing through, by dt, . 
dr aT + 
Cr +r 
dt 
4S7 
(E. 17) 
so that setting dr/dt -0 gives the asymptotic variance-covariance 
matrix of y(t), E, as 
r AT + Ar + 1: - 0. 
00 
(E. 1.8) 
Note that since both 1: 0 and 
1: are nxn symmetric matrices, equation 
(E. 1.8) provides 'zn(n+1) independent simultaneous equations which can 
be solved for the lan(n+l) independent elements, of r0 in terms of the 
parameters of A and E. 
E. 2 Particular Solution Ii System 2.3(E) 
The particular analogue to equation (E. 1.1) is equation (3.3.67) 
with A the 2x2 matrix S. Then the particular analogue to equation 
(B. I. 8), is equation (3.3.60) such that 
a2a. ssssa2aa20 y yp 11 21 11 12 y yp 1 
++0 
aa2ssssaa20a2 py p 12 22 21 221 py p2 
(E. 2,1) 
This gives the three independent simultaneous equations in a2, a2 and yp 
0 
yp 
2S a2+ 2s cr -a 
2 (E. 2.2 
11 y 12 yp I 
2S 22 cr 
2+ 2S cr = -a 
2 
(E. 2.3) 
p 21 yp 2 
s 21 a2+s 12 a2+ 
(S 
11 +s 22 
)a as 0 (E. 2.4) 
yp yp 
which can be written in matrix form as in equation (3.3.70). 
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E. 3 ýParticular Solution ri : System_3.3(F) 
The particular analogue to equation (E. 1.1) is equation (3.3.85) 
with A the 3x3 matrix, L. Then the particular analogue to equation 
(E. 1.8) is equation (3.3.86) such that 
a2 a a y yp YV 
a a2 a py p PV 12 
a a a2 1' 1 VY VP v 13 
2 
a 0 0 
2 
a 0 2 
2 0 a 3 
12 13 
00 
0 -P 
wo. 
2 
aa a y yp YV 
2 
a a a py p pv 
2 
aaa VY VP V 
(E. 3.1. ) 
222- 
This gives six independent simultaneous equations in ay, ap, av, a yp 
a YV and a PV , 
21 a2+ 21 a+ 21 a -a 
2 (E, 3.2) 
11 y 12 yp 13 yv 1 
ga 241a+1a2+1a0 (E. 3.3) 
y1 11 12 13 f yp p VP 
2 
ill-p)a 
YV 
+1 12 cr VP 
+1 13 cr v. 
0 (E, 3.4) 
29a --a 
2 (E. 3.5) 
yp 2 
-pa PV 
+ Ga 
YV 
0 (E. 3.6) 
-2 
2 (E. 3.7) Pav 
I 
09 
From equations (E. 3-5) - (E. 3.7)0, 
-1 2 
yp 
20 cr 2 (E. 3.8 ) 
ty PV -p 
-1 Oa 
YV 
a2. lap-1 a2 v3 
(E. 3.9) 
(E. 3.10) 
so that substituting equations (E. 3.8) - (E. 3.10) into equations 
(E. 3.2) - (E. 3.4), 
21 a2-1 G-la + 21 am -a 
2 
11 y 12 2 13 yv 1 
ea 
2_ Itl 071a 2 +1 a2+1 p7lea .0 y 11 2 12 p 13 YV 
p+1 P-1 9)(7 + Ill P-1 a20 (E. 3.13 12 YV 13 3 
Finally, multiplying through equation (E. 3.13) by pG_l and rear- 
ranging, 
21 a2+ 21 a- -a 
2+1 e-la2 (E. 3.14) 11 y 13 yv 1 12 2 
ea 2+1a2+1 P-1 9a - 121 0-1 a2 y 12 p 13 YV 11 2 
+ 112 )a 
YV 
tal G-la 
2 
(E. 3.16) 13 3 
or 
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21 0 21 a2 --ly 
2+I 
e7la 2' 13 y1 12 2 
1 P-1 Ga2 ill 07la2 (E. 3.17) 12 13 p 11 2 
00 (l -1+112 a yvi -al 
G71a 2 
ll-P)P'6 13 3 
Applying Cramer's Rule to equation (E. 3.27) then gives the expressions 
for a2 and a2 in equations (3.3.88) - (3.3.89) respectively. yp 
4,41 
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